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Summary and main conclusions
This communication draws the main policy messages
from the ‘Public finances in EMU — 2005’ report pre-
pared by the Commission services (1). The report has
been published yearly since 2000. It presents an over-
view of recent budgetary developments in the European
Union, tracks the evolution in EU fiscal surveillance,
and carries out analysis on fiscal policy issues of rele-
vance for the EU-wide policy debate.
Large budgetary imbalances persist 
in some countries …
After deteriorating for three consecutive years, reflecting
to a large extent the economic slowdown, the euro-area
general government deficit improved marginally in 2004
(from 2.8 % of GDP in 2003 to 2.7 % in 2004). The def-
icit of the EU-25 aggregate also fell (from 2.9 % to 2.6 %
of GDP), largely as a consequence of the considerable
improvement in deficits in a number of recently acceded
Member States. According to the spring 2005 Commis-
sion forecasts, the euro-area and EU deficits will remain
roughly stable in 2005 and 2006, based on the assump-
tion of unchanged policy. Conversely, debt ratios are
projected to grow both for the euro-area and the EU
aggregate, reaching, respectively, 71.9 and 64.2 % of
GDP in 2006. Aggregate deficit figures mask notewor-
thy differences between countries. In 2004, six EU coun-
tries, including three euro-area countries, exhibited
budgetary positions in balance or in surplus. In contrast,
in four euro-area Member States (Germany, Greece,
France and Italy) and seven non-euro-area countries (the
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and the UK), deficits were above the 3 % of
GDP reference value. While the deficit is projected to be
reduced in 2005 or 2006 in a number of countries that are
currently subject to the excessive deficit procedure
(Germany, France, Cyprus and Malta), Italy and Portu-
gal are expected to have deficits above the 3 % of GDP
ceiling in 2005 on the basis of their current policies.
… and further action under the excessive 
deficit procedures has been necessary
Since the summer of 2004, 10 EU countries have been
subject to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). In
December 2004, the Commission and the Council clari-
fied their position regarding the EDP for Germany and
France, following the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ruling of July 2004. Since both countries
had taken measures which could plausibly result in the
excessive deficit being corrected in 2005, it was decided
that at that stage no further action under the EDP was
necessary. In the case of the EDP for the Netherlands, the
Council concluded in October 2004 that effective action
was being taken by the Dutch government. Following
the March 2005 fiscal notifications indicating that the
deficit of the Netherlands had fallen to 2.5 % of GDP in
2004, the Commission proposed on 18 May 2005 to
abrogate the decision on the existence of the excessive
deficit. In the case of the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hun-
gary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia, after their accession to
the EU, the Council decided that an excessive deficit
existed in each of them, and, consequently, decided to
issue recommendations under Article 104(7) of the EC
Treaty. A further recommendation under the same article
of the Treaty was addressed in February 2005 to
Hungary which, unlike the other five new Member
States, had failed to take effective action in response to
the first recommendation.
For the first time, in February 2005, the Council decided
to issue a notice under Article 104(9), the last step before
sanctions. This notice was addressed to Greece and
contained a deadline for correcting the excessive deficit
postponed by one year, i.e. until 2006, as a result of sub-
stantial revisions in deficit figures. At the occasion of the
fiscal notifications of September 2004 and March 2005,
the fiscal data of Greece underwent a revision of unprec-
¥1∂ The summary and main conclusions of this report have been adopted by
the College of Commissioners in the form of a communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2005) 231
final, adopted on 1 June 2005. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
economy_finance/publications/publicfinance_en.htm.11
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1997 were revised upwards and the 2003 and 2004 defi-
cits jumped, respectively, to 5.2 and 6.1 % of GDP.
The exceptionally large revision in the Greek govern-
ment accounts came at a time when increasing emphasis
was being put on improving statistical governance in the
budgetary field. The Council called on the Commission
to improve the monitoring of the quality of reported
fiscal data and to make proposals designed to strengthen
EU statistical governance. In its December 2004 com-
munication ‘Towards a European governance strategy
for fiscal statistics’, the Commission outlined three lines
of action to this end: (i) building up the legislative frame-
work; (ii) developing the operational capacity of the
Commission; (iii) defining European standards on the
independence of statistical institutes. The Commission
also took initiatives for the implementation of these lines
of action. On 2 March 2005, it adopted a proposal for the
amendment of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93,
which governs the reporting of fiscal data, with the
purpose of improving the quality of statistical data used
in the EDP. Moreover, the Commission adopted on
25 May 2005 a communication including a recommen-
dation to Member States on EU-wide standards on statis-
tical institutes including principles on, inter alia, profes-
sional independence, confidentiality, reliability and
timeliness of data, and adequacy of resources of statisti-
cal institutes.
A good fiscal framework, but which needed 
to be improved: the 2005 Stability 
and Growth Pact reform
The EU fiscal framework has delivered over the last dec-
ade important achievements, with the very high deficits
at the beginning of the 1990s brought under control, and
comfortable surpluses attained by a number of Member
States. However, over time, the need emerged for recon-
sidering some of its elements in order to strengthen its
effectiveness.
The review process leading to the 2005 Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) reform was launched by the
Commission with its communication ‘Strengthening
economic governance and clarifying the implementation
of the Stability and Growth Pact’ (1). In response to the
Commission communication, the Eurogroup, the Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council and the
Commission engaged in several rounds of intense dis-
cussions in order to reach consensus, discussions which
benefited from technical input from the Commission and
Member States. The negotiations revealed differing
views among Member States on how much room for dis-
cretion was necessary to properly take account of eco-
nomic developments in the assessment of budgetary per-
formance. The need for some margin for judgment was
weighed against the objectives of preserving simple,
transparent rules and ensuring equal treatment.
At the extraordinary Ecofin meeting of 20 March 2005,
the Council adopted the report ‘Improving the imple-
mentation of the Stability and Growth Pact’ with a view
to improving the EU fiscal framework. The report, sub-
sequently endorsed by the European Council of 22 and
23 March 2005, updates and complements the existing
legal framework of the SGP. The agreement encapsu-
lated in the Ecofin report entails changes to both the pre-
ventive and corrective arms of the Pact and contains rec-
ommendations for improving fiscal and statistical
governance at both the EU and the national levels.
The preventive arm of the Pact has been strengthened by
ensuring that due attention is given to the fundamentals
of fiscal sustainability when setting medium-term budg-
etary objectives. It is further underpinned by the Member
States’ commitment to actively consolidating public
finances when they are experiencing favourable eco-
nomic conditions and the possibility for the Commission
to act by directly addressing policy advice to a Member
State if it fails to do so. The new agreement also includes
incentives for Member States to carry out structural
reforms, with a view to making the fiscal framework
more consistent with the renewed Lisbon strategy (2). In
particular, the implications of major structural reforms
that have a verifiable positive impact on fiscal sustaina-
bility over the long term will be taken into account in the
assessment of budgetary policies.
The main modifications to the corrective arm of the Pact
concern the definition of ‘excessive deficits’ and the
modalities for their correction, which now permit a more
comprehensive economic assessment of budgetary
developments in the implementation of the EDP. In par-
ticular, the new rules allow the one-year deadline for the
correction of an excessive deficit to be extended by an
¥1∂ COM(2004) 581, 3.9.2004.
¥2∂ Commission communication to the European Council ‘Working together
for growth and jobs — A new start for the Lisbon strategy’ (COM(2005)
24, 2.2.2005).12
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in the EDP to be repeated (if unexpected adverse eco-
nomic events occur and provided that effective action
has been taken by the Member State concerned in full
compliance with recommendations). The new agreement
specifies a set of ‘relevant factors’ that the Commission
and the Council can take into account when taking deci-
sions on the EDP. These factors include, inter alia,
developments in potential growth and prevailing cyclical
conditions, but also considerations with respect to debt
sustainability and the implementation of policies geared
towards meeting the objectives of the Lisbon agenda.
Budgetary discipline and the prompt correction of exces-
sive deficits are ensured. Countries with deficits above
3 % of GDP that are not close to the reference value or
that are not temporary would be considered to be in an
excessive deficit position. Furthermore, Member States
in EDP are requested to undertake a minimum fiscal
effort. Finally, when assessing whether the excessive
deficit has been corrected, the Council shall carefully
consider an excess of the reference value which reflects
the implementation of pension reforms implying a man-
datory partial or total shift from pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
to funding.
In order to fully restore the Pact’s credibility and
strengthen the enforcement of budgetary discipline,
the Ecofin report contains complementary elements to
improve fiscal governance. First, with a view to
strengthening peer support, the Council and the
Commission should commit to publicly explaining
their positions at the relevant stages of EU fiscal sur-
veillance. Second, it is suggested that national-level
rules and institutions could play a more prominent
role in domestic budgetary surveillance, thereby
underpinning and complementing the surveillance
procedures at the EU level. Third, with due respect to
the national prerogative in this area, the report calls
for a greater involvement of national parliaments in
the EU fiscal surveillance process, including by dis-
cussing stability and convergence programmes or
action taken in response to EDP recommendations.
Finally, the agreement underpins the work under way
towards strengthening the governance of fiscal statis-
tics.
The European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005 invited
the Commission to put forward legislative proposals to
adapt the existing regulations in line with the new agree-
ment. On 20 April, the Commission adopted proposals
for amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and
(EC) No 1467/97 (1). These proposals need to be adopted
by the Council after due involvement of the European
Parliament and the European Central Bank (2).
Overall, the way ahead with the implementation of the
SGP reform will be characterised by more room for
economic judgment in the fiscal surveillance procedure
and in the assessment of individual country cases. This
allows for a more constructive and transparent policy
dialogue between the Commission and the Council and
among Member States and will help to restore a sense of
national ownership of the rules. The agreement will be
tested in the months and years ahead. The greater room
for judgment stresses the importance of ensuring both
equal treatment and effective enforcement in the imple-
mentation of the new system, thereby putting a greater
responsibility on both the Commission as it assesses
budgetary developments and the Council as it decides on
what steps to take in the surveillance procedure.
Developments in EU budgetary surveillance
The ‘Public finances in EMU’ report regularly provides
analytical work aimed at improving the understanding of
public finance issues in the EU and upgrading budgetary
surveillance. This year, the report presents, among other
topics, analysis on the discrepancy between budgetary
plans presented in stability and convergence programmes
and results, on the determinants of debt dynamics, and on
the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Achieving effective budgetary planning 
and its surveillance
The process of fiscal surveillance has provided a wealth of
data on budgetary plans, outcomes and assessments,
which have been used with a view to comparing actual
budgetary developments relative to plans and to evaluate
how the Commission’s assessment of stability and con-
vergence programmes has evolved over the years. On the
first aspect, the data show that slippages between budget-
ary plans and outcomes have been frequent and sizeable in
some years, even controlling for growth surprises. Such
slippages seem mainly associated with differences
between planned and realised expenditure/GDP ratios,
discrepancies in revenue ratios having played a minor
role. Such analysis highlights the importance of finding
¥1∂ COM(2005) 154 and COM(2005) 155, 20.4.2005.
¥2∂ The Treaty foresees the cooperation procedure for Council Regulation
(EC) No 1466/97 and the consultation procedure for Council Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97.13
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iture patterns in a manner which increases their quality —
also to better match the new Lisbon priorities — and
ensures their sustainability. The Commission has
responded to the discrepancy between budgetary plans
and outcomes by increasingly focusing its assessment on
the credibility of the adjustment path described in the sta-
bility and convergence programmes, and by assessing
Member States’ fiscal policies more comprehensively
over time, thereby also taking into greater account aspects
relating to the sustainability and quality of public finances.
Understanding the determinants of debt dynamics
In EU fiscal surveillance, increased focus is put on debt
developments. The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio
depend on the realised budget balance, nominal growth,
and the so-called ‘stock-flow adjustment’, capturing the
residual discrepancy between the change in the outstand-
ing debt stock and the general government deficit, as
defined in the protocol to the Maastricht Treaty. The
usual analysis focuses on deficits and nominal growth,
while much less attention has been given to the stock-
flow adjustment. However, this component conveys rel-
evant information about the evolution of government
assets and liabilities (e.g. as a result of privatisation oper-
ations) and the discrepancy between cash and accrual
deficits. The ‘Public finances in EMU’ report aims to fill
this gap by analysing the determinants of the stock-flow
adjustment for EU Member States. It shows that the
stock-flow adjustment in past years has, on average,
been positive (consequently adding to the build-up of
debt) and that in some countries the stock-flow adjust-
ment is partly associated with cash deficits being
systematically higher than ‘Maastricht deficits’. This
evidence further supports the importance of paying
attention to debt dynamics in budgetary surveillance.
Increasing focus on the long-term sustainability 
of public finances
The looming budgetary implications of ageing popula-
tions and the need to finance in a sustainable way the
European social model are broadening the focus of pub-
lic finance management and budgetary surveillance in
the EU to encompass considerations of long-term sus-
tainability. In line with the renewed Lisbon strategy and
the integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (1), many
countries have implemented important reforms with a
view to strengthening sustainability. The impact of such
reforms on sustainability, however, is not easily quanti-
fiable, nor easily comparable across countries.
At the EU level, sustainability analysis has been carried
out by the Commission services since 2001 in the con-
text of the assessment of the stability and convergence
programmes, on the basis of data provided therein and
estimates of age-related expenditures up to 2050. The
‘Public finances in EMU — 2005’ report indicates that,
without a medium-term budgetary consolidation, a sus-
tainable position will not be reached for most Member
States. Sustainability risks are identified in 10 Member
States (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece,
France, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia).
The report also describes the current Commission
approach to carrying out sustainability analysis, dis-
cusses the robustness of debt projections and sustainabil-
ity indicators with respect to the major assumptions
underlying the analysis, and outlines suggestions for
possible improvements.
In light of the 2005 SGP reform package, long-term con-
siderations will be given greater prominence in EU
budgetary surveillance. In this respect, increased infor-
mation exchange among Member States and with the
Commission on national age-related expenditure projec-
tions would increase transparency and lead to a better
assessment of the long-term sustainability of public
finances and of their implications for the setting of
medium-term objectives (2).
Structural reforms and budgetary objectives
The Commission’s mid-term review of the Lisbon strat-
egy and the integrated guidelines for growth and jobs
drew greater attention to economic reforms which
increase growth and employment through action at the
macro, micro and employment level. Part III of the ‘Public
finances in EMU — 2005’ report reviews and discusses
the link between the implementation of structural reforms
and budgets in implementing the EU framework for fiscal
policy, an under-researched issue that is expected to
become more relevant in EU budgetary surveillance.
Reforms can substantially improve government
accounts in the medium to long term. For example,
reforms directly aimed at containing the growth of cer-
¥1∂ COM(2005) 141, 12.4.2005.
¥2∂ The Commission will report by the end of 2006 on the progress achieved
on this front.14
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pension reforms or efficiency improvements in the
healthcare sector, allowing a more effective response to
ageing-related pressures) can have an impact on the
future path of government budgets and debt (1). Reforms
that improve potential output and growth (including, for
instance, labour and product market reforms) may also
have indirect positive effects. It is often claimed that
numerical rules to limit deficits may discourage struc-
tural reforms. A first reason for why there could be a
trade-off between reforms and budgetary objectives is
the presence of short-term direct budgetary costs of
reforms (e.g. pension reforms introducing a funded pillar
outside the government sector or public investment in
education and training which bring long-term benefits
that may more than compensate for the initial costs). A
second reason is related to the fact that reforms can be
costly to particular groups in society, so that tax cuts or
government transfers may be needed to overcome resist-
ance to their introduction.
The analysis contained in the ‘Public finances in EMU
— 2005’ report considers labour and product market and
pension reforms (without contemplating growth-enhan-
cing projects with upfront budgetary costs such as the
development of physical infrastructure, education and
training, and R & D) and focuses on two issues. First,
what impact do reforms have on budgets in the short
term? Second, is there evidence that fiscal consolida-
tions prevent reforms? In spite of limitations related to
the quality and availability of data on structural reforms,
the analysis provides interesting results. The expectation
that reforms are less frequent in years where a budgetary
consolidation takes place does not seem to be strongly
supported by the data. However, in the aftermath of
reforms there is in general a slight deterioration in
budget balances. Results differ depending on the type of
reforms considered and on how reforms are designed.
The analysis gives some indications that the reform of
the SGP has gone in the right direction, but also that cau-
tion is required on the way structural reforms are to be
considered in the implementation of the SGP. In light of
the high variance of results, a mechanistic, one-size-fits-
all approach where all reforms, or all reforms belonging
to some broad categories, are considered in the same way
should be avoided. This means that careful judgment is
needed on a case-by-case basis and considering the rele-
vant features of the specific reforms at stake.
The 2005 SGP reform package includes provisions
aimed at ensuring that the budgetary objectives of the
EU fiscal framework do not clash with structural reforms
that may contribute to sound public finances and
increased growth in the medium to long run. Applying
them along the lines above could support an efficient
contribution of public finances to a sustainable Lisbon
strategy.
Fiscal challenges during convergence in the recently 
acceded Member States
By acceding in 2004, 10 Member States have achieved
an important step in the process of integration into the
EU. Economic integration, however, is expected to con-
tinue through the catching-up of their income levels and
the prospective adoption of the euro as their currency.
Fiscal policy can make a key contribution to this process
of these countries through efficient and sustainable tax
and expenditure policies and by supporting a stable
development of the economy. Over the long run, these
two roles are complementary. Strong growth enhances
the economy’s financing capacity, while stability is cru-
cial for private investment and sustainable catching-up.
In the short run, however, some of the new Member
States may need to make choices: higher spending on
infrastructure, training or R & D can make it harder to
contain budget deficits, and tax and pension reforms
introducing funded pillars recorded outside the govern-
ment sector may also involve upfront budgetary costs.
Part IV of the ‘Public finances in EMU — 2005’ report
discusses the main challenges for the conduct of fiscal
policy which the new Member States may face in the
coming years.
The new Member States have certain advantages that
allow them to finance part of their needs: high potential
growth and, in some cases, low public debt. However,
they may continue to experience a degree of volatility in
their public finances, reflecting transformations under
way in the real economy and, for the Baltic region and
central Europe, in the financial sector. Moreover, the
stock of contingent liabilities is relatively high in many
recently acceded Member States, and this creates the risk
of sudden upward jumps in debt levels as factors trigger-
ing government payments related to explicit or implicit
guarantees materialise.
¥1∂ Efficiency gains are a key factor for a positive long-term impact of struc-
tural reforms on public finances. Improved public procurement practices
could contribute to the realisation of such gains.15
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tance of using periods of strong growth to achieve budg-
etary improvements and thus to ensure adequate head-
room to stabilise the economy during a downturn. This
lesson is of the highest relevance for the recently
acceded Member States. In light of the possible emer-
gence of credit and asset price booms in these countries,
it will be important that in setting targets for fiscal policy
there is no overestimation of potential growth and that
transitory elements are properly identified in assessing
the dynamics of tax revenues. In the run-up to euro adop-
tion, moreover, the credibility of budgetary plans and a
balanced policy-mix are particularly important. These
factors call for prudence in setting medium-term fiscal
goals. Meanwhile, in countries that retain national cur-
rencies for an extended period, care is needed concern-
ing the build-up of balance-sheet vulnerabilities associ-
ated with unhedged borrowing in foreign currencies.
While acknowledging the differences among them, there
is some scope for policy-makers in the new Member
States to achieve synergies in pursuing growth and sta-
bility objectives. First, there is room to restructure exist-
ing expenditure programmes and enhance tax bases in
ways that both strengthen their public finances and
improve the incentives for growth, possibly already in
the short term. Second, fiscal institutions could be
improved, including through enhanced transparency of
budgetary procedures and effective frameworks for
multiannual budgetary planning and expenditure con-
trol. Third, well-conceived supervisory policies would
improve risk management in the private sector, thereby
containing government contingent liabilities, and well-
designed monetary policies would steer market expecta-
tions towards stability.
Overall, the analysis carried out indicates that while the
framework for economic and budgetary surveillance in
economic and monetary union (EMU) has provided posi-
tive results — in terms of budgetary achievements and
reforms already undertaken by most Member States —
more needs to be done to deliver the expected results. The
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, in parallel with
the relaunch of the Lisbon strategy, has reinforced the cor-
respondence of the rules and governance processes with
the economic reality and needs of the European Union and
its Member States. The synergies between macroeco-
nomic stability and the creation of growth and employ-
ment through important reforms of the economy should
now be exploited. As in the case of the renewed Lisbon
strategy, the reformed Stability and Growth Pact will be
tested in the months and years ahead: the way the new
framework will be implemented from the start will be cru-
cial for its credibility and the overall success of the ambi-
tious approach which Europe has decided to embrace. All
Member States of the EU are strongly encouraged to pur-
sue this strategy by enhancing the quality and ensuring the
sustainability of their public finances.16
Part I
Current developments and prospects

Summary
After having deteriorated for three consecutive years, the
euro-area general government deficit improved margin-
ally in 2004 to 2.7 % of GDP, from 2.8 % of GDP in
2003. The nominal deficit of the EU fell from 2.9 % of
GDP in 2003 to 2.6 % of GDP in 2004. The larger
improvement in the EU deficit is due to a significant
reduction in deficits in a number of the recently acceded
Member States (EU-10). According to the spring 2005
forecasts of the Commission services, the euro-area and
EU deficits will remain roughly stable in 2005 and 2006,
based on the assumption of unchanged policy. Past and
projected developments in the EU and euro-area deficits
result from diverse budgetary performances across
Member States. In 2004, only three euro-area countries
and six EU countries had budgetary positions in balance
or in surplus, both in nominal and cyclically adjusted
terms. In contrast, in four euro-area Member States (Ger-
many, Greece, France and Italy) and seven non-euro-
area countries (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and the UK), deficits reached or
breached the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2004. The
deficit is projected to be reduced to or below 3 % of GDP
in 2005 in France, albeit temporarily, and in the UK and
Cyprus. The deficit would be brought below 3 % of GDP
in 2006 in Germany and Malta. After having kept their
deficit at or just below 3 % of GDP in 2004, Portugal and
Italy could breach the 3 % of GDP ceiling significantly
in 2005, on the basis of the current policies.
In cyclically adjusted terms, the euro-area deficit
remained unchanged in 2004, at 2.4 % of GDP. Across
the EU-15, the cyclically adjusted deficit was particu-
larly high in Germany, France, Greece, Italy and the UK.
It deteriorated significantly in Greece, Spain and Lux-
embourg. According to the latest Commission forecasts,
the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) in the euro area
and the EU-15 should improve by 0.3 percentage points
of GDP in 2005 and slightly worsen again in 2006,
despite the projected improvement in the macroeco-
nomic situation. Efforts to improve the underlying budg-
etary positions should be made as economic conditions
recover in order to ensure sufficient room for the auto-
matic stabilisers to operate when necessary.
One of the consequences of the lack of substantial
adjustment in the underlying fiscal position is that the
debt-to-GDP ratio continues to increase. After having
stood at 70.8 % in 2003 and 71.3 % in 2004, the euro-
area debt ratio is projected to reach 71.7 % in 2005 and
71.9 % in 2006. In the EU, the debt-to-GDP ratio would
increase from 63.8 % in 2004 to 64.2 % in 2006. The
debt ratio would remain particularly high in Belgium,
Greece and Italy (106.3 % of GDP). In the last, the debt
ratio would continue to increase over the projection
period. The debt ratio is also projected to increase over
the next two years from a relatively high level in Ger-
many, France, Portugal and Malta.
Budgetary developments in 2004 triggered further
actions by the Commission and the Council in the con-
text of the implementation of the SGP. Since summer
2004, 10 EU countries have been subject to the excessive
deficit procedure: four euro-area Member States and six
of the EU-10. For the first time, the Council decided to
issue a notice under Article 104(9) of the EC Treaty, the
last step before sanctions. This recommendation was
addressed to Greece, which has to correct its excessive
deficit in 2006. In December 2004, the Commission and,
subsequently, the Council clarified their position regard-
ing the excessive deficit procedure for Germany and
France, after the events of November 2003 and the ruling
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of
13 July 2004. Considering that these two countries had
taken measures that make plausible a correction of the
excessive deficit in 2005, the Commission decided that
no further actions were necessary in the context of the
excessive deficit procedure. Finally, the Commission
considered that the Netherlands had taken effective
action to correct its excessive deficit. Concerning non-
euro-area Member States, the Council decided on 5 July
2004 that an excessive deficit existed in the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia19
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country for its correction. Except for Hungary, the Com-
mission considered on 22 December 2004 that all coun-
tries had taken effective action in response to the Council
recommendation, in particular to respect the 2005 deficit
targets set in the May 2004 convergence programmes.
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that no further
steps were necessary for the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Malta, Poland and Slovakia under the excessive deficit
procedure. In March 2005, the Council addressed a new
recommendation to Hungary.
In the context of budgetary surveillance, the Commis-
sion also assessed the 2004 updates of the stability and
convergence programmes submitted by the 25 Member
States and proposed Council opinions on these docu-
ments. For the euro-area countries, macroeconomic and
budgetary projections included in the programmes are
consistent with an annual improvement in the CAB of
0.3 to 0.4 percentage points over the coming years. This
implies a tightening of the fiscal stance in the euro area
compared with the current situation. A close-to-balance
position in cyclically adjusted terms would then almost
be reached by 2008 (– 0.7 % of GDP). However, for sev-
eral Member States, the projected budgetary adjustment
would remain insufficient to ensure that a sufficient
safety margin to prevent a breach of the 3 % of GDP ref-
erence value would be reached over the time span cov-
ered by the programmes. In addition, the budgetary tar-
gets of some Member States are based on growth
assumptions and government expenditure projections
which appear to be overly optimistic. This is a source of
concern since the implementation record of the pro-
grammes has, in several cases, been characterised by a
repeated postponement of the achievement of the close-
to-balance or in surplus objective. Concerning the
medium-term plans of the recently acceded Member
States, the expected budgetary development in the pro-
jection period indicates a substantial consolidation of
public finances for all of them. By 2007, only the Czech
Republic foresees the general government deficit to be
still above the 3 % of GDP reference value. Large deficit
reductions are expected in countries with initially high
deficits, such as Cyprus, Malta, Poland and Hungary. All
the non-euro-area Member States are expected to
improve their CABs by the end of the programme
period, except for Estonia and Sweden, where they are
projected to be broadly unchanged at a sound level.
The increased focus on long-term sustainability in the
EU has resulted in reforms in several countries, leading
to some further improvement to cope with the budgetary
impact of ageing populations. Several countries, includ-
ing the larger ones, have implemented reforms with a
view to strengthening sustainability; for example, Ger-
many and Italy have reformed their pension systems and
France has reformed its healthcare system. The EU-10
have been fully included in the analysis for the first time.
The situation for these countries is generally positive; a
majority have recently implemented major reforms of
their pension systems and they generally have a rela-
tively low debt-to-GDP ratio, both of which contribute to
a more sustainable position over the long run.
However, the analysis also shows that the planned budg-
etary consolidation in the medium term is a very impor-
tant factor in achieving a more sustainable position for
most Member States, as was the case in previous years.
The results show that there are risks to long-term sustain-
ability in 10 countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary,
Malta and Slovenia). In seven other countries (Spain,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and
the UK), there could be some risks due to the projected
medium-term budgetary developments, the budgetary
impact of enacted reforms or, as is the case for Spain and
Poland, due to the considerable uncertainties over the
long-term age-related expenditure trends. Finally, seven
countries (Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Austria, Finland and Sweden) at present appear to face
only limited risks in view of the budgetary costs of an
ageing society.20
1. Budgetary developments in the euro area 
and EU Member States
1.1. Short-term developments 
and prospects for the budget 
balance and public debt
In 2004, the budgetary position in the euro area
improved slightly after having deteriorated for three con-
secutive years (see Table I.1). Compared with 2003, the
nominal deficit fell by 0.1 percentage point and reached
2.7 % of GDP. The aggregate nominal deficit of the
entire EU also improved, by 0.3 percentage points, and
reached 2.6 % of GDP in 2004 (see Table I.2).
The aggregate outcome for the euro area as a whole
results from diverse budgetary performances across
Member States. In the case of Germany, Greece, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, the budgetary posi-
tions in 2004 remained weak with nominal deficits rang-
ing from 2.5 % of GDP in the Netherlands to 6.1 % of
GDP in Greece. Germany, Greece and France have
remained in excessive deficit positions, while, in the
Netherlands, the deficit has been under the 3 % of GDP
reference value. According to the Commission’s spring
2005 forecasts, the budgetary situation remained weak in
Italy and Portugal in 2004 as deficits reached respec-
tively 3.0 and 2.9 % of GDP (1). In 2004, the nominal
deficit also significantly deteriorated in Spain and
Luxembourg. Outside the euro area, a large majority of
Member States improved their budgetary situation, apart
from Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. Given the pro-
tracted period of low growth, only Belgium, Ireland and
Finland had nominal budgetary positions in balance or in
surplus in the euro area. Overall, the nominal budget bal-
ances in 2004 did not worsen (or did so only marginally)
compared with the previous year in the case of Belgium,
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Portugal and Finland.
Certainly, the budgetary performance also differed
across the Member States outside the euro area. Nominal
budget balances in 2004 varied from a deficit of 5.2 % of
GDP in Malta to a surplus of 2.8 % of GDP in Denmark.
In the case of Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia
and the UK, the nominal deficit in 2003 was above the
reference value of 3 % of GDP, and only Denmark,
Estonia and Sweden had a surplus budgetary position.
Relative to 2003, the budgetary position remained
roughly unchanged or improved in 10 countries, while it
deteriorated in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. The
improvement was particularly important in the Czech
Republic and Malta.
Looking ahead to 2005 and 2006, the Commission’s
spring 2005 forecasts project that economic growth in
the euro area as a whole will hover around 2 %, decreas-
ing to 1.6 % in 2005 in order to rise to 2.1 % in 2006. The
nominal budget balance is expected to improve slightly,
to 2.6 % of GDP in 2005 and deteriorate again in 2006
(2.7 % of GDP). In light of the scarcely resilient eco-
nomic situation coupled with difficulties in pursuing
budgetary consolidation in some Member States, the
aggregate nominal deficit for the entire EU is foreseen to
hold stable at 2.6 % of GDP in 2005 and decline only
slightly to 2.5 % of GDP in 2006.
At the Member State level, the surplus budgetary posi-
tions in the case of Belgium and Ireland are expected to
deteriorate into deficit positions in 2005. Under a no-
policy-change assumption, the deficit in Belgium would
continue to worsen in 2006, while in Ireland it would
hold stable. In contrast, Spain and Finland are expected
to maintain their budgetary positions in balance or in sur-
plus throughout the forecast period. Among the Member
States outside the euro area, this is also the case of
Denmark, Estonia and Sweden.
¥1∂ Following the Eurostat decision of 23 May 2005, the government deficit of
Italy has been provisionally set at 3.1 % of GDP for the year 2003 and at
3.1 % of GDP for the year 2004 (Eurostat: Euroindicators, News Release
65/2005, 23.5.2005).21
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projects that the nominal deficits in Germany, Greece,
Italy and Portugal will be exceeding the 3 % of GDP
reference value in 2005 and, except Germany, also in
2006, when France is expected to breach the reference
value again. In Germany, the nominal deficit is projected
to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2005 and move slightly
below the reference value in 2006. In Greece, the nomi-
nal deficit is expected to stay at higher levels than 3 % of
GDP in 2005 and slightly improve in 2006. The period
of weak budgetary situation in France is being pro-
longed, since the nominal deficit is expected to remain
around the 3 % of GDP threshold also in 2005 and
breach the reference value again in 2006. Although the
excessive deficit procedure for Portugal was abrogated
in 2004, the nominal deficit is foreseen to exceed 3 % of
GDP again in both 2005 and 2006. In Italy, although the
nominal deficit is expected to hover around the reference
value in 2004, it is projected beyond the threshold in
2005 and will deteriorate further in 2006.
The nominal deficit is also projected to be high in other
Member States. In the UK, it is foreseen to remain well
above 2 % of GDP during the forecast period and in Aus-
tria, the nominal deficit would be around 2 % of GDP. In
the new Member States, the nominal deficit is expected
to decline or remain unchanged in more than half of the
countries. In the case of Latvia, a significant deteriora-
tion is projected for 2005, while the surplus in Estonia is
expected to be reduced over the forecast period.
In cyclically adjusted terms, relative to 2003, the deficit
in the euro area remained unchanged in 2004, at 2.4 % of
GDP. According to the Commission’s spring 2005 fore-
casts, the cyclically adjusted budget balance is projected
to decrease in 2005 and deteriorate again slightly in
2006, reflecting the weak resilience of the budgetary
consolidation process which has stalled in the last couple
of years. Among the euro-area countries with higher
cyclically adjusted deficits, deterioration over the entire
projection period is expected in Italy. In Portugal, after a
pronounced deterioration expected to occur in 2005, it is
projected to slightly improve in 2006. Improvements
over the whole period are foreseen in Germany, Greece
and the Netherlands, while in France the improvement
will fade out in 2006, when the cyclically adjusted defi-
cit is planned to be above 3 % of GDP. Despite the
expected improvement in Greece, the cyclically adjusted
deficit is projected to remain above 5 % of GDP over the
whole period.  
Table I.1
General government budgetary position — Euro area, 2001–06
(% of GDP)
2001 (1) 2002 (1) 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total revenue (1) 46.5 46.1 46.3 45.7 45.6 45.4
Total expenditure (2) 48.3 48.6 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.0
Actual balance (3) = (1) – (2) – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.7
Interest (4) 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3
Primary balance (5)  = (3) + (4) 2.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
UTMS proceeds 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (6) – 2.4 – 2.6 - 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance = (6) + (4)   1.6 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0
Change in actual balance – 1.9 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
Due to:   — cycle – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.6 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
               — UMTS – 1.1 0 0
               — interest 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
               — cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.7 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1
(1) Including UMTS receipts. UMTS receipts as a percentage of GDP would be equal in 2001 to 0.2 for Belgium, 0.2 for Denmark, 0.5 for Greece, 0.1 for France, 
and 0 for the euro area and the EU-15. In 2002, they would be equal to 0.2 for Ireland and 0 for the euro area and the EU-15.
NB: Differences are due to rounding.
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.22
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C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sThe euro-area government debt-to-GDP ratio increased
to 71.3 % in 2004 (see Table I.3 and Part II, Chapter 5,
in this report). According to the Commission’s spring
2005 forecasts, the debt ratio is projected to increase
slightly in 2005, to 71.7 % of GDP and again in 2006,
reaching 71.9 % of GDP. Over the period 2004–06, it is
expected that the primary surplus would not offset the
combined negative contribution from interest expendi-
ture and stock-flow adjustment. The aggregate debt ratio
in the EU is lower in comparison with the euro area.
Nevertheless, the ratio is projected to increase somewhat
and reach 64.1 % of GDP in 2005 and 64.2 % in 2006.
As was the case with the euro area, the overall positive
contribution from the primary balance will not fully off-
set negative contribution from the other two elements of
debt dynamics — interest expenditure/growth and stock-
flow operations.
Aggregate figures tend to hide different pictures across
countries. In 2004, Greece and Italy continued to have
Table I.2
Budget balances in EU Member States, 2003–06
(% of GDP)
Budget balance Cyclically adjusted 
budget balance
Cyclically adjusted
primary balance
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE 0.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2 6.5 5.3 4.7 4.0
DE – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.3 0.7
EL – 5.2 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 4.4 – 5.7 – 7.1 – 5.5 – 5.3 0.1 – 1.4 0.0 0.1
ES 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.2 2.7 1.8 2.1 2.2
FR – 4.2 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.1 – 1.0 – 0.7 0.2 – 0.1
IE 0.2 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6 0.2 1.6 – 0.1 0.1 1.5 2.8 1.0 1.1
IT (1) – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 4.6 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 4.0 2.7 2.6 2.0 1.0
LU 0.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6 1.6 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.5
NL – 3.2 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.5 2.8
AT – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.6 2.3 1.9 1.1 1.2
PT – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.9 – 4.7 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 3.7 0.7 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.7
FI 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.6 3.2 2.4 1.9 1.8 5.2 4.3 3.5 3.4
EUR-12 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0
CZ – 11.7 – 3.0 – 4.5 – 4.0
DK 1.2 2.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 3.4 2.5 2.4 4.5 5.7 4.7 4.4
EE 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.5
CY – 6.3 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 1.9
LV – 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 1.5
LT – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
HU – 6.2 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.1
MT – 10.5 – 5.2 – 3.9 – 2.8  
PL – 4.5 – 4.8 – 4.4 – 3.8
SI – 2.0 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1
SK – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 4.0
SE 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.7 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.8
UK – 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.5
EU-25 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.5
(1) Following the Eurostat decision of 23 May 2005, the government deficit of Italy has been provisionally set at 3.1 % of GDP for the year 2003 and at 3.1 % of GDP
for the year 2004 (Eurostat: Euroindicators, News Release 65/2005, 23.5.2005).
NB: Excluding UMTS receipts for Ireland in 2002. Cyclically adjusted figures are computed with the production function method, except for Spain, where the HP filter
method has been used.
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.23
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still be the case also in 2006 (1). Belgium managed to
reduce its debt below this level in 2004 and its debt ratio
is expected to be reduced further in the future. In addi-
tion to these three countries, six EU Member States are
projected to have debt ratios above 60 % of GDP in
2005. The combined effect of poor growth performance
and interest expenditure is expected to significantly
affect the budgetary situation in Germany, France, Italy
and the Netherlands, as well as in Portugal and Malta,
where in addition, large primary deficits are projected.
¥1∂ Following the Eurostat decision of 23 May 2005, the government debt of
Italy has been provisionally set at 106.5 % of GDP for the year  2003 and at
106.6 % of GDP for the year 2004 (Eurostat: Euroindicators, News
Release 65/2005, 23.5.2005).
Table I.3
Composition of changes in government debt ratio in EU Member States, 2003–06
(% of GDP)
Gross debt Change in 
gross debt 
Change in 2004–06 
due to:
2003 2004 2005 2006 2004–06 Primary balance
Interest and 
growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 100.0 95.6 94.9 91.7 – 3.9 – 7.9 0.9 3.1
DE 64.2 66.0 68.0 68.9 2.9 0.1 3.6 – 0.8
EL 109.3 110.5 110.5 108.9 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 2.3 2.7
ES 51.4 48.9 46.5 44.2 – 4.7 – 4.1 – 1.8 1.3
FR 63.9 65.6 66.2 67.1 1.5 0.4 1.1 0.0
IE 32.0 29.9 29.8 29.6 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 2.2 2.9
IT (1) 106.3 105.8 105.6 106.3 0.5 – 1.7 2.4 – 0.2
LU 7.1 7.5 7.8 7.9 0.4 3.0 – 0.6 – 2.0
NL 54.3 55.7 57.6 57.9 2.2 – 2.0 3.0 1.2
AT 65.4 65.2 64.4 64.1 – 1.0 – 2.0 1.1 – 0.2
PT 60.1 61.9 66.2 68.5 6.6 3.6 1.4 1.6
FI 45.3 45.1 44.3 43.7 – 1.4 – 6.4 – 0.3 5.3
EUR-12  70.8 71.3 71.7 71.9 0.6 – 1.3 1.5 0.3
CZ 38.3 37.4 36.4 37.0 – 0.4 5.8 – 2.6 – 3.6
DK 44.7 42.7 40.5 38.2 – 4.4 – 8.5 1.0 3.0
EE 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.0 – 1.0 – 1.7 – 0.4 1.2
CY 69.8 71.9 69.1 66.6 – 5.3 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 1.3
LV 14.4 14.4 14.0 14.3 – 0.1 1.5 – 1.4 – 0.3
LT 21.4 19.7 21.2 20.9 1.2 2.6 – 1.8 0.5
HU 56.9 57.6 57.8 57.9 0.3 0.7 – 1.9 1.5
MT 71.8 75.0 76.4 77.1 2.2 – 1.9 3.7 0.4
PL 45.4 43.6 46.8 47.6 3.9 3.1 – 0.4 1.2
SI 29.4 29.4 30.2 30.4 1.0 1.0 – 0.6 0.6
SK 42.6 43.6 44.2 44.9 1.3 3.1 – 1.9 0.0
SE 52.0 51.2 50.3 49.2 – 2.0 – 5.8 – 0.4 4.2
UK 39.7 41.6 41.9 42.5 0.9 1.6 0.0 – 0.8
EU-25 63.3 63.8 64.1 64.2 0.4 – 0.8 1.0 0.2
 (1) Following the Eurostat decision of 23 May 2005, the government debt of Italy has been provisionally set at 106.5 % of GDP for the year  2003 and at 106.6 % of
GDP for the year 2004 (Eurostat: Euroindicators, News Release 65/2005, 23.5.2005).
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 economic forecasts.24
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The developments in the EU and euro-area budgetary
positions are derived from changes in expenditure and
revenue ratios. On the expenditure side, the euro-area
expenditure-to-GDP ratio decreased in 2004, both in
nominal and cyclically adjusted terms, compared with
the previous year (see Table I.4). This is due to a com-
bined effect of reductions in social expenditures, collec-
tive consumption, interest and other expenditures.
According to the Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts,
the expenditure ratio is projected to decline further dur-
ing the forecast period, with additional reduction in col-
lective consumption and social transfers other than in
kind, while other items are foreseen to remain broadly
unchanged. On the revenue side, the revenue-to-GDP
ratio also decreased in 2004, both in nominal and cycli-
cally adjusted terms, and is expected to decline further in
the coming years.
At the Member State level, the patterns are generally
similar (see Table I.5). Only in Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Portugal and outside the euro area, in Latvia,
Slovakia and the UK, are expenditure ratios projected to
increase over the 2004–06 period. In contrast, over the
same period, large decreases are expected in Germany,
Greece, Austria, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovenia.
Revenue ratios are set to increase pronouncedly over
2004–06 in the case of the Netherlands and outside the
euro area, in Poland and the UK, whereas important
reductions are foreseen in Belgium, Ireland, Italy,
Austria, Finland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia
and Hungary.
In the euro area, the projected decrease in tax revenues
on income and wealth, social contributions and other
resources is being offset by an expected decline in
expenditure on collective consumption, social benefits
other than in kind, and subsidies. Such a development
respects lessons from the past showing that tax measures
resulting in a decline in tax revenues should be accom-
panied by expenditure cuts to avoid the worsening of the
general government balances. Nevertheless, the compo-
sition of expenditure adjustment should not constrain
growth-enhancing expenditure items such as public
investment, education and R & D. The reduction in inter-
est expenditure that has contributed particularly to a bet-
ter allocation of available resources in past years will not
continue as the interest burden will stabilise at 3.3 % of
GDP over the projection period.  
Table I.4
Euro-area government revenue and expenditure, 2002–06
(% of GDP)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total revenue 46.1 46.3 45.7 45.6 45.4
 — Cyclically adjusted 46.0 46.7 46.1 46.1 45.8
Taxes on imports and production 13.4 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.6
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.2 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5
Social contributions 16.0 16.2 15.9 15.9 15.9
  Of which actual social contributions 14.9 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.8
Other revenue 4.6 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.3
Total expenditure 48.6 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.0
 — Cyclically adjusted 48.6 49.0 48.4 48.1 47.9
Collective consumption 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1
Social benefits in kind 12.1 12.3 12.2 12.2 12.2
Social benefits other than in kind 16.9 17.2 17.1 17.1 16.9
Interest 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3
Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7
Other expenditures 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.25
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1.3.1. The fiscal stance and policy-mix 
in the euro area
An appropriate policy-mix can be defined as a combi-
nation of monetary and fiscal policies that ensures
price stability and keeps economic activity close to its
potential level. In the euro area, given that monetary
policy is centralised and fiscal policies decentralised,
it is of particular importance to assess both the aggre-
gate fiscal stance at the euro-area level and national
fiscal stances. Namely, the aggregate fiscal stance
affects the policy-mix at the euro-area level, and is,
therefore, one of the elements to be considered by the
ECB when setting the monetary policy. Analogously,
the policy-mix for the euro area will have an impact
on the national policy-mix via the common interest
rates.
Graph I.1 examines the fiscal stance (approximated by
the changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance,
CAPB) in relation to cyclical conditions (approximated
Table I.5
Total revenue and expenditure in EU Member States, 2003–06
(% of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE 51.3 49.6 49.1 48.5 50.9 49.5 49.3 49.0
DE 45.0 43.8 43.6 43.4 48.8 47.5 47.0 46.2
EL 43.5 43.9 44.3 44.3 48.0 50.0 48.8 48.7
ES 40.0 40.2 40.4 40.5 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
FR 50.4 50.8 51.5 51.1 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
IE 34.6 35.7 34.5 34.0 34.4 34.3 35.1 34.6
IT 46.3 45.4 44.6 44.0 49.2 48.4 48.2 48.5
LU 45.5 44.9 44.4 44.2 45.1 46.0 46.0 46.0
NL 45.8 45.5 45.8 47.6 49.0 48.0 47.9 49.2
AT 50.0 49.4 48.1 47.4 51.2 50.7 50.1 49.2
PT 44.8 43.8 42.5 43.1 47.7 46.7 47.4 47.8
FI 53.3 52.5 51.9 51.3 50.8 50.4 50.3 49.8
EUR-12 46.3 45.7 45.6 45.4 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.0
CZ 41.6 42.7 41.8 41.0 53.3 45.7 46.3 45.1
DK 56.6 57.7 56.5 55.7 55.3 55.0 54.3 53.5
EE 38.9 40.9 40.8 39.2 35.8 39.1 40.0 38.7
CY 39.1 39.4 39.4 38.9 45.4 43.6 42.3 40.7
LV 34.2 35.2 35.4 35.3 35.7 35.9 37.0 36.8
LT 32.3 31.8 32.3 31.6 34.2 34.3 34.8 33.6
HU 44.5 47.5 43.9 43.0 50.8 52.0 47.8 47.1
MT 40.5 49.0 48.8 48.6 50.9 54.1 52.6 51.4
PL 44.3 43.8 44.2 44.2 48.8 48.7 48.6 48.0
SI 46.2 45.8 45.4 45.1 48.2 47.7 47.6 47.2
SK 35.4 35.1 36.1 34.8 39.2 38.5 39.9 38.8
SE 58.6 58.4 57.8 57.4 58.4 57.0 57.0 56.6
UK 40.0 40.4 40.9 41.4 43.4 43.6 44.0 44.1
EU-25 45.6 45.3 45.2 45.1 48.5 47.9 47.8 47.6
Pm EU-15      45.7 45.4 45.4 45.2 48.5 48.0 47.9 47.7
Pm EU-10 42.4 43.0 42.5 42.0 48.1 46.8 46.4 45.5
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.26
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behaviour in accordance with the SGP would be repre-
sented by movements along the horizontal axis. In other
words, countries would achieve and maintain broadly
balanced budgets over the economic cycle. Thus,
changes in the output gap would not imply movements
in the CAPB. However, as long as a Member State has
not yet reached the medium-term target of the SGP, a
restrictive fiscal stance — that is a positive change in the
CAPB — would be needed.
According to the Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts,
the euro-area fiscal stance in 2004 was slightly on the
side of countercyclical fiscal loosening, although still
broadly neutral. Looking ahead to 2005 and 2006, the
euro-area fiscal stance is projected to remain broadly
neutral. Lessons from the past show, however, that
efforts to improve the underlying budgetary positions
should be made as economic conditions improve, in
order to ensure sufficient room for the automatic stabilis-
ers to operate in the next downturn.
Graph I.2 illustrates the euro-area policy-mix, by plot-
ting the fiscal stance on the vertical axis and the mone-
tary stance (approximated by the change in the real
short-term interest rates) on the horizontal axis. Against
the background of a protracted slowdown in economic
activity, the monetary stance tightened somewhat and
became more neutral, after three consecutive years of
loosening. Overall, in 2004, the euro-area fiscal stance
could still be seen as neutral, coupled with a growth-sup-
portive monetary stance, despite tightening with respect
to 2003, thus contributing to a recovery of economic
activity and closing of the output gap. The policy-mix in
the early years of EMU has therefore been broadly
appropriate to support growth-enhancing economic con-
ditions and macroeconomic stability.    
¥1∂ In line with the Council agreement, the output gap in this section is com-
puted with the production function method. It should be noted, however,
that changes in the output gap are equally relevant for the judgment of the
stance in relation to cyclical conditions. The changes in the gap can be
inferred in Graph I.1 by looking at the horizontal distance between years.
Graph I.1: Euro-area fiscal stance and cyclical conditions, 2000–06
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.
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Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.
Graph I.3: Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in the EU-15 Member States, 2004
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.
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at the national level
The aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area results from
a variety of diverse fiscal stances across Member States,
despite fairly similar cyclical developments.
Graph I.3 shows that most EU-15 countries recorded a
negative output gap in 2004, with the exception of
Greece.
In 2004, several EU countries ran moderately broadly
neutral fiscal policies in a context of negative output
gaps. Policies were, however, clearly countercyclical in
the case of Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain. It is worth
mentioning that the nominal budget balances in these
countries markedly worsened in the course of 2004.
Finland, which was benefiting from past consolidation
efforts and therefore had a large safety margin, was also
somewhat loosening the fiscal stance.
The Netherlands ran procyclical policy in 2004, reflect-
ing consolidation efforts in order to keep the nominal
deficits below the 3 % of GDP reference value. At the
same time, Denmark and Ireland tightened their fiscal
stance, while in the latter the output gap deteriorated
quickly. Greece stands out for loosening the fiscal stance
in spite of a large positive output gap.
As pointed out above, the overall policy-mix in the euro
area was still accommodative in 2004 with most Mem-
ber States experiencing a broadly neutral fiscal stance
despite increasing real interest rates (see Graph I.4). The
real interest rates rose in half of the euro-area Member
States, in particular in Ireland, the Netherlands and
Portugal.
While Graph I.4 refers to the changes in the real short-
term interest rates, their level is equally important when
assessing the policy-mix. After the reductions in the
nominal interest rate decided by the ECB in the course of
2003, the real interest rate for the euro area (i.e. the short-
term interest rate corrected by private consumption infla-
tion) amounted to 0.2 % in 2004. However, this aggre-
gate figure for the euro area conceals significant differ-
ences across Member States due to disparities in
inflation rates across countries. The highest real interest
rates were in Finland and the Netherlands (1.2 and 0.2 %
respectively), whereas in a number of countries (Bel-
gium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portu-
gal), the real interest rates were negative.
Regarding 2005, the overall fiscal stance of the euro area
is expected to be broadly neutral (see Graph I.5),
although some procyclical fiscal tightening is expected,
particularly in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
Greece is projected to considerably tighten its fiscal
stance, even though the output gap is expected to be pos-
itive. Portugal, Ireland and Austria, on the other hand,
are, however, projected to loosen their fiscal stance.      29
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Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.
Graph I.5: Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in the EU-15 Member States, 2005
Source: Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts.
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2. Implementing the Stability 
and Growth Pact
2.1. Introduction
The fiscal framework of EMU aims at ensuring budget-
ary discipline through two main requirements. These
are the Treaty requirement to avoid excessive deficit
positions, measured against reference values for defi-
cits and debt of 3 and 60 % of GDP respectively, and
the requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
to achieve and maintain a budgetary position of ‘close
to balance or in surplus’ over the cycle. Compliance
with the ‘close-to-balance or in-surplus’ requirement
secures fiscal discipline and the sustainability of public
finances, and thus contributes to maintaining an eco-
nomic environment in which monetary policy can
effectively pursue price stability. It also provides the
necessary room for manoeuvre to allow the automatic
stabilisers to play freely without breaching the 3 % ref-
erence value of the Treaty.
The rules-based framework of the Treaty and SGP
consists of both preventive and dissuasive elements,
both of which are backed up with enforcement proce-
dures. Section 2.2 gives a short description of these
procedures, namely the excessive deficit procedure
and the early-warning mechanism. This section is
entirely based on the provisions in force, and does not
discuss the recent reform proposals agreed in the
Council.
During 2004 and the early part of 2005, the deterioration
in the budgetary positions has required the Commission
and the Council to apply the various enforcement mech-
anisms of the SGP against several Member States. Sec-
tion 2.3 reviews the implementation of these mecha-
nisms since spring 2004 in the EU countries. It examines
the developments concerning the Member States which
have been subject to an excessive deficit procedure and
other countries which have been the object of Council
recommendations giving early warning.
2.2. The enforcement mechanisms 
of the Stability and Growth Pact
This section provides a description of the enforcement
mechanisms at the disposal of the Commission and the
Council to ensure budgetary discipline in the EU. It
explains the different steps of the excessive deficit
procedure, which are codified in Article 104 of the EC
Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and
when these steps need to be activated. This description
puts particular emphasis on the consequences of euro-
area membership on the procedure. In a second step, a
short description of the early-warning mechanism is
provided. This mechanism is codified in Article 99(4)
of the Treaty and Articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.
The excessive deficit procedure
Article 104 of the Treaty states that Member States
shall avoid excessive government deficits. In particu-
lar, Member States shall comply with budgetary disci-
pline by respecting two criteria: a deficit ratio and
a debt ratio not exceeding reference values of respec-
tively 3 and 60 % of GDP. A few exceptions are spec-
ified in the Treaty. Article 104 also sets out the proce-
dure to be followed to identify and correct situations
of excessive deficit, and voting modalities in the
course of the procedure. Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
on the Stability and Growth Pact clarifies the proce-
dure.
The first four steps of the procedure, corresponding to
the provisions of paragraphs 3 to 6 of Article 104, con-
cern the identification of situations of excessive deficit.
The excessive deficit procedure is triggered if the defi-31
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a situation, the Commission adopts a report, in accord-
ance with Article 104(3), reviewing in detail the eco-
nomic and budgetary situation of the Member State
considered. As foreseen in Article 104(4) and Regula-
tion (EC) No 1467/97, the Economic and Financial
Committee formulates an opinion on this report within
two weeks. The Commission takes this opinion into
account and, if it considers that an excessive deficit
exists, addresses an opinion under Article 104(5) to the
Council. On the basis of the Commission opinion, the
Council itself decides on the existence of an excessive
deficit under Article 104(6).
The subsequent steps of the procedure are dedicated to
the correction of excessive deficits. When it decides that
an excessive deficit exists, the Council addresses a rec-
ommendation to the Member State concerned in accord-
ance with Article 104(7). In this recommendation, the
Council sets two deadlines: one for the Member State to
take effective action to correct the excessive deficit, and
one for the correction of the excessive deficit itself (2).
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 specifies that the latter
deadline shall be the year following the identification of
an excessive deficit, unless there are special circum-
stances.
In the case where action by the Member State concerned
leads to the correction of the excessive deficit, the Coun-
cil shall decide, in accordance with Article 104(12), to
abrogate its decisions under the excessive deficit proce-
dure. In other words, the procedure is closed. In the event
the Council considers that no effective action has been
taken, it may decide, as stated in Article 104(8) of the
Treaty, to make public its recommendation according to
Article 104(7).
The steps described above apply to all EU countries. The
further steps of the procedure depend on whether the
Member State is a euro-area Member State.
The excessive deficit procedure applies in full to euro-
area Member States. For these countries, Article 104(9)
stipulates that, provided the Council adopts a decision
under Article 104(8), it may decide to give notice to the
Member State concerned to take the necessary meas-
ures to reduce the deficit. The recommendations under
Article 104(9) of the Treaty shall include a deadline for
the correction of the excessive deficit, and Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97 specifies that measures for the deficit
reduction that the Council judges necessary have to be
taken by the Member State concerned within two
months at the most from the adoption of the notice
under Article 104(9).
This step constitutes a move towards even closer surveil-
lance, and is the ultimate step before the possible impo-
sition of sanctions. If the Member State fails to comply
with the recommendations, the Council may decide to
impose sanctions no later than two months after notice
has been given. In the case of compliance with the rec-
ommendations formulated in the notice under Article
104(9), the decisions taken under Article 104(6) to (9)
are abrogated with a Council decision in accordance
with Article 104(12), and the procedure is closed.
As already mentioned, non-euro-area Member States are
not exempt from the obligation to avoid excessive defi-
cits, but the later steps of the EDP do not apply to them.
When a Member State outside the euro area in a situation
of excessive deficit fails to respect the recommendations
addressed under Article 104(7), it cannot be submitted to
the last two steps of the excessive deficit procedure,
namely the notice foreseen in Article 104(9) and the
imposition of sanctions foreseen in Article 104(11) (3).
Non-compliance with a recommendation under Article
104(7) may lead to a renewed recommendation accord-
ing to Article 104(7). 
Denmark, Sweden, the UK, and the EU-10 are in such a
situation. The specific situation of the EU-10, which
have the status of ‘Member States with a derogation’, in
the sense of Article 122 of the Treaty, was detailed in the
2004 edition of this report. This report also underlined
that, in addition to Council recommendations, other
channels may act as complementary discipline mecha-
nisms for these countries.
¥1∂ Article 104(2) of the Treaty states that a deficit in excess of the 3 % refer-
ence value that is only exceptional and temporary may not be considered
excessive in the case where the deficit remains close to the reference value.
A deficit above 3 % of GDP may also not be considered excessive if it has
declined substantially and reached a level that comes close to the reference
value. The same article provides an exception for countries having a debt
ratio above 60 %, if this ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the
value of 60 % of GDP at a satisfactory pace.
¥2∂ Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 stipulates that the deadline for taking meas-
ures cannot exceed four months.
¥3∂ These Member States have no voting right on decisions provided for under
the two paragraphs.32
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In complement to the excessive deficit procedure, the
Treaty foresees in its Article 99(4) the possibility for
the Council to make recommendations to Member
States in the case where their economic policies ‘are
not consistent with the broad guidelines … or … risk
jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and
monetary union’. Based on this article, Regulation
(EC) No 1466/97, which constitutes the preventive arm
of the SGP, provides the Council with the possibility to
issue ‘early warnings’ to Member States in order to pre-
vent the occurrence of an excessive deficit.
Early warnings are issued by the Council, upon recom-
mendations of the Commission, in the event that the
Council identifies significant divergence of the budget-
ary position from the medium-term budgetary objective
of ‘close to balance or in surplus’, or the adjustment path
towards it.
2.3. The surveillance mechanisms 
since spring 2004
Since summer 2004, 10 EU countries have been subject
to an excessive deficit procedure: four euro-area Mem-
ber States and six of the recently acceded Member
States (1). In addition, in 2004, the Commission recom-
mended to the Council that an early warning be issued to
Italy to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit.
Below is a presentation of the ongoing procedures con-
cerning the various countries.
2.3.1. The surveillance mechanisms 
in the euro-area countries
Since spring 2004, the Commission and the Council
have taken action or clarified their positions concerning
four euro-area Member States in EDP. The Council
decided to address an Article 104(9) recommendation,
the latest step of the procedure before sanctions, to
Greece, which has to correct its excessive deficit in
2006. The Commission clarified its position for the
excessive deficit procedure for Germany and France,
after the events of November 2003 and the ruling of the
Court of Justice of 13 July 2004. Finally, the Commis-
sion and the Council considered that the Netherlands had
taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit and
the Commission proposed on 18 May 2005 to abrogate
the EDP.
Greece
On 4 May 2004, the Greek authorities submitted a
revised EDP notification showing a 2003 deficit of
3.2 % of GDP. This provided prima facie evidence for
the existence of an excessive deficit. The Council
decided that an excessive deficit exists in Greece and
addressed on 5 July 2004 a recommendation to Greece
with a view to bringing the excessive deficit situation to
an end by 2005. The Council established the deadline of
5 November 2004 for Greece to take appropriate meas-
ures to this end.
Based on its autumn 2004 forecast incorporating the data
revisions of September 2004 notification and projecting
the 2005 deficit at 3.6 % of GDP, on 22 December 2004
the Commission recommended to the Council to decide
under Article 104(8) that no effective action had been
taken in response to its Article 104(7) recommendation.
The Council decided accordingly on 18 January 2005.
On 9 February 2005, the Commission recommended to
the Council to give notice to Greece, in accordance with
Article 104(9) of the Treaty, to take the necessary meas-
ures to remedy its excessive deficit situation.
The Commission recommended extending the deadline
for bringing the deficit below the 3 % reference value by
one year to 2006. When taking this decision, the Com-
mission took into account the fact that the deficit would
likely be substantially higher than expected (the 2003
deficit was revised to 5.2 % in March 2005, up from an
estimated 4.6 % of GDP in September 2004 and 1.7 % of
GDP in March 2004), due to statistical revisions and to
expenditure overruns associated notably with the organ-
isation of the Olympic Games. In addition, the Commis-
sion considered that GDP growth prospects for 2005 and
2006 had become less favourable, making the reduction
of the deficit more difficult.
On 17 February 2005, the Council adopted a decision giv-
ing notice to Greece, in accordance with Article 104(9) of
the Treaty, to take measures to remedy the situation of
excessive deficit as rapidly as possible and at the latest by
2006 through: (i) a rigorous implementation of the 2005
budget as approved by its Parliament; and (ii) implement-
ing in 2006 adjustment measures of a permanent nature
leading to a correction in the deficit of at least 0.6 percent-
¥1∂ For documents concerning these procedures, see the section on fiscal sur-
veillance on the Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s website (http://
europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/
procedures_en.htm). 33
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had to submit, by 21 March 2005 at the latest, a report out-
lining the decisions to respect these recommendations.
In March 2005, Greece submitted a report, which was
assessed in the Commission communication of 6 April.
The Commission concluded that the Greek government
is taking effective action so that no further steps under
the EDP seem to be needed at this stage. Greece shall
submit other reports by 31 October 2005, 30 April 2006
and 31 October 2006 examining progress made in
respecting the recommendations of the notice issued
under Article 104(9).     
¥1∂ The Council also recommended Greece to pursue further the efforts to
identify and control factors other than net borrowing, which contribute to
the change in debt levels, with a view to ensuring that the government
gross debt ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the reference value
at a satisfactory pace in line with the correction of the excessive deficit.
Box I.1: The revision in the Greek deficit and debt (1)
In 2004, the Greek data on the government deficit and debt underwent a very large revision. The government deficit for
2003, which was initially reported at 1.7 % of GDP, stood at 4.6 % of GDP after the September 2004 notification. Follow-
ing a further revision in March 2005, it stands at 5.2 % of GDP. The deficit ratios over the period 1997–2003 were also
quite significantly revised upwards by up to 2â % of GDP. A separate revision of the debt data led to increases of between
5 and 8 % of GDP. Moreover, if a revision which had already taken place in autumn 2002 is taken into account, the overall
upward revision in the deficit and debt ratios reaches, for some years, 4 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Moreover,
in March 2005, Eurostat did not validate the revised Greek data and highlighted inconsistencies in the recording of flows
with the EU budget which could lead to further upward revisions in the deficit figures.
The revision in the Greek accounts concerned several topics as summarised Table I.6. The most significant revisions —
such as the revision in social security accounts and military expenditure — were in relation to difficulties in the compilation
and estimation of basic data. Other revisions — such as debt assumptions, capital injections and interest — concerned an
inappropriate application of accounting rules. 
(1) For more information on the revision of Greek government statistics, see ‘Report by Eurostat on the revisions of the Greek government deficit and debt
figures (1997–2003)’ (SEC(2004) 1539, 22.11.2004). 
(Continued on the next page)
Table I.6
Main components of the revision in the Greek data, 1997–2003
(% of GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003
Deficit (as of March 2004) 4.0 2.5 1.8 2.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.4 1.7
Military expenditure 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.9 1.2 1.7 0.7
Interest 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Social security accounts — — — — 1.0 0.4 0.6
Debt assumptions/capital injections 1.0 1.1 0.8 — — — —
Tax revenue — — — — — — 0.9
Other 0.4 0.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1
Deficit (as of March 2005) 6.6 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.6 (2) 4.1 (2) 5.2 (2)
Debt (as of March 2004) 108.2 105.8 105.2 106.1 (1) 106.6 (1) 104.6 102.6
Bonds with capitalised interest 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.4
Social security accounts 1.0 1.9 1.9 3.2 3.9 3.5 2.6
Other 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Debt (as of March 2005) 114.0 112.4 112.3 114.0 114.8 (2) 112.2 (2) 109.3 (2)
(1) Data for 2000 and 2001 had already been significantly revised in autumn 2002.
(2) Not validated by Eurostat and subject to further upward revision.
Source: Eurostat. 34
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Graph I.6: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Greece
Source: Commission services
Revisions in statistics, and in particular in the government deficit and debt data, are not unusual. After the publication of
the first outcomes in March, data are often revised because new information becomes available or because errors are cor-
rected. However, ‘the scope and size of the past revisions in the Greek case are unprecedented and very serious, particularly
as regards the overall credibility of the multilateral surveillance framework’ (2).
The revision in the Greek accounts revealed ‘systemic weaknesses’ in the statistical authorities of Greece: notably ‘lack of
expertise’ and ‘lack of reliable basic data needed to produce public accounts of good quality’ (3). However, this case also
illustrated insufficiencies in the Commission services and of a more general nature. Notwithstanding a permanent dialogue
between the national statistical authorities and Eurostat, the latter has neither the resources nor the legal means to counter-
check the veracity and reliability of information provided by Member States. Moreover, in spite of the relevance of budg-
etary statistics for macroeconomic surveillance and for the decision on participation in the monetary union, and the fact
that most difficulties in the Greek statistical system had been identified in earlier years, the statistical issues used to be dis-
cussed among a restricted circle of statisticians without being brought to public attention and the appropriate political level.
In this respect, the Ecofin Council of 7 December 2004 regarded as ‘serious cause for concern that … Eurostat validated
the critical March 2000 EDP notification data of Greece [immediately before the decision on the participation of Greece
in the euro], in spite of significant open issues related to the fiscal data’ and that ‘the Commission’s and the ECB’s con-
vergence reports failed to emphasise to the Council potential problems with regard to Greek budgetary statistics’.
The revision in the Greek accounts also brought the issue of professional independence of national statistical authorities to
the fore. (See Box II.2 on the strengthening of the governance of budgetary statistics which summarises recent develop-
ments and proposals to address these weaknesses.)
(2) Ecofin Council conclusions of 7 December 2005.
(3) Commission communication ‘Report on the accountability issue related to the revision of Greek budgetary data’ (COM(2004) 784, 1.12.2004).
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Summary of past events and consequences of the Court
of Justice ruling of 13 July 2004
Following evidence of government deficits above 3 % of
GDP in 2002, the Council decided in spring 2003 that
excessive deficits existed in Germany and France and
adopted recommendations under Article 104(7) with a
view to bringing this situation to an end by 2004. In
autumn 2003, the Commission assessed the measures
taken in both countries and considered that the actions
implemented by Germany and France were inadequate
to correct their excessive deficits and recommended the
Council to decide accordingly. The Commission also
recommended the Council to adopt a decision giving
notice to these two countries to take measures to remedy
the situation. In light of the weaker-than-expected eco-
nomic situation, the Commission recommended that the
deadline for correcting the deficit should be extended by
one year to 2005.
On 25 November 2003, the Council voted on the recom-
mended decisions but did not achieve the required
majority. Instead, the Council adopted conclusions
addressing recommendations to Germany and France for
the correction of the excessive deficit by 2005 and stat-
ing that, in light of the commitments by the two Member
States, the excessive deficit procedure was held in abey-
ance. The Commission brought the case before the Court
of Justice of the European Communities challenging cer-
tain elements of the Council conclusions of 25 Novem-
ber 2003. On 13 July 2004, the Court annulled the Coun-
cil conclusions in so far as they aimed at formally
suspending the procedure and modifying the existing
recommendations. However, the Court did not elaborate
on the implications of its decision for the excessive def-
icit procedure for Germany and France.
On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted a com-
munication clarifying the situation of Germany and
France in relation to their obligations under the exces-
sive deficit procedure following the judgment of the
Court of Justice. The Commission considered that, in
assessing the position of Germany and France, it is
appropriate to take into account the consequences of the
Council conclusions until their annulment by the Court,
and notably the fact that these conclusions benefited
from the presumption of validity that is attached in prin-
ciple to every Community instrument.
Therefore, while maintaining its view on the inadequacy
of the actions taken by Germany and France to correct
the excessive deficit by 2004, the Commission recog-
nised that the actions of the two Member States con-
cerned taken in the aftermath of the Council conclusions
of 25 November 2003 and up to their annulment by the
Court on 13 July 2004 were based on the notion that the
deadline for the correction of the deficit had been effec-
tively moved to 2005. In light of these circumstances, the
Commission considered that the assessment of the
actions taken to correct the excessive deficit situation
should refer to 2005 as the relevant deadline. The Coun-
cil agreed with this position.
As detailed in the following two subsections, the Com-
mission considered in its communication that Germany
and France were in a position that makes the correction
of the excessive deficit still possible. The Commission
noted, however, that, if failures in implementing the
envisaged correction measures should emerge at a later
stage, it would have to recommend to the Council to
enhance the budgetary surveillance and to take the nec-
essary action within the provisions of the Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact.
Germany
In the autumn 2004 forecasts, the Commission projected
real GDP growth at 1.5 % and the general government
deficit at 3.4 % of GDP in 2005 based on a no-policy-
change scenario with the reference date 18 October 2004.
On 4 November, the federal government presented a
savings package and, in the Fiscal Planning Council
(Finanzplanungsrat) meeting of 18 November, the fed-
eral, state and local levels of government agreed to
reduce the government deficit to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005.
The Commission considered in its communication of
14 December 2004 that measures taken as well as a sub-
sidy repayment by the state banks (Landesbanken)
would allow the 2005 deficit to be reduced to 2.9 % of
GDP. Therefore, the Commission considered that the
measures taken by the German authorities were consist-
ent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2005.
Accordingly, the Commission concluded in its commu-
nication of 14 December 2004 that no further steps were
necessary under the excessive deficit procedure.
The Commission, however, noted that the budgetary sit-
uation of Germany remains vulnerable, that none of the
additional measures constitutes a structural reform with36
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to the cash settlement office shifts an implicit liability to
the future. In addition, the Commission noted that any
unfavourable development on the macroeconomic or on
the budgetary side could bring the deficit above 3 %
in 2005.
In spring 2005, the Commission services revised their
deficit forecast for 2005 up to 3.3 % of GDP, due to eco-
nomic developments in Germany which were less
favourable than expected at the end of 2004. This sug-
gests that additional measures may be needed to bring
the deficit below 3 % of GDP in 2005. However, in view
of the uncertainties attached to the 2005 deficit outcome
at this point in the year, the Commission considered that
it would be premature to take further steps under the
excessive deficit procedure. The Commission will con-
tinue monitoring the budgetary situation, which remains
vulnerable, in the coming months. 
France
The Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts pro-
jected the general government deficit at 3.7 % of GDP in
2004 and 3.0 % of GDP in 2005. The deficit reduction
was projected to result from expenditure restraint and a
significant increase in revenues, stemming notably from
a large one-off payment (0.5 % of GDP) linked to the
transfer of the responsibility for the payment of pensions
of the employees in public electricity and gas companies
to the social security sector (1). Based on these forecasts,
the Commission considered that actions taken by the
French authorities were broadly consistent with a correc-
tion of the excessive deficit by 2005. Accordingly, the
Commission concluded in its communication of
14 December 2004 that no further steps were necessary
under the excessive deficit procedure.
As in the case of Germany, the Commission noted that
the budgetary situation of France remained vulnerable.
The Commission also noted that any unfavourable
development on the macroeconomic or on the budgetary
side could compromise the achievement of the objective
of correcting the excessive deficit in 2005 at the latest.
The Commission also underlined that the deficit reduc-
tion in 2005 largely relies on the favourable impact of a
¥1∂ Expenditure restraint is planned to stem notably from (i) the stabilisation
of State expenditures in real terms, and (ii) an expected slowdown in
health expenditure following the reform of the health insurance system
adopted in summer 2004.
Graph I.7: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Germany
Source: Commission services.
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2004 Commission services’ deficit forecast, which pro-
jected an increase in the deficit to 3.3 % of GDP in 2006
under the assumption of an unchanged policy.
In spring 2005, the Commission services confirmed their
forecast of a 2005 deficit of 3.0 % of GDP, on a no-policy-
change basis. The deficit forecast for 2006 was revised
slightly upwards, to 3.4 % of GDP. Following this fore-
cast, and considering the uncertainties attached to the
2005 deficit outcome, the Commission considered that it
would be premature to take further steps under the exces-
sive deficit procedure, and will continue monitoring budg-
etary developments, which remain vulnerable.
The Netherlands
In light of a reported general government deficit of 3.2 %
of GDP in 2003 and considering the risk that the deficit
might remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004, the Council
placed the Netherlands in excessive deficit on 2 June 2004
and at the same time issued an Article 104(7) recommen-
dation for its correction. The Netherlands government
was recommended to put an end by 2005 at the latest to
the present excessive deficit. To that end, it was recom-
mended to take action regarding corrective measures
in 2005 amounting to at least a â percentage point of
GDP by the deadline of 2 October 2004.
Following this recommendation, the Dutch authorities
implemented an additional savings package for 2004
equivalent to 0.6 percentage points of GDP on top of the
savings measures that had already been included in the
2004 budget. The measures involved, in particular, higher
premiums for health insurance, lower health expenditure
and an end to subsidies on employing low-skilled work-
ers. The budget for 2005 contained further deficit-reduc-
ing measures adding up to an adjustment of a â % of GDP
for 2005. The corrective measures were for the largest part
of a structural nature, thus having a deficit-reducing
impact also in subsequent years. On 6 October 2004, the
Commission considered that the Netherlands had taken
effective action to correct the excessive deficit by 2005.
The Council concurred with this analysis in its conclu-
sions of 21 October 2004.
On a no-policy-change basis, the Commission services’
spring 2005 economic forecast projected the deficit at
2.0 % in 2005, after 2.5 % of GDP in 2004. Following
this forecast, the Commission recommended on 18 May
to the Council to abrogate its decisions under Article
104(6) and (7) of the Treaty.
Graph I.8: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in France
Source: Commission services.
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In spring 2004, the Commission projected for 2004 a
budget deficit of 3.2 % of GDP compared with a target
of 2.2 % of GDP in the 2003 update of the programme
and of 0.6 % of GDP in the 2002 update. The Commis-
sion, also considering that divergence from the objec-
tives was almost entirely structural and the projected
interruption of the reduction of the debt ratio, recom-
mended, on the basis of Article 99(4) of the Treaty and
Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97,
that an early warning be issued to Italy to prevent the
occurrence of an excessive deficit. In July 2004, in view
of the announcement of further consolidation measures
by the Italian authorities, the Council decided not to put
to the vote the Commission recommendation for an early
warning to Italy.
In March 2005, the Italian authorities reported a 2004
deficit of 3.0 % of GDP. Eurostat indicated that it was
not in a position to validate the figures for Italy in view
of pending statistical issues and that ‘the clarification of
these issues could lead to an upward revision in the gov-
ernment deficit, most notably for 2003 and 2004’. This
suggests a clear risk that the 2004 deficit was already
above the reference value of 3 % of GDP. On a no-
policy-change basis, the spring 2005 forecasts of the
Commission services project the 2005 deficit at 3.6 %
of GDP, followed by 4.6 % of GDP.
2.3.2. The surveillance mechanisms 
in the non-euro-area Member States
After the publication of the Commission services’ spring
2004 economic forecasts, which took into account data
reported in March 2004, the Commission initiated the
excessive deficit procedure for six new Member States:
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta, Poland
and Slovakia. The Council decided on 5 July 2004 that
an excessive deficit existed in these countries and at the
same time issued an Article 104(7) recommendation to
each of them for its correction. Different deadlines, from
2005 to 2008, were set for the correction of the excessive
deficit, taking into account the deficit level, growth pros-
pects, and the intentions of the authorities regarding the
participation in EMU. Except for Hungary, the Commis-
sion considered on 22 December 2004 that all countries
had taken effective action in response to the Council rec-
ommendation, in particular to respect the 2005 deficit
target set in the May 2004 convergence programmes.
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that no further
steps were necessary for the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Graph I.9: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the Netherlands
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5Malta, Poland and Slovakia under the excessive deficit
procedure.
Hungary
On 5 July 2004, the Council issued a recommendation to
the Hungarian authorities to implement the measures
envisaged in the May 2004 convergence programme
aiming at a correction of the excessive deficit by 2008.
The Hungarian authorities were recommended to stand
ready to introduce additional measures, if necessary,
with a view to achieving the deficit targets for 2004
and 2005.
On 18 January 2005, the Council considered that Hun-
gary had not taken effective action in response to its rec-
ommendation. The Council considered that the measures
taken were not sufficient to avoid a sizeable deviation
from the 2004 and 2005 deficit targets and from the
adjustment path planned in the convergence programme.
Having joined the Community on 1 May 2004, Hungary
is a Member State with a derogation, which means that
it is to avoid excessive deficits but that Article 104(9)
and (11) of the Treaty does not apply to it. The Council
therefore issued another recommendation based on
Article 104(7), taking into account information from
Hungary’s convergence programme update submitted
in December 2004.
This update foresees a decline in the general government
deficit from 4.4 % of GDP in 2004 to 2.2 % of GDP in
2007 and 1.6 % of GDP in 2008. These figures benefit
from the decision by Eurostat of 23 September 2004
allowing that, for a transitory period, until the March
2007 fiscal notification, second-pillar pension funds can
be recorded inside the general government. This lowers
the yearly deficit figures by 0.8 to 1 percentage point
between 2004 and 2008. Including the impact of the pen-
sion reform of 1998, the projected deficit path would
show a reduction from 5.3 % of GDP in 2004 to 2.8 % of
GDP in 2008.
On 8 March 2005, the Council adopted a new recom-
mendation under Article 104(7) recommending notably
the Hungarian authorities to: (i) put an end to the exces-
sive deficit situation as rapidly as possible; (ii) take
action in a medium-term framework in order to bring the
deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2008 in a credible and
sustainable manner; and (iii) take effective action by
8 July 2005 regarding additional measures, as far as pos-
sible of a structural nature, in order to achieve the deficit
target for 2005 as set in the December convergence
Graph I.10: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Italy
Source: Commission services.
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Article 104(7) recommendation will be assessed by the
Commission at the expiry of this deadline.
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast pro-
jected a deficit of 3.9 % of GDP in 2005, followed by
4.1 % of GDP in 2006, on a no-policy-change basis. This
is to be compared with the 3.6 and 2.9 % of GDP respec-
tively in the December 2004 update of the convergence
programme, which constituted the basis for the multian-
nual adjustment path recommended by the Council in
March 2005.
Czech Republic
The Council recommendation under Article 104(7) to
the Czech authorities was to correct the excessive deficit
by 2008 and to take effective action by 5 November 2004
in order to achieve the 2005 deficit target, set in the
May 2004 convergence programme at 4.7 % of GDP.
In summer 2004, the Parliament passed a law on new
budgetary rules, which introduced fiscal targeting based
on medium-term expenditure ceilings for central govern-
ment. Although the expenditure ceilings will become
legally binding only in 2006, the government had
already accepted them as voluntary guidelines for the
2004 and 2005 budgets. The 2005 State budget largely
respects the 2005 expenditure ceiling, leading to a sharp
decline in the expenditure ratio, and includes revenue
cuts worth 0.7 % of GDP.
The spring 2005 forecast of the Commission services of
a deficit of 4.5 % of GDP in 2005 confirms that the
measures taken by the Czech authorities should be suffi-
cient to achieve the 2005 deficit target. The Commission
projects a further decline in the deficit in 2006, at 4.0 %
of GDP.
Cyprus
The Council recommended the Cypriot authorities to
take effective action by 5 November 2004 in order to
achieve their objective of bringing the deficit below 3 %
of GDP in 2005 in a credible and sustainable manner.
According to the projections in the 2005 budget, the def-
icit would decrease to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005, i.e. just
below the reference value of 3 % of GDP. The deficit
reduction in 2005 is projected to be achieved through
Graph I.11: Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Hungary
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5revenue increases and expenditure cuts. The measures
ensuring expenditure restraint appear to be mostly struc-
tural (cap on current expenditure, increase in the retire-
ment age for public sector employees). Revenue meas-
ures are a mix of structural and one-off measures (tax
amnesty, fees for issuance of title deeds for certain real
estate).
In spring 2005, the Commission services projected a
decline in the deficit ratio to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005 and,
on a no-policy-change basis, to 1.9 % in 2006. This con-
firms that the consolidation impact of the envisaged
measures should be sufficient to achieve the 2005 deficit
target.
Malta
The Council recommended to the Maltese authorities to
correct the excessive deficit by 2006 and to take action
by 5 November 2004 regarding the measures envisaged
to achieve the 2005 deficit target set in the May conver-
gence programme at 3.7 % of GDP.
The 2005 budget confirmed this projection, targeting a
decline in the deficit ratio from 5.2 % in 2004 to 3.7 %
in 2005. Two thirds of the total deficit reduction would
result from structural measures consisting mainly of tax
increases (introduction of an excise duty on mobile
telephony services, increase in the departure tax on air
fares, imposition of VAT and excise duty on kerosene,
increase in excise duty on tobacco). The remaining third
would be generated through one-off measures on the
revenue side (sale of government property, revenues to
be raised from listed/unlisted companies).
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
the 2005 deficit at 3.9 % of GDP, confirming that the
budgetary target set in the budget for 2005 (3.7 % of
GDP) is plausible.
Poland
The Council recommended to the Polish authorities to
correct the excessive deficit by 2007 and to take action
by 5 November 2004 regarding the measures envisaged
to achieve the 2005 deficit target of 4.2 % of GDP set in
the convergence programme of May 2004.
The budget for 2005 foresees a reduction in the govern-
ment deficit from 5.6 % of GDP in 2004 to 3.9 % in
2005. The deficit would decrease further to 3.1 % of
GDP in 2006. Measures from the Hausner plan con-
tained in the budget would have a deficit-reducing
impact of 1.1 percentage points in 2005 and 0.8 percent-
age points in 2006. The authorities expect to achieve a
further deficit reduction of up to 0.6 % of GDP by imple-
menting measures aiming at a widening of the tax base.
The measures adopted and planned appear to be mostly
of a structural nature, thus also having a deficit-reducing
impact in subsequent years.
The Commission services’ spring 2005 economic fore-
casts confirm that the consolidation impact of the envis-
aged measures should be sufficient to achieve the 2005
deficit target in the budget. In particular, against the
background of the projected strong growth and the cor-
rective measures taken by the government, the projec-
tions by the Commission services show a decline in the
deficit to 4.4 % of GDP in 2005 from the estimated
4.8 % in 2004 and, on a no-policy-change basis, further
to 3.8 % in 2006.
Slovakia
As regards Slovakia, the Council recommended to cor-
rect the excessive deficit by 2007 and to take effective
action by 5 November 2004 regarding the measures
envisaged to achieve the 2005 deficit target set at 3.9 %
of GDP in the May convergence programme.
On 9 December 2004, the Slovak Parliament adopted the
budget for 2005, setting the 2005 deficit target at 3.8 %
of GDP (3.4 % of GDP without the revenue loss stem-
ming from the introduction of a funded pension pillar).
The budget incorporates: (i) a systemic pension reform,
leading to a redirection of social security contributions to
a newly introduced funded pension pillar; (ii) the last
tranches of the current government’s healthcare reform
agenda; and (iii) further public sector rationalisation.
These reforms almost fully completed the current gov-
ernment’s reform agenda, most of which had already
been implemented in the budget year 2004 and which
encompassed, in particular, a comprehensive tax reform
package.
In their spring 2005 forecast, the Commission services
projected an increase in the general government deficit
from 3.8 % of GDP in 2005 to 4.0 % in 2006, on a no-
policy-change basis. This confirms that the measures
presented up to now are broadly sufficient to achieve the
2005 deficit target set in the May 2004 convergence pro-
gramme.42
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3. Overview of the 2004 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes
3.1. Growth projections
The examination of the sixth round of updates of stabil-
ity and convergence programmes (SCPs), covering the
period up to 2008, was completed by March 2005 for all
the countries apart from Portugal, which was expected to
deliver the final update only in spring 2005 (1).
In order to make an assessment of the budgetary targets
set by Member States in the 2004 updates of the pro-
grammes, it is necessary to examine the growth assump-
tions upon which the budgetary commitments are made.
Economic growth is, according to the updates, projected
to recover gradually over the coming years. The average
GDP growth in the euro area is expected to increase to
2.3 % in 2005 and to reach around 2.4 % in 2006 and in
the following years (see Table I.8). Particularly favoura-
ble growth prospects are expected to continue in the
EU-10.
In comparison with the 2003 updates of the programmes,
growth projections have been revised downwards (see
the lower half of Table I.8 and Table I.9). The negative
revisions concern the whole period, but, in particular,
2005 and 2006. Nevertheless, growth projections are still
more favourable than the Commission services’ autumn
2004 forecast, by on average 0.3 and 0.2 percentage
points per year respectively in 2005 and 2006. This was
also the case for the previous updates. The growth pro-
jections seem to be even more optimistic in comparison
with the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecasts
(see last row of Table I.8).
The aggregate potential GDP growth in the euro area is
projected to be relatively stable at between 2 and 2.2 %
throughout the entire programme period. The output gap
in the euro area is projected to narrow but remain negative
throughout the programme period. More precisely, the
euro-area output gap would be – 1 % of potential GDP in
2005, fall further in 2006 to – 0.8 % and to – 0.6 % in 2007
(see Graph I.13). Because of more favourable growth sce-
narios in the updates on average, the output gap projec-
tions are less negative than in the Commission services’
autumn 2004 forecasts. Outside the euro area, the new
Member States exhibit the highest rates of potential GDP
growth in the Union.
3.2. The medium-term budgetary targets
Based on these growth assumptions, the nominal deficit
in the euro area would, according to the updated pro-
grammes, amount to 2.8 % of GDP in 2004, which is a
â percentage point higher compared with the previous
updates (see Table I.9). The nominal deficit is, thereaf-
ter, projected to be gradually reduced to 1.3 % of GDP
by 2007. The overall improvement relies strongly on the
budgetary consolidation projected in the large Member
States, such as Germany (2ä percentage points over the
period 2004–08), France (2.7 percentage points over the
same period) and Italy (1.5 percentage points over the
period 2004–07) and also in Greece (3.7 percentage
points over the same period). Outside the euro area, sub-
stantial consolidation of public finances is foreseen in
recently acceded Member States with budget deficits.
Among these, particularly strong reductions are
expected in the countries with initially high deficits, such
as Cyprus (3.9 percentage points over the next four
years), Malta (3.8 percentage points over the next three
years), Poland (2.8 percentage points over the same
period) and Hungary (2.7 percentage points over the
next four years). 
¥1∂ See Table I.17. for a summary of the Council examinations of the 2004
updates of the stability and convergence programmes.44
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sThe excessive deficits in Germany and France are
foreseen to be corrected in 2005 according to the
respective stability programme. However, there are
risks that the deficits in both countries will remain
above the 3 % of GDP reference value also in 2005, in
particular as growth may be lower than expected. In
Greece, the expected deficit is projected to be cor-
rected in 2006.
The Netherlands also appears to be on track to correct its
excessive deficit in 2005.
Outside the euro area, sizeable budgetary improvements
are expected in all six Member States under the exces-
sive deficit procedure, of which only Cyprus is projected
to bring the deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference
value in 2005.
According to the latest updates, Malta will follow in
2006, Slovakia and Poland in 2007, and Hungary in
2008, while the Czech Republic does not plan to correct
the excessive deficit before the end of the programme
period (1).
Ireland and Estonia are the only Member States that
project a budgetary deterioration between 2004 and the
end of the programme period, albeit from a surplus
budgetary position. A comparison between the projec-
tions provided by the Member States (the left panel of
Table I.10) and the Commission services’ autumn
2004 and spring 2005 forecasts (right panels) shows
that most updates are more optimistic about budgetary
developments in 2005 and 2006 than the Commission
services’ forecasts, in particular those of France,
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. The only countries
projecting less favourable budgetary developments
compared with the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecasts are Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Esto-
nia and Lithuania, reflecting among other things more
cautious growth assumptions.    
Table I.8
Euro area: growth projections and macroeconomic developments in the 2004 updates (percentage change 
on preceding year), and comparison with the Commission forecasts and the 2003 updates (percentage points)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2004 updates of the stability programmes
Real GDP growth 0.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5
GDP deflator 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
HICP change 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.5
Employment growth  0.1 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.2
Labour productivity growth   0.8 2.2 1.4 1.3
2003 updates of the stability programmes
Real GDP growth 0.6 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.5
Difference from 2004 updates 0.0 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts
Real GDP growth 0.6 2.1 2.0 2.2
Difference from 2004 updates 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecasts
Real GDP growth 0.6 2.0 1.6 2.1
Difference from 2004 updates 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3
NB: Commission services’ calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding. The Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts were used to obtain a representative
aggregate by replacing the missing information on HICP in the German programme and for Greece and Portugal (both 2004–06). For Spain and France, the private
consumption index was used instead of the HICP. The missing information on employment growth for France was replaced by reported information on dependent
employment growth in the market sector.
¥1∂ According to the Council recommendation under Article 104(7), its dead-
line to correct the excessive deficit is 2008.45
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5All countries provided figures for the cyclically adjusted
budget balance (CAB) in their updates of the pro-
grammes. They are presented in the left panel of
Table I.11 The central panel of the table shows the CAB
derived by the Commission services, on the basis of the
figures provided by the Member States in the updates.
According to these figures, the CAB for the euro area,
which amounted to – 2.1 % of GDP in 2004, is projected
to improve by, on average, 0.4 percentage points of GDP
annually in the coming years.   
Although for the euro area in 2005 the Commission serv-
ices’ forecasts foresee a similar size of adjustment (the
right panel of Table I.10), no significant improvement is
expected in 2006.
One reason for this divergence could be the no-policy-
change assumption for 2006 in the Commission services’
forecasts.
According to the Commission services’ calculations, of
the six euro-area countries showing a deficit in the CAB
in 2004, only Spain is expected to be in balance in 2008,
while the projected budgetary adjustment in Germany,
France, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands is insufficient
to ensure that a budgetary position close to balance is
achieved within the programme period.
In particular, attention should be paid to the planned
adjustments in Member States in excessive deficit posi-
tions. According to the Commission services’ calcula-
Table I.9
Projections of real growth in the 2004 updates (percentage change on preceding year)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0
DE – 0.1 1.8 1.7 1 ã 2.0 2.8
EL 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.2
ES 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0
FR 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
IE 3.7 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.4
IT 0.3 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3
LU 2.9 4.4 3.8 3.3 4.3
NL – 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.5 2.5
AT 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.4
PT
FI 2.0 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.0
EUR-12 0.6 (1) 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5
CZ 3.1 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8
DK 0.5 2.2 2.5 1.3 1.9
EE 5.1 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0
CY 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.5
LV 7.5 8.1 6.7 6.5 6.5
LT 9.7 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.0
HU 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.6
MT – 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.8 2.2
PL 3.8 5.7 5.0 4.8 5.6
SI 2.5 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.0
SK 4.2 5.0 4.5 5.1 5.4
SE 1.6 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.3
UK (2) 2 ä 3 ä 3 2 â 2 ä
EU-25 1.2 (1) 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7
(1) In the calculation of the euro-area and the EU averages for the year 2003, data from the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts were used for France and
Cyprus. The same source was used for Portugal for the period 2004–06 to get a representative aggregate.
(2) Financial years ending in the following March.46
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t stions, Germany projects an improvement in the CAB of
0.6 percentage points in 2005, of 0.5 percentage points
in 2006 and of only 0.3 percentage points in 2007. As
regards France, the Commission services’ calculations
indicate a planned improvement in the CAB of 0.6 to
0.7 percentage points of GDP per year as from 2005.
Greece foresees a particularly important adjustment of
2.6 percentage points in 2005, of 0.9 percentage points
in 2006 and of 0.5 percentage points in 2007. For the
three Member States, the size of the projected adjust-
ments in the updates is broadly in line with that calcu-
lated by the Commission services (based on the updates)
and for Germany it is also in line with the Commission
services’ autumn 2004 forecast. For the Netherlands, the
Commission services’ calculations foresee an improve-
ment in the CAB by 0.4 percentage points in 2005 and no
changes beyond that, which makes the update tilted
towards the optimistic side.
Table I.10
Nominal budget balances in the 2004 updates and the Commission services’ autumn 2004 
and spring 2005 forecasts (1)
(% of GDP)
2004 updates of the stability 
and convergence programmes
Commission services’ 
autumn 2004 forecasts
Commission services’ spring 
2005 forecasts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
BE 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.6
DE – 3.8 – 3ã – 2.9 – 2â – 2.0 – 1â – 3.9 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.8
EL – 5.2 – 6.1 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 5.5 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 4.4
ES 0.4 – 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
FR – 3.6 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 0.9 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4
IE 0.1 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.5 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
IT – 2.4 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 4.6
LU 0.8 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9
NL – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.6
AT – 1.1 – 1.3 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.0 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.7
PT – 2.9 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 2.9 – 4.9 – 4.7
FI 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.6
EUR-12 – 2.7 (1) – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.7
CZ – 12.6 – 5.2 – 4.7 – 3.8 – 3.3 – 4.8 – 4.7 – 4.3 – 3.0 – 4.5 – 4.0
DK 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.7 2.8 2.1 2.2
EE 3.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.9 0.5
CY – 4.8 – 2.9 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 5.2 – 3.0 – 2.4 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 1.9
LV – 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.9 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 1.5
LT – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
HU (2) – 5.5 – 4.5 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 5.5 – 5.2 – 4.7 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.1
MT – 9.6 – 5.2 – 3.7 – 2.3 – 1.4 – 5.1 – 4.0 – 3.3 – 5.2 – 3.9 – 2.8
PL (2) – 3.9 – 5.4 – 3.9 – 3.2 – 2.2 – 5.6 – 4.1 – 3.1 – 4.8 – 4.4 – 3.8
SI – 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1
SK (2) – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.8 – 3.9 – 3.0 – 3.9 – 4.0 – 4.1 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 4.0
SE 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.8
UK (3) – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7
EU-25 – 2.8 (1) – 2.7 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.5
(1) In the calculation of the euro-area and the EU averages for the year 2003, data from the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts were used for France and
Cyprus. The same source was used for Portugal for the period 2004–06.
(2) For Hungary and Poland, the budgetary burden arising from their respective pension reforms is not included in the left panel. According to the March 2005 EDP
notification, the budgetary effect for Hungary was 0.9 % of GDP p.a. in 2003 and 2004. According to Hungarian national sources, the effect in 2005 and 2006 is
expected to be of 1.1 % of GDP in 2005 and 1.2 % of GDP p.a. for the period until 2008. The budgetary effect on the deficit for Poland was, according to the March
2005 EDP notification, 1.7 % of GDP in 2003 and 2.0 % of GDP in 2004. According to Polish national sources, the effect on the deficit in 2005 and 2006 is
expected to be 1.9 % of GDP p.a. For Slovakia, the figures include the deficit-increasing effect of the introduction of a funded pension scheme in 2005 (estimated in
the convergence programme at 0.4 % of GDP in 2005, 1 % of GDP in 2006 and 1.1 % of GDP in 2007).
(3) Financial years ending in the following March, excluding the UMTS receipts.47
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5The development in the general government balance can
be decomposed by sectors of government (see Table I.12).
Table I.12. Euro area: net lending by subsectors in the
2004 updates shows that the budget deficit of the general
government in the euro area is mainly the result of a large
deficit of the central government, with a far smaller deficit
for the state/local governments. The social security sector
is foreseen to be recording a small surplus.
3.3. Composition of the budgetary 
adjustment
The updates of the programmes show that both revenue
and expenditure ratios are expected to decline over the
programme period (see Table I.13). In the euro area, total
receipts are expected to fall by 0.6 percentage points
between 2004 and 2007, to below 45 % of GDP by the
end of the programme period. This is more than compen-
sated by reductions in the expenditure ratio which, over
the same period, are expected to amount to almost 2 per-
centage points of GDP. Revenue ratios are projected to
decline in all Member States with the exception of
Greece, Spain and France, where they are expected to
increase. Contrary to this, outside the euro area, total
receipts are foreseen to rise in all countries except for the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Malta and
Sweden, where they are set to decrease. Particularly
strong reductions in revenue are projected in Estonia,
Ireland and Austria. Almost all Member States are set to
decrease the expenditure ratio, with the exception of
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the UK. Particularly
strong reductions are planned by the Czech Republic,
Germany, Hungary, Malta and Austria. For Germany
and France, the size of projected adjustments in the
updates is very much in line with that calculated by the
Commission services (based on the updates) and for
Germany also in line with the Commission services’
autumn 2004 forecast.                 
A closer look at the euro-area budgetary developments
for the general government over the programme period
reveals that the abovementioned reduction in total
receipts can be ascribed to a planned fall in social contri-
butions and other revenues. As to the components of
public expenditure, very limited data are provided for
collective consumption. According to the updates, most
of the planned reduction in total expenditure is due to a
decrease in social transfers in the euro area, both in kind
and other than in kind, as they are projected to fall by
1.8 percentage points over the programme period. The
rest is due to lower gross fixed capital formation,
Graph I.12: Nominal budget balances in the euro area: evolution in projections 
from the 2000–04 updates of the stability programmes (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t splanned cuts in subsidies as well as slightly reduced
interest and other expenditure. Graph I.14 presents the
contribution to the change in the budget balances from
four budget components, namely primary current expen-
ditures, interest expenditure, gross fixed capital forma-
tion and total revenues. A number of remarks can be
made.
Firstly, Member States that have been under the exces-
sive deficit procedure project a substantial improve-
ment in budget balances via cuts in primary current
expenditures. However, excluding Greece, France,
Cyprus, Slovakia and Poland, further tax cuts are also
foreseen. In the case of Hungary, the Netherlands,
Poland and Slovakia, the budgetary adjustment
involves a decline in public investments (1). The
Table I.11
Cyclically adjusted budget balances in the 2004 updates and the Commission services’ autumn 2004 
and spring 2005 forecasts on the basis of the production function method
(% of GDP)
2004 programme updates Commission services’ calculations based on the 2004 updates (1)
Commission 
services’ autumn 2004 
forecasts (1)
Commission 
services’ spring 2005 
forecasts (1)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
BE 0.4 0.0 – 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.0 – 0.4 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
DE – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 3.0 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 2.3
EL – 6.9 – 4.4 – 3.8 – 3.3 – 7.0 – 4.4 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 6.1 – 4.4 – 3.8 – 7.1 – 5.5 – 5.3
ES – 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 – 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.3 0.0 0.2
FR – 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 0.7 – 3.5 – 2.8 – 3.1 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.1
IE 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.2 – 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.6 – 0.1 0.1
IT – 2.2 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 3.4 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 4.0
LU – 1.4 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.6 0.7 0.3 1.4 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
NL – 2.1 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.0
AT – 0.6 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 0.7 0.0 0.9 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.0 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.6
PT (2) – 1.9 – 2.7 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 3.7
FI 2.1 1.7 2 2.1 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.4 1.9 1.8
EUR–12 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.2
CZ – 5.2 – 4.7 – 3.8 – 3.3
DK 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2 2.3 1.5 1.8 1.9 3.4 2.5 2.4
EE 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
CY – 4.3 – 2.7 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 0.9
LV – 1.7 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.6
LT – 3.1 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 2.1
HU – 4.4 – 3.6 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 1.7
MT – 3.8 – 2.2 – 0.9 – 0.1
PL – 5.3 – 3.9 – 3.1 – 2.3
SI – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.0
SK – 3.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.0
SE 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.6 1.7 0.8 0.7
UK (3) – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.6 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6
EU-25 (4) – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 2.1 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.0
(1) Based on the production function method, except in the case of Spain, where the HP filter method was used. The Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts are
based on pre-budget figures for the UK; for 2006, on the assumption of unchanged policies.
(2) For Portugal (2004–06), the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts have been used to have a representative aggregate for the 2004 updates and the Commis-
sion services’ calculations.
(3) Financial years ending in the following March for data on the convergence programme update.
(4) For the Commission services’ calculations, it concerns the EU-15.
¥1∂ The apparent decline in Cyprus, which mainly occurs in 2004, is attributa-
ble to the reclassification of certain expenditures previously included in
the development expenditures to ordinary or current expenditures.  49
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2 0 0 5decline in the new Member States implies that the
budgetary adjustment arising from this item is coming
to an end, particularly given their substantial invest-
ment needs to improve infrastructure. In Hungary, a
significant fall in interest expenditure over the pro-
gramme period is expected to contribute to an improve-
ment in the budget balance. Secondly, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg and the UK plan to increase the
expenditure ratio (notably public investments). This
will be financed by an increase in the revenue ratio,
which should help in reducing the deficit bringing it
closer to balance. Thirdly, several Member States with
a budget close to balance or in surplus in 2004 (Bel-
gium, Denmark and Sweden) foresee cuts in primary
current expenditures as well as in taxes, thereby reduc-
ing the size of the public sector while maintaining
sound budgetary positions. Finally, deterioration in the
budget balance over the period is expected in Estonia
and Ireland, albeit from a position of budget surpluses.
The reduction in revenues in both countries is partially
compensated by cuts in primary current expenditures,
and in public investments.
Table I.12
Euro area: net lending by subsectors in the 2004 updates
(% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government – 2.7 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.3
Central government – 1.7 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.7
State plus local governments – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1
Social security funds 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4
NB: Commission services’ calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes.
Graph I.13: Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in the euro area, 2004–07
NB: The changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance are used as a proxy of the fiscal stance, while the size of the output gap is used as a proxy of the
cyclical conditions. A positive value for the fiscal stance represents a tightening of discretionary fiscal policies.
Source: Commission services’ calculations based on the 2004 updates of the stability programmes.
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The gross debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area is expected
to have increased to 71.1 % of GDP in 2004 (see
Table I.15). As was the case in the previous vintages of
updates, most Member States revised their debt level
upwards but project a gradual improvement in the debt
ratio over the programme period. However, the adjust-
ment path is slower and the debt ratio for 2006 is pro-
jected to be 1.3 percentage points higher than the figure
projected in the 2003 updates (see Graph I.15) and even
higher compared with the previous updates. This is
mainly due to smaller primary surpluses, while the con-
tribution from the increasing nominal GDP growth is
projected to remain broadly unchanged.
Table I.15 also shows that the estimated stock-flow com-
ponent on average increases the debt ratio over the pro-
gramme period. This could stem from plans to build up
financial assets (e.g. public pension reserve funds which
are invested in non-governmental assets) (1). 
Table I.13
Revenue and expenditure ratios in the 2004 updates 
(% of GDP)
Total revenue Total expenditure
2004 2007 2004–07 2004 2007 2004–07
BE 49.6 49.1 – 0.5 49.6 48.8 – 0.8
DE 43â 42â – 1.0 47â 44â – 3.0
EL 44.4 46.7 2.3 50.4 48.9 – 0.5
ES 39.9 40.1 0.2 40.6 39.8 – 0.8
FR 50.4 50.8 0.4 54.0 52.4 – 1.6
IE 35.2 33.2 – 2.0 34.3 33.8 – 0.5
IT 45.6 44.1 – 1.5 48.5 47.1 – 1.4
LU 43.4 44.7 1.3 44.8 45.7 0.9
NL 45.0 44.1 – 0.9 48.0 46.0 – 2.0
AT 48.7 46.0 – 2.7 50.0 46.7 – 3.3
PT (1)
FI 50.5 50.5 0.0 48.5 48.4 – 0.1
EUR-12 45.5 44.9 – 0.6 48.3 46.5 – 1.8
CZ 49.3 47.5 – 1.8 54.6 50.8 – 3.8
DK 55.6 54.5 – 1.1 54.4 52.8 – 1.6
EE 41.0 37.6 – 3.4 40.0 37.6 – 2.4
CY 39.0 40.6 1.6 43.8 42.1 – 1.7
LV 34.3 35.1 0.8 36.0 36.5 0.5
LT 33.0 34.5 1.5 35.5 36.0 0.5
HU (2) 44.8 43.2 – 1.6 49.3 45.6 – 3.7
MT 44.7 42.9 – 1.8 49.9 44.3 – 5.6
PL (2) 43.2 44.0 0.8 48.6 46.2 – 2.4
SI 46.1 46.3 0.2 48.2 47.4 – 0.8
SK (2) 35.3 35.8 0.5 39.1 38.8 – 0.3
SE 55.5 54.1 – 1.4 54.8 53.2 – 1.6
UK (3) 37.9 39.9 2.0 40.9 42.0 1.1
EU-25 44.6 44.4 – 0.2 47.4 45.9 – 1.5
(1) For Portugal (2004–06), the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts have been used to have a representative aggregate for the 2004 updates and the Commis-
sion services’ calculations.
(2) See footnote 2 to Table I.10.
(3) Financial years ending in the following March. Concerns total current revenue.
NB: Commission services’ calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes. Therefore, the net lending implied
by this table may be different from that in Table I.10.
¥1∂ As in the previous updates, large contributions of the stock-flow compo-
nent over the period are identified in Finland (with a yearly average around
4 % of GDP), Greece (around 3 %), Sweden (around 1.5 %) and Ireland
(around 1 %).51
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Euro area: budgetary developments within the general government
(% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004–07
Components of revenue
     Taxes 25.6 26.8 26.7 26.7 26.8 0.0
     Social contributions 15.6 15.3 15.2 14.9 14.9 – 0.4
     Other revenue 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 – 0.3
Total revenue 46.2 45.5 45.2 45.0 44.8 – 0.7
Components of expenditure
     Collective consumption
     Social transfers in kind 14.8 14.6 14.2 14.1 13.8 – 0.8
     Social transfers other than in kind 17.7 17.6 17.2 16.9 16.6 – 1.0
     Interest expenditure 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 – 0.1
     Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 – 0.1
     Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.2 – 0.3
     Other 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 – 0.1
Total expenditure 48.9 48.3 47.5 47.1 46.4 – 1.9
NB: Commission services’ calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding, lack of data or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes.
Graph I.14: Contribution to change in budgetary position, 2004–07 (percentage points)
NB: A positive value indicates a positive contribution to the change in budgetary position. A positive value in total variation of budgetary position (value is
presented on top of columns) implies an improvement in the balance. For UK data, refer to 2004–06. For Portuguese data, refer to the period 2004–06
from the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecast. For Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, see footnote 2 to Table I.10. 
Source: 2004 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
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Member States with debt levels currently above the 60 %
of GDP ceiling (Belgium, Germany, Greece, France,
Italy, Austria and Portugal) that plan to reduce their debt
levels over the programme period, only Austria expects
it to be below the debt reference value by the end of it.
On the other hand, by the end of the programme period,
only Ireland and Luxembourg plan not to have their debt
levels above 30 % of GDP.
In the Member States outside the euro area, government
debt is on average lower. Overall, apart from the Czech
Table I.15
Euro area: gross debt level and changes in the 2004 updates 
(% of GDP)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Gross debt level 71.1 70.7 69.7 68.3 (1)
Change in gross debt 0.4 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 1.4
Previous updates of the programmes 70.0 69.4 68.4 67.6
Difference 1.1 1.3 1.3 – 0.7
Contributions to change in gross debt
     Primary balance – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.1
     Interest expenditure 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3
     Nominal GDP growth – 2.7 – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.8
     Stock-flow adjustment (2) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
(1) For Portugal (2004–06), the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts have been used to have a representative aggregate for the 2004 updates and the Commis-
sion services’ calculations. Therefore, the 2007 projection of the aggregate gross debt level does not include information on projected debt in this country.
(2) The programmes do not always contain enough information to identify directly the contribution from different factors to the development of the euro-area debt
ratio. Therefore, it has been necessary in some cases to derive the contribution from nominal GDP growth (GDP deflator plus real GDP growth multiplied by the
debt ratio). In this way, the stock-flow adjustment is derived as a residual.
NB: Commission services’ calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes.
Graph I.15: Debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area: evolution in projections from the 2000 updates 
to the 2004 updates of the stability programmes (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5Republic, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and the UK, all these
Member States are expected to have lower debt levels in
2007 than in 2003. By the end of the programme period,
only in Malta is government debt expected to stay above
the 60 % of GDP reference value. Finally, in four coun-
tries, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia,
debt levels are expected to be below 30 % of GDP at the
end of the programme period.  
Table I.16
Debt levels in the 2004 updates (1)
(% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 100.0 96.6 95.5 91.7 88.0 84.2
DE 64.2 65â 66.0 66.0 65â 65.0
EL 110.5 108.0 103.9 99.9
ES 50.7 49.1 46.7 44.3 42.0 40.0
FR 64.8 65.0 64.6 63.6 62.0
IE 32.1 30.5 30.1 30.1 30.0
IT 106.2 106.0 104.1 101.9 99.2
LU 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.5
NL 54.1 56.3 58.1 58.6 58.3
AT 64.5 64.2 63.6 63.1 61.6 59.1
PT
FI 45.6 44.6 43.4 42.5 41.7 41.1
EUR-12 70.7 71.1 70.7 69.7 67.5  
CZ 37.8 38.6 38.3 39.2 40.0
DK 44.7 42.3 39.4 37.4 35.3
EE 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.1 2.9
CY 74.9 71.9 69.2 65.7 58.1
LV 14.4 14.2 14.5 14.8 15.0
LT 21.4 20.1 20.9 20.3 20.1
HU 57.0 57.3 55.3 53.0 50.6 48.3
MT 70.4 73.2 72.0 70.5 70.4
PL 45.4 45.9 47.6 48.0 47.2
SI 29.4 30.2 30.7 30.9 29.7
SK 42.8 43.0 44.2 45.3 45.5
SE 52.0 51.7 50.5 50.0 49.0
UK (2) 39.5 40.9 41.8 42.4 42.8 42.8
EU-25 63.3 63.7 63.4 62.7 60.9
(1) In the calculation of the euro-area and the EU averages for the year 2003, data from the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecasts were used for France and
Cyprus. The same source was used for Portugal for the period 2004–06.
(2) Financial years ending in the following March.
Source: Commission services.54
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4. The sustainability of public finances 
based on the 2004 updates of stability 
and convergence programmes
4.1. Introduction
The projected demographic changes, with the old-age
dependency ratio doubling over the coming decades in
the EU, have led to growing concerns regarding the
long-term sustainability of public finances. Since the
launch of the euro, in 1999, the Commission has
sought to integrate an examination of the sustainabil-
ity of public finances into the existing EU framework
for the surveillance of Member States’ economic and
budgetary policies, in line with the conclusions of the
Stockholm (March 2001) and Barcelona (March
2002) European Council meetings and the March
2003 Ecofin Council. In addition, the 20 March 2005
Ecofin Council emphasised long-term sustainability
issues in the context of the reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
The Commission is therefore regularly producing the
assessment of long-term sustainability of public
finances in the context of the Stability and Growth
Pact. This chapter presents the overview of the assess-
ment of the long-term sustainability of public finances
based on the 2004 updates of stability and convergence
programmes, carried out by the Commission for the
fourth year in a row. With this round of assessments,
the quantitative analysis also includes for the first time
the recently acceded Member States.
The assessment of long-term sustainability of public
finances is a multifaceted issue and there is no unique
indicator which gives a clear response on whether a
country’s public finances are sustainable in the long run.
Thus, drawing on the EPC 2003 report (1), the Commis-
sion assessed long-term sustainability of public finances
using both quantitative indicators and qualitative infor-
mation. Although the approach followed was broadly
similar to that used in previous assessments (see Euro-
pean Commission, 2002a, 2003a and 2004a for a review
of the first three assessments), it is important to note a
number of improvements undertaken in order to enhance
the quality of the assessment.
As regards the quantitative indicators, in the previous
assessment round the cyclical component of the budget
balance was netted out so that the long-term projections
were only affected by the more structural components of
the budget. With the current assessment round, one-off
measures have also been netted out so that such tempo-
rary measures do not affect the long-term projections. In
practice, the tax-to-GDP ratio in the last year of the pro-
gramme has been corrected by the cyclical component
and in addition by any possible one-off measures. In
addition, public pension funds with the strict purpose of
covering pension-related expenditures have been netted
out from Maastricht debt, as this adjusted gross debt
measure better reflects the sustainability challenge.
Also, greater attention has been devoted to qualitative
features when making the assessment, which is a key
aspect in enriching the interpretation of the results
obtained. The main qualitative features shaped into the
assessment deal with the current level of the debt ratio,
the impact of structural reforms and the reliability of the
projections, and the current level of the tax burden.
¥1∂ See the report of the Economic Policy Committee (2003), ‘The impact of
ageing populations on public finances: overview of analysis carried out at
EU level and proposals for a future work programme’, October 2003
(available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/documents/
2003/pensionmaster_en.pdf).57
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4.2.1. Quantitative indicators
Table I.18 summarises the data included in the 2004
updates of the stability and convergence programmes
that were used to run the sustainability indicators. Prior-
ity has been given to the national projections reported in
the programmes, complemented, if necessary, with the
commonly agreed EPC projections.
Table I.19 presents projected changes in the expenditure
and revenues between the first year of projections and
2050. As expected, the projections of age-related expen-
ditures show that especially pension but also healthcare-
related expenditures are of the highest concern for the
long-term sustainability of public finances. In fact, in
12 Member States, healthcare expenditure is expected to
grow faster than pension spending, notably in France,
Malta, Austria, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK. In turn,
other age-related expenditures — among which educa-
tion — are projected to decline in the majority of coun-
tries, although insufficiently to offset the increase in pen-
sion and healthcare expenditures.
EPC projections on unemployment benefits and educa-
tion, carried out for the first time in 2003, were added to
the age-related expenditures for all EU-15 countries that
did not provide such information in the programme (1).
Thus, at least four different age-related expenditure
items — pensions, healthcare, education and unemploy-
ment benefits — were included in the calculations for
almost all EU-15 Member States which contributed to
increased comprehensiveness of the quantitative assess-
ment. For the new Member States, the long-term projec-
tions relied on information contained in the December
2004 convergence programmes and in some cases in the
May 2004 programmes.
On the revenue side, the level of revenue-to-GDP ratio
was kept constant at the underlying level (net of the cycle
and one-off measures) reached in the last year of the pro-
gramme period for most countries (2). The experience so
far suggests that, in the current policies scenario, dynam-
ics may be present not only on the expenditure side, but
also on the revenue side, the latter due to country-spe-
cific factors. It could be envisaged to review the criteria
for which dynamics on the revenue side should be con-
sidered in the sustainability analysis. The adjustment for
the cycle and one-off measures has, in general, the larger
impact on the ‘2004’ scenario compared with the ‘base-
line’ scenario, as: (i) countries are expected to gradually
close the output gap thus reducing the cyclical impact on
the budget balance; and (ii) countries do not plan major
one-off measures for the last year of the programme
period. For most Member States, the cyclically adjusted
balance is higher than the nominal budget balance, as the
output gap is estimated to be negative in most countries.
This improves the primary balance. By contrast, netting
out one-off measures with a positive impact on the
budget balance lowers the primary balance.  
With this assessment exercise, public pension fund
assets were taken into consideration in the sustainability
analysis for those Member States which provided infor-
mation in sufficient detail (3). In brief, such funds should
be taken into account as several Member States have
established funds with the strict purpose of using them to
cover pension-related expenditure. Reducing debt, and
accumulating national government bonds or other liquid
financial assets in public pension funds have a similar
effect on sustainability. In the assessment round of the
2004/05 updated stability and convergence programmes,
the Commission services adjusted Maastricht gross debt
by taking into account such fund assets when assessing
the sustainability of public finances. Adjusted gross debt
equals Maastricht gross debt net of consolidated public
pension fund assets with a market value in the general
government sector accumulated for the strict purpose of
covering pension-related expenditure. Six Member
States (Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Finland and
Sweden) provided the size of public pension fund assets
¥1∂ For a detailed analysis of long-term education expenditure see Economic
Policy Committee (2003) and Montanino et al. (2004).
¥2∂ Changes in the tax ratio were included for seven Member States (Den-
mark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania the Netherlands and Sweden)
in line with the assumption of unchanged legislation. In Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden, projected tax revenues vary as they can largely
be attributed to the deferred tax revenues from contributions to funded
pension systems as well as accumulated earnings prior to disbursement.
For Germany, the projected rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio was addition-
ally influenced by the path of social security contributions which follows
the laws that govern the social security system resulting from unchanged
legislation including the pension insurance sustainability law. In the coun-
tries that implemented systemic reforms of pension systems, total revenue
projections were adjusted for the projected dynamics in the pension contri-
butions to the statutory funded pillar (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), in
order to ensure consistency with the public pension expenditure projec-
tions where such a delimitation was made available. 
¥3∂ In the assessment of the 2002 and 2003 updated stability and convergence
programmes, such assets were taken into account in the case of Finland
and Sweden. 58
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Data used to run the sustainability indicators
(% of GDP)
Age-related expenditure Total non-
age-related 
expenditure
Total revenues
 Pensions Healthcare Education Others
 2009 2050 2009 2050 2009 2050 2009 2050 2009 (const.) 2009 2050
BE 8.8 13.0 7.7 10.6 4.1 3.7 6.5 4.9 17.2 49.0 49.0
CZ 8.6 15.2 6.5 9.3 3.8 3.6 30.2 47.5 47.5
DK 5.5 7.8 8.2 11.0 17.2 18.5 18.9 54.0 57.0
DE 10.9 13.8 7.0 9.5 3.9 3.6 2.5 1.1 16.0 42.1 45.3
EE 6.4 3.7 4.6 4.6 26.2 37.5 36.9
EL 12.3 22.6 5.1 6.6 3.2 3.2 0.4 0.2 22.4 46.2 46.2
ES 8.0 13.0 5.8 7.2 3.9 3.7 0.6 0.4 19.6 40.2 40.2
FR 12.9 14.5 8.1 12.6 5.9 5.5 1.0 0.7 21.0 51.1 51.1
IE 4.1 7.7 6.1 7.8 3.9 3.2 1.0 1.0 17.3 34.1 34.1
IT 13.6 14.4 6.5 8.1 4.5 4.2 0.4 0.3 14.1 43.9 43.9
CY 4.2 9.2 3.5 4.0 30.5 40.6 40.6
LV 5.0 5.2 4.1 4.5 5.9 5.8 20.4 34.8 33.3
LT 5.3 7 4.6 4.6 25.1 34.8 33.3
LU 7.5 9.3 0.3 0.3 37.8 45.1 45.1
HU 7.4 7.6 34.6 42.4 42.4
MT 7.8 8.0 4.7 7.1 28.2 42.9 42.9
NL 5.2 8.3 7.5 10.7 5.0 4.9 6.2 6.6 19.2 45.0 48.4
AT 14.2 13.6 5.2 6.4 5.6 5.0 1.5 2.0 16.4 45.8 45.8
PL 7.1 4.5 4.4 3.5 31.8 42.5 42.5
PT
SI 12.8 18.2 6.8 9.6 26.1 46.3 46.3
SK 6.9 7.4 5.0 6.6 3.4 3.4 0.8 0.6 20.3 36.9 36.9
FI 12.3 15.2 10.3 13.4 5.6 5.4 1.7 0.8 17.1 50.6 50.6
SE 8.6 9.4 10.8 13.1 8.1 8.5 5.3 7.4 16.6 54.4 54.6
UK 6.8 7.7 8.8 10.9 5.3 5.2 2.1 2.6 18.6 40.2 40.2
NB: Data refer to the first year of projections, 2009, unless specified differently. In all the countries, other age-related expenditure includes unemployment ben-
efits; where relevant, additional items are specified below. Total revenues refer only to the programme scenario. BE: Other expenditures include family
allowances, unemployment and early-retirement transfers, work-related accidents and sickness and residual regimes. CZ: The starting year is 2008. DK: The
starting year is 2011. Other expenditure items are transfer payments. Concerning the change in tax revenues, the net tax on net pension payments is pro-
jected to increase by 3.0 percentage points of GDP by 2050. DE: Projections were made by the IFO Institute for Economic Research. Revenues are pro-
jected to increase by 3.2 percentage points by 2050, including a rise in net tax on net pension payments and a rise in social security contributions in line
with current legislation. EE: Revenue includes contributions to the funded pillar of the pension system. EL: The revised updated stability programme of
March 2005. Therein, the Alternative 2 scenario was used as the reference scenario. The starting year is 2008. Healthcare does not include care for the eld-
erly. ‘Others’ include unemployment benefits. ES: The projections come from the 2003 updated stability programme. FR: The projections for pensions and
healthcare end in 2040 and were kept constant as a share of GDP until 2050. IE: The starting year is 2008. LV: The starting year is 2008. Revenue includes
State social security contributions. LT: The starting year is 2008. Revenue includes social contributions to old-age pensions. LU: The starting year is 2008.
No projections on healthcare and education expenditures were reported. Equally, the EPC projections for Luxembourg do not include information on these
two items. MT: The starting year is 2008. NL: The starting year is 2008. Other age-related expenditure includes disability benefits. Net old-age-related
direct tax revenues are projected to increase by 3.4 percentage points by 2050. AT: Other age-related expenditure includes care expenditure. PL: The starting
year is 2008. SI: The starting year is 2008. SK: The starting year is 2008. Other expenditure item is child allowances. FI: Healthcare includes sickness insur-
ance payments. SE: The starting year is 2008. Healthcare expenditure includes ill-health and medical care expenditure. Other age-related expenditure also
includes labour market training grants and wage guarantees, childcare and care of the elderly. The net old-age-related tax revenues are projected to increase
by 0.2 percentage points by 2050. UK: Public pension services expenditure is included in pensions. The non-age-related expenditures are projected to
decline by 1.8 percentage points by 2050.
Sources: Commission services, EPC and national updated stability and convergence programmes (2004).59
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tions and an adjusted gross debt-to-GDP ratio was calcu-
lated for these countries. In the case of Denmark, Finland
and Sweden, where the accumulation of funds has taken
place for many years, this adjustment had a considerable
impact (the adjusted gross debt measure is described in
detail in Part II of this report).
Table I.20 and Table I.21 present, respectively, the
extrapolation of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the sustaina-
bility gaps under two scenarios. Under a so-called ‘base-
line’ scenario, the starting position in terms of the under-
lying budget balance (i.e. net of the cyclical component
and any one-off measures), the level of the debt-to-GDP
ratio, the primary spending and the tax revenues are the
figures reported by the Member States for the final year
of their 2004 updated stability or convergence pro-
gramme: for most Member States, this is 2008.
The extrapolation of the debt-to-GDP ratio relies on sev-
eral assumptions.
(i) The tax burden remains constant as a share of GDP
unless there are foreseen increases of revenues due
to the design of the pension system reflecting
unchanged legislation. Thus, future additional reve-
nue from taxes on pension benefits resulting from
the accumulation of non-taxable contributions are
included, while changes in revenues due to assump-
tions on future trends in private consumption or due
to special sources are not considered.
Table I.19
Projected changes in the expenditure and revenues between the first year of projections and 2050
(% of GDP)
Age-related expenditure
Total revenues Net change
Pensions Healthcare Education Other age-related 
expenditure Total 
BE 4.2 2.9 – 0.4 – 1.6 5.1 0.0 5.1
CZ 6.6 2.8 – 0.2 9.2 0.0 9.2
DK 2.3 2.8 1.3 6.4 3.0 3.4
DE 2.9 2.5 – 0.3 – 1.4 3.7 3.2 0.5
EE – 2.7 0.0 – 2.7 – 0.6 – 2.1
EL 10.3 1.5 0.0 – 0.1 11.7 0.0 11.7
ES 5.0 1.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 6.0 0.0 6.0
FR 1.6 4.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 5.4 0.0 5.4
IE 3.6 1.7 – 0.7 0 4.6 0.0 4.6
IT 0.8 1.6 – 0.3 – 0.1 2.0 0.0 2.0
CY 5.0 0.5 5.5 0.0 5.5
LV 0.2 0.4 – 0.1 0.5 – 1.5 2.0
LT 1.7 0.0 1.7 – 1.5 3.2
LU 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.8
HU 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
MT 0.2 2.4 2.6 0.0 2.6
NL 3.1 3.2 – 0.1 0.4 6.6 3.4 3.2
AT – 0.6 1.2 – 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5
PL – 2.6 – 0.9 – 3.5 0.0 – 3.5
PT
SI 5.4 2.8 8.2 0.0 8.2
SK 0.5 1.6 0.0 – 0.2 1.9 0.0 1.9
FI 2.9 3.1 – 0.2 – 0.9 4.9 0.0 4.9
SE 0.8 2.3 0.4 2.1 5.6 0.2 5.4
UK (1) 1.0 2.1 – 0.1 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.2
(1) A decline in non-age-related expenditure of 1.8 percentage points of GDP was incorporated into the ‘net change’.
NB: Concerning the first year of the projections, see the note to Table I.18.
Sources: Commission services, EPC and national updated stability and convergence programmes (2004).60
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available projections. This implies that increasing
the number of life years does not reduce the number
of years of illness and that the level of services pro-
vided remains unchanged.
(iii) Non-age-related primary expenditures remain con-
stant as a share of GDP at the 2008 level over the
projection period (1). These include mainly public
investment, other social expenditure apart from edu-
cation, healthcare and pensions, purchases of goods
and services not due to age-related expenditures,
compensation of employees (excluding the staff in
the education and healthcare sectors).
(iv) The GDP deflator is fixed at 2 % for the whole pro-
jection period.
(v) The GDP real growth rate is country specific and
relies on the information submitted in the 2004
updated programmes, or, if absent, on the agreed
EPC assumptions (2).
¥1∂ The Commission took into account the decline in the non-age-related expen-
ditures in the case of the UK only. The dynamics reflect the current set of
legislation in place, according to which most non-pension social benefits
will rise in line with prices after 2009–10, reducing their share of GDP. ¥2∂ See Economic Policy Committee (2001).
Table I.20
Projected evolution of debt levels up to 2050
(% of GDP)
Programme scenario 2004 scenario
 
2004 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 96.6 75.7 24.7 28.8 73.2 19.0 18.3
CZ 38.6 41.4 83.2 305.8 54.8 140.8 447.1
DK (1) 24.8 9.8 – 28.1 – 23.1 8.0 – 26.3 – 16.1
DE 65.5 62.2 39.6 23.0 73.6 91.0 138.7
EE 4.8 2.2 – 22.8 – 84.2 – 3.5 – 52.1 – 153.5
EL 110.5 94.7 139.5 403.3 105.2 202.4 562.80
ES (1) 49.0 35.1 4.3 55.9 36.1 5.6 58.0
FR 64.8 59.0 89.5 219.3 70.3 158.4 383.3
IE (1) 21.7 12.0 12.0 62.6 3.6 – 0.6 42.5
IT 106.0 90.7 31.2 – 5.7 99.1 119.8 218.0
CY (1) 73.8 46.9 36.6 83.2 72.2 125.5 253.8
LV 14.2 15.1 35.4 109.3 16.0 40.4 122.0
LT 20.1 19.1 20.9 76.7 23.8 40.3 115.9
LU 5.0 5.8 31.8 74.4 11.2 49.7 104.0
HU 57.3 45.8 42.4 49.9 57.8 77.9 119.9
MT 73.2 65.8 64.1 60.1 89.8 177.0 286.3
NL 56.3 55.6 81.9 154.5 55.8 98.9 195.4
AT 64.2 54.2 16.4 – 18.6 55.3 24.9 0.6
PL 45.9 44.9 – 8.3 – 68.8 61.4 57.2 69.8
PT
SI 30.2 25.9 37.7 187.4 28.0 54.2 229.3
SK 43.0 46.0 56.2 110.6 49.0 76.5 153.8
FI (1) 6.4 – 4.5 – 30.5 – 13.7 – 14.7 – 45.1 – 35.1
SE (1) 28.8 17.7 3.5 59.6 13.4 14.6 92.1
UK 40.9 42.7 52.5 89.9 46.4 71.2 128.7
(1) Adjusted gross debt.
Source: Commission services.61
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both on employment trends and labour productivity
trends. However, labour productivity is assumed to
converge at a common rate of growth of 1.75 % per
year by 2030.
(vi) The nominal interest rate converges towards an EU
average level of around 5 to 6 % in 2015. It is cal-
culated as the sum of the EU average real growth
rate plus the ECB inflation target (2 %) plus an
interest rate growth differential of 2 (1). To avoid a
discrete jump in the debt projections, it is assumed
that the implicit interest rate on debt in the final
year of the stability/convergence programme
converges towards the common nominal interest
rate in a linear fashion within 10 years.
The baseline scenario assumes that Member States actu-
ally achieve the budgetary targets laid down in their pro-
grammes. However, such an outcome is by no means
assured. In order to assess the relevance of the consoli-
dation processes in the medium term to achieve long-
term sustainability, a ‘2004 position’ scenario was run in
the same way as the baseline scenario, except that the
starting budgetary position was different since it was
based on the budgetary data for 2004. Debt levels are
extrapolated from 2008 to 2050 assuming that no budg-
etary consolidation is achieved, i.e. the underlying pri-
mary balance in 2008 remains the same as the 2004 level
and no stock-flow operations take place.
Once the debt-to-GDP ratio has been projected up to
2050, a series of synthetic indicators can be produced to
assess the degree of sustainability of the projected debt-
to-GDP ratio. These indicators — called sustainability
gaps — indicate the scale of budgetary adjustment
required for a Member State to reach a sustainable public
finance position over the long run.
They measure the difference between the current tax
ratio and the constant tax ratio over the projection period
necessary to achieve a predetermined debt level in the
future. The choice of both the targeted debt ratio and the
length of the projection period is arbitrary and can affect
the results. Thus, the Commission calculated two
sustainability gaps for both the baseline and the 2004
scenarios. Another indicator was also calculated this
year, the required primary balance. The indicators are
described in more detail in Part II of this report.
It is important to recall that the purpose of the debt extrap-
olation is to signal possible imbalances on the basis of cur-
rent policies and projected age-related expenditure trends.
However, the limitations of this exercise are clear and
results need to be interpreted with caution. Being a
mechanical, partial equilibrium analysis, projections are in
some cases bound to show highly accentuated profiles. As
a consequence, the projected evolution of debt levels is not
a forecast of possible or even likely outcomes and should
not be taken at face value. Instead, the indicators are a tool
to facilitate policy debate and at best provide an indication
of the timing and scale of emerging budgetary challenges
that could occur on the basis of ‘no policy change’.
Findings from the quantitative assessment can be sum-
marised as follows.
First, even assuming that all Member States achieve their
medium-term budgetary targets (baseline scenario), and
assuming a full impact of legislated structural measures
incorporated into the long-term projections, there is a
risk of unsustainable public finances (measured against
the 60 % of GDP reference value in 2050) emerging in
about half of the EU Member States.
Second, debt developments for most Member States fol-
low a U-shaped pattern. In the next 15 to 20 years, debt
levels are projected to decrease due to the running of bal-
anced budget positions. This trend would, however, start
to reverse once the budgetary impact of ageing starts to
take hold, with the largest increase in most countries
expected between 2030 and 2050. Following the pro-
jected dynamics of the debt levels in the future, there is
now a clear window of opportunity to contain the risks
of increasing debt that will emerge in the future (see
Graph I.16 for the EU aggregate).
Third, the risk of unsustainable public finances increases
considerably if Member States do not achieve their targets
in the medium term. An indication of this can be seen by
comparing the projected debt levels under the baseline
scenario with the 2004 scenario (2). This issue is relevant
for a majority of Member States and especially for those
which had a high cyclically adjusted deficit in 2004.
¥1∂ Economic Policy Committee (2001).
¥2∂ This latter scenario assumes that no budgetary consolidation takes place
during the programme period, i.e. that the underlying primary balance
remains at its 2004 level. 62
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order of magnitude to the budgetary adjustment needed
to ensure sustainable public finances. The sustainability
gap according to the S2 indicator under the baseline sce-
nario indicates that an additional permanent budgetary
adjustment of more than 2 percentage points of GDP is
needed in several Member States, and in some cases con-
siderably more. This thus suggests that there could be
sustainability risks even if the planned consolidation
takes place.
The scale of budgetary adjustment efforts could be even
greater if account is taken of the stated budgetary objec-
tives of some Member States such as a reduction in the
tax ratio (1).
4.2.2. Comparison with last year’s results
The historical record of the quantitative assessments
contributes to the understanding of the developments
related to the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Table I.21
Results of the sustainability gap indicators
Programme scenario 2004 budget scenario
S1 S2 RPB S1 S2 RPB
BE – 0.5 0.5 5.2 – 0.7 0.4 5.1
CZ 4.3 7.5 6.1 6.7 10.0 6.2
DK (1) – 1.4 – 0.5 3.1 – 1.2 – 0.4 3.0
DE – 0.8 – 0.1 2.0 1.2 1.6 2.2
EE – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 1.4
EL 4.0 6.5 9.3 7.9 10.4 9.4
ES (1) – 0.1 1.9 4.3 0.0 1.9 4.3
FR 2.3 3.2 5.1 4.6 5.5 5.3
IE (1) 0.1 1.9 3.4 – 0.3 1.6 3.3
IT – 0.9 – 0.9 4.0 2.2 2.3 4.0
CY (1) 0.6 2.7 4.8 4.7 6.6 5.0
LV 0.8 2.1 1.6 1.0 2.3 1.6
LT 0.4 2.7 2.6 1.4 3.6 2.6
LU 0.4 2.1 1.5 1.1 2.9 1.5
HU – 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.3
MT 0.0 – 0.1 1.7 4.1 3.9 1.9
NL 1.5 2.0 3.2 2.3 2.8 3.2
AT – 1.3 – 1.0 1.9 – 1.0 – 0.7 1.9
PL – 2.9 – 1.8 – 1.8 0.2 1.3 – 1.7
PT
SI 2.1 4.7 5.5 2.9 5.4 5.5
SK 1.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 3.2 2.0
FI (1) – 1.0 0.4 3.4 – 1.4 0.1 3.2
SE (1) 0.0 1.5 4.5 0.6 2.0 4.4
UK 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 2.7 2.1
(1) Adjusted gross debt.
NB: S1 measures the required change in tax revenues as a share of GDP over the projection period that guarantees to reach a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 % in 2050. S2
indicates the change in tax revenues as a share of GDP that guarantees the respect of the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, i.e. that equates the
actualised flow of revenues and expenditures over an infinitive horizon to the debt as existing at the outset of the projection period. Based on S2, the required pri-
mary balance (RPB) indicates the average minimum required cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of GDP over the first five years of the projection period
that guarantees the respect of the intertemporal budget constraint of the government for this period.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ The sustainability gap indicators do not suggest that taxes should be
increased, but rather that there should be an appropriate combination of tax
increases, reducing the level of non-age-related primary spending and/or
reform of pension and healthcare systems to curtail the impact of ageing
on expenditure growth.63
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key aspects relating to the input data should be borne in
mind: (i) national projections included in the stability
and convergence programmes were used for almost all
countries, which may hamper the comparability of the
results to some degree; (ii) budgetary positions at the end
of the programme period were adjusted so as to net out
not only the effect of the cycle but also from this year
onwards any one-off measures, i.e. an underlying budg-
etary position.
Table I.22 shows why this year’s results of the quantita-
tive indicators differ from last year’s results. It analyses
reasons for such development, based on a pure compari-
son of the projections used in the two years for the base-
line scenario. By comparing the baseline scenarios, the
adjustment for one-off measures should not have a large
impact on the comparability, as most countries do not
plan major one-off measures at the end of the pro-
gramme period.
4.2.3. Qualitative considerations
The 2004 updated programmes contain useful informa-
tion to better qualify the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances. The level of the public debt-to GDP ratio in
2004 is a source of concern in at least three countries,
namely Belgium, Greece and Italy. In order to reduce
debt towards 60 % before the impact of ageing takes
place, these countries have to run sustained high primary
surpluses (above 4 %) over the next 10 to 15 years, and
even more in the case of Greece. Such an ambitious
budgetary strategy is subject to risk and it cannot be
excluded a priori that pressures to reduce the tax burden
or to increase some expenditure items may arise, putting
at risk long-term sustainability. In addition, the medium-
term dynamic of the debt-to-GDP-ratio is affected by
stock-flow operations. In previous years, debt has been
reduced at a slower pace due to such operations, espe-
cially in Greece and Italy, while in Belgium gross debt
has been reduced significantly in recent years, aided by
the achievement of a balanced budget position.
The current level of the debt-to-GDP ratio puts several
countries in a safer position than the main quantitative
indicator (S2) would suggest (1). Ireland, the UK, Fin-
land, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Spain and all the
Graph I.16: Debt development in the EU
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ To remedy this, the new S1 indicator attempts to capture the scale of
adjustment necessary to comply with the 60 % of GDP reference value in
the long term, namely in 2050. 64
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have a relatively low level of debt-to-GDP ratio.
This gives some room to tackle the problem if future
imbalances arise. For other countries (namely Germany
and France), a source of concern is not the very high
level of debt-to-GDP ratio but rather its recent upward
trend. The budgetary deterioration has pushed debt up
over the last few years and it has quickly reached levels
close to or above the reference value of the Maastricht
Treaty.
An important aspect of long-term sustainability is to
implement measures of a structural nature that help to
ensure that a sound budgetary position can be main-
tained in the longer term.
Reform measures in the fields of pensions and healthcare
are the main areas for which expenditures are expected
to rise, but there are also others, for example long-term
care, education and childcare and more general pro-
grammes such as unemployment and sickness benefit/
insurance schemes. In many respects, structural reforms
can be beneficial both in improving or modifying certain
expenditure trends and in strengthening the potential
growth rate of the economy. Both these aspects can be
difficult to quantify, not least the latter.
Directly linked to this is the issue of the robustness of
the projections. This aspect is crucial in making the
assessment of long-term sustainability. While uncer-
tainty surrounds any projection in the long term, there
are cases where this is a greater source of concern. In
Spain, the projected pension expenditures are indeed
surrounded by considerable uncertainty regarding
demographic changes and the Spanish authorities did
not present long-term projections in the 2004 update
with reference to this uncertainty. In Poland, the lack of
long-term projections beyond 2020 prohibits a com-
plete sustainability analysis. This is underlined by the
fact that most of the impact of ageing populations is
expected to take place after 2020.
The projections for Poland keep the age-related expend-
iture-to-GDP ratio unchanged from that year onwards
and thus probably underestimate the budgetary impact of
population ageing. For Hungary, there is a lack of long-
term projections for expenditure items other than pen-
sions and the longer-term expenditure trends may be
underestimated there too.
The projected increase in age-related expenditures in Ger-
many also warrants consideration. The German authori-
ties provided a set of projections up to 2050 which include
the impact of the recent reforms under Agenda 2010,
including reform of the pension system which is projected
to reduce the pension expenditure dynamics. The positive
impact of the reform of the labour market, the so-called
Hartz IV, has also been included in the projections. These
are projected to result in a significant strengthening of
labour supply and employment, which in turn should
reduce the unemployment rate. The projected results for
age-related expenditures hinge on the achievement of
these underlying projections, for which it may be too early
to draw firm conclusions. The German authorities also
included a rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio in the long-
term projections, consistent with current legislation in
place. This implies a considerable rise in pension contri-
butions (of about 2 percentage points) over the coming
decades, which may have implications for the achieve-
ment of other policy objectives. In France, a reform of the
healthcare system was implemented in 2004, which
should result in budgetary savings up to 2008. However,
the savings over the longer term are subject to some uncer-
tainty. The French updated stability programme therefore
included several scenarios for the evolution of healthcare
expenditures over the longer term. The Commission serv-
ices considered that healthcare spending is likely to rise
faster than income over the longer term, compared with
the main scenario in the French stability programme. In
Italy, the pension system was reformed in 2004, which is
projected to result in budgetary savings over the coming
decades. However, this reform will take effect only from
2008 onwards, which introduces some uncertainty
concerning its impact on the projected budgetary savings
included in the Italian stability programme.
Another factor to be considered as a potential risk is
whether debt projections rely on a very high tax burden
compared with the EU average or other industrialised
countries. This is the case in Denmark and Sweden
where the tax burden is around 50 % of GDP, and
slightly less so in Austria, Belgium and Finland. Even if
each Member State can decide on its optimal level of tax-
ation, pressures to reduce the tax burden cannot be
excluded in the future. In addition, there is less room to
increase taxes should imbalances appear in the future.
As highlighted in this section, the qualitative considera-
tions are a very important element in the sustainability
analysis in order to enrich the information provided by
the sustainability indicators.65
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The 2004 projections compared with the 2003 projections (EU-15)
Results compared 
with last year What are the differences between this and last year’s projections?
BE Worsened • Greater increase in healthcare expenditures. 
• Slightly higher total revenues in the first year of the projection.
DK  Similar • Greater increase in pension and healthcare expenditures. 
• Higher total revenues in the first year of the projection.
DE  Improved • Age-related spending is higher in the first year of the projection, but increases less in the period to 
2050 compared with last year, reflecting a lower projected rise in pension expenditure and 
unemployment benefits. 
• The revenue-to-GDP ratio in the first year of the projection is lower compared with last year, but a 
stronger rise in the period to 2050 is projected.
EL  Worsened • Non-age-related spending is much higher in the first year of the projection. 
• The revenue-to-GDP ratio in the first year of the projection is also higher, but does not offset the 
higher expenditures. 
• The gross debt-to-GDP ratio is much higher in the first year of the projection.
ES  Slightly worsened •  This year’s projections were run on the basis of information provided last year, as new projections 
were not provided in the updated programme. 
• Higher non-age-related expenditures in the first year of the projection.
• Partly compensated by higher revenues in the first year of the projection.
FR  Worsened • The revenue-to-GDP ratio in the first year of the projection is slightly lower compared with last year. 
• Age-related spending is higher in the first year of the projection and increases more in the period to 
2050 compared with last year, reflecting a higher share of healthcare expenditure at the outset and 
also a greater rise, resulting from an improved, broadened estimate provided in the French update. 
Correcting for the broadened estimate, the 2004 healthcare reform reduces the projected rise in 
healthcare spending.
IE  Improved • Some of the improvement is due to a recalculation of the pension and healthcare expenditures from 
GNP to GDP terms, which results in a smaller increase in age-related expenditures over the projection 
period. 
• The projected tax revenues are higher in the first year of the projection. 
• Lower debt in the first year of the projection.
IT  Similar • The pension expenditure is lower over the first decades of the projections and higher towards the 
end (last 10 years). 
• The starting underlying budgetary position is worse this year (a deficit of 0.9 percentage points of 
GDP instead of a balanced budget).
LU  Worsened • The projected tax revenues are lower in the first year of the projection. 
• The lower revenues are only partially countered by slightly lower expenditures in the first year of 
the projection. 
NL  Similar • The projected tax revenues are slightly higher in the first year of the projection and the increase is 
greater. 
• Higher revenues are partly countered by a slight increase in non-age-related expenditures in the 
first year of the projection. Higher debt level in the first year of the projection.
AT  Improved • Mainly lower pension expenditures stemming from the expected impact of the pension reform.
PT   
FIN  Worsened • The projected age-related expenditures are very similar to last year. 
• The projected tax revenues are lower in the first year of the projection, as are the increases. 
• A lower debt level in the first year of the projection.
SE  Worsened • The projected tax revenues are lower compared with last year. 
• The lower revenues are only partially countered by slightly lower expenditures over the projection 
period.
UK  Improved • A higher rise in age-related expenditures, including public pensions, is offset by a fall in non-age-
related expenditures over the projection period and total spending is projected to rise less than 
last year. 
• The projected revenues are somewhat higher in the first year of the projection.
 Source: Commission services.66
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Despite the fact that each country faces country-specific
problems, for the purpose of summarising the main
results it is possible to group countries according to the
main source of potential budgetary imbalances and the
seriousness of the risk as follows.
Very high-debt countries (Belgium and Italy). The source
of risks for these countries is mainly the level of the debt-
to-GDP ratio. It should be noted that Belgium has reduced
its debt ratio very resolutely, by almost 15 percentage
points of GDP since 2000, benefiting from the achieve-
ment of a balanced budget position, while Italy’s debt
ratio has been reduced considerably less, by around 5 per-
centage points of GDP over the same period. At first sight,
the quantitative indicators suggest that these countries
appear to be relatively well placed to meet the costs of
ageing populations. This is because they are currently run-
ning high primary surpluses in order to meet their Treaty
and SGP commitments: hence, there is more scope to
reduce interest payments in the future and thus offset
future expected increases in spending due to ageing popu-
lations. However, this implies that very high-debt coun-
tries are able to sustain large primary surpluses over sev-
eral (15 to 20) years. This will imply running actual
budget surpluses, which inevitably leads to the challenge
of competing budgetary pressures for tax cuts and/or
increased public expenditures.
High-deficit countries (Germany, France, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia). These countries have recently
adopted pension reforms which aim at better controlling
expenditure in the long run and the projections run by the
Commission fully included the savings estimated by
Member States. The systemic pension reforms in Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia contribute to a more sustaina-
ble position over the long term, though the projections in
Poland are subject to considerable uncertainty as they
end in 2020. There are uncertainties regarding the budg-
etary impact of the pension reforms. In addition, a com-
prehensive strategy to ensure long-term sustainability
must include budgetary consolidation in the medium
term. Otherwise, any effort to control age-related expen-
ditures will be offset by raising interest payments and the
debt-to-GDP ratio is then likely to show explosive paths.
Countries with risks due to pension developments (the
Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta and
Slovenia). These countries face a similar pattern in age-
related expenditure in the long term. In particular, pen-
sion expenditure is foreseen to increase at a faster pace
than in most other Member States, reflecting only lim-
ited progress in the pension reform process. In Greece
and the Czech Republic, age-related expenditure is pro-
jected to rise by more than 10 percentage points in the
period to 2050. The exception is Malta, where a very
small rise is projected until 2050, which hinges on sig-
nificant savings from 2030 onwards, resulting from a cap
on pension expenditure. A pension reform is under dis-
cussion which should address both sustainability and
adequacy. This means that, in addition to a policy of run-
ning down debt (where Spain is performing particularly
well and Slovenia and the Czech Republic have rela-
tively low debt levels), measures to better control future
trends in pension expenditure should be envisaged. In
the Czech Republic and Slovenia the rise in pension
expenditure is very high, beyond 2020 in the case of
Slovenia, suggesting that corrective measures will have
to be taken. Risks rely also on the uncertainties sur-
rounding pension projections. In the case of Spain, there
are large differences between the EPC projections and
the Spanish projections on future pension expenditure,
influenced by different demographic scenarios.
Countries with some risks due to the uncertainties over
the medium term (Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and
the UK). These countries face risks mainly linked to the
medium-term budgetary developments. These countries
appear to be in a relatively favourable position to meet
the cost of ageing populations. Measures have been put
into place in order to meet the ageing challenge. How-
ever, reducing the fiscal deficit in the medium term is
important, as highlighted by the difference between the
baseline and 2004 scenarios in the Commission’s analy-
sis. Also, projections in the medium term rely on several
assumptions. Revenue projections are subject to macro-
economic uncertainty whereas expenditure projections
include announced policies and might therefore be less
straightforward to change in case of adverse economic
developments. In the UK’s case, there is a possibility of
insufficient provision of private pensions which might
have implications for the UK public finances. The
authorities have introduced the pension protection fund,
from April 2005, to protect members of private defined-
benefit schemes where the sponsoring firm becomes
insolvent and there are insufficient assets in the scheme
to meet its liabilities. The effectiveness of these meas-
ures is yet to be tested.
Countries with limited risk (Denmark, Estonia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Austria, Finland and Sweden). These67
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5countries share a number of common characteristics,
including sound budgetary positions, and reforms of
their pension systems that have strengthened the link
between contributions and entitlements, increased the
share of pensions that are financed on a funded basis, and
increased the capacity of pension systems to cope with
demographic developments such as changes in life
expectancy. For most of these countries, the develop-
ment of gross debt does not reflect properly the sound-
ness of their budgetary position due to the accumulation
of liquid financial assets to cope with future challenges.
In the case of Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden,
this was taken into consideration in the quantitative
analysis, but Estonia and Luxembourg also have public
pension funds.
Table I.23 summarises the main conclusions reached by
the Ecofin Council in its opinions on the stability and
convergence programmes on the basis of the Commis-
sion’s assessment. It shows how, for a number of coun-
tries, the long-term budgetary position has improved due
to structural reforms and the increased focus on long-
term challenges.
4.4. Conclusions
This assessment round suggests that the increased focus
on long-term sustainability in the EU has resulted in
some further improvement to cope with the budgetary
impact of ageing populations. In Part II of this report, an
evaluation of how the sustainability analysis has
improved over the last few years is provided. Several
countries, including larger ones, have implemented
reforms with a view to strengthening sustainability; for
example, Germany and Italy reformed their pension sys-
tems and France reformed its healthcare system, which
represent important steps in the right direction. With the
current assessment, the recently acceded Member States
have been fully included in the analysis for the first time.
The situation for these is in general positive; a majority
have implemented major reforms of their pension sys-
tems and they generally have a relatively low debt-to-
GDP ratio, which contributes to a more sustainable posi-
tion over the long run.
However, there is a serious concern regarding the
achievement of the planned budgetary consolidation in
the medium term for most Member States. According to
this year’s assessment, if the fiscal consolidation fore-
seen in the medium term does not materialise, the pro-
jected debt dynamics would worsen considerably. This
underlines the importance of strengthening the fiscal
positions sooner rather than later.
Overall, the results show that there are risks to long-term
sustainability in 10 countries (Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, Hun-
gary, Malta and Slovenia). In another seven (Spain,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and
the UK), there could be some risks due to the projected
medium-term budgetary developments, the budgetary
impact of enacted reforms or, as is the case for Spain and
Poland, due to considerable uncertainties concerning the
long-term age-related expenditure trends. Finally, seven
countries (Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Fin-
land, Austria and Sweden) appear to face only limited
risks in view of the budgetary costs of an ageing society,
though it nevertheless represents a challenge.68
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Policy conclusions on the sustainability of public finances
Are public finances sustainable? What are the main issues? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
BE Belgium still appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the current level of gross debt.
While declining, the debt ratio is still high 
and a steady reduction hinges upon 
sustaining high primary surpluses for a 
prolonged period. Containing primary 
expenditures might prove difficult, 
especially in the healthcare sector, but is 
important in view of the government’s 
strategy of reducing the tax burden in order 
to create employment. Given the projected 
increase in the old-age dependency ratio, 
pursuing this broad strategy with 
determination is crucial to the achievement 
of long-term sustainability.
No. Belgium’s strategy for coping with the 
budgetary cost of an ageing population is 
mainly based on gross debt reduction 
through maintaining a balanced budget 
position or a small surplus (itself relying 
primarily on primary expenditure restraint) 
and an ageing fund.
CZ The Czech Republic appears to be at serious 
risk, on grounds of the very important 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
The strategy of fiscal consolidation outlined 
in the programme needs to be 
complemented with additional reforms to 
reduce the sustainability risks associated 
with the projected increase in pension and 
healthcare expenditures.
No. 
DK Denmark appears to be in a favourable 
position, despite significant projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
Achieving continued tight expenditure 
control and a considerable rise in 
employment on which the Danish strategy 
also relies may prove challenging. 
No. The Danish budgetary strategy is mainly 
based on further debt consolidation through 
continued budget surpluses and should 
result in a sustainable position over time.
DE Germany still appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary cost of 
an ageing population. However, with the 
implementation of structural reforms and 
budgetary consolidation in the medium 
term, as planned, Germany could be in a 
relatively favourable position. 
The already legislated structural reforms of 
Agenda 2010 and, in particular, the pension 
reform are likely to reduce the budgetary 
impact of ageing, although the expenditure-
reducing effect of the ongoing reforms is 
subject to uncertainty. Moreover, long-term 
sustainability hinges crucially on the 
achievement of the planned budgetary 
consolidation in the medium term and on 
reducing the debt level; both the federal 
states and social security systems play a role 
in this.
No. This year’s policy conclusions are similar. 
The 2004 pension reform puts Germany on a 
better footing, however, maintaining that 
there is a need to achieve a budgetary 
position close to balance or in surplus.
EE Estonia appears to be in a favourable 
position, despite important projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
A low government debt level, considerable 
government financial reserves and a 
medium-term budgetary strategy that is 
fully consistent with the objective of a close-
to-balance or in-surplus budgetary position, 
together with credible and thorough 
reforms of the pension and healthcare 
systems which are meant to stem budgetary 
pressures in the longer term, should ensure 
that public finances remain on a sustainable 
footing.
No. 
EL Greece appears to be at serious risk with 
regard to the long-term sustainability of 
public finances, also on account of the very 
important projected budgetary costs of an 
ageing population. 
The considerable increase projected in age-
related spending suggests that additional 
measures to control public pension 
expenditures, including the resolute 
implementation of reform measures 
enacted, are necessary. The gross debt-to-
GDP ratio, while projected to fall, remains 
above 100 % of GDP throughout the 
programme period. 
No. Even if the planned budgetary 
consolidation should materialise over the 
programme period, a considerable 
sustainability gap emerges, pointing to the 
need for a broad-based approach to ensure 
the sustainability of the public finances.
(Continued on the next page)69
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Are public finances sustainable? What are the main issues? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
ES Spain appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, in spite of the projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
The large increase in pension expenditure 
projected in the very long term suggests that 
current policies need to be supplemented by 
measures to prevent the emergence of 
unsustainable trends in public finances in 
the long run, in particular through a 
comprehensive reform of the pension system 
in line with the recommendations of the 
multi-partisan agreement ‘Pacto de Toledo’.
No. There are however risks surrounding the 
long-term expenditure projections.
FR France still appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the large projected budgetary 
costs of an ageing population. However, the 
implementation of major structural reforms 
of the pension and health systems in 2003 
and 2004 respectively put France on a better 
footing.
Further efforts, both additional budgetary 
consolidation and additional reforms, would 
be needed in the years ahead in order to 
ensure fully the sustainability of government 
finances. 
No. 
IE Ireland appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite significant 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
The Irish strategy is mainly based on 
conformity to the Stability and Growth Pact 
framework and further asset accumulation 
in the National Pensions Reserve Fund 
(NPRF). Overall, Ireland’s relatively low tax 
ratio should ease the accommodation of any 
sustainability gap that might arise in the 
longer term.
No. The relatively low debt ratio in Ireland, 
the pension reform measures already 
enacted and the accumulation of reserves in 
the National Pension Reserve Fund will 
contribute to budgetary sustainability and 
help cope with the impact of ageing. 
IT Italy appears to be at some risk. However, 
if the expected savings of the pension 
reform are achieved and budgetary 
consolidation in the medium term is 
implemented and maintained, as planned, 
Italy could be in a relatively favourable 
position.
In Italy, it is important that the budgetary 
targets are fully implemented, the expected 
savings from the pension reform are 
achieved and any departure from the 
strategy of running large primary surpluses, 
effectively leading to rapid debt reduction, 
is promptly corrected.
No. The adoption in 2004 of a pension 
reform is an important step towards 
addressing the budgetary consequences of 
an ageing population and will contribute to 
improving the situation of Italy in this 
respect.
CY Cyprus appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs 
of an ageing population. 
It is imperative for Cyprus to pursue the 
reform process in order to reduce the 
sustainability risks associated with the future 
evolution of age-related expenditures, 
together with the planned and necessary 
budgetary consolidation in the medium 
term.
No. Cyprus’s strategy is mainly based on the 
budgetary consolidation in the next few 
years and additional reforms of the pension 
and healthcare systems to be implemented 
in the future.
LV Latvia appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite significant 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population.
Reforms in the field of health and long-term 
care could involve higher expenditures and 
risks to sustainability may emerge in the 
long run. Latvia’s relatively low tax ratio 
should, however, ease the accommodation 
of any such sustainability gap that may arise. 
Latvia also relies on a contained budget 
deficit over the medium term.
No. Latvia’s relatively low debt ratio, pension 
reform measures enacted, including the 
introduction of the funded pillar, and the 
accumulation of assets in the funded 
pension scheme will contribute to limiting 
the budgetary impact of ageing. 
LT Lithuania appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite the projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
Risks related to the costs of the pension 
reform should be monitored. In addition, 
reform measures in the field of healthcare 
could involve higher expenditures. 
Lithuania’s relatively low tax ratio should, 
however, ease the accommodation of any 
such sustainability gap that may arise. 
Lithuania also relies on a contained budget 
deficit over the medium term.
No. Lithuania’s relatively low debt ratio and 
pension reform measures enacted, including 
the introduction of the funded pillars, will 
contribute to limiting the budgetary impact 
of ageing. 
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Are public finances sustainable? What are the main issues? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
LU Luxembourg appears to be in a favourable 
position, despite important projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
The ratio between contributors to and 
beneficiaries of the pension system will 
deteriorate, even under a favourable 
scenario whereby employment growth 
keeps up with the exceptional rates 
recorded in the last two decades. Therefore, 
some restraint is called for in order to ensure 
that government spending remains in line 
with revenue and that the policy of 
accumulating reserves can be maintained, 
together with the adoption of measures 
aiming at raising the currently low 
employment rate of residents, especially 
older ones.
No. The large net positive asset position can 
be expected to offset at least in part the 
future costs of ageing.
HU Hungary appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs 
of an ageing population. 
Risks are in part related to the uncertainty 
regarding the long-term budgetary trends 
due to the lack of information on healthcare 
expenditure projections. It is moreover 
important to pursue reforms, particularly in 
the field of healthcare, as well as to 
implement resolutely the planned budgetary 
consolidation in the medium term.
No. Hungary’s strategy is mainly based on 
budgetary consolidation in the next few 
years and additional reform measures to be 
implemented in the future. The reformed 
pension system, including the introduction 
of the funded pillar, contributes to reducing 
the budgetary impact of ageing and to 
reducing risks of unsustainable public 
finances.
MT Malta appears to be at risk on grounds of 
the projected costs of an ageing population. 
While failure to achieve the budgetary 
targets would clearly put sustainability at 
risk, the pursuit of the reform process of the 
pension and healthcare systems is also 
important for the containment of the 
increase in age-related public expenditure in 
the long term. 
No. Malta’s strategy for ensuring 
sustainability is dependent on the 
achievement of the budgetary targets.
NL The Netherlands appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite important 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
Given the projected increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio, and in the absence of 
further fiscal consolidation leading to a 
budgetary position close to balance or in 
surplus in the medium term, further reforms 
that would modify the trends in age-related 
expenditures and raising further 
participation rates would reduce 
sustainability risks over the longer term.
This year’s policy conclusions emphasise 
progress in the implementation of reforms 
in the areas of social security, pensions and 
healthcare in 2004. In addition, sizeable net 
assets in large funded-pillar private pension 
systems outside general government 
contribute to a more sustainable position, 
which merits a more positive tone than last 
year.
AT Austria appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite important 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
After the pension reform of 2003, Austria 
passed a further pension reform in 2004, 
with the aim of bringing all groups of 
private and public sector employees into a 
harmonised pension system. The significant 
contribution of the 2004 law to long-term 
financial sustainability is being backloaded 
to take effect only after 2030, while the 
medium-term savings from the 2003 law 
were partly reduced.
No. The pension reforms of 2003 and 2004 
are set to provide substantial budgetary 
relief in the long term.
PL The lack of budgetary projections beyond 
2020 makes it difficult to assess the long-
term sustainability of the Polish public 
finances. On the basis of the information 
available, some risks cannot be ruled out. 
Uncertainties regarding the budgetary 
impact of policies aimed at strengthening 
the long-term budgetary trends remain, as 
most of the budgetary impact of ageing is 
likely to take place after 2020. Moreover, the 
resolute implementation of the planned 
budgetary consolidation in the medium 
term should be an important contribution to 
the achievement of a sustainable position.
No. The pension reform in Poland, which 
includes the creation of a funded pension 
pillar, should contribute to the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances. 
However, the lack of information on other 
age-related expenditures gives rise to major 
uncertainties regarding the long-term 
budgetary trends in Poland. 
(Continued on the next page)71
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Are public finances sustainable? What are the main issues? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
SI Slovenia appears to be at some risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
an ageing population. 
The projected increase in pension 
expenditure beyond 2020 remains very high. 
In addition, despite the introduction of some 
rationalisation measures of the healthcare 
system in 2004, a further substantial reform 
of the healthcare system would contribute 
to the improvement of the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances.
No. However, the ongoing pension reform 
has had a positive budgetary impact.
SK Slovakia appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite the projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population.
Full implementation of the pension and 
healthcare reforms is a key condition for 
reaching a sustainable position, in addition 
to the achievement of the planned 
budgetary consolidation path over the 
programme period and until 2010.
No. The structural reforms adopted, in 
particular in the pension and health areas, 
contribute to longer-term sustainability.
FI Finland appears to be in a favourable 
position, despite important projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
The strategy outlined in the programme is 
broad-based and consists of further debt 
consolidation and structural reforms, for 
example further steps of the pension reform 
and measures aimed at raising the exit age. 
No. The structural reforms enacted and 
planned should have beneficial effects on 
the public finances. Also, the considerable 
public pension fund assets will help to ease 
the budgetary pressure in the longer term.
SE Sweden appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite important 
projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
A risk to long-term sustainability may 
emerge in the long run. This is based on the 
projected increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio and existing trends in 
healthcare-related expenditures, labour 
force participation and employment. 
Without further reforms, modifying these 
trends, aiming at a budget surplus over the 
next 10 years of 2 % of GDP, in line with the 
government’s budgetary target, becomes a 
key factor in addressing sustainability over 
the longer term. 
No. The structural reforms enacted and 
planned should have beneficial effects on 
the public finances. Also, the considerable 
public pension fund assets will help to ease 
the budgetary pressure in the longer term.
UK The UK appears to be in a relatively 
favourable position, despite the projected 
budgetary costs of an ageing population. 
However, higher age-related expenditures 
cannot be excluded as there is a possibility of 
insufficient provision of private pensions 
which might have implications for the public 
finances. The authorities are introducing the 
Pension Protection Fund, from April 2005, to 
protect members of private defined-benefit 
schemes where the sponsoring firm becomes 
insolvent and there are insufficient assets in 
the scheme to meet its liabilities. The 
effectiveness of these measures is yet to be 
tested. 
This year’s policy conclusions emphasise the 
UK’s relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio and 
the strong focus that the authorities have 
placed, in existing policies, on long-term 
sustainability of the public finances. The 
relatively low tax ratio should ease the 
accommodation of any imbalances that may 
arise in the longer term. These aspects merit 
a more positive tone than last year.
Sourcses: Council opinions on the 2004 updated stability and convergence programmes on the basis of the Commission’s assessments.72
Part II
Evolving budgetary surveillance

Summary
This part of the report describes the major innovations in
the EU framework for fiscal policy and reviews notable
developments in budgetary surveillance. It is divided
into three chapters. The first chapter illustrates the main
features of the agreed lines for revising the Stability and
Growth Pact. The second chapter deals with several
topics of relevance in EU fiscal surveillance: the discrep-
ancy between budgetary plans in stability and conver-
gence programmes and outcomes; the determinants of
debt dynamics; the role of national budgetary institutions
in shaping budgetary results. The third chapter reviews
the Commission’s methodology for assessing the long-
term sustainability of public finances.
The debate on the reform of the Stability
and Growth Pact
The European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005
endorsed the Council report ‘Improving the implementa-
tion of the Stability and Growth Pact’, agreed by the
Ecofin ministers at their extraordinary meeting of
20 March. It updates and complements the Stability and
Growth Pact. It also recommends measures for improv-
ing fiscal and statistical governance both at the national
and at the EU level. This agreement on the revision of the
rules of the Pact is the result of a comprehensive review
of the Stability and Growth Pact that followed the Com-
mission communication of September 2004. In conjunc-
tion with the renewed commitment from all Member
States to stability-oriented budgetary policies and effec-
tive fiscal surveillance, the compromise agreement of
March 2005 puts an end to the uncertainty that has sur-
rounded the interpretation of the existing budgetary rules
in the last few years. Following the agreement by the
Council, the Commission has launched the legislative
procedures for amendment of the existing regulations
where necessary to implement the agreement. Final
adoption of the revised set regulations lies with the
Council.
In the agreement, the Treaty’s reference values for gov-
ernment deficit and debt remain the anchors of the sys-
tem. The preventive arm of the Pact has been strength-
ened by ensuring that due attention is given to the
fundamentals of fiscal sustainability when setting
medium-term budgetary objectives. In future, the
medium-term objective of a country will be defined on
the basis of its current debt ratio and potential growth.
For Member States having adopted the euro and for
those participating in the European exchange rate mech-
anism, the agreed range of medium-term objectives is
between – 1 % of GDP for countries with a combination
of low debt and high potential growth, and balance or in
surplus for countries with a combination of high debt and
low potential growth. The preventive dimension of the
Pact is further underpinned by the strengthened commit-
ment of Member States to actively consolidate public
finances under favourable economic conditions and the
possibility for the Commission to act by issuing timely
policy advice if this is not the case. The new agreement
also includes incentives for Member States to embark
upon structural reforms. In particular, major structural
reforms that have direct long-term cost-saving effects
and verifiably improve fiscal sustainability over the long
term will be considered. The main modifications in the
corrective arm of the Pact concern the definition of
‘excessive deficits’, the possible extension of the exist-
ing deadline for the correction of an excessive deficit,
and the introduction of the possibility of repeating steps
in the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure
(EDP). Considerations are also included related to the
assessment of systemic pension reforms in the EDP, and
the enhanced focus on surveillance on government debt.
In particular, the new rules allow expanding the one-year
deadline for the correction of an excessive deficit by an
additional year in case a correction in the year directly
following the identification of an excessive deficit is not
warranted on economic grounds. Moreover, under the
strict provision that effective action has been taken by
the country concerned, the Council can decide to repeat
certain steps in the excessive deficit procedure, in the
case of an unexpected adverse economic event hitting a75
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Finally, the new agreement specifies a set of ‘relevant
factors’ that the Commission and the Council can take
into account when deciding on the existence of an exces-
sive deficit and when determining the deadline for its
correction. These factors include, inter alia, develop-
ments in potential growth and prevailing cyclical condi-
tions, but also considerations with respect to debt sus-
tainability, the implementation of policies geared
towards meeting the objectives of the Lisbon agenda or
the record of fiscal consolidation in ‘good times’ will be
assessed.
These modifications will increase the room for judgment
in the application of the excessive deficit procedure. How-
ever, a number of complementary elements built into the
new agreement will effectively constrain the scope for dis-
cretion, preserving strong incentives for fiscal discipline
in the EU on the basis of a rules-based EU framework.
First of all, both the Commission, when considering
whether an excessive deficit exists or may occur, and the
Council, when deciding on the existence of an excessive
deficit, will take into account any relevant factors only if
the general government deficit remains close to the refer-
ence value and its excess over the reference value is tem-
porary. Second, other relevant factors are always consid-
ered in an overall assessment, in which a large number of
factors, including those that may call for a stricter interpre-
tation of the deficit figures, are examined. No simple dis-
counting of certain categories of public expenditure from
the deficit calculations is foreseen. Third, Member States
in excessive deficit are requested to achieve a minimum
annual budgetary effort of 0.5 % of GDP irrespective of
relevant factors. Fourth, the Commission will always
issue a report under Article 104(3), if the deficit of a Mem-
ber State exceeds 3 % or if it sees a risk of an excessive
deficit. Finally, the obligation of the Council to impose
sanctions in case a Member State in excessive deficit
repeatedly fails to act in compliance with the successive
decisions of the Council remains unchanged as the ulti-
mate threat against non-compliance.
The 2005 Ecofin report recognises that modifications to
the provisions of the Pact are not sufficient to ensure a
meaningful improvement in their implementation. In
order to solidly re-establish the credibility of the Pact
and to strengthen the enforcement of budgetary disci-
pline, the report contains a number of complementary
elements designed to increase the ownership of the Pact
provision and clarify the respective roles and responsi-
bilities of the various actors involved as well as measures
to improve the quality and timeliness of statistical data,
both at the national and at the EU level.
Issues in EU budgetary surveillance 
and sustainability analysis
Since the inception of the EU fiscal framework, budget-
ary surveillance in the EU has been evolving. This evo-
lution has been partly driven by the need to tackle spe-
cific issues that have been encountered in the practical
application of the framework (e.g. measuring the coun-
tries’ fiscal effort), partly in response to a changing eco-
nomic and institutional landscape (e.g. ageing popula-
tions, EU enlargement), and partly as a result of efforts
to upgrade the analytical toolkit used in EU budgetary
surveillance though technical work carried out in work-
ing groups attached to the relevant Council committees
(e.g. the agreed methodology for computing potential
output and output gaps). The ‘Public finances in EMU’
report regularly collects analytical work undertaken by
the Commission services with the aim of improving the
understating of public finance issues in the EU and
upgrading budgetary surveillance. This year, the focus is
on the discrepancy between budgetary plans from stabil-
ity and convergence programmes and results, the analy-
sis of debt dynamics, the role of national budgetary insti-
tutions in shaping fiscal outcomes, and the assessment of
public finance sustainability in the long term.
The process of fiscal surveillance has provided a wealth
of data on budgetary plans, outcomes and assessments.
This information is used in this report for two purposes:
(i) comparing budgetary developments in the Member
States relative to plans; (ii) investigating how the Com-
mission’s assessment of stability and convergence pro-
grammes has evolved over time. As regards the first
aspect, the data show that slippages between budgetary
plans and outcomes have been common and sizeable in
some years, even after controlling for growth surprises.
Such slippages seem mainly associated with differences
between planned and realised expenditure/GDP ratios,
discrepancies in revenue ratios having played a minor
role. As far as the Commission’s assessment of stability
and convergence programmes is concerned, retrospec-
tive analysis shows that the Commission has responded
to the discrepancy between budgetary plans and out-
comes by focusing the assessment increasingly on the
credibility of the adjustment path described in the pro-
grammes. Moreover, the scope in fiscal surveillance has
broadened over time and Member States’ fiscal policies
are assessed in a more comprehensive way.76
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developments. The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio
can be decomposed into three components: one related
to the budget balance realised, one associated with nom-
inal growth, and one, named the stock-flow adjustment,
capturing the discrepancy between the change in the out-
standing debt stock and the government budget balance
as defined in the protocol to the Maastricht Treaty. The
usual analysis focuses on the first two elements, with
much less attention being paid to the magnitude, charac-
teristics and determinants of the stock-flow adjustment.
However, this component of the debt dynamics could
convey relevant information concerning the evolution of
government assets and liabilities and the reconciliation
between cash and ‘Maastricht’ deficit figures. Analysis
contained in this report aims at filling this gap, providing
analysis on the determinants of the stock-flow adjust-
ment for EU Member States. It is shown that the stock-
flow adjustment in past years has been positive on aver-
age (adding therefore to the build-up of debt), and that in
some countries the stock-flow adjustment is partly asso-
ciated to cash deficits being systematically higher than
Maastricht deficits.
There is growing agreement among economists and pol-
icy-makers that institutional aspects, related, for instance,
to the procedures and practices for the preparation,
approval and implementation of the budget law, or the
existence of medium-term expenditure frameworks, are
key determinants of budgetary outcomes. The relevance
of national budgetary institutions in supporting the effec-
tiveness of the EU fiscal framework has been recognised
in the EU Treaty and the debate leading to the agreed lines
for revising the SGP. A section in this part of the report
reviews the existing economic literature on the role of
budgetary institutions in shaping fiscal outcomes and pro-
vides analysis on EU Member States. Although there is
evidence of a possible link between national budgetary
institutions and budgetary outcomes, difficulties in inter-
preting the results should not be underestimated.
For instance, it has been argued that the very different
degree of effectiveness of the EU fiscal framework in
inducing budgetary discipline across EU countries could
be explained by differences in the overall budgetary
arrangements and institutions across Member States.
According to this argument, countries which base the
containment of deficits on a strong role of finance min-
istries (‘delegation countries’) are less likely to be
strongly affected by fiscal rules at the EU level than
countries whose fiscal governance is based instead on
procedures and arrangements among different spending
ministries and levels of government (‘commitment
countries’). However, given that delegation countries
also tend to be large countries, it could be difficult to dis-
entangle the role of institutions from sheer country size
in determining budgetary outcomes: in larger countries,
the EU budgetary objectives may have received less
weight than in smaller countries and there may have
been a perception of larger costs of fiscal consolidation
in larger countries.
At the EU level, sustainability analysis has been carried
out since 2001 in the context of the assessment of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes. It is based on debt
projections on the basis of budgetary data provided in
stability and convergence programmes and estimates of
age-related expenditures (mainly pension, healthcare
and education) up to 2050. A set of indicators is con-
structed to provide a synthetic quantification of sustain-
ability risks. Given the uncertainty surrounding the far
future, judgment is a key aspect of sustainability analy-
sis: robustness of budgetary projections, reliability of
planned or implemented reforms, composition of the
budget, risks associated with the medium-term scenario
are all elements to be considered when performing the
sustainability analysis. In light of the general agreement
on the need to increase the focus of EU budgetary sur-
veillance on long-term public finance developments, this
part describes the current Commission approach for car-
rying out sustainability analysis, discusses the robust-
ness of debt projections and sustainability indicators
with respect to the major assumptions underlying the
analysis, and outlines suggestions for possible improve-
ments. In particular, it is suggested that increased infor-
mation exchange within the Ageing Working Group
attached to the Economic Policy Committee for what
concerns national projections on age-related expendi-
tures, including on the models to carry out such projec-
tions, would increase transparency and contribute to
upgrading the overall assessment of the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances.77

1. The debate on the EU fiscal framework
1.1. Introduction
On 22 March 2005, the EU Heads of State or Govern-
ment endorsed the report of the Ecofin Council entitled
‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact’ (1). Two days before, at their extraordinary
meeting of Sunday 20 March, ministers for finance had
reached consensus on the reform of the Pact after several
months of intense discussion.
The new set of rules introduces more economic rationale
and flexibility in the application of the EU fiscal frame-
work and encourages Member States to achieve the nec-
essary budgetary consolidation when economic condi-
tions are favourable. In conjunction with a renewed
commitment from all Member States to stability-ori-
ented budgetary policies and the surveillance proce-
dures, the new agreement puts an end to the uncertainty
that has surrounded the interpretation of the existing
budgetary rules since November 2003 and can reinforce
the credibility of the EU fiscal framework.
The 2005 Ecofin report updates and complements the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It recommends, fur-
thermore, complementary measures for improving fiscal
and statistical governance both at the national and at the
EU level.
The agreement on the revision of the rules of the Pact is
the result of a comprehensive review of the Stability and
Growth Pact. It was launched by the Commission with
its September 2004 communication against the back-
ground of past and prospective budgetary developments
and challenges as well as in light of the experience with
the implementation of the budgetary rules in the EU
Member States.
Overall, the agreement reached by the Council reflects a
broadly balanced compromise. On the one hand, more
economic judgment will be introduced in the application
of the rules in order to better reflect the economic reali-
ties in the enlarged EU. This will help in fostering the
acceptability and ownership of the budgetary rules in
Member States. On the other hand, renewed commit-
ment of Member States to sound budgetary policy
throughout the economic cycle provides a solid basis for
improved and economically sensible implementation of
the Pact.
The fundamental rules remain unchanged. In particular,
the Ecofin report reconfirms the agreement that the
Treaty’s reference values for government deficit and
debt will remain the anchor of the system. This is under-
pinned by the commitment of the Commission always to
make a report under Article 104(3), the initial step of the
excessive deficit procedure, if a deficit exceeds 3 %.
Any excess of the deficit that will not be small and tem-
porary will be considered excessive, whatever the influ-
ence of ‘other relevant factors’. An excessive deficit will
still need to be corrected promptly, despite the new
extension of the deadlines in the excessive deficit proce-
dure. A new annual minimum budgetary effort has been
introduced for countries in EDP.
The Commission will ensure a forceful implementation
of the agreement and continue the impartial and equal
application of the rules to all Member States. Following
the agreement by the Council, the Commission has
swiftly moved on and presented to the Council for adop-
tion the necessary legislative proposals for implement-
ing the agreed changes (2).
This chapter of the report describes and explains the
main elements of the 2005 reform package. It provides,
¥1∂ See Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 22 and 23
March 2005 (7619/05) and the (Ecofin) Council report to the European
Council of 21 March 2005 (7423/05). 
¥2∂ The legislative procedure was still ongoing at the time the 2005 public
finance report went to press.79
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5furthermore, a first and tentative assessment of the
changes against a set of established criteria for optimal
fiscal rules and provides the reader with information
about the main stages of the debate. In order to put the
changes into perspective, it begins by briefly recapitulat-
ing the key features of the existing EU fiscal framework.
1.2. The architecture of the existing EU 
fiscal framework
When the project of European economic and monetary
union (EMU) was launched, there was widespread
recognition that enhanced economic coordination
mechanisms were needed among the countries sharing
the single currency.
In order to ensure the benefits of Union-wide financial
stability, Member States in the 1990s reached consensus
on the design of a supranational fiscal policy framework
at the level of the EU. The rules were adapted to the insti-
tutional characteristics of EMU and designed with a
view to encouraging Member States to pursue sound
budgetary policies while allowing sufficient margins for
national budgetary flexibility.
The EU fiscal framework provides a combination of
numerical and procedural rules enshrined in the Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact (1).
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the require-
ment for Member States to keep their public deficit
below 3 % of GDP and the general government debt
level below 60 % of GDP (or diminishing at a satisfac-
tory pace towards this reference value) as well as disci-
plinary rules to be followed in case a Member State fails
to meet these criteria. According to Article 104(3), when
assessing a Member State’s compliance with these crite-
ria, the Commission shall also take into account whether
the government deficit exceeds government investment
expenditure and take into account all other relevant fac-
tors. The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 1997,
further complemented and specified the rules of the
Treaty with a view to reinforcing the preventive ele-
ments of the framework and inducing Member States to
correct excessive deficit positions speedily if they occur.
The 1997 SGP consists of two Council regulations,
which are politically underpinned by the resolution of
the 1997 Amsterdam European Council. The first regu-
lation ((EC) No 1966/97) on the strengthening of the sur-
veillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and
coordination of economic policies constitutes the pre-
ventive arm of the Pact. The regulation lays down a mon-
itoring and early-warning system with a view to prevent-
ing government deficits from becoming excessive. It
requires Member States to achieve and maintain budget-
ary positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’. This is
meant to ensure that fiscal policy contributes to an envi-
ronment in which monetary policy can effectively main-
tain price stability whilst being growth supportive.
Moreover, by maintaining a budgetary position of ‘close
to balance or in surplus’, Member States would have the
necessary room for manoeuvre for cyclical stabilisation
through the working of the automatic stabilisers without
the 3 % of GDP reference value for deficits being
breached (see, for example, Buti and Sapir, 2002). In
addition, it would lead to a rapid reduction in the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio, implying a lower interest bur-
den and creating further scope for governments to pursue
growth-enhancing reforms.
In order to allow for a consistent monitoring of the
budgetary developments, the regulation requests Mem-
ber States to submit stability or convergence pro-
grammes (2). They include the medium-term objective
for their budgetary position and describe the adjustment
path towards it. In addition, since 2001, the annual
updates of the stability and convergence programmes
have contained complementary information on the long-
term sustainability of public finances.
The Council is at the core of the peer review mechanism
established by the Treaty and specified by the Pact.
Based on the assessment of the Commission, the Council
examines the programmes and formulates an opinion for
each Member State. If the Council identifies significant
divergence of the budgetary position from the medium-
term budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards
it, it can decide to address a recommendation to the
Member State concerned to take the necessary action.
¥1∂ For a more detailed description of the EU fiscal rules see Buti and Sapir
(1998) and Cabral (2001). On the optimal design of fiscal policy rules, see
Kopits and Symansky (1998).
¥2∂ Member States having adopted the euro submit stability programmes, and
the other Member States submit convergence programmes. The main dif-
ference between the stability and convergence programmes concerns the
quality of the monitoring of implementation. In terms of content, conver-
gence programmes have to provide additional information on the medium-
term monetary policy objectives, and price and exchange rate stability (see
European Commission, 2000). 80
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1). The main pur-
pose of the regulation is to speed up and clarify the
excessive deficit procedure as defined in Article 104 of
the Treaty. It introduces a rigorous timetable for the pro-
cedure designed to strengthen the dissuasive nature of
the Treaty requirements and provide incentives to ensure
a sufficient safety margin from the reference value of
3 % of GDP for the government deficit.
Main elements of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 include
the following:
• The definition of the existence of an excessive defi-
cit, including the concepts of ‘exceptional and tem-
porary’ excess over the reference value and ‘severe
economic downturn’. According to the regulation,
the excess of a deficit can be considered exceptional
if it results (a) from an unusual event outside the
control of the Member State or (b) from a severe
economic downturn. In either case, and provided
that the deficit remains close to the reference value,
no excessive deficit would be identified.
• The deadlines for the correction of the excessive
deficit. The regulation stipulates that within four
months the Member State has to take effective
action for the correction of an excessive deficit and
that the correction of the excessive deficit should be
completed in the year following its identification by
the Council, unless there are ‘special circum-
stances’ (2). The latter concept is not specified and
leaves discretionary room for decision-making in
the Council.
• Rules for the monitoring and assessment of the
results of corrective actions taken.
• Deadlines for the subsequent steps in the procedure,
including the application of sanctions.
¥1∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding-up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. ¥2∂ See Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, Article 3(4).
Box II.1: Why fiscal rules?
Unsustainable budgetary positions are a major threat to macroeconomic stability. The experience of lax fiscal policies in
several European countries up to the early 1990s had provided evidence of the adverse effects of high public deficits and
rising debt levels on economic growth and stability. The existence of large deficits and debt levels tends to push up prices
and interest rates, distorts the allocation of resources and constrains the economy’s capacity to respond countercyclically
in case of an economic downturn. Effective multilateral fiscal rules can play an important role in countering the frequent
deficit bias of fiscal policies by providing an external anchor to domestic budgetary reforms.
The formation of the economic and monetary union created additional arguments for fiscal rules at the supranational level.
The combination of a single currency and decentralised fiscal policies carried out by sovereign countries calls for enhanced
coordination of macroeconomic policies within EMU. With the adoption of a single currency, the potential for economic
spillover between the participating Member States, including through the conduct of budgetary policy, increases consider-
ably. At the same time, market discipline tends to diminish as the risk of exchange rate changes and the ability of national
central banks to influence the national interest rate of a specific country disappear. Such constellations open the possibility
for free-riding and give rise to the risk of moral hazard behaviour. In the absence of fiscal rules, governments in Member
States may have an incentive to run overly expansionary policies because the costs in the form of higher interest rates are
spread across all members and can be expected to remain muted for the (ir-)responsible country. As a result of such behav-
iour, the aggregate deficit and debt in the euro area could rise to levels well beyond what is sustainable and socially accept-
able. There is also a risk of impairing the functional independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), if Member States
were allowed to accumulate unsustainable levels of public debt. High-debt countries, in order to avoid a default with neg-
ative repercussions on the euro-area-wide financial market, could de facto force the ECB to either accept a higher level of
inflation than warranted (inflationary bail-out) or to bail out the indebted country at the cost of the whole union, despite
the no-bail-out rule enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. (See, for example, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998.)81
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explicitly specify the application of the debt criterion of
the Treaty, as compliance with the deficit criterion was
deemed sufficient to ensure a satisfactory rate of debt
reduction.
The rules of the Pact are embedded in a wider framework
of economic governance and coordination in the EU and
complemented by a more comprehensive set of policy
instruments and rules, both at the EU level (e.g. the
broad economic policy guidelines) and at the national
level. Moreover, statistical governance, both at the level
of the EU and at that of the Member States, including
rules concerning the timely provision of correct and
comparable budgetary data, is another key element of the
EU fiscal framework.
1.3. Improving the implementation of the 
SGP — The 2005 reform package
The review of the SGP provisions took place against the
background of a deteriorating budgetary performance of
many EU Member States as well as in light of the changes
in economic circumstances of the enlarged EU. By and
large, in line with the ideas presented by the Commission
in its communication of 3 September 2004 (1), the 2005
Ecofin report identifies five areas where improvement is
warranted, notably to:
(i) enhance the economic rationale of the budgetary
rules to improve their credibility and ownership;
(ii) improve ‘ownership’ by national policy-makers;
(iii) use more effectively periods when economies are
growing above trend for budgetary consolidation in
order to avoid procyclical policies;
(iv) take better account in Council recommendations of
periods when economies are growing below trend;
(v) give sufficient attention in the surveillance of budg-
etary positions to debt and sustainability.
While some of these objectives could only be achieved
by reducing the degree of automaticity of the existing
rules and allowing for more economic judgment, the
achievement of others is facilitated by adequately
strengthening the incentives for compliance and enforce-
ment. Moreover, the Commission, being the guardian of
the Treaty and responsible for equal treatment in the
application of EU rules, was concerned to ensure that by
improving the economic underpinning of the Pact its
rules-based character would not be jeopardised. Overall,
the agreement reached by the Council reflects a balanced
compromise.
The 2005 Ecofin report, endorsed by the European
Council, updates and complements the existing SGP. For
the implementation of some of the agreed changes, it is
necessary to formally amend the Council regulations
which underpin the SGP. Beyond these legal changes,
the Ecofin report provides guidance for the Member
States, the Council and the Commission in the applica-
tion and interpretation of the Pact provisions. In line with
the commitment of the Council to limit legislative
changes to a minimum, the report actually suggests only
minimal changes to the regulations (including in the pre-
ventive arm of the Pact (Regulation (EC) No 1466/97),
notably on how to take structural reforms into account in
the context of budgetary surveillance, and in the correc-
tive arm of the Pact (Regulation (EC) No 1467/97), nota-
bly the new definition of a ‘severe economic downturn’;
the nature of ‘other relevant factors’ and the steps of the
EDP in which they should be considered; and the exten-
sion of the deadlines for taking effective action and meas-
ures in the course of the excessive deficit procedure).
Elements designed to improve the economic underpin-
ning and to increase the ownership of the Pact provisions
are introduced both in the preventive arm of the Pact and
in the application of the rules of the excessive deficit pro-
cedure. Moreover, the agreed measures to improve eco-
nomic, fiscal and statistical governance are cross-cutting
by nature. Their main aim is to strengthen the legitimacy
and ownership of the Pact and thereby foster its preven-
tive power.
In order to facilitate comparability with the existing Pact,
the following three sections review the major modifica-
tions of the Pact provisions, by looking in turn at the
changes in the preventive and the corrective arms and the
measures related to the dimension of fiscal and statistical
governance.
¥1∂ Commission communication ‘Strengthening economic governance and
clarifying the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’
(COM(2004) 581 final, 3.9.2004). See, also, Deroose and Langedijk
(2005) for a concise presentation of the reasons for reform. An alternative
view focusing on effective and full application of the original SGP is pre-
sented by Annett et al. (2005).82
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Both the Commission and the Council considered
enhancing the preventive dimension of the Pact a central
objective of the reform (1). Experience in the run-up to
the recent protracted economic slowdown had high-
lighted the importance of prudent and symmetric-over-
the-cycle fiscal policies and, in particular, the need to
achieve surpluses in economically good times. More-
over, in light of the increased economic diversification in
the EU of 25 Member States, there is a need to better dif-
ferentiate the medium-term budgetary policy objective
according to relevant country-specific features. For lack
of economic rationale, uniform budgetary objectives for
all countries no longer appeared appropriate.
In response to these challenges, the new agreement
includes four major innovations in the preventive arm:
(i) the definition of country-specific medium-term
objectives within a given range and the procedure to set
and revise them; (ii) agreement on a minimum annual
budgetary effort for countries that have not yet reached
the medium-term objectives; (iii) policy advice by the
Commission to encourage Member States to stick to
their adjustment path; (iv) the treatment of structural
reforms.
These reform elements are designed to enhance the eco-
nomic underpinning of the EU’s medium-term fiscal
policies, by providing more room for country-specific
considerations. They are intended to raise Member
States’ compliance with their medium-term objectives.
and strengthen the incentives for prudent fiscal policies
over the cycle and the implementation of structural
reforms. The main modifications in the preventive arm
are described below.
(i) Country-specific medium-term objectives
The new definition of the medium-term budgetary objec-
tive (MTO) is designed to better take into account the
diversity of economic and budgetary positions and risks
across Member States. In future, the medium-term budg-
etary objective of a country will be defined on the basis
of its current debt ratio and potential growth, while the
overall objective of achieving over the medium term a
budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus
remains. For Member States having adopted the euro and
for those participating in the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM II), the agreed range of MTOs is between – 1 % of
GDP for countries with a combination of low debt and
high potential growth and balance or in surplus for coun-
tries with a combination of high debt and low potential
growth.
The aim of the new country-specific MTO is threefold.
It is designed to provide a safety margin with respect to
the 3 % deficit limit, to ensure fiscal sustainability in the
long run, and to improve the scope for productive public
investment.
By taking into account relevant economic fundamentals,
the new provision on the MTO allows for a better differ-
entiation among countries while preserving the simplic-
ity and transparency of the rule. Sustainability risks asso-
ciated with implicit liabilities are indirectly addressed by
ensuring that debt converges towards and remains at pru-
dent values. Member States are thus offered the choice of
combining different degrees of structural reform and
debt reduction according to national preferences. Incen-
tives for structural reform are not compromised.
The report invites the Commission to continue method-
ological work on measuring and assessing implicit liabil-
ities and to provide a progress report by the end of 2006.
Once criteria and modalities for the assessment of
implicit liabilities are established and agreed by the
Council, the definition of the MTO will be reviewed
with a view to reflecting such implicit liabilities more
explicitly in the medium-term objective. As in the past,
the MTO is defined in cyclically adjusted terms, net of
one-off and temporary measures. The MTO for every
Member State will be reviewed every four years and
revised in light of the respective developments in gov-
ernment debt, potential growth and fiscal sustainability.
(ii) Minimum annual budgetary effort for countries that 
have not yet reached the medium-term objectives
Member States of the euro area and of ERM II that have
not yet reached their MTO have agreed to achieve, as a
benchmark, an annual adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP (2).
All Member States that have not yet reached their MTO
are expected to achieve it over the cycle, by implement-
ing more ambitious fiscal adjustment during good times.
The new agreement on a minimum budgetary effort
¥1∂ See the Council declaration on the Stability and Growth Pact of 18 June 2004
and the Commission communication of 3 September 2004. 
¥2∂ Measured in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and other temporary
measures. 83
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fiscal rules. The 1997 Pact provisions contain no explicit
reference to the appropriate adjustment path.
The 2005 Ecofin report contains, furthermore, a commit-
ment of Member States for the conduct of more symmet-
ric fiscal policies over the cycle. Governments have
agreed to pursue active consolidation of the budget when
the economic conditions are favourable, i.e. in ‘good
times’, and to use windfall revenues, as a rule, for the
reduction of government deficit and debt. The report
defines ‘good times’ as periods during which actual
GDP growth is above potential growth, ‘taking into
account tax elasticities’. This implies that the magnitude
of consolidation in good times will depend on the actual
impact of growth on public revenues. The latter is largely
determined by the composition of the sources of growth.
(iii) Early-warning system
With a view to strengthening the preventive character of
the Pact, the 2005 Ecofin report clarifies and expands the
existing early-warning mechanism. The report expects
the Commission to issue direct, i.e. without prior Coun-
cil involvement, policy advice to encourage Member
States to realise the agreed adjustment path. Accord-
ingly, the Commission will address the Council in future
not only if there is an acute risk of breaching the 3 % of
GDP reference value, but also in cases of unjustified
deviations from the adjustment path towards the MTO or
the MTO itself, including in good times. The agreement
pertains to the transition period until the new Constitu-
tion becomes effective. Once it is in force, the instrument
of ‘policy advice’ will be replaced by a Commission
‘opinion’ in line with the new Article III-184(5), directly
addressed to the Member State concerned.
(iv) Structural reforms
With a view to eliminating possible disincentives for
structural reforms, the Council agreed that, under certain
conditions, certain structural reforms can justify a tem-
porary deviation from the MTO and, for Member States
that have not yet reached their MTO, temporary devia-
tions from the adjustment path towards the MTO.
Provided that respect of the 3 % of GDP reference value
is not jeopardised and the budgetary position is expected
to return to the MTO within the four-year programme
period, the Council, when assessing the MTO or the
adjustment path towards it, will take into account major
structural reforms. Only major structural reforms that
have direct long-term cost-saving effects and verifiably
improve fiscal sustainability over the long term will be
considered. This rule pertains, in particular, to systemic
reforms of the pension scheme of a Member State. Such
reforms typically imply budgetary costs in the short run
to the benefit of lower ageing-related implicit liabilities
in the long run. Significant other supply-side reforms
that raise potential growth can also be considered. These
modifications should be seen in the context of increasing
the consistency of the various policy objectives and
instruments at the EU level, in particular with the objec-
tives of the Lisbon strategy.
In order to allow the Commission and the Council to
scrutinise the envisaged structural reforms and assess
their impact on the MTO and the adjustment path
towards it, Member States will be requested to provide
detailed documentation of the expected cost–benefit
effects of the envisaged reforms in the context of the
annual updates of stability and convergence pro-
grammes. It is furthermore envisaged to give the Council
three, instead of two, months for the examination of the
programmes following their submission.
1.3.2. Changes in the corrective arm
The main modifications in the corrective arm of the Pact
concern: (i) the definition of ‘excessive deficits’, includ-
ing the revision of the concept of ‘severe economic
downturn’ and the role of ‘other relevant factors’; (ii) the
possible extension of the existing one-year deadline for
the correction of an excessive deficit following its iden-
tification by one year and the introduction of repetition
of steps in the EDP; (iii) considerations related to the
assessment of systemic pension reforms in the EDP; and
(iv) focus on debt and fiscal sustainability.
Many commentators have criticised the revisions in the
excessive deficit procedure as a significant weakening
of the dissuasive dimension of the Pact. It is argued
that, in particular, the agreement on the application of
other relevant factors de facto erodes the 3 % of GDP
reference value, and that the lack of constraint would
give rise to growing deficits in the future (1). However,
such an assessment overlooks key elements of the new
2005 reform.
¥1∂ See, for example, Feldstein (2005) and Deutsche Bundesbank press release
of 21 March 2005.84
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Main changes to the Stability and Growth Pact following the Council agreement of 20 March 2005
Original Revised
1. Changes in the preventive arm
Medium-term 
objective (MTO)
All Member States (MS) have a medium-term budgetary 
objective of ‘close to balance or in surplus’.
• Country-specific differentiation of MTOs according to 
stock of public debt and potential growth. 
• MTOs for euro-area and ERM II MS are set between 
– 1 % of GDP and balance or in surplus (in cyclically 
adjusted terms and net of one-offs). 
• Implicit liabilities to be taken into account at a later 
stage, when modalities for doing so are agreed by the 
Council.
Adjustment path 
towards the MTO
No specific provisions. • MS to take active steps to achieve the MTO. 
• Annual minimum adjustment for MS of the euro area or 
of ERM II of 0.5 % of GDP. 
• The effort should be higher in ‘good times’. 
• ‘Good times’ are identified as periods where output 
exceeds its potential level, ‘taking into account tax 
elasticities’.
Early policy advice Early warnings are adopted/addressed by the Council, upon 
recommendation of the Commission.
In addition, the Commission can issue direct ‘early policy 
advice’ to encourage MS to stick to their adjustment path. To 
be replaced by ‘early warnings’ in accordance with the 
Constitution once applicable.
Structural reforms No specific provision. Reforms will be taken into account when defining the 
adjustment path to the MTO and may allow a deviation 
from it under the following conditions:  
• only major reforms (direct/indirect impact on 
sustainability);  
• safety margin to the 3 % reference value is guaranteed; 
• the deficit returns to the MTO within the programme 
period;  
• detailed information is provided in the stability/
convergence programmes.  
Special attention to systemic pension reforms.
 2. Changes in the corrective arm
Preparing a report 
under Article 
104(3)
No obligation for the Commission to prepare a report if a 
deficit exceeds 3 %.
• The Commission will always prepare a report in cases 
where there is a deficit above 3 %.  
• The report will examine whether the exceptions in 
Article 104(2) apply.  
• It will take into account whether the deficit exceeds 
government investment expenditure and all ‘other 
relevant factors’.
Severe economic 
downturn
‘Severe economic downturn’ if there is an annual fall in real 
GDP of at least 2 % for the preparation of the report under 
Article 104(3) by the Commission, and in decisions under 
Article 104(6) by the Council, if observations by the Member 
State concerned show that the downturn is exceptional in 
light of evidence of the abruptness of the downturn and the 
accumulated loss of output with respect to past trends. The 
MS commit not to invoke the severe economic downturn 
when growth is above – 0.75 %.
An economic downturn may be considered ‘severe’ in cases 
of a negative growth rate or accumulated loss of output 
during a protracted period of very low growth relative to 
potential growth.
(Continued on the next page)85
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Original Revised
‘Other relevant 
factors’ (ORFs)
No specific definition of ‘ORFs’ and their role in the excessive 
deficit procedure.
• The Commission report under Article 104(3) will take 
into account:  
– developments in the medium-term economic 
position (potential growth, cyclical conditions, 
implementation of policies);  
– developments in the medium-term budgetary 
position (public investment, quality of public 
finances, as well as fiscal consolidation in ‘good 
times’, debt sustainability);  
– any other factors, which, in the opinion of the MS, 
are relevant in order to assess the excess over the 
reference value.  
• ORFs will be considered in the steps from Article 104(4) 
to (6) only if the excess over the reference value is 
temporary and the deficit remains close to the reference 
value. Any deficit above 3 % that is neither close to the 
reference value nor temporary will be considered 
excessive.  
• If the Council has decided that an excessive deficit exists, 
the ORFs will also be considered in the subsequent 
procedural steps of Article 104 (except in Article 104(12), 
i.e. abrogation, and when deciding to repeat steps in 
the EDP).
Systemic pension 
reforms
No specific provision. • These are treated like an ORF, but under strict 
conditions also with a role in abrogation.  
• Consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given 
regressively for the initial five years after an MS has 
introduced the reform (or five years after 2004).
Increasing the 
focus on debt and 
sustainability
No specific provision. • The debt criterion, and in particular the concept of a 
debt ratio ‘sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace’, will be applied in 
qualitative terms.  
• The Council will formulate recommendations on the 
debt dynamics in its opinions on the stability and 
convergence programmes.
Extending 
deadlines for 
taking effective 
action and 
measures
 • Deadlines are extended:  for a decision under Article 
104(6) — from three to four months after notification;  
• for taking effective action following Article 104(7) — 
from four to six months;  
• for moving to Article 104(9) — from one to two months;  
• for taking action following a notice under Article 104(9) 
— from two to four months.
Minimum fiscal 
effort
No specific provision. Countries in excessive deficit are required to achieve a 
minimum fiscal effort of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a 
benchmark.
Initial deadline for 
correcting the 
excessive deficit
The excessive deficit has to be corrected in the year 
following its identification, unless there are ‘special 
circumstances’.
The rule remains; possible extension by one year based on 
ORFs and on the condition that minimum fiscal efforts have 
been taken.
Repetition of 
steps in the EDP
Not foreseen. Deadlines for correcting the excessive deficit can be 
extended if:  
• effective action has been taken by the MS concerned in 
compliance with the initial recommendation or notice, 
and 
• unexpected adverse economic events with major 
unfavourable budgetary effects occur during the 
correction phase.
Source: Commission services.86
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excessive deficit procedure to better capture economic
reality, including the consideration of the agreed wider
set of ‘other relevant factors’ or the possibility to incur a
repetition of procedural steps, is effectively constrained
by complementary provisions of the new agreement,
preserving the character of the rules-based system.
Firstly, both the Commission, when considering whether
an excessive deficit exists or may occur, and the Council,
when deciding on the existence of an excessive deficit,
will take into account any relevant factors only if the
general government deficit remains close to the refer-
ence value and its excess over the reference value is tem-
porary.
Secondly, there will be no simple discounting of certain
categories of public expenditure from the deficit calcula-
tions. Other relevant factors are always considered in an
overall assessment, in which a large number of factors,
including those that may call for a stricter interpretation
of the deficit figures, are examined symmetrically to
assess compliance with budgetary discipline.
Thirdly, Member States in excessive deficit are
requested to achieve a minimum annual budgetary effort
of 0.5 % of GDP (1) irrespective of relevant factors.
Fourthly, the Commission will always issue a report
under Article 104(3) if the deficit of a Member State
exceeds 3 % or if it sees a risk of an excessive deficit.
Finally, the obligation of the Council to impose sanc-
tions in cases where a Member State in excessive deficit
repeatedly fails to act in compliance with the successive
decisions of the Council remains unchanged as the ulti-
mate threat against non-compliance. The various modi-
fications in the corrective arm are presented in more
detail below.
(i) Definition of ‘excessive deficits’
The identification of an excessive deficit is the corner-
stone of the SGP’s dissuasive arm. According to Article
104(2a) of the Treaty (and the protocol on the excessive
deficit procedure), a government deficit above 3 % of
GDP is considered to be excessive unless the excess over
the 3 % is only exceptional and temporary and the gov-
ernment deficit ratio remains close to the reference
value (2). Existing Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
specifies in Article 2 that the excess over 3 % can be con-
sidered exceptional if it results (a) from an unusual event
outside the control of the Member State (e.g. a natural
disaster) or (b) from a severe economic downturn, which
is defined as an annual fall in real GDP of at least 2 %
(Article 2(2). In order for the excess to be considered
temporary, the Commission’s forecast must indicate that
the deficit will fall back below the reference value fol-
lowing the end of the unusual event or the severe eco-
nomic downturn. The Commission’s usual forecasting
period is two years.
‘Severe economic downturn’ redefined
In order to reformulate the exceptionality clause more in
line with economic reality in the EU Member States, the
Council agreed to make the condition of ‘severe eco-
nomic downturn’ less demanding and suggested adapt-
ing Article 2(2) and (3). Accordingly, both the Commis-
sion and the Council, when assessing and deciding on
the existence of an excessive deficit according to Treaty
Article 104(3) to (6), may consider as exceptional in the
sense of Article 104(2a) an excess over the reference
value ‘which results from a negative growth rate or from
the output loss accumulated during a protracted period of
very low growth relative to potential growth’. However,
the overarching conditions of ‘close to the reference
value’ and ‘temporariness’ continue to apply. 
The role of ‘other relevant factors’ clarified
Moreover, with a view to ensuring a balanced and com-
prehensive assessment of the budgetary developments in
the context of the economic and fiscal conditions pre-
vailing in a country, the 2005 Ecofin report clarifies a set
of ‘other relevant factors’ that the Commission and the
Council will take into account when deciding on the
existence of an excessive deficit and when determining
the deadline for its correction (3). In particular, the Com-
mission when preparing the report under Article 104(3),
which initialises the excessive deficit procedure, ‘should
appropriately reflect developments in the medium-term
economic position (in particular, potential growth, pre-
vailing cyclical conditions, the implementation of poli-
cies in the context of the Lisbon agenda and policies to
¥1∂ In cyclically adjusted terms net of one-off and temporary measures.
¥2∂ See Cabral (2001) for details. 
¥3∂ The Treaty provisions on the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104)
include the concept of other relevant factors. However, in practice, it did
not play a significant role in the excessive deficit procedures in the past.87
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developments in the medium-term budgetary position
(in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in “good
times”, debt sustainability, public investment and the
overall quality of public finances)’.
Furthermore, the Commission shall give ‘due considera-
tion’ ‘to any other factors, which in the opinion of the
Member State concerned, are relevant in order to com-
prehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over
the reference value’. Such factors may include ‘budget-
ary efforts towards increasing, or maintaining at a high
level, financial contributions to fostering international
solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, nota-
bly the unification of Europe’.
Once the Council has taken the decision that an exces-
sive deficit exists, ‘the other relevant factors will also
be considered in the subsequent steps’ of the procedure,
including in the decision on the appropriate deadline
for the correction of the excessive deficit and the
assessment of effective action, but not ‘in the decision
of the Council whether a Member State has corrected
its excessive deficit’.
The 2005 Ecofin report stresses that other relevant fac-
tors are taken into account only under the condition that
‘the excess over the reference value is temporary and the
deficit remains close to the reference value’. In other
words, if a deficit above 3 % exceeds what is considered
‘close to the reference value’ or if there is no indication
in the budgetary forecast provided by the Commission
that the deficit will fall below the reference value, the
presumption prevails that an excessive deficit exists
despite all ‘other relevant factors’, and the Council shall
decide accordingly.
(ii) Deadlines and repetition of steps in the excessive 
deficit procedure
The 1997 Pact provisions are characterised by a high
degree of automatism both with respect to the timing and
the sequence of the respective steps in the EDP. The
2005 Ecofin report, while upholding the principle that an
excessive deficit should be corrected promptly, intro-
duces more flexibility to respond to changes in economic
circumstances. The new agreement sticks to the provi-
sion that, as a rule, an excessive deficit should be cor-
rected the year after it is identified by the Council, i.e.
usually the second year after it occurs. However, in cases
where a correction in the consecutive year would be
unwarranted for economic reasons, the Council may
decide to set the deadline for the correction of the exces-
sive deficit in the second year after its identification.
When deciding on the appropriate deadline for the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit, the other relevant factors
analysed by the Commission in its report under Article
104(3) will be taken into account.
The increased flexibility with respect to setting the initial
deadline for correction is counterbalanced by the Coun-
cil agreement that, as a benchmark, countries in exces-
sive deficit have to implement a minimum fiscal adjust-
ment of at least 0.5 % of GDP (1) irrespective of the
existence of other relevant factors. The Council, on the
basis of a recommendation of the Commission, can inter-
vene at any time, if it finds that the action implemented
by the country concerned is inadequate to bring the
excessive deficit to an end as recommended, and move
to the next step in the procedure.
With a view to allowing both the Commission and the
Council to provide an appropriate assessment of all
aspects, the delay for adoption of a decision under Arti-
cle 104(6) establishing the existence of an excessive def-
icit is extended from three to four months after the noti-
fication deadline. By the same token, to facilitate the
effective adoption of more comprehensive consolidation
packages in the context of national budgetary processes,
the delay for taking effective action is extended from
four to six months. For the same reasons, the one-month
deadline for the Council to take a decision to move from
Article 104(8) to Article 104(9) is extended to two
months, and the two-month deadline under Article
104(9) to four months. As a result, the overall maximum
period of 10 months within which the Council is obliged
to take a decision to impose sanctions in cases where a
Member State participating in the euro area fails to com-
ply with the successive decisions of the Council (2) is
effectively extended to 16 months.
The 2005 Ecofin report also introduces the possibility of
repeating steps in the excessive deficit procedure,
thereby correcting what has been seen as one of the main
sources of rigidity of the current Pact.
In cases where an unexpected adverse economic event
with a considerable negative impact on the budget hits a
¥1∂ In cyclically adjusted terms, and net of one-off and other temporary
measures.
¥2∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, Article 7.88
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the deadlines initially agreed by the Council following
Article 104(7) or (9) can be revised and expanded.
However, a repetition of these steps can only be invoked
under the provision that effective action has been taken
by the country concerned in compliance with the initial
recommendation or notice. This implies that, as a mini-
mum, measures of the magnitude of 0.5 % of GDP in
cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and other tem-
porary measures, must be in place. 
(iii) Taking into account systemic pension reforms
In line with the provisions concerning the treatment of
so-called second-pillar pension reforms in the definition
of the MTO, the 2005 Ecofin report commits the Council
and the Commission to ‘consider carefully’ in the
Graph II.1: Extended deadlines for the steps in the EDP
Source: Commission services.
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caused by the introduction of a multi-pillar pension sys-
tem that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar.
In particular, when assessing whether the excessive def-
icit has been corrected, the Commission and the Council
will compare the developments of the nominal deficit
figures under the EDP with the net costs related to the
implementation of the second pillar.
Over the first five years after the implementation of such
a reform, and following a regressive mode, the deficit
figures can be corrected for the net costs of the pension
reforms. The correction will be for 100 % of the net costs
in the first year, for 80 % in the second year, and for 60,
40, and 20 % in the third, fourth and fifth years respec-
tively. For Member States that have already imple-
mented such reforms, the same five-year mechanism
would apply, starting in 2005.
While these provisions are generally designed to provide
further incentives for increasing the long-term sustaina-
bility of pension systems, they pertain particularly to a
number of new Member States which have recently
started with the build-up of a fully funded second pillar.
While most of these countries are currently in EDP, a
certain proportion of the excessive deficit is attributable
to the pension reform. Thus, the agreement reached by
the Council on the treatment of second-pillar pension
reforms in the EDP may have implications for the assess-
ment of fiscal convergence in line with the deficit criteria
laid down in the Treaty for deciding on membership in
the euro area.
(iv) Focus on debt and fiscal sustainability
The Commission intends to apply in full the provisions
of the Treaty. Under the current legal provisions, accord-
ing to Article 104(2) of the Treaty, the Commission
monitors whether the debt ratio exceeds the reference
value and, if so, whether it is sufficiently diminishing
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
pace. The Commission has the possibility, where it is of
the opinion that there is an excessive deficit for non-
compliance with the debt criterion, to recommend to the
Council to take a decision on the existence of an exces-
sive deficit according to Article 104(6) of the Treaty.
The 2005 Ecofin report recalls the Commission’s obliga-
tion to examine compliance with budgetary discipline on
the basis of both the deficit and the debt criterion and
reaffirms the need to reduce government debt to below
60 % of GDP at a satisfactory pace. The Council calls, in
particular, for a strengthening of the debt surveillance
framework by applying the Treaty’s concept of ‘suffi-
ciently diminishing and approaching the reference value
at a satisfactory pace’ for the debt ratio in qualitative
terms. This implies that macroeconomic conditions, in
particular the level of potential growth and the cyclical
position, and debt dynamics should be taken into
account, including the pursuit of appropriate levels of
primary surpluses as well as other measures to reduce
gross debt, including one-off and other temporary meas-
ures, and debt management strategies. Following such an
approach avoids a mechanistic interpretation of gross
debt figures.
In cases where the Council identifies a situation of non-
compliance with the debt criterion, it will formulate a
recommendation in the context of the Council opinions
on the stability programme.
1.3.3. Improving governance
The 2005 Ecofin report recognises that modifications to
the provisions of the Pact are not sufficient to ensure a
meaningful improvement of their implementation. In
order to solidly re-establish the credibility of the Pact
and to strengthen the enforcement of budgetary disci-
pline, it is important that complementary measures are
taken to enhance the institutional conditions for fiscal
and statistical governance. The report contains a number
of elements designed to increase the ownership of the
Pact provisions and clarify the respective roles and
responsibilities of the various actors involved as well as
measures to improve the quality and timeliness of statis-
tical data, both at the national and at the EU level.
(i) Fiscal governance
The 2005 Ecofin report stresses that increasing the effec-
tiveness of peer support and pressure is an integral part
of a reformed Stability and Growth Pact. With a view to
strengthening the central peer support functions of the
Pact, the Council and the Commission are committed to
explaining publicly their positions and decisions at all
appropriate stages of the fiscal surveillance procedure
established by the Treaty and the Pact.
The report highlights, furthermore, the importance of
national budgetary rules complementing Member
States’ commitments under the Stability and Growth
Pact at the EU level. It suggests that national institutions90
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surveillance, thereby underpinning and complementing
the monitoring and surveillance procedures at EU level.
A more effective mobilisation of the national public
opinion is seen as a useful measure to strengthen national
ownership and enhance enforcement.
Following the same rationale, it is foreseen that a new
government taking office will show continuity with
respect to the budgetary targets endorsed by the Council
on the basis of the Member State’s previous update of the
stability/convergence programme. When the new gov-
ernment prepares its first update of the programme, it is
expected to present its budgetary strategy, outlining the
means and instruments which it intends to employ to
achieve the agreed targets.
With due respect to the subsidiarity principle, the report
suggests a greater involvement of national parliaments in
the EU fiscal surveillance process. It invites Member
State governments, in particular, to present to their
national parliaments their stability or convergence pro-
gramme and the respective Council opinions thereupon,
and to discuss with the national parliaments the follow-
up to recommendations in the context of the early-warn-
ing and excessive deficit procedures.
In order to facilitate better differentiation between fore-
casting and policy errors, Member States are requested
in future to include more comprehensive sensitivity ana-
lysis and/or develop alternative scenarios in their respec-
tive stability and convergence programmes. This will
enable the Commission and the Council to consider a
wider range of possible fiscal outcomes.
In this context, the report points to the important contribu-
tion that Commission forecasts can provide for the coordi-
nation of economic and fiscal policies. It calls, in particu-
lar, on the Member States of the euro area and ERM II to
use the ‘common external assumptions’ provided by the
Commission in its forecasts. More generally, Member
States are called upon to explain divergences in the
national and the Commission forecasts in their stability or
convergence programmes and their respective updates,
and also to assess possible forecast errors.
(ii) Statistical governance
The 2005 Ecofin report recognises that the credibility
and implementation of the fiscal framework rely cru-
cially on the availability of correct and reliable fiscal
data. Transparent budgetary statistics are also seen as
instrumental in enabling financial markets to better
assess and distinguish the creditworthiness of the differ-
ent Member States, thus providing an important signal-
ling device for policy errors.
The report recalls, in particular, the need to have in place
adequate practices, resources and capabilities to produce
high-quality statistics at the national and European level
and to ensure the independence, integrity and accounta-
bility of both national statistical offices and Eurostat.
With respect to Eurostat, the report emphasises the
importance of further developing its operational capac-
ity, monitoring power, independence and accountability.
Given the crucial importance of reliable data for the
functioning of the EDP and in order to avoid moral haz-
ard behaviour, the report makes reference to the possibil-
ity of invoking sanctions, to be considered in cases of an
infringement of the obligations to duly report govern-
ment data.
The Commission and the Council pursue the objective of
improving the governance of the European statistical
system in parallel with the reform of the SGP. In Decem-
ber 2004, the Commission presented three main lines of
action towards a European governance strategy for fiscal
statistics (1). They include the further elaboration of the
legal framework related to the reporting of fiscal data;
the development of European standards for the institu-
tional set-up of statistical authorities; and, finally, the
provision of additional resources to enable the relevant
Commission services to enhance their activity level with
respect to budgetary surveillance and the verification of
the quality of budgetary statistics (see Box II.2 on
strengthening the governance of budgetary statistics).
1.4. An assessment of the 2005 SGP reform 
according to criteria for an optimal 
fiscal policy rule
Buti et al. (2003) assess the design and compliance
mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact rules
against the set of eight criteria for an ideal fiscal rule
established by Kopits and Symansky (1998). They con-
clude that EU fiscal rules appeared to fare relatively well
against the Kopits–Symansky criteria. The SGP’s
¥1∂ See the Commission communication ‘Towards a European governance
strategy for fiscal statistics’ (COM(2004) 832, 22.12.2004).91
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aspects concerned enforceability and support of struc-
tural reforms. Buti et al. highlight the existing trade-offs
between the various criteria, namely between simplicity
and flexibility, between simplicity and adequacy, and
between flexibility and enforceability. These trade-offs
are influenced by the multinational setting in which the
rules are applied. In particular, Buti et al. argue that a
multiplicity of countries increases heterogeneity and dis-
persion of preferences with the consequence that a one-
size-fits-all fiscal rule is likely to be suboptimal.
Against this background, the 2005 reform of the SGP, as
reflected in the Ecofin report, can be tentatively
assessed. Overall, the analysis suggests that the changes
result in a broadly balanced set of new rules. Table II.2
shows that the Kopits–Symansky (KS) score deterio-
rated on the criteria on which the SGP scored high in the
assessment of Buti et al. In particular, it appears that in
comparison with the original Pact, the new provisions
are less well defined, contain a higher risk of interpreta-
tive ambiguity, and are less transparent and more com-
plex. On the other five criteria, where the ratings had
been less positive, its score improved.
KS-1 — A well-defined fiscal rule, in terms of the indi-
cator to be constrained, institutional coverage and escape
clauses, is paramount for effective enforcement.
Whereas the Treaty criteria remain well defined as to the
policy variables subject to constraints (i.e. budget bal-
ance and gross public debt) and the institutional cover-
age (i.e. general government), the escape clauses speci-
fied by the SGP are widened and subject to some more
ambiguity. The concepts of closeness and temporariness
are activated, but not fully specified; overall judgment of
‘other relevant factors’, as well as of ‘cumulative loss of
output’ to identify a severe economic downturn, is intro-
duced in the decision on the existence of an excessive
deficit; room for judgment is introduced in setting the
deadline for correction of the excessive deficit. On the
other hand, the SGP medium-term objectives, which
remained vague under the 1997 SGP, are specified.
Moreover, the fiscal adjustment required both in the
excessive deficit procedure and towards the medium-
term objective is specified, while additional judgment is
introduced by allowing for the consideration of struc-
tural reforms. The SGP remains silent on how to apply
the excessive deficit procedure in the case of violation of
the public debt criterion of the Treaty which requires the
debt ratio to be on a declining trend as long as it is above
the 60 % of GDP reference value. Overall, the adjust-
ments of the SGP which introduced more room for judg-
ment have resulted in a deterioration against the KS cri-
teria of a well-defined system.
KS-2 — Transparency has several dimensions. For fis-
cal rules to score high on transparency, they need to
include provisions on accounting conventions, forecast-
ing exercises, reporting practices, and interpretation of
data. The Treaty and the SGP continue to be based on
ESA 95 accounting. The Commission’s forecasts are the
reference point for assessing the risk of an excessive def-
icit or for detecting a ‘significant divergence’ from the
set of budgetary targets. The respective roles of Com-
mission and national forecasts in the assessment of sta-
bility and convergence programmes and in the EDP (rep-
etition of steps) have been partly clarified. However,
increased use of non-measurable indicators in the assess-
ment, in order to allow for a richer judgment of the eco-
nomic and budgetary circumstances, reduces transpar-
ency. The 2005 reform of the SGP formalises the
practice of previous years to increasingly use cyclically
adjusted measures, indicators of implicit and contingent
liabilities and estimates of potential growth which are all
subject to uncertainty. In addition, the assessment of
structural reforms for which no conventions or reporting
practices exist reduces transparency of the fiscal rules.
The reform of the statistical governance, on the other
hand, addresses moral hazard problems and incentives
for creative accounting by enhancing statistical surveil-
lance. Overall, the more complex and richer framework
with increasing importance of non-measurable and
uncertain indicators, in addition to the data based on
ESA 95 accounting, will reduce transparency.    
KS-3 — The EU fiscal rules were simple and easily
understandable. Some of the simplicity has been lost by
introducing room for judgment in the decision on the
existence of an excessive deficit and in the adjustment
path. The large range of possible relevant factors which
need to be assessed renders the system more sophisti-
cated and complex. In addition, the factors mentioned
under KS-1 and KS-2, affecting transparency and the
concept of a well-defined framework, also affect sim-
plicity. On the other hand, the agreement that the Com-
mission shall always prepare a report under Article
104(3) if the EDP deficit exceeds the 3 % of GDP refer-
ence value is straightforward. It enhances simplicity and
clarifies accountability in decision-making. Overall, the
increased room for judgment and the wider range — and
more uncertain nature — of indicators that are assessed
imply increased complexity of the rules. 92
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Main elements of the governance of budgetary statistics. The main elements of the governance of budgetary statistics in
the EU were described in Part II, Chapter 4, of the 2003 edition of the report ‘Public finances in EMU’. They consist in:
(i) a consistent set of accounting rules; (ii) the Commission authority in providing the data for budgetary surveillance,
though statistics are compiled from basic sources by the national authorities in compliance with the principle of subsidi-
arity; (iii) well-defined deadlines for the transmission of the main government figures — i.e. deficit and debt — as well as
for the transmission of the complete underlying accounts; (iv) the role of Eurostat in the assessment of the quality of data
reported by Member States; and (v) multilateral discussion of methodological issues within the Committee on Monetary,
Financial and Balance-of-Payment Statistics (CMFB). The 2003 report also described developments such as the adoption
by the Ecofin Council, on 18 February 2003, of a code of best practice and a number of steps towards the compilation of
government accounts with quarterly frequency.
Some progress … In the meantime, there has been progress notably concerning the timeliness, completeness and consist-
ency of government accounts. There have also been important decisions concerning the accounting of innovative and com-
plex transactions — for example, public–private partnerships — and the government delimitation, for example in relation
to the reform of pension systems. A major achievement was the remarkably smooth integration of new Member States into
the transmission and validation of fiscal statistics. As regards the compilation of quarterly accounts and their use in budg-
etary surveillance — which were characterised in the 2003 report as a medium-term project and a major challenge for the
future — there have also been some steps forward. Quarterly government revenue and expenditure accounts are already
available for the euro area (1), though data per country are under embargo until the end of 2005; the quarterly government
debt is available for most countries.
… but evidence of data quality problems. However, evidence of substandard quality in the budgetary statistics of some
Member States — which materialised notably in the exceptionally large revision in the Greek government accounts in
2004 (2) — the discrepancies in the accounts of some Member States (3) and the ensuing suspicions about the quality of
budgetary data have led the Council and the Commission to propose strengthening the governance of these statistics.
The Council calls for action. On 2 June 2004, the Ecofin Council noted that ‘reliable fiscal statistics are essential for the
credibility of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The EDP notification of March 2004 showed rather good compliance
with the code of best practice as regards the reporting deadlines. There was also a considerable improvement in the avail-
ability of detailed data on the government subsectors …’. However, ‘on several occasions, fiscal statistics have been
revised after a new government took office. The Council considers that the compilation and reporting of statistics for the
EDP must not be vulnerable to political and electoral cycles’. Therefore, ‘the Council invites the Commission to strengthen
the monitoring of the quality of reported fiscal data and report back to the Council before the end of the year 2004’.
From a more general perspective, the Council also concluded that ‘high-quality statistics are fundamental for European
policies. The Council considers that integrity, independence and accountability of data compilers, and the transparency of
the compilation methods, underpinned by the appropriate institutional arrangements, are crucial to ensure such high-quality
statistics. It would therefore be recommendable to develop minimum European standards for the institutional set-up of sta-
tistical authorities. The Council invites the Commission to make, by June 2005, a proposal for such standards, which rein-
force the independence, integrity and accountability of Member States’ national statistical institutes. These standards
should also help to address the specific concerns on the quality of fiscal statistics’. The importance given by policy-makers
to the quality of budgetary statistics is illustrated by the fact that this topic was also in the agendas of the 10 September and
7 December 2004 and 17 February 2005 Ecofin Council meetings.
(1) See Table 6.4 of the ECB monthly bulletins (euro-area statistics).
(2) See Box I.1 on the revision in the Greek accounts.
(3) See Part II, Section 2.2, of this report for a detailed discussion on the stock-flow adjustments in the EU Member States.
(Continued on the next page)93
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The Commission proposes three lines of action. The Commission response to the Ecofin Council conclusions was out-
lined in the communication ‘Towards a European governance strategy for fiscal statistics’ (4) adopted on 22 December
2004. The Commission strategy involves three lines of action: (i) building-up the legislative framework; (ii) the develop-
ment of the operational capacity of the Commission; (iii) the preparation of European standards on the independence of
statistical institutes. The rest of this box elaborates on the first and third items of this strategy. The second line of action
consists mainly of increasing the resources devoted to budgetary surveillance and to checking the quality of budgetary sta-
tistics in the relevant Commission services (Eurostat and the Economic and Financial Affairs DG).
Completing the legal framework. On 2 March 2005, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation which
is intended to strengthen the quality of the statistical data for the excessive deficit procedure (5). The proposal consists of
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, which is the legal act governing the reporting of fiscal data for the EDP.
The amended regulation will enter into force after formal adoption, by qualified majority, by the Ecofin Council. The Euro-
pean Parliament and the ECB are also participating in the adoption of this regulation as they are required to prepare non-
binding opinions. 
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 currently has two sections on (1) definitions and (2) rules and coverage of reporting. Accord-
ing to the Commission proposal, these two sections will be kept basically unchanged. However, Section 2 will be com-
pleted with two new articles establishing the Member States’ obligation to report and properly document revisions in data,
and clarifying that the tables transmitted by Member States are public.
The Commission proposes to add three new sections (3, 4 and 5) to the regulation. Section 3 establishes a number of pro-
cesses to check that data compiled and reported by national authorities comply with the accounting rules and are reliable,
complete and consistent. In a number of respects, the proposal enshrines existing practices, such as the preparation and
publication by the national authorities of statistical inventories for government accounts (6), the regular dialogue between
Eurostat and the Member States’ statistical authorities, and a procedure involving the CMFB when there is a need to com-
plete and clarify the accounting rules. However, the proposal goes further than existing practice by establishing further vis-
its, during which Eurostat will look at the detailed economic data which justify the reported figures. The association of
experts from other Member States to these visits will broaden the expertise. Moreover, transparency will be ensured by
making public the conclusion of the quality assessment (7).
Section 4 clarifies the provision in the Treaty protocol, according to which the statistical data for the EDP are provided by
the Commission. The provision of data is done by Eurostat, by publishing the data three weeks after the deadlines for the
transmission of data by the Member States. The new section makes clear that the Eurostat task is not simply to reiterate
Member States’ figures; it can publicly raise reservations to the data transmitted by Member States in case there is enough
evidence that data compiled by the national authorities are of substandard quality, or even unilaterally amend these data in
case reported figures do not comply with the rules and there is sufficient information to provide alternative estimates.
Section 5 answers specifically concerns on the vulnerability of fiscal statistics to political cycles. It establishes that the
compilation of fiscal statistics data is done in accordance with a number of principles, most notably impartiality (8) and that
the officials responsible for the compilation of government accounts should abide by these principles.
(4) COM(2004) 832.
(5) COM(2005) 71.
(6) Statistical inventories are documents prepared by the national statistical authorities, describing the methods, procedures and sources for the compila-
tion of statistics. Rather than a description of the accounting rules, the inventories should detail how Member States apply the rules, which services
provide which data, the estimation procedures to deal with missing data, etc.
(7) In the communication of 1 December 2004 (COM(2004) 784), the Commission acknowledged that discussions on the quality of fiscal statistics often
took place within a restricted circle of statisticians and were not effectively communicated to the political level and to the public.
(8) According to Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 on Community statistics, statistics shall be compiled according to the principles of impartiality, reli-
ability, relevance, cost-effectiveness, statistical confidentiality and transparency. Specifically, impartiality means that data are compiled ‘in an objec-
tive and independent manner, free from any pressure from political or other interest groups’.
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understandable. Some of the simplicity has been lost
by introducing room for judgment in the decision on
the existence of an excessive deficit and in the adjust-
ment path. The large range of possible relevant factors
which need to be assessed renders the system more
sophisticated and complex. In addition, the factors
mentioned under KS-1 and KS-2, affecting transpar-
ency and the concept of a well-defined framework,
also affect simplicity. On the other hand, the agree-
ment that the Commission shall always prepare a
report under Article 104(3) if the EDP deficit exceeds
the 3 % of GDP reference value is straightforward. It
enhances simplicity and clarifies accountability in
decision-making. Overall, the increased room for
judgment and the wider range — and more uncertain
nature — of indicators that are assessed imply
increased complexity of the rules. 
Box II.2 (continued)
Table II.2
Trade-offs according to good fiscal policy rule criteria
Kopits and Symansky (1998) criteria Buti et al. (2003) 
assessment of the SGP
Impact of the 2005 
reform on fulfilment 
of the criteria
Well-defined: no ambiguous definitions, competence divisions or escape clauses + + (–)
Transparent: data reporting and data analysis according to the same rules/
procedures; no interpretation problems
+ + (–)
Simple: rules being easily understandable and observable + + + (–)
Flexible: allow for capturing of the impact of important influences not captured in 
the framework, making its application less mechanistic
+ + (+)
Adequate to goal: rules should not be too broad nor too narrow; legal instruments 
should be capable of obtaining the goal
+ + (+)
Enforceable/credible: rules should be credible; application impartial; susceptible to 
subjective pressures
+ (+) (1)
Consistent — internally and with other policy objectives + + (+)
Supportive of structural reforms: rules should take due account of the importance 
of structural reforms for the economy
+ (+)
(1) The (+) assessment of the enforceability/credibility of the rules is compared with the situation existing after November 2003.
NB: Buti et al. (2003) assessment:  +++ very good, ++ good, + fair. Assessment of the 2005 reform of the SGP:  (+) improvement, (–) deterioration.
European standards for the statistical institutes. The third line of action — which covers all economic statistics and not
simply fiscal data — concerns the development of European standards for the institutional set-up of statistical authorities.
Such standards should reinforce the independence, integrity and accountability of statistical institutes, which should
improve trust and confidence in statistical authorities and the credibility and quality of their statistics. On 24 February
2005, the Statistics Programme Committee (SPC), comprising the directors-general of the national statistical institutes and
of Eurostat, unanimously adopted a European statistics code of practice. This code of practice includes 15 principles rang-
ing from professional independence of data compilers, statistical confidentiality, impartiality and objectivity, accuracy,
reliability and timeliness of data to adequacy of resources of statistical institutes. On 25 May 2005, the Commission
endorsed this code, recommending that Member States recognise it as a common set of standards at the European level for
statistical authorities, and intends to set up a reporting system to monitor adherence within the European statistical
system (9). 
(9) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council and recommendation on the independence, integrity and
accountability of the national and Community statistical authorities (COM(2005) 217).95
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ing more flexibility in different stages and parts of the
fiscal framework. The tight specification of the escape
clauses of the ‘severe economic downturn’ has been
widened, allowing judgment by the Commission and
Council. Also, the consideration of other relevant factors
in the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit
increases flexibility, though within the margins of ‘tem-
porariness’ and ‘closeness to the reference value’. The
Council also has the flexibility to grant at the start an
additional year for the correction of an excessive deficit
if ‘special circumstances’ occur. As to deviation from
the medium-term objective and the adjustment path to it,
certain structural reforms may be considered. Overall,
the flexibility is clearly enhanced — though within con-
straints — to better capture economic reality and allow
sound policy advice.
KS-5 — Adequacy of the rules has to be assessed in
relation to their final goal. Rules should be neither too
broad nor too narrow. The goal of the EU fiscal rules is
to ensure budgetary prudence. The concept of budgetary
prudence has widened over the years (see Part II, Chap-
ter 3, on increased focus on sustainability and growth).
The deficit limit guaranteed fiscal discipline on a yearly
basis, but was no longer adequate for long-term sustain-
ability. Increased focus on debt and future debt develop-
ments as well as catering for structural reforms enhances
the adequacy of the rules of this long-term objective.
Moreover, differentiation of the medium-term objective
according to risks to sustainable debt developments (ini-
tially on the basis of debt levels and potential growth; in
the future, possibly also on the basis of implicit liabili-
ties) allows better catering for adequate policies in all
countries, including, in particular, in peripheral countries
that are characterised by large public investment needs,
low debt level and high growth potential. While the goal
remains budgetary prudence, a more sophisticated
approach is taken to minimise short-term policies which
are excessively procyclical and inconsistent with budg-
etary stabilisation over the cycle. To this end, the eco-
nomic situation and developments are considered in the
deadlines for correcting excessive deficits and early
warnings or early policy advice will be applied to avoid
procyclical policy in good times. Overall, the adequacy
of the rules to their goal has improved.
KS-6 — The narrow specification in the SGP of the time-
table of the excessive deficit procedure and the application
of sanctions was set to improve enforceability. Experi-
ence has shown that the narrow specification did not con-
tribute to the enforceability in the existing institutional set-
ting. Instead, it led to rising tensions and a loss of
credibility after the events of November 2003. Against
this background, the renewed commitment and consensus
among the 25 Member States as reflected in the 2005
Ecofin report constitute a solid fundament for restoring
the dented credibility of the framework. Agreement to
enhance fiscal governance, through development and
increased involvement of national institutions and parlia-
ments, could also contribute to enhancing peer pressure
and increasing reputational costs to discipline national
authorities. As in the old system, subjective political pres-
sure on the enforcement can be expected to remain, which
proves that the renewed SGP continues to bite.
KS-7 — Consistent — internally and with other pol-
icy objectives. A good fiscal rule has to be internally
consistent and consistent with other policies. The SGP
implies that countries attain broadly balanced budgets in
cyclically adjusted terms and then let automatic stabilis-
ers play freely. Empirical evidence shows that this would
be consistent with attaining a relatively high cyclical
smoothing while safeguarding the 3 % deficit ceiling.
Such behaviour would imply a neutral fiscal stance at the
euro-area level and be consistent with a monetary policy
entrusted with maintaining price stability. This could be
considered an internally consistent framework in its
steady state, if all countries have achieved their medium-
term objectives. However, as long as the medium-term
objectives had not been achieved, excessively procycli-
cal policies were required in economic downturns,
which could be considered inconsistent with the objec-
tives of (automatic) fiscal stabilisation. Allowing for
considering the economic situation and developments of
a country in EDP addresses this inconsistency between
policy objectives. It should be noted, however, that this
also reduces the possible deterrent effect of high eco-
nomic (and political) costs of an EDP which provided
Member States with an incentive to pursue ambitious
consolidation towards the medium-term objective. In
addition to the consideration to avoid excessively procy-
clical policies in bad times, the 2005 reform allows the
taking into account of structural reforms, thus addressing
a major criticism and potential external inconsistency
between the policy objectives of the budgetary frame-
work and structural reforms (see also KS-8).
KS-8 — Fiscal rules should be supportive of structural
reforms. The reformed framework explicitly takes bet-
ter account of structural reforms, in particular those that96
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arm (deviation from the MTO or adjustment path) and
the corrective arm (other relevant factors, special cir-
cumstances, possible early abrogation for specific sec-
ond-pillar pension reforms).
Overall, the comparative assessment of the new rules
against the established set of criteria for ideal fiscal rules
provides a useful indication of the quality and direction
of the various changes. The interpretation of the results,
however, must be viewed with caution. Some of the cri-
teria partly overlap and some are highly interlinked.
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the various
qualitative scores in Table II.2 cannot be summed up.
While the results suggest a broadly balanced set of rules,
it cannot be concluded that the new rules are ‘better’ or
‘worse’ than the existing rules.
After six years of accumulated experience with the exist-
ing rules of the Pact, the 2005 report reflects Member
States’ shifted preferences along the trade-offs towards
greater flexibility, in order to better respond to the
changing economic conditions, such as those related to
enlargement, demographic ageing and the low-growth
conditions. There are basically two distinct options to
allow for greater flexibility in the application of fiscal
rules. Either the sophistication of the provisions them-
selves is increased by adding more contingencies to the
rules while their implementation is kept straightforward,
or the rules are kept simple, but a more flexible applica-
tion is introduced, thus exerting more economic judg-
ment of the individual case (1).
Following the intention to preserve the rules-based char-
acter of the EU fiscal framework, the Commission ini-
tially favoured responding to the increased preference
for flexibility with the development of a significantly
more sophisticated set of rules. While this would have
been at the expense of simplicity and transparency, it
would have minimised the room for discretionary judg-
ment and facilitated equal treatment. In light of these
considerations, the agreement finally reached by the
Council constitutes a compromise.
Whereas the legal content of the rules remains by and
large unchanged, the new agreement introduces more
room for economic judgment in their application. How-
ever, given the limits of enforcement power in a supra-
national setting, in order to contain deficits from becom-
ing excessive, the new procedural flexibility is
effectively restricted to relatively small fiscal slippages
by holding on to simple and transparent conditions,
including the deficit and debt reference values and the
principles of closeness and temporariness, and by
requesting an annul minimum fiscal effort.
The increased scope for judgment raises the responsibil-
ity for both the Commission when assessing budgetary
developments in Member States and the Council when
deciding on the appropriate steps in the surveillance pro-
cedure. It also elevates the need to ensure transparency
and accountability in decision-making by the various
actors.
1.5. The road to the 2005 SGP reform
The agreement on the 2005 reform marks the end of a
longer-drawn review and discussion process at the level
of the EU about the further development of the EU fiscal
rules. The interpretation and application of the rules have
evolved over time and discussions about reinforcing the
fiscal coordination have been ongoing since the start of
EMU (2).
1.5.1. Early stages of the reform debate
Following the conclusions of the 2002 Barcelona Euro-
pean Council on the need to reinforce existing fiscal pol-
icy coordination mechanisms, the Commission adopted
on 27 November 2002 five proposals to improve the
interpretation of the SGP (3). Against the background of
mixed budgetary performance since 1999 and emerging
difficulties in the implementation of the rules, the Com-
mission proposed: (i) to establish medium-term budget-
ary objectives that take account of the economic cycle,
i.e. measured in cyclically adjusted terms and net of one-
off measures; (ii) for countries that have not yet realised
a budgetary position of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ to
achieve an annual improvement in the underlying budg-
etary position of at least 0.5 % of GDP; (iii) to avoid pro-
cyclical policies in economically good times; (iv) to
ensure consistency between the Pact rules and the goals
¥1∂ Beetsma and Debrun (2003) also make this point.
¥2∂ Previous editions of ‘Public finances in EMU’ provide ample evidence.
See also Deroose and Langedijk (2005) for a concise overview of the
experiences with the Stability and Growth Pact in the first six years and a
description of the Commission’s approach for improving it.
¥3∂ See the Commission communication ‘Strengthening the coordination of
budgetary policies’ (COM(2002) 668 final, 27.11.2002) and European
Commission (2003a). 97
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rary deviations from the underlying budgetary position
of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ or the adjustment path
towards it; and (v) to attach greater weight to the sustain-
ability of public finances, including by making the
Treaty’s debt criterion operational. Moreover, the Com-
mission pointed to the need to take complementary
measures in order to foster the overall fiscal and statisti-
cal governance, including through more transparent
communication so as to enhance external incentives for
Member States to run sound fiscal policies and improve-
ments concerning the quality and timeliness of govern-
ment finance statistics.
In March 2003, the Ecofin Council endorsed in its report
to the spring European Council (1) most of the Commis-
sion’s proposals to improve the effective application of
the SGP, yet agreed that there was no need for legal
changes to the current EU fiscal rules (2).
In parallel, the debate on the coordination of budgetary
policies in the framework of EMU continued in the Con-
vention on the Future of Europe. The new Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed in
Rome on 29 October 2004 and currently subject to the
ratification procedures in the 25 Member States,
strengthens the role of the Commission in the excessive
deficit procedure. Notably, it establishes the right for the
Commission to address an early warning directly to a
Member State if it considers that an excessive deficit in
that Member State exists or may occur. Furthermore, the
Council’s decision on the existence of an excessive def-
icit will in future be based on a ‘proposal’ from the Com-
mission, which is more difficult for the Council to over-
rule than a Commission ‘recommendation’, which is the
current basis for the Council decision.
Tensions in the application of the SGP continued to
accumulate, creating considerable institutional uncer-
tainty. They culminated in the legal dispute between the
Commission and the Council concerning the excessive
deficit procedure for France and Germany (3). These ten-
sions gave further evidence of diminished ownership of
the rules in several Member States and undermined the
credibility of the framework as a whole.
Even though the budgetary framework set by the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact helped to
deliver overall macroeconomic stability in the EU and to
keep budgetary positions at prudent levels in most EU
countries, it became clear that the fiscal rules needed to be
adapted in light of changing economic circumstances in
order to remain relevant and acceptable to Member States.
A further stretching of the Pact provisions by simply mod-
ifying their interpretation would have jeopardised the
rules-based character of the system. Against this back-
ground, the Commission launched a major review of the
Stability and Growth Pact, by examining both its perform-
ance in the past as well as its potential to adequately
respond to the prospective challenges, notably those asso-
ciated with the increased economic heterogeneity in the
enlarged EU and the demographic changes ahead.
On 18 June 2004, when agreeing on the Draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, the European
Council adopted a declaration on the Stability and
Growth Pact. It stressed that raising growth potential and
securing sound budgetary positions are the two pillars of
the economic and fiscal policy of the Union and the
Member States. The European Council also invited the
Commission to put forward proposals towards a further
development of the SGP.
1.5.2. The launch of the review
The Commission with the adoption of its communica-
tion ‘Strengthening economic governance and clarify-
ing the implementation of the Stability and Growth
Pact’ on 3 September 2004 launched a major review
process of the SGP and provided further orientation for
the future set-up of the SGP. Building on the communi-
cation of November 2002, it proposed four main areas
for reform, notably: (i) to place more focus on debt and
sustainability in the surveillance of budgetary posi-
tions; (ii) to introduce the concept of country-specific
medium-term objectives; (iii) to increase the economic
underpinning of the excessive deficit procedure; and
(iv) to ensure earlier action to correct inadequate budg-
etary developments. In addition, the communication
contained a number of ideas to improve the fiscal gov-
ernance, enforcement and ownership of the EU fiscal
rules. Particular proposals included measures to
improve the consistency between national and EU
processes, including through more involvement of
national institutions in budgetary surveillance, and to
increase the transparency and accountability of the var-
ious actors in the surveillance process.
¥1∂ Ecofin Council report on strengthening the coordination of budgetary poli-
cies of 7 March 2003, 6877/03 (Press 61). 
¥2∂ See European Commission (2003a), pp. 78–79.
¥3∂ See Box II.3 on the decision of the Court of Justice of 13 July 2004. 98
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tion, stated that the Commission communication pro-
vided a good basis for discussion. There was consensus
not to envisage any changes to the Treaty provisions and
to keep legal modifications of the regulations underlying
the SGP to a minimum.
On the basis of the communication, the Council’s fur-
ther guidance, and drawing from abundant input from
academics and policy-makers, the Commission serv-
ices further analysed and developed the options for
strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, expanding
the main ideas into a practical coherent framework. A
set of technical issues papers addressing the key ele-
ments of the fiscal framework was prepared by the
Commission services for discussion in the Economic
and Finance Committee. Together with contributions
from Member States, they provided the basis for in-
depth discussions with the Member States from Sep-
tember 2004 until March 2005.
On 16 November 2004, Ecofin ministers had an
exchange of views on the substance of a number of the
issues at stake. The discussions followed by and large
the proposals made by the Commission. Ministers
agreed to explore a limited number of practical options,
so as to be able to agree on concrete proposals to the
Heads of State or Government at the spring European
Council in March 2005. The main focus of the debate
was, in particular, on ways to better use periods of eco-
nomic recovery to consolidate public finances, how to
take into account sustainability of public finances in
defining medium-term targets, how to increase the focus
on debt and sustainability, how to take into account eco-
nomic circumstances in the excessive deficit procedure,
and about whether and, if so, how to take into account
Box II.3: The Court of Justice of the European Communities decision on the EDP for France 
and Germany of 13 July 2004
On recommendation by the Commission, the Council decided in the first half of 2003 that an excessive deficit existed
in Germany and France and adopted recommendations with a view to bringing this situation to an end by 2004. In
autumn 2003, the Commission recommended that the Council should establish that the actions implemented by
Germany and France were not adequate and should give them notice to take measures to remedy the situation. In light
of the weaker-than-expected economic situation, the Commission recommended that the deadline for correcting the def-
icit should be extended to 2005. On 25 November 2003, the Council voted on the recommended decisions but did not
achieve a majority. (See ‘Public finances in EMU — 2003’, Box II.1.) Instead, the Council adopted conclusions address-
ing recommendations to Germany and France for the correction of the excessive deficit by 2005 and stating that in light
of the commitments by the two Member States the excessive deficit procedure was held in abeyance. The Commission
challenged certain elements of the Council conclusions of 25 November before the Court of Justice.
In its judgment of 13 July 2004 (see Case C-27/04 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European
Union), the Court annulled the Council conclusions in so far as they aimed at formally suspending the procedure and mod-
ifying the existing recommendations. The Court, recalling the Commission’s right of initiative in the excessive deficit
procedure, argued that the Council went beyond its competence by de facto modifying the recommendations decided by
the Council under Article 104(7) EC. While it acknowledged the Council’s right for discretion, the judgment clarified that
‘… the Council cannot break free from the rules laid down in Article 104 EC and those which it set for itself in Regulation
1467/97 …’.
The Court’s judgment created unique circumstances in relation to the excessive deficit procedure concerning Germany and
France. In substance, the annulled Council conclusions went along the same lines as the recommendations of the Commis-
sion for remedying the situation, notably that the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit should be extended to
2005. Moreover, the actions of the Council in November 2003 had a factual effect on the path of fiscal adjustment in the
countries concerned. In its communication concerning the situation of Germany and France in relation to their obligations
under the excessive deficit procedure following the judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 December 2004 (COM(2004)
813), the Commission took the position that a satisfactory resolution of the budgetary problems of Germany and France
within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact demands the assessment of the actions taken to correct the excessive
deficit should refer to 2005 as the relevant deadline.99
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framework. The agenda was widened in the course of the
subsequent meetings of ministers, notably to address
aspects of fiscal and statistical governance.
The negotiations revealed differing views among Mem-
ber States on how much judgment was deemed neces-
sary to sufficiently capture economic reality and pursue
economically sound policies. While mainly the larger
countries tended to be in favour of ensuring more room
for case-specific judgment, the Commission and most of
the smaller countries expressed a high preference for the
predictability of the Pact as a rules-based system.
At the ministerial level, discussions in the Ecofin Coun-
cil, including all 25 Member States, were usually pre-
ceded by an exchange of views within the Eurogroup.
The capacity of the Luxembourg Presidency, starting in
January 2004, to mediate a compromise was boosted by
the unique triple function of Luxembourg’s Prime Min-
ister and Minister for Finance, Jean-Claude Juncker,
being simultaneously President of both the Eurogroup
and the Ecofin Council as well as presiding over the
European Council.
1.5.3. The 2005 Council agreement on the reform 
of the SGP and follow-up
Following the failure of the Ecofin meeting of
8 March 2005 to reach agreement on the reform pack-
age, Jean-Claude Juncker convened an extraordinary
meeting on Sunday 20 March 2005, two days prior to the
start of the 2005 spring European Council. Ministers met
first in the formation of the Eurogroup, followed by the
meeting of the Ecofin Council in the afternoon. Minis-
ters were keen to conclude their review of the SGP in
time for the spring European Council in order to avoid a
reopening of the debate by the Heads of State or Govern-
ment. The specification of ‘other relevant factors’ and
the treatment of second-pillar pension reforms in the
excessive deficit procedure were the main issues of
debate until the last moment. Agreement was finally
reached later in the day. The Ecofin Council adopted the
report to the European Council ‘Improving the imple-
mentation of the Stability and Growth Pact’.
The European Council endorsed the report on
22 March 2005, stating that it updates and comple-
ments the Stability and Growth Pact. It furthermore
invited the Commission to adopt the necessary legisla-
tive proposals to adapt the existing Regulations (EC)
No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97 in accordance with
the new agreement.
On 20 April, the Commission adopted the draft propos-
als for amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1466/97
and (EC) No 1467/97, which were subsequently submit-
ted to the Council.
The Council is the decisive body for the adoption of the
Commission draft proposals. The two regulations are
based on different legal bases, requiring distinct legisla-
tive procedures. Inter alia, they foresee a different
degree of consultation of the European Parliament and
the European Central Bank. By the time the 2005 report
‘Public finances in EMU’ went to press, the procedure
for the adoption of the legislative package was still ongo-
ing. In parallel, work has started to amend and update the
code of conduct in light of the 2005 Pact reform.100
2. Developments in EU budgetary 
surveillance
2.1. The stability and convergence 
programmes: a retrospective overview 
of plans, outcomes and assessments, 
1998–2005
2.1.1. Introduction
Over the years, the process of fiscal surveillance of sta-
bility and convergence programmes has provided a
wealth of data on budgetary plans, outcomes and assess-
ments. The aim of this section is to make a first use of
these data over the 1998–2005 period to analyse: (i) the
magnitude, main features and determinants of the dis-
crepancy between budgetary plans in stability and con-
vergence programmes and actual outcomes; and (ii) the
way in which stability and convergence programmes
have been assessed by the Commission services.
The analysis highlights the following points:
• slippages between budgetary plans and outcomes
have been common and in some years quite sizeable;
• the difference between the budgetary plans in stabil-
ity and convergence programmes and actual data is
mainly associated with slippages on the expenditure
side, discrepancies in revenues having played a rel-
atively minor role;
• growth which is different than expected contributes
to explaining part of the difference between data on
stability and convergence programmes and actual
outcomes;
• the scope of the assessment of stability and conver-
gence programmes by the Commission services has
broadened over time.
Section 2.1.2. analyses the main features of the slippages
recorded between budgetary plans in stability and con-
vergence programmes and results. A short overview of
the topics considered in the Commission’s assessment of
stability and convergence programmes is presented in
Section 2.1.3. ‘Evolving budgetary surveillance: the
Commission’s assessment of stability and convergence
programmes’. Section ‘Conclusions’ concludes.
2.1.2. The stability and convergence programmes: 
plans and outcomes
The role of the stability and convergence programmes in 
EU fiscal surveillance
In the run-up to the introduction of Stage III of EMU in
1999, all EU Member States committed to regularly sub-
mitting programmes, convergence programmes for non-
euro-area countries and stability programmes for euro-
area countries (1). The programmes are a requirement
under the Stability and Growth Pact, and since 1998 all
EU Member States have submitted updates yearly.
From the outset, the content of the programmes has var-
ied in terms of the variables included, the length of the
forecasting period and the focus and degree of thorough-
ness of the qualitative analyses. Since 1998, the content
of the programmes has been governed by a code of con-
duct endorsed by the Council. The code of conduct
stressed the importance of the information being suitable
and allowing for comparison across Member States,
while also acknowledging that the programmes are the
responsibility of national authorities and that the possi-
bilities and practices differ across countries. The code of
conduct was upgraded in 2001 to increase the streamlin-
¥1∂ The first convergence programmes were delivered in 1991. The submis-
sion of these programmes was not compulsory, but took place at the initia-
tive of the Member States. Updates and revisions of the programmes have
since been presented with varying time spans.101
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comparability of the programmes. The changes include
both the status of the code of conduct and the variables
specified. The code of conduct of 1998 ‘does not suggest
that the guidelines be made obligatory, but any departure
would have to be justified by the Member States con-
cerned’. In 2001, the wording was slightly stricter, ask-
ing ‘that the guidelines be followed as far as possible,
and any departure would have to be justified by the
Member States concerned’. The 2001 code of conduct
also specifies more variables including a standardised set
of tables that should be presented. The required time
horizon has remained the same throughout the EMU
period, demanding annual forecasts for at least the pre-
ceding, the current and the three following years.
The 1998 code of conduct refers to discussions in the
Monetary Committee promoting the use of a common
set of macroeconomic projections, but recognising the
practical difficulties involved. It is mentioned, however,
that significant differences from the Commission’s pro-
jections should be justified. By 2001, Member States
were asked to present at least one set of projections based
on common basic assumptions for the main extra-EU
variables, the assumptions being provided by the Com-
mission after consultation with national experts. For
intra-EU variables, the wording is the same as in 1998,
requiring justifications of significant differences from
the Commission’s projections.
This analysis focuses on the euro-area countries. The
10 recently acceded Member States have only had time
to produce two programmes, and including all Member
States in the averages for the last few years would thus
make the figures less comparable over time. The analysis
below is limited to the EMU period, i.e. programmes
under the code of conduct of 1998 or 2001. The figures
for this period are more complete and comparable than
in earlier programmes, but, even for this period, chal-
lenges remain. Some countries present two or more sce-
narios. Unless the programmes clearly state on which
scenario policy forecasts are based, this analysis consid-
ers the more cautious one. Some other discrepancies also
remain, including missing data. For total revenues and
total expenditures, a large number of data are missing for
early years, when their provision was not clearly speci-
fied in the code of conduct, while data for the budget bal-
ance and GDP growth are much more complete. This
underlines the indicative nature of the results, especially
regarding the breakdown on revenue and expenditure
discrepancies for the first part of the period analysed.
Since the introduction of the 2001 code of conduct, the
data used in this analysis have almost always been avail-
able. Still, both for the euro area and for the whole EU,
less than half of the Member States were in full compli-
ance with the code of conduct in the 2004 updates. Most
of these broadly complied, but one euro-area country and
three other Member States only partly complied (see
Part I, Chapter 3).
Budget balances
Graph II.2 displays the development of actual general
government budget balances in the EUR-12 for the
1998–2004 period and compares this to the estimates
given in the stability and convergence programmes over
the same period. The graph shows that actual balances
were higher than expected in 1999 and 2000, but lower
in the last four years. It also shows that the programmes
have consistently forecast improved budget balances,
while in reality deficits increased in most of the period.  
Graph II.3 presents the same information in a different
way. This graph presents the budget balance slippages,
i.e. the actual outcome less the budget balance envisaged
in the relevant programme. Negative figures thus mean
that the actual outcome was lower than expected. In this
graph, the slippages are presented according to time
horizon. The line marked t thus represents projections
for the year the programme was published, the line t + 1
represents projections for the year ahead, and so on.
When all the lines are below zero for 2001, this means
that for all years the projections made in (the average of)
the 2001 programmes were above the actual outcomes.
This is also the case for the programmes from 2002,
2003 and 2004. Not surprisingly, the graph shows that
the discrepancies between plans and actual outcomes are
larger for long time horizons than for short ones.
Significant deteriorations in the budget balance in some
large Member States heavily influence the EUR-12
weighted averages. However, even though the exact num-
bers change and the budgetary developments appear less
dramatic, the qualitative picture remains the same if one
looks instead at unweighted averages. The above descrip-
tion thus seems broadly to fit many Member States.
Expenditures and revenues
A key issue in the public finance debate is the composi-
tion of fiscal consolidations. For all years since 1998,
most Member States have projected expenditure-based
consolidations. However, while the average expenditure102
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E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eGraph II.2: General government budget balances — Projections from different programmes — 
Weighted averages, EUR-12 (1)
(1) In the 1998 programme averages, three observations are missing for 2002. In the 1999 programme averages, three observations are missing for 2003.
In the 2000 programme averages, one observation is missing for 2002 and 2003 and two observations are missing for 2004.
Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission.
Graph II.3: Budget balance slippages — Various time horizons — Weighted averages, EUR-12 (1)
(1) In the 1998 programme averages, three observations are missing for 2002. In the 1999 programme averages, three observations are missing for 2003.
In the 2000 programme averages, one observation is missing for 2002 and 2003 and two observations are missing for 2004.
Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission.
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2 0 0 5share fell between 1998 and 2000, it has mostly
increased since. At the same time, the average revenue
share has fallen, and the failure to implement the planned
expenditure cuts has resulted in a worsening of the aver-
age budget balance, as opposed to the planned budgetary
consolidation. Overall, while actual expenditures have
been higher, and partly substantially so, than planned,
most forecasts for revenues have been much closer to the
actual outcomes (see Graphs II.4 and II.5).
Growth corrections
Deficits are influenced by many factors which are dif-
ficult to foresee and are unlikely to exactly replicate the
budgetary plans made in advance. An important dis-
tinction can be drawn between deviations from plans
mainly within and mainly outside the control of the
government. One central factor is unexpected changes
in economic growth. Economic growth directly affects
budgets through automatic stabilisers. If growth is low,
labour and capital incomes grow more slowly than nor-
mal, thus lowering the level of tax revenues compared
with a high-growth situation. On the expenditure side,
social expenditures, especially unemployment benefits,
increase when the cycle is weak. As Graph II.6 shows,
there were positive growth surprises in 1999 and 2000,
and negative growth surprises in the years after. Slip-
pages caused by growth surprises can to a considerable
degree be contributed to factors outside government
control. However, it should also be noted that produc-
ing realistic estimates of growth is an important task
and a necessary basis for responsible economic policy
formulation (see Section 2.3.7).
A first rough evaluation of whether failure to forecast
growth correctly explains the budget balance slippages
can be obtained by (i) multiplying the growth errors with
the sensitivity of budget balances to the effects of the
cycle, and (ii) correcting the slippages for this factor.
This correction shrinks the differences between plans
and actual outcomes, but does not remove them. On
average across programmes and forecast horizons,
growth surprises seem to explain about two thirds of the
budget balance overruns. This still leaves important lee-
way for national authorities in the endeavour for improv-
ing budget balance control.    
Graph II.4: Expenditure slippages — Projections from different programmes — 
Weighted averages, EUR-12 (1)
(1) In the 1998 programme averages, five observations are missing for 1998 and 1999 and six observations are missing for 2000, 2001 and 2002. In the
1999 programme averages, two observations are missing for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 and three observations are missing for 2003. In the 2000 pro-
gramme averages, two observations are missing for 2000 and 2001 and four observations are missing for 2002, 2003 and 2004. In the 2001 programme
averages, one observation is missing for 2003 and 2004.
Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission.
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E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eGraph II.5: Revenue slippages — Projections from different programmes — 
Weighted averages, EUR-12 (1)
(1) In the 1998 programme averages, seven observations are missing for 1998 and 2002 and six observations are missing for 1999, 2000 and 2001. In the
1999 programme averages, four observations are missing for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 and five observations are missing for 2003. In the 2000 pro-
gramme averages, three observations are missing for 2000 and 2001 and five observations are missing for 2002, 2003 and 2004. In the 2001 programme
averages, one observation is missing for 2003 and 2004.
Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission.
Graph II.6: Growth rate forecasts from stability and convergence programmes — 
Projections from different programmes — Weighted averages, EUR-12 (1)
(1) In the 1998 programme averages, one observation is missing for 1998 and three observations are missing for 2002. In the 1999 programme averages,
three observations are missing for 2003. In the 2000 programme averages, two observations are missing for 2004. 
Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission.
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2 0 0 52.1.3. Evolving budgetary surveillance: the 
Commission’s assessment of stability and 
convergence programmes
The purpose of this section is to analyse the evolution of
the Commission’s assessments of the stability and con-
vergence programmes. Information about the evolution
of fiscal surveillance over time can be obtained by sys-
tematically comparing the content of the Commission’s
assessments in different years. Table II.3 compares the
assessments of 2005 with those of early 2000 (1).
The first column summarises the main topics that could
be included in the assessments of Member States’
medium-term fiscal strategies. Typically, the following
topics are covered in the assessments: (i) the underlying
assumptions (e.g. are growth projections on which the
programmes are based realistic?); (ii) the risks to the
adjustment path (e.g. are budgetary measures taken of a
temporary or structural nature?; does the budget balance
leave sufficient margin for not breaking the 3 % of GDP
reference value in the event of an economic downturn?);
(iii) the analysis of debt and sustainability (e.g. are debt
levels declining at a satisfactory pace of reduction in
countries with a debt ratio above 60 % of GDP?; how
will ageing populations affect the long-term budgetary
outlook?); (iv) a range of issues related to structural
reforms and the quality of public finances, including the
composition of public expenditure (e.g. protecting pro-
ductive expenditure such as education, R & D or public
investment), the budgetary impact of structural reforms
and national budgetary institutions that are conducive to
fiscal discipline such as medium-term expenditure
frameworks for controlling public expenditure.
The last three columns of Table II.3 report the percent-
age of programmes in which a clear independent and
normative assessment by the Commission was made (2).
For example, a score of 100 for ‘underlying assump-
tions’ implies that all the Commission’s assessments
included a clear assessment of the underlying assump-
tions of the medium-term budgetary strategy (3).
The content of Table II.3 can be summarised as follows:
• Assessments of the underlying assumptions are a key
part of fiscal surveillance, both in 2000 and 2005.
• In 2000, assessing compliance with the numerical
rules of the EU Treaty was the key topic in fiscal sur-
veillance: does the adjustment path leave enough
room for normal cyclical variations of the budget
without surpassing the 3 % of GDP reference value?
On the basis of this condition, the assessments con-
cluded whether a country did or did not comply with
the medium-term objective of the SGP. Instead, by
2005, the overall assessment has become more
refined. The question of whether the adjustment path
leaves enough room for normal cyclical variations is
still assessed, but complemented with a separate
assessment of compliance with the medium-term
objective of close to balance (CTB) or in surplus. In
addition, and more important, an overall judgment
has been added on the question of whether the pro-
posed adjustment path is credible. This reflects the
experience of systematic underperformance of
budgetary policies with respect to plans (see previ-
ous section).
• The analysis of the long-run fiscal sustainability,
completely absent in 2000, has become an important
part of every individual assessment in 2005.
• In 2000, a high percentage of assessments con-
tained a decomposition of debt developments, sep-
arating the impact of relevant factors (i.e. the
budget balance, interest rate developments, growth
developments and so-called ‘stock-flow opera-
tions’, i.e. operations that influence the stock of
gross debt but not the deficit). However, an overall
assessment of compliance with the debt criterion of
the Treaty was included only in about one third of
the cases. In contrast, by 2005, both the decompo-
sition of debt developments and the assessment of
compliance with the debt criterion had become a
standard part of the analysis.
• Regarding the assessment of structural reforms and
also the quality of public finances, there is a clear
trend towards concentrating the assessment on the
budgetary impact of structural reforms and on
institutional issues (expenditure control, fiscal
rules for lower levels of government). Given the
further increase in the attention for the budgetary
¥1∂ Stability and convergence programmes and Commission assessments are
published on the Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s website (http://
europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm).
¥2∂ Hence, the criterion in doing the survey was not whether a topic has been
mentioned in the assessment. Instead, phrases such as ‘too optimistic’,
‘more ambition is needed’, etc. indicate a clear assessment. 
¥3∂ In a large number of cases, the judgment pointed to too optimistic growth
assumptions. 106
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report), the degree of assessment could be expected
to increase further on this topic. Similarly, the role
of domestic budgetary institutions in ensuring
compliance with budgetary discipline is now
widely recognised, so that also this is an important
aspect of fiscal surveillance that could be devel-
oped further in the years to come (see also Part II,
Section 2.3, on the role of national budgetary insti-
tutions in this report).
In sum, the analysis shows that the scope of fiscal sur-
veillance has broadened significantly in recent years.
Fiscal policies are assessed on the basis of a range of
fiscal indicators that account for different aspects of
fiscal policy behaviour. Fiscal surveillance thus com-
plements the simple and transparent reference values of
the EU fiscal framework and serves as a basis for using
the room for economic judgment that is given by the
EU Treaty to the European Commission in operating
the system.
Table II.3
Assessments of stability and convergence programmes: 2000 versus 2005
EU-15
2000
EU-15
2005 (1)
NMS
2005
Broad topic Specific topic Percentage of programmes including 
an assessment
Adjustment path: underlying assumptions Underlying assumptions (growth) 100 100 100
Adjustment path towards 3 % of GDP 
or close to balance or in surplus
Sufficient margin for not breaking 3 % of GDP? 100 100 60
Compliance with CTB? n.a. (2) 93 50
Credibility measures expenditure side (one-
off?)/revenue side
67 100 100
Overall assessment of credibility of adjustment 
path
47 93 100
Sensitivity analysis? 40 100 20
Debt Decomposition of debt developments 60 100 100
Overall assessment of debt development/
satisfactory rate of reduction
33 100 70
Sustainability Quantitative assessment of long-run 
sustainability
0 100 100
Qualitative assessment of long-run 
sustainability
0 100 100
Analysis of contingent liabilities 0 0 30
Overall assessment of sustainability 0 100 100
Quality of public finances Composition of adjustment (revenue/
expenditure side)
13 14 0
Composition of expenditure (redirecting 
towards productive items)
27 21 0
Composition of revenue, including tax burden 
on labour
20 0 0
Impact of structural reforms on budgetary 
position 
7 36 50
Impact of structural reforms on potential 
growth and employment
0 14 0
Fiscal governance Role of expenditure rules and expenditure 
control
13 43 20
Federalism/national stability pacts 13 21 0
Efficiency of public sector 0 14 0
(1) The assessment for Portugal was not available when this report was finalised.
(2) In 2000, if a country had established a sufficient safety margin for not breaking the 3 % of GDP reference value, then the assessments concluded that the country
complied with the medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus (CTBOIS). By 2005, compliance with CTBOIS was subject to a
separate assessment, based on the cyclically adjusted balance (when available).
Source: Findings of the authors on the basis of the Commission’s assessments of the stability and convergence programmes.107
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The stability and convergence programmes provide a
valuable source for comparing budgetary develop-
ments in the Member States relative to plans. Lessons
drawn from such comparisons are central to evaluate
the realism in future budgetary plans. To improve com-
parability, the progress made over the last year in
streamlining the content of the programmes is impor-
tant. Still, some areas remain to be tackled.
The analysis carried out in this section of the report has
pointed to frequent and sometimes sizeable slippages in
budget balances relative to medium-term plans. In
order to improve adherence to planned budgetary
developments, it is important to understand why slip-
pages occur and how they can be avoided. Better esti-
mation of growth is no doubt important. Still, the analy-
sis has shown that discretionary measures have also
played a central role during the last seven years. As a
consequence, there is clearly room for better adherence
to expenditure plans in the endeavour to improve
budget balance control.
The way the assessment of the stability programmes is
done by the Commission services has been evolving
over the past few years. This has partly reflected
improvements in the analytical toolbox for budgetary
surveillance (e.g. the use of budget balance measures
adjusted for the cycle, the development of sustainabil-
ity indicators, etc.), and has partly been driven by the
experience accumulated with the operation of the EU
fiscal framework. Overall, the scope of the assessment
has broadened: the number of factors taken into
account in assessing fiscal plans has increased. This
tendency is likely to continue in the coming years, as a
result of the increased focus on long-term public
finance developments (e.g. the impact of pension
reforms) and on factors related to fiscal governance
(e.g. the working of national budgetary institutions)
which is present in the revised SGP.
2.2. The dynamics of government debt: 
decomposing the stock-flow adjustment
2.2.1. Introduction
The government deficit and debt are closely interrelated
concepts. Deficits imply debt issuance while surpluses
lead to debt repayments. However, given the specific
definitions of deficit and debt applied for the EU budg-
etary surveillance (1), the change in the debt level in any
given year can be larger or smaller than the deficit.
The difference between the change in the outstanding
debt stock and the yearly deficit flow is known as the
stock-flow adjustment (SFA), or less frequently as defi-
cit–debt adjustment. A positive (negative) SFA means
that factors other than the government deficit increase
(reduce) the government debt. In some cases, the nomi-
nal debt level can even fall while there is a deficit, or can
increase in the presence of a surplus (2). As is shown
below, while the SFA is typically set to zero in the theo-
retical analysis of debt dynamics, in real life such an
assumption is unwarranted.
The reconciliation of deficit and debt figures requires a
number of intermediate steps involving the breakdown of
the SFA into several categories. The analysis of the SFA
is all the more important as the EU budgetary surveillance
— which so far has focused on the deficit — may have
provided incentives for shifting items from the deficit to
the SFA, i.e. from above to below the line. A careful
analysis of the SFA is therefore important to countercheck
the reliability and plausibility of the deficit figures.
This section is organised as follows: Section 2.2.2 pro-
vides an overview of the available SFA data and spells
out concerns associated with the high and persistent lev-
els of SFA in some Member States. Section 2.2.3 breaks
down the SFA into three main components, which corre-
spond to differences in the definitions of deficit and debt.
Each component is also split into sub-categories. Section
2.2.4 concludes.
¥1∂ The deficit and debt definitions that are relevant for the EU budgetary sur-
veillance procedures have been established by the Treaty protocol on the
excessive deficit procedure and specified in Council Regulation (EC)
No 3605/93. The deficit and debt are defined through cross-references to
the European system of accounts (nowadays ESA 95). 
¥2∂ The developments in the debt-to-GDP ratio also depend on the GDP
growth rate, as can be seen in the usual equation:
, where t denotes a time 
subscript, D is the government debt level, NB is the government deficit
(net borrowing with a plus sign), Y represents GDP at current market
prices and y the nominal GDP growth rate. 
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The main data
Graph II.7 shows annual data on the SFA for EU Mem-
ber States from 2000 to 2004 (1). The data show that the
SFA is rarely zero or close to zero. In other words, the
change in the debt level rarely corresponds to the deficit.
SFAs in the vicinity of zero (in the interval – 0.2 % to
+ 0.2 % of GDP) are relatively rare. Moreover, SFAs
tend to be positive and not to cancel out over time; for
most countries, in most years, the government debt has
increased by more than the deficit. For the EU-15, the
weighted average SFA over the last 10 years or so has
been + 0.4 % of GDP. In cumulative terms, this means
that the government debt ratio for the EU-15 is now
4.1 percentage points higher than could be expected if
the SFA had been set to zero since 1994.
Concerns
Large SFAs are often presented as a source of concern,
as a suggestion of inconsistent and low-quality statistics.
In fact, high positive SFAs even over a protracted period
are not necessarily an indication of any fundamental
error in statistics. As is shown below, high and positive
SFAs are even the normal outcome for low-debt govern-
ments in surplus. However, the high and persistent SFAs
in some Member States, in particular in those which are
in deficit and have large debts, need to be closely scruti-
nised and explained, or the consistency of government
accounts and truthfulness of deficit statistics will be put
into question.
2.2.3. The main components of the SFA
The SFA exists because of differences in the basic
accounting principles according to which the govern-
ment deficit and debt are defined and compiled. Accord-
ingly, the SFA can be split into three components along
with these differences:
• differences between the accrual and cash bases of
recording transactions;
• differences in the gross and net recording of transac-
tions with financial assets;
• valuation effects and remaining statistical adjust-
ments.
¥1∂ Longer time series on the SFA per Member State (though not on its com-
ponents) are available on the AMECO database.
Graph II.7: Stock-flow adjustment, 2000–04 (% of GDP)
NB: The five bars for each country depict the SFAs for each year during the period 2000-2004. The white dot is the average of these five years.
Source: Commission services.
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transactions in the deficit and the debt
Deficit on an accrual basis. Expenditure and revenue are
recorded in the government accounts at the time of the
underlying transaction — that is ‘when economic value
is created, transformed or extinguished, or when claims
and obligations arise, are transformed or are cancelled’
— irrespective of effective cash payments and receipts.
For example, interest is recorded as accruing continu-
ously during the lifetime of a bond or a loan, and not
when lenders receive the corresponding cash payments.
For conventional bonds and loans that pay interest every
year, the difference between interest accrued and effec-
tive cash payments in each year is very small, if any.
However, the difference between interest accrued and
paid can be quite considerable in the case of zero-coupon
bonds or other financial instruments which do not regu-
larly pay interest, as well as in other circumstances when
the issuance price is significantly different from the
redemption price.
Lags between the underlying transactions and the related
cash payments are also very frequent for other expendi-
ture categories. If the government takes delivery of some
equipment in year t, expenditure must be recorded in
year t even if the payment is deferred to a later period.
Likewise, expenditure of year t must be recorded as
expenditure in that year, even if, for any reason, the
effective payment is postponed to t + 1. The transactions
that have already been recorded as expenditure, but for
which the effective cash payment has not yet taken place,
are called accounts payable (1).
There are also lags between accrual accounting and cash
accounting for revenue. For example, in many countries,
taxes and social contributions collected in the very first
months of year t are allocated to the government accounts
of t – 1, as the obligation of paying the tax was generated
by transactions that took place in year t – 1. In the case of
revenue, the difference between accruals and cash
accounting gives rise to accounts receivable. There are
also accounts payable in relation to revenue (e.g. taxes to
be reimbursed), and accounts receivable in relation to
expenditure (e.g. cash payments in advance of deliveries).
The government debt is a cash concept. Debt is recorded
when financial instruments have been effectively issued.
Moreover, the government debt is defined at face value.
This means that interest which has accrued but has not
yet been effectively paid to bondholders — for example,
in the case of saving certificates or of bonds with a grace
period — is not included in the government debt (2).  
Furthermore, the debt definition that is relevant for the
budgetary surveillance in the EU does not include
accounts payable (3). Therefore, the debt does not
increase when the government commits a payment, but
only when the government has to obtain resources from
financial markets to finance effective cash outflows.
Data on the difference between cash and accruals. The
different accounting bases of the government deficit and
debt imply that the net accumulation of accounts receiv-
able and payable, and the difference between interest
accrued and paid contribute to the SFAs (4).
It is crucial to note that the difference between cash
accounting and accrual accounting is only a matter of
timing. In principle, the differences between effective
cash payments and the underlying expenditure, between
interest accrued and interest paid, and between the effec-
tive cash receipts and the underlying revenue cancel
each other out in the medium term (5). Large and pro-
tracted differences between accrual and cash data may
suggest data quality problems.
Accrual data are considerably more difficult to estimate
than cash figures and compilation errors are not rare. As
a result, unexplained discrepancies between the accrual-
and cash-based data, and between deficit and debt
¥1∂ Here, the term ‘accounts payable’ does not include lags in relation to inter-
est expenditure, which are considered separately.
¥2∂ When the face value of a bond, for example a zero-coupon bond, is higher
than the issuance price, the debt increases at issuance of the bond by more
than the financing received from financial markets. This means that the
cumulated interest of zero-coupon bonds, that is the difference between the
face value and the issuance price, is treated in the debt definition as if it
were paid at issuance.
¥3∂ The exclusion of accounts payable from the government debt was decided
mainly for pragmatic reasons, in relation to the difficulty in collecting reli-
able data and the little macroeconomic relevance of these liabilities. In
several EU Member States, a relatively frequent example of accounts pay-
able is healthcare-related payment arrears (delays in payments by social
security to pharmacists or to hospitals).
¥4∂ The issuance of zero-coupon bonds, the reimbursement of bonds that do
not regularly pay coupons, the accumulation of revenue arrears, the settle-
ment of payment arrears and the payment of expenditure in advance, etc.,
result in positive SFAs. Symmetrically, interest accrued by zero-coupon
bonds, or by other bonds that do not regularly pay coupons, the accumula-
tion of payment arrears, the collection of revenue in arrears, etc., lead to
negative SFAs.
¥5∂ Differences may persist in two cases: exceptional transactions with partic-
ularly long lags for effective cash disbursements or because of nominal
growth (e.g. it is normal that VAT revenue on an accrual basis is persist-
ently higher than effective VAT collection on a cash basis).110
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roeconomically relevant in most countries. In this sec-
tion, statistical discrepancies — i.e. the differences that
statisticians cannot allocate to any specific SFA category
— are deemed to come mainly from the differences
between accrual and cash accounting and included in
this first component of the SFA.
Graph II.8 shows the component of the SFA that is due to
the difference between cash and accruals in each of the EU
Member States. Given the volatility of data, the graph
shows the average for the last five years, rather than
annual data. For most countries, the difference between
accruals and cash interest (the light coloured bars in the
graph) is very small. The most significant difference (a
negative SFA) exists for Italy, given the weight of bonds
that do not regularly pay interest to bondholders (notably
postal bonds) in its debt structure. It corresponds to inter-
est that accrued during the period considered and was
properly recorded as deficit-increasing expenditure, but
that has not yet been paid to the bondholders.
Cash–accruals differences in the recording of revenue
and primary expenditure (the darker bars in the graph)
are also small for most countries, and figures would be
even smaller if the average was extended over longer
periods. However, Greece, Italy and Portugal are outliers
and their data have given reason for concern (1).
Net versus gross: accounting for financial assets in the 
deficit and the debt
The government deficit (surplus) is a net concept. The
government deficit is defined in the protocol on the
excessive deficit procedure as net borrowing. This
means that, when compiling the government deficit (sur-
plus), one should consider the government net financial
transactions. In practice, the government deficit is
mainly compiled on the basis of the government non-
Graph II.8: Time of recording: cash and accruals, average 2000–04 (% of GDP)
(1) For Germany and Austria, data refer to 2000–03.
(2) For Malta, data refer to 2001–03.
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ In the case of Italy, the difference comes notably from lags in the payment
of social contributions, the settlement of healthcare-related arrears, the
reimbursement of taxes, the recording of transactions with the EU budget
and exceptionally large statistical discrepancies. In Greece, most of the
difference concerns statistical discrepancies, which are, by their own
nature, not explained, though accounts receivable (presumably on taxes)
and an inconsistent recording in structural fund revenue also play a role. It
should be noted that the difference between cash and accrual accounting in
Greece is now much smaller (in particular, for the most recent years) than
before the revision of the deficit and debt time series in 2004. In the case
of Portugal, the difference between cash and accrual data has been clari-
fied. It is explained by the large stock of spending arrears at the beginning
of 2000 and their settlement in the following years, notably in 2002.111
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civil servants, purchases of goods and services, transfers
paid, taxes and contributions collected, etc.), and not the
financial transactions. However, by accounting identity,
the balance of financial transactions must be the same as
the balance of non-financial operations. Seen from this
perspective, the government deficit (surplus) is the dif-
ference between revenue and expenditure excluding
financial transactions.
The government debt is valued in gross terms. The gov-
ernment debt is gross. This implies that the government
debt changes when government accumulates financial
assets and therefore needs to finance this acquisition.
Moreover, the debt is consolidated between and within
the government subsectors. If a government sector (say
social security) sells private bonds and buys securities
issued by central government, the consolidated gross
debt falls and there is a negative SFA. If social security
buys private bonds and sells central government securi-
ties, the SFA is positive and the consolidated gross debt
of the government as a whole increases.
Data on the accumulation of financial assets. The accu-
mulation of financial assets by the government is quan-
titatively the most significant component of the SFA. An
accumulation of financial assets leads to a positive SFA;
a reduction in financial assets implies a negative SFA.
Graph II.9 shows the accumulation of financial assets by
the EU Member States over the period 2000–04. (Note
that the scale of this graph is not comparable to Graphs II.8
and II.10 on the other components of the SFA.) The
accumulation of financial assets is broken down into
four subgroups: liquidities (i.e. currency and deposits
with banks), securities other than shares (i.e. bonds
issued by non-government units), loans and shares. It
should be noted that ‘shares’ include equity in public
enterprises as well as in privately controlled companies,
and covers both quoted and non-quoted shares. It also
includes privatisation proceeds, with a minus sign.
The Member States that have registered the largest accu-
mulation of financial assets are those that have been in
surplus and have relatively small debts, such as Den-
mark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. These
governments prefer to invest their surpluses in financial
assets, rather than reimbursing government debt. For
some of them — such as Estonia and Luxembourg — the
government debt is so low that the accumulation of
assets is the only option, as there is virtually no debt to
Graph II.9: Accumulation of financial assets, average 2000–04 (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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the accumulation of financial assets depend heavily on
changes in the investment strategy of social security,
shifting investment from government paper to private
bonds and shares.
A number of countries with relatively high deficits and
high debts — such as Greece, Cyprus and Austria (1) —
have also accumulated a considerable stock of financial
assets over the last five years. Moreover, the accumula-
tion of financial assets is also significant for countries
such as Portugal and Hungary if privatisation proceeds
and liquidities are accounted separately. The countries
showing a larger reduction in their financial assets are
the Czech Republic and Slovakia given their privatisa-
tion programmes.
In many cases, the accumulation of financial assets cor-
responds to an accumulation of wealth, and the govern-
ment behaviour when accumulating financial assets is
not much different from the behaviour of a private profit-
driven agent. However, in some cases, financial assets
accumulated by the government might include a dis-
guised subsidisation of certain economic activities. 
The following questions are relevant when considering
the accumulation of financial assets by the government:
Will loans granted by the government to public enter-
prises or to developing countries be reimbursed at mar-
ket conditions? Are shares in public enterprises worth
the money that the government paid for them? In the case
of negative answers, the logic is that the purchase of
these ‘assets’ is recorded as capital expenditure thus
increasing the government deficit.
For effective budgetary surveillance, the Commission
services (in particular Eurostat) regularly request
detailed data on the accumulation of financial assets
from Member States, for example on the financial situa-
tion and outlook of the public enterprises receiving cap-
ital injections. In several cases, Eurostat requested Mem-
ber States to reclassify capital injection into public
enterprises, from below to above the line, thus revising
the government deficit upwards. The rules on the
accounting classification of capital injections into public
enterprises are now relatively strict, but their implemen-
tation has been particularly difficult. These strict rules
might have to widen to all kinds of financial assets, for
example loans granted to public and private enterprises
and to developing countries.
Valuation effects and residual adjustments
The third component of the SFA corresponds to valua-
tion effects with an impact on the government debt and a
number of residual adjustments. These cases are
depicted in Graph II.10.
Foreign exchange. The government debt denominated in
foreign currencies is valued according to the market
exchange rates. Therefore, movements in the exchange
markets lead to changes in the value of government debt,
though the debt face value was kept constant. These
increases or reductions in the debt value do not have any
direct impact (2) on the government deficit and are there-
fore booked as SFAs (3). 
The valuation of foreign-currency-denominated debt
used to be a significant component of the SFA in a
number of Member States until some years ago. It is now
almost irrelevant in those which are part of the euro area.
If one considers the average from 2000 to 2004, the
Member States where the exchange rate developments
have contributed most to the SFA are Greece (4) and
Slovenia (positive SFAs) and Lithuania, Slovakia and
Sweden (negative SFAs).
Early reimbursements. There is also a need to register an
entry in the SFA when the government reimburses debt
at a price other than its face value, in particular in the
case of early redemptions in secondary markets (5).
These transactions and the respective SFAs are very fre-
quent, though with relatively small macroeconomic rel-
evance. The cases of Italy and Sweden are worth men-
tioning. In Italy, at the end of 2002, the government
¥1∂ In the case of Cyprus, most financial assets accumulated by the government
are reported as deposits with the central bank. In Greece, most financial
assets are social security investment in shares. In the case of Austria, most
financial assets are loans granted by central government to other sectors.
¥2∂ There is an indirect impact in the sense that exchange rate movements may
increase or reduce interest expenditure on foreign debt.
¥3∂ A depreciation of the national currency vis-à-vis the currencies repre-
sented in the government debt leads to a positive SFA, while an apprecia-
tion implies a negative SFA. It should be noted that the change in the value
of foreign-currency-denominated debt is treated as capital gains and
losses, which are always recorded below the line and have no direct impact
on the deficit. Member States may have an incentive in issuing debt in
low-yield currencies, as this would reduce their interest spending, even if it
would increase their risk exposure.
¥4∂ In Greece, the exchange rate effects were quite significant until joining the
monetary union in 2001; it reached annual adjustments of almost 3 % of
GDP in 1999 and 2000. However, such an effect is now negligible.
¥5∂ Included here are the cases where a government subsector other than the
debt issuer buys the government liability in the secondary market.113
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rate and correspondingly lower face value. This opera-
tion led to a negative SFA and a reduction in the debt
level by almost 2 % of GDP. In the case of Sweden, the
2000–04 average is heavily influenced by a large reim-
bursement of high-interest-rate bonds with new bonds in
2000.
Other adjustments (1). Finally, there are other residual
and relatively exceptional adjustments, which might lead
to increases or reductions in the government debt and to
positive and negative SFAs. An interesting case is when
some units are reclassified from non-government sectors
to government and vice versa. In these cases, the govern-
ment debt may increase or decrease because the debts of
the reclassifying units are included in, or excluded from,
the government debt. The consolidating financial assets
of the unit being reclassified also need to be taken into
account, therefore a reclassification of a unit into gov-
ernment might increase or reduce the debt. The most
remarkable cases in the last few years concern the reclas-
sification as government of the Czech Banking Consoli-
dation Agency in 2002 or of a Belgian unit that used to
be involved in mortgage loans in 2001. Another kind of
‘other adjustments’ was the loss of the legal tender status
of the coins denominated in the former national curren-
cies in 2002 (2). Some rare debt assumptions in the con-
text of liquidation of public enterprises also imply an
entry under ‘other adjustments’.
2.2.4. Conclusions
The high level of the SFA in some countries, i.e. the
large discrepancies between the deficit and debt devel-
opments, has raised concerns about the quality of the
government finance statistics, and even about the appro-
priateness of the existing deficit and debt definitions.
The fact that the deficit is not the only determinant in the
evolution of the debt level is not an indication of any fun-
damental error in the accounts of Member States. A large
SFA is not, by itself, a source of concern. High positive
Graph II.10: Valuation effect and residual adjustments, average 2000–04 (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ It should be stressed that the statistical discrepancies are not classified
under this heading, but as timing differences, as most statistical discrepan-
cies originate in the complexities of the accrual accounting.
¥2∂ In most countries, coins are issued by the Treasury — not by central banks
— and constitute government debt. The coins that lost their legal tender
status and were not exchanged against the euro were removed from the
government debt. This operation was recorded without any impact on the
government deficit and led to a negative SFA.114
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ments in surplus. The issue is more worrying when there
are protracted high positive SFA components in high-
debt countries in deficit.
All Member States transmit data on the SFA to the Com-
mission on the occasion of the EDP reportings. Data on
the SFA transmitted by Member States are available
both for general government as a whole and for each of
the government subsectors. These figures are now pub-
licly available, as the Commission publishes the com-
plete tables transmitted by Member States in the context
of the EDP notification (1). Some Member States also
took the initiative of elaborating on the sources and com-
ponents of their SFA in their stability and convergence
programmes. The Commission has increased its exami-
nation of the quality of the Member States’ government
accounts. This involves careful scrutiny of the size and
the components of the SFA to identify issues that are rel-
evant for budgetary surveillance or suggesting account-
ing difficulties.
2.3. The role of budgetary institutions 
in shaping budgetary outcomes
2.3.1. Introduction
In the European Union, while the coordination of fiscal
policies is based on the common objectives of sound and
sustainable fiscal policies, the implementation of fiscal
policy remains in the hands of domestic authorities. The
implication of this institutional set-up is that, for the sys-
tem to function properly, the EU’s budgetary goals must
be embedded in the machinery of national policy-mak-
ing. The EU Treaty explicitly recognises this point when
it calls on Member States to ‘ensure that national proce-
dures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their
obligations in this area deriving from this Treaty’. The
relevance of this point has been confirmed by a growing
body of research that has investigated the interaction
between national fiscal rules and institutions and budg-
etary outcomes. It has thus become increasingly clear
that, whatever steps are taken to improve surveillance at
EU level, it is equally important to ensure that domestic
budgetary rules and institutions contribute towards
sound public finances (European Commission, 2004a).
The Ecofin Council report of March 2005 ‘Improving
the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’
reflects these points in concluding that ‘national budget-
ary rules should be complementary to the Member
States’ commitments under the Stability and Growth
Pact’ and ‘the Council considers that domestic govern-
ance arrangements should complement the EU frame-
work. National institutions could play a more prominent
role in budgetary surveillance to strengthen national
ownership, enhance enforcement through national pub-
lic opinion and complement the economic and policy
analysis at EU level’.
The aim of this section is to contribute to the debate on
the role of national budgetary institutions in shaping
budgetary outcomes. Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 briefly
review the conceptual issues and available empirical
evidence. Section 2.3.4 concentrates on the role of opti-
mistic forecasts and creative accounting in explaining
budget deficits. Section 2.3.5 discusses a specific insti-
tutional issue, i.e. whether the EU fiscal rules are com-
patible with fiscal policies in so-called delegation
States. The next two sections focus in more detail on
two topics that have arisen in the context of EU fiscal
surveillance, i.e. the interaction between the EU fiscal
rules, national expenditure rules and fiscal outcomes
(Section 2.3.6) and the role of national forecasting
authorities in producing unbiased forecasts (Section
2.3.7). Section 2.3.8 concludes.
2.3.2. Conceptual framework
Fiscal institutions are ‘all the rules and regulations
according to which budgets are prepared, approved and
carried out’ (Alesina and Perotti, 1999) while a fiscal
rule can be defined as ‘a permanent constraint on fiscal
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fis-
cal performance, such as the government budget deficit,
borrowing, debt or a major component thereof’ (Kopits
and Symansky, 1998). It follows from these definitions
that fiscal rules can be seen as a subset of the budgetary
institutions that guide the preparation, approval and
implementation of budgets.
Fiscal institutions structure the decision-making process
and restrain the range of possible budgetary outcomes.
Why institutions matter can be understood on the basis
of problems of spending bias, deficit bias and a lack of
transparency that characterise unstructured and unre-
strained budgetary processes. First, externalities that
influence the size of government (the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio). Oversized government may arise from the
common pool resource problem. Individual spending
ministers, local governments or representatives in parlia-
¥1∂ See the Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s website 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/natnot.htm).115
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ency, thus, when making demands on the budget, they
fail to realise that their spending implies a cost to the
public at large. If budget constraints or the minister for
finance are weak, adding up the spending demands in the
budgetary process will underplay the total cost of spend-
ing and lead to an excessively high budget. Strong insti-
tutionalised constraints or a strong minister for finance,
representing the interests of all taxpayers, may ensure
that the budget reflects the true cost to the public and
define the size of the budget accordingly.
Second, governments may overspend relative to rev-
enue, i.e. run deficits that lead to unsustainable govern-
ment debt. Several explanations have been put forward
as to why fiscal policy may suffer from a deficit bias,
including political inaction due to conflicts of interest
and debt as a strategic variable to affect policy choices of
future governments (see Alesina and Perotti, 1994, for
an overview). The typical institutional response to the
deficit bias has been to introduce permanent constraints
on fiscal policy, such as the fiscal rules that were intro-
duced both in Europe and in the United States of Amer-
ica in the early 1990s.
Lastly, even if fiscal arrangements are found that are
designed to eliminate these above externalities, any par-
ticular budget may still overshoot, i.e. deviate from its
planned outcome. This may be the case when the fiscal
arrangements work improperly, are based on unrealistic
assumptions, are loosely implemented or not enforced,
or softened when unforeseen economic developments
affect the budget, or when the budgetary authority is not
able to control fully side budgets (e.g. social security). A
possible remedy is to create independent bodies in
charge of evaluating the transparency, accuracy, and
projections of the government budget (Alesina and Per-
otti, 1999).
2.3.3. Budgetary outcomes and the centralisation 
of the budgetary process: survey 
of empirical evidence
Empirical research on the interaction between budgetary
institutions and measures of fiscal discipline has typi-
cally used indices that aim at capturing the key charac-
teristics of the institutions in a single number. Such an
approach requires making assumptions on which institu-
tional aspects to include in the index and how to weigh
them. In practice, the indices as used in different studies
show overlap but also differ with respect to the emphasis
that the researcher has put on different aspects. For
example, the pioneering study by von Hagen (1992)
emphasises common pool problems and builds an index
that captures the degree of centralisation of the budget-
ary process. It covers the stages of: (i) budget formula-
tion (including restrictions on the budget and the relative
position of the minister for finance vis-à-vis the spend-
ing ministers); (ii) budget approval (focusing on the
degree to which amendments in parliament may increase
the size of the budget); and (iii) budget implementation
(e.g. can the minister for finance block expendi-
tures?) (1). The index as developed by Alesina et al.
(1999) is built around three insights: (i) fiscal constraints
may be conducive to fiscal discipline; (ii) hierarchical
procedures should be conducive to fiscal discipline; (iii)
transparent procedures should lead to more fiscal disci-
pline (2). In comparison with the index as developed in
von Hagen (1992), this index thus puts a somewhat
larger weight on ex ante constraints on the budget.
In interpreting the results from empirical research on the
interaction between fiscal institutions and fiscal out-
comes, a key consideration is whether the causality runs
from institutions to outcomes or the other way round. On
the one hand, the argument that the causality may run
from budgetary outcomes to institutions is based on the
observation that fiscal rules and institutional reform have
generally been introduced in response to dissatisfaction
with budgetary outcomes. They are therefore at least to
some extent exogenous, with the implication that they
cannot be used as explanatory variables of budgetary
outcomes. On the other hand, the argument that budget-
ary institutions are exogenous to budgetary outcomes, so
that they can be included in regression analysis as an
explanatory variable, is based on the fact that institutions
(laws, decision-making procedures) change very slowly
over time so that it is reasonable to assume that they are
exogenous. Finally, it may also be the case that both
budgetary institutions and budgetary outcomes may be a
function of a third variable of voter preferences (Poterba,
1996). If this view is right, then countries with a strong
preference for particular types of budgetary outcome use
the institutions as tools for reaching this particular budg-
etary outcome.
¥1∂ The original index as developed by von Hagen also contains a section on
the responsiveness of the budget. Given that this element was dropped in
later studies, it is not mentioned here.
¥2∂ This index was used to study the effects of budgetary institutions in Latin
American countries and has subsequently been used by de Haan et al.
(1999) for EU Member States.116
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of research that uses budgetary institutions as an explan-
atory variable for budgetary outcomes. Graph II.11 vis-
ualises the correlation between the index of the degree of
centralisation of the budgetary process, based on von
Hagen et al. (2002) for the period 1981–95, and average
budget balances. Following the same approach, Graph
II.12 presents the results for the period 1994–98 for sev-
eral recently acceded Member States on the basis of
Gleich (2003). Both studies thus find evidence of a sta-
tistically significant link between budgetary institutions
and budgetary outcomes. In addition to such bivariate
correlations, studies that have included the indices of fis-
cal institutions in fuller models of fiscal reaction func-
tions have also concluded that budgetary institutions
influence budgetary outcomes in EU Member States,
although the effect may be small (de Haan et al., 1999).
The policy implication is that appropriate institutional
reform of national budgetary institutions may be condu-
cive to fiscal discipline.
2.3.4. Explaining budgetary slippages: the role of 
optimistic forecasts and creative accounting
The previous section discussed research that investi-
gates institutional explanations for the fiscal deficit
bias. As a complement to this approach, recent research
has investigated how institutionally weak governments
may use a strategy of window dressing, i.e. of appear-
ing in line with the objectives of the EU fiscal rules in
the short run, while showing a deficit bias in a longer-
term perspective.
A first possibility to do so is to base the budget on
overly optimistic growth assumptions. In this case,
expenditures are set in relation to revenue projections
that are based on overly optimistic growth assumptions.
Corrective measures can then be avoided ex ante, while
ex post revenues will be lower than expected and a def-
icit bias will arise due to inertia on the expenditure side
(i.e. overshooting). On this point, Milesi-Ferretti and
Moriyama (2004) argue that opportunistic govern-
ments may try to avoid the costs of improving budget-
ary positions by using more favourable growth assump-
tions so that the negative outcome can later be blamed
on bad luck.
Another possibility for window dressing is to resort to
creative accounting, as it allows for steering the meas-
ured deficit in the desired direction while avoiding struc-
tural adjustment measures. In this context, the model of
creative accounting developed by Milesi-Ferretti (2003)
points to a trade-off between window dressing and real
fiscal adjustment, and relates it to the transparency of the
budget (1).
These arguments may be generalised into the hypothesis
that budgetary outcomes may be correlated with overop-
timistic budgetary projections and creative accounting/
one-off measures.
Graph II.13 shows the correlation of the degree in opti-
mism in growth forecasts on which the budgetary pro-
jections in the stability and convergence programmes
are based with average budget deficits for EU Member
States since the early 1990s. It confirms that, for the
period as a whole, countries that have systematically
based their budgetary projections on overly optimistic
growth forecasts have recorded higher deficits. This
evidence is further underpinned by the finding that
overoptimistic projections for the budget balance are
related to the size of deficits across countries, as shown
in Graph II.14.
Graph II.15 shows the correlation between the average
yearly incidence of one-offs and creative accounting for
the period 1993–2003 and the average deficit for the
same period (2). It confirms that countries that have used
more one-offs and creative accounting have also
recorded higher deficits.  
Whereas these data point to an interaction between
budgetary institutions and budgetary outcomes, they do
not reveal the direction of causality. On the one hand,
following a strategy of window dressing through overop-
timistic growth assumptions and creative accounting
will itself also lead to a deficit bias in a longer time per-
spective. On the other hand, it might be that countries
that do not address the problems of deficit bias and non-
transparent fiscal procedures through appropriate budg-
etary institutions at national level will more easily run
against the constraints of the EU fiscal rules, and then
may choose a strategy of window dressing to circumvent
those rules.     
¥1∂ Ceteris paribus, a rule imposed when the budget is not transparent yields
more creative accounting and less fiscal adjustment.
¥2∂ Based on Koen and van den Noord (2005).117
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2 0 0 5Graph II.11: Centralisation of the budgetary process and average deficits, 1981–95
Sources: Centralisation index: von Hagen et al. (2002). Deficits (% of GDP): AMECO database.
Graph II.12: Centralisation of the budgetary process and average deficits in central and east European 
countries, 1994–98
Sources: Centralisation index: Gleich (2003). Deficits (% of GDP): EBRD transition report 2000.
– 5
0
5
10
15
20
IT EL SE IE BE ES PT AT DK DE NL FR LU FI UK
Centralisation index
Average deficit 1981–95
– 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
RO HU BG PL LT CZ SK SI LV EE
Centralisation index
Average deficit 1994– 98118
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eGraph II.13: Degree of optimism in growth forecasts and budget deficits, averages 1991–2002
Sources: AMECO database for average budget deficits (1991–2002) and Strauch et al. (2004) for mean error in difference between growth forecast and 
outcome in stability and convergence programmes for 1991–2002. Countries included are EU-15 Member States except Luxembourg. Variables 
are measured as a percentage of GDP.
Graph II.14: Degree of optimism in budgetary projections and budget deficits, averages 1991–2002
Sources: AMECO database for average budget deficits (1991–2002) and Strauch et al. (2004) for mean error in difference between planned budget balance 
and outcome in stability and convergence programmes for 1991–2002. Countries included are EU-15 Member States except Luxembourg. Varia-
bles are measured as a percentage of GDP.
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the SGP: commitment versus delegation as 
the key variable?
In addition to the argument that fiscal discipline is corre-
lated with indices of budgetary institutions, it has also
been argued that fiscal performance of EU Member
States under the SGP depends somehow on the institu-
tional setting, i.e. whether a country uses a commitment
or a delegation strategy for centralising the budgetary
process (Hallerberg, 2004; IMF, 2004b). The key argu-
ment is that the ideal way for a country to address com-
mon pool problems by centralising its budgetary process
depends on its electoral system. Countries with an ideo-
logically unified government (i.e. a one-party govern-
ment or if the parties in government are close to one
another ideologically) need a strong minister for finance
to centralise the budgetary process in order to obtain
aggregate fiscal discipline. Conversely, in countries in
which the government is less unified ideologically —
notably multi-party governments — fiscal contracts (e.g.
coalition agreements) are more suited to achieve a better
control of the budgetary process. The underlying idea is
that it is difficult for a strong minister for finance to con-
strain him/herself to fiscal rules, whereas rules are more
useful in coalition governments.
It follows from the above reasoning that delegation
States (typically Germany, Greece, France and Italy in
the current context) should centralise the budgetary
process by relying on the budgetary discretion of a
strong minister for finance, whereas the commitment
States (Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland) should
rely on a rules-based approach. Since the SGP rules-
based framework is a type of commitment approach, it
should fit commitment countries very well, while in del-
egation countries there would be fewer incentives to fol-
low the SGP rules.
A difficulty in identifying the approach to centralising
the budgetary process (delegation versus commitment)
as a key explanatory factor in explaining budgetary per-
formance under the SGP is that the choice of a delegation
approach is strongly correlated with the size of the coun-
try: large Member States are mostly delegation coun-
tries. Buti and Pench (2004) address the question of why
large countries have flouted the SGP. They put forward
Graph II.15: Incidence of one-off measures and creative accounting and budget balances, 
averages 1993–2003
Sources: AMECO database for average budget deficits (1993–2003) and Koen and van den Noord (2005) for measures of average one-offs, creative account-
ing operations and classification errors for 1993–2003. Countries included are EU-15 Member States except Luxembourg. Variables are measured 
as a percentage of GDP.
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has mattered: (i) in larger countries, EU considerations
may receive less weight than domestic considerations;
(ii) large countries have more voting power in the
enforcement procedures of the SGP; (iii) there may have
been a perception of larger costs of fiscal consolidation
in larger countries. Moreover, it may be difficult to dis-
tinguish between commitment and delegation countries
since reforms of the fiscal institutions may change the
classification of given countries over time (1). Finally, it
is also possible to directly question the argument that fis-
cal rules (i.e. either national fiscal rules or the rules of the
SGP) are not suitable for delegation States, as there are
examples of countries like the UK that combine a strong
finance minister with a rules-based approach (2). More-
over, Hallerberg et al. (2004) in a paper based on an
update of the data set in von Hagen (1992) argue that
budgetary rules also seem to operate as disciplining
devices for delegation States. The authors claim that,
over the 1990s, fiscal constraints such as expenditure
rules were given a more prominent role in several EU
Member States.
2.3.6. Expenditure rules and expenditure outcomes
Conceptual issues
The EU fiscal rules apply to the budget balance, i.e. the
difference between total revenue and expenditure. Many
Member States have also introduced national fiscal rules
that aim at controlling public expenditure in the context
of medium-term expenditure frameworks. In many
countries, such national fiscal rules are seen as a key
institutional tool for complying with the EU fiscal rules.
European Commission (2003a) contains a detailed dis-
cussion of the interaction between the EU fiscal rules
and national expenditure rules. National expenditure
rules can complement the EU fiscal rules in several
ways:
• they help in tackling the deficit bias by addressing
the principal source of the fiscal profligacy: political
and institutional temptation to raise expenditure in
good times;
• they support the operation of the automatic stabilis-
ers by helping to prevent tax increases in bad times;
• they can contribute to the policy objective of
improving the quality of public spending;
• if adequately set and enforced, they make tax reduc-
tions more credible by making economic agents
anticipate that they will be permanent;
• they are helpful in the implementation of durable
consolidation packages: the literature suggests that
expenditure-based consolidations are more likely to
be long-lasting.
In European Commission (2003a), there is also an
empirical analysis on the design and implementation of
expenditure rules in EU Member States. The design
includes the definition of the target (in real or nominal
terms, as a ceiling or a rate of growth), what to leave out
of the rule (cyclically sensitive items and/or productive
expenditure categories), the legal base of the rule (polit-
ical agreement or based on law) and the enforcement of
the rules. The analysis suggests that the rules had con-
tributed to expenditure control in countries that had
implemented more ambitious rules. Subsequent analysis
in European Commission (2004a) shows that consolida-
tions are more likely to be expenditure-based in coun-
tries with stronger rules (Denmark, the Netherlands,
Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK).
Expenditure developments in countries with strong 
and weak expenditure rules
In order to further illustrate the interaction between
expenditure developments, expenditure rules and politi-
cal priorities, Graph II.16 shows the developments in
primary expenditure for two groups of countries. The
first group consists of countries that have pioneered the
use of medium-term expenditure frameworks (Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) (3). The second
group consists of countries with less emphasis on
expenditure rules in the context of a medium-term
expenditure framework (Germany, Italy and Portugal) or
for which a weak design and frequent overruns have
made the rule largely ineffective (France). Expenditure
¥1∂ For instance, Spain and Austria have moved towards a delegation
approach as from 2000 (Hodson, 2005).
¥2∂ The two formal fiscal rules in the UK are the golden rule and the sustaina-
ble investment rule. Government departments are also given three-year
spending limits (departmental expenditure limits), while any spending that
cannot reasonably be subject to such multi-year limits is included in
annual managed expenditure.
¥3∂ The UK could also be included in this group. It has been excluded, how-
ever, given that total expenditure in the UK is much lower than that in
these countries and given that the political preferences in the UK have
strongly shifted towards expenditure increases in recent years. 121
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government expenditure-to-GDP ratios, with 1997 chosen
as the base year (1).
In the first group of countries primary expenditure was at
a high level of 56 % of GDP in 1993. In all countries
within this group, a strong political consensus emerged
on the need to bring down public expenditure. An inter-
esting feature is that public expenditure had been on a
downward path for several years already when the rules
were introduced. To some extent, the expenditure rules
may therefore signal the political consensus rather than
being an exogenous budgetary institution that can
explain why expenditure was reduced by large amounts.
A structural break in this trend of expenditure reductions
seems to have occurred in 2000. In the second group of
countries, primary expenditure started from a much
lower level of 31 % of GDP in 1993 and has since moved
slowly upwards.
This trend continued despite the reductions in budget
deficits during the 1990s that were based on increases in
revenues. Again, the year 2000 represents a structural
break after which expenditure has been rising again.
2.3.7. Explaining budgetary outcomes: 
the role of macroeconomic forecasts
Conceptual issues
Expenditure rules that are cast in numerical targets
require an accurate revenue projection — based on
unbiased economic growth forecasts — if these rules are
intended to support the SGP’s budget balance target. In
its March 2005 agreement, the Ecofin Council con-
firmed the relevance of this topic: ‘The Council recog-
nises that it is important to base budgetary projections on
realistic and cautious macroeconomic forecasts. It also
recognises the important contribution that Commission
forecasts can provide for the coordination of economic
and fiscal policies.’
Conceptually, the observed link between the optimism
on the growth outlook and fiscal performance can be
explained by inertia in the execution of the budget. On
the revenue side, it is reasonable to assume that any var-
iation in the rate of economic growth will automatically
¥1∂ The choice of the base year is dictated by the fact that most countries intro-
duced their expenditure rules around 1997 (the rules were introduced in
1994 in the Netherlands, in 1997 in Denmark and Sweden, and in 1999 in
Finland).
Graph II.16: Expenditure developments: effects of expenditure rules, 1993–2003
Source: Commission services.
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receipts, as under unchanged fiscal policy tax bases
should bear a stable relationship to the level of economic
activity (1). In the planning stage of the budget, projected
revenues are a determinant of expenditures. In the exe-
cution phase of the budget, however, preset expenditure
lines are hard to adjust to deviations in economic growth
from the ex ante projection. Targeting the budget bal-
ance is thus facilitated if budgetary projections can rely
on unbiased forecasts in the planning stage.
If official growth forecasts were unbiased (i.e. on aver-
age the projection does not differ from the true value),
the effect of overestimating or underestimating eco-
nomic growth on the budget balance target would have
to be accepted as the price of uncertainty. However, a
completely different conclusion is warranted if official
growth forecasts suffer from some sort of structural opti-
mism, systematically overrating the underlying rate of
the economy.
Optimistic forecasts: empirical evidence
Strauch et al. (2004) analyse the track record of budg-
etary forecasts contained in the stability and conver-
gence programmes presented between 1991 and 2002.
Their results support the view that several Member
States produced optimistic growth assumptions. More-
over, countries with the most optimistic growth out-
looks are also those with the largest slippages from
budgetary targets. The link between the forecast bias
and fiscal performance is confirmed by Larch and
Salto (2003). Focusing attention on the four largest
economies of the EU (Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and Italy) and using a longer sample (1987–
2003), they show first that forecast errors of potential
output growth are significant in explaining variations
in the CAB and second that official growth forecasts
have an optimism bias in three of the four countries
considered. The same authors show that the bias can be
as high as 0.2 to 0.3 % of GDP per year, producing a
measurable impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio in the
medium term. For instance, over the past five years,
since the beginning of EMU, the optimism bias can,
ceteris paribus, account for around one full addi-
tional percentage point of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
These estimates are confirmed by Forni and
Momigliano (2004). They conclude that the misjudg-
ment of cyclical conditions has an average yearly
impact of 0.2 % of GDP on the budget in more than
half of the OECD countries.
Institutional issues
Table II.4 summarises current practice in forecasting in
EU Member States. In most Member States, the govern-
ment itself is responsible for the economic forecasts that
underlie the budgetary planning. Usually, the forecasts
are produced by the Ministry of Finance. In a few cases,
other government agencies are involved, for example the
Economics Ministry in Germany and the statistical insti-
tute as a division of the Economics Ministry in Luxem-
bourg. Only four Member States have their economic
forecast produced outside the government. It should be
noted that these countries are small, so that the forecast-
ing institute almost has a monopoly position (the Neth-
erlands and Belgium) or only few competitors (Austria)
within the country’s forecasting landscape. The extent of
delegation ranges from a pure gentleman’s agreement in
Austria to a formal obligation in Belgium. As regards the
legal status of the external forecasters, they are all intel-
lectually independent, but receive most of their funds
from the government and are in some cases government
agencies. In Belgium, the most formalised case of dele-
gation, the National Accounts Institute, comprising the
national statistical institute, the central bank and the Fed-
eral Planning Bureau (a public agency with legally
granted intellectual independence), produces the fore-
cast. The government is expected by law to use this fore-
cast in the budgetary process. The year 2001 was the
only year, in which the government made use of its
power to override the forecast — for a more prudent one.
In those cases where the forecast remains within the
domain of the government, it can still be subject to out-
side checks before it is published. The central bank is
consulted in many Member States, though on a formal
basis only in those that delegated the forecast.
Academic institutes are consulted in many cases. In the
UK, the National Audit Office has the mandate to audit
many of the assumptions on which the forecasts are
based, for example on trend growth, price develop-
ments, claimant unemployment, etc., with access to all
relevant government documents. The weakest form of
outside control during the forecasting process is the
timing of the forecast. Despite the lack of outside con-
sulting, in Germany, for example, the forecast is con-
¥1∂ In addition, if the tax system is taken to be roughly proportional, which
would seem to be the case for most EU countries, the revenue-to-GDP
ratio should be broadly neutral with respect to growth.123
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institutes published their joint forecast. In France, in
contrast, no independent institute systematically moni-
tors the government’s growth and budgetary forecasts.
Smaller countries, especially the new Member States
but also Greece and Portugal, sometimes lack a moni-
toring infrastructure of independent research institutes,
so that forecasts of international institutions are the
only comparator.
Upon publication, the government forecast is compared
with other forecasts in about half of the countries. The
degree of openness about competing forecasts varies.
In Italy, for example, a formally independent public
body (ISAE), the central bank and the national statisti-
cal institute discuss the government’s forecast during a
parliamentary hearing. The UK Treasury, for example,
makes a comparison of independent forecasts available
on its website, which is updated monthly. The UK
employs a further safeguard against overoptimism: it is
the only country that bases budgetary projections
explicitly on trend growth of a ä percentage point
below its neutral view.
Due to the implementation lag of corrective measures on
the expenditure side, frequent updates of forecasts can
Table II.4
Characteristics of forecasting institutions in EU Member States
Responsibility for forecast Consultation process Publication
Ministry 
of Finance
Independent 
institute
Government 
can 
override 
forecast
Statutory 
involvement 
of central 
bank
Consultative 
involvement 
of central 
bank
Academic 
and/or 
political 
peer review
Comparison 
with other 
forecasts
Explicitly 
errs on the 
side of 
caution
Date of last 
update
BE  X X      Sept./Oct.
CZ X   X X X Sept.
DK X    X Aug.
DE Econ. Min.   X   Oct.
EE X     X X  Aug.
EL X        June
ES X     Sept.
FR X        Sept./Oct.
IE X     X   Dec.
IT X     Sept.
CY X    X    Sept.
LV X   X     Aug./Sept.
LT X   X X  Sept.
LU Statec/Econ. 
Min.
  X  X  Nov.
HU X   X  X Sept./Oct.
MT X   X   Oct.
NL  X     X  Aug./Sept.
AT  X    X Sept.
PL X     Aug./Sept.
PT X      X  Oct.
SI  X X    X  Oct.
SK X   X X X Aug./Sept.
FI X     Sept.
SE X     X X  Sept.
UK X X X X X March (1)
(1) Fiscal year starts in April.
Source: Commission services.124
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countries record public finance developments on a
monthly basis, most countries produce official macro-
economic forecasts only twice a year, at the beginning of
the budgetary process and towards its end.
Towards unbiased forecasts: do institutional 
characteristics matter?
Strauch et al. (2004) investigate for the EU-15 in the
period 1991–2002 whether there is a forecasting bias,
using the projection horizons contained in the stability
and convergence programmes. These are usually submit-
ted in December by the Member States, after the budget-
ary process for the forthcoming year is completed,
although before 1998 they were not always submitted
regularly. Thus, they are based on the most recent fore-
cast underlying the budget. An interesting finding is that
national forecasts of GDP growth that are produced by
independent institutes (in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Austria) show no bias. This is confirmed by Jonung and
Larch (2004) with data taken directly from the national
forecast publication and with a longer time horizon.
A further noteworthy result is that forecasts produced by
the government may be biased but need not be. Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal (according to
Strauch et al., 2004) plus France (according to Larch and
Salto, 2003) are systematically optimistic in their growth
projections. However, in Denmark, Greece, Spain, Fin-
land and the UK, where the Finance Ministry also pro-
duces the official forecast, a significant bias could not be
detected.
Moreover, it is also found that, where the forecast is pro-
duced by the government, other institutional characteris-
tics do not seem to fully explain the difference between
having a bias or not. In Spain and the UK, the official
(unbiased) forecasts are validated against competing
forecasts from the central bank or other forecasters and
academics. In contrast, this is not the case in France, but
neither in Denmark nor Greece. Yet, according to
Strauch et al. (2004), the French and the Greek budget-
ary forecasts have systematically underestimated the
deficit. Furthermore, Ireland and Sweden systematically
err on the side of caution, according to Strauch et al.
(2004). Nonetheless, it seems that the more transparent
the official forecast is towards peer review and the
stronger the outside monitoring, the less tendency there
is for an overoptimistic bias.
In sum, available analysis provides some support to the
view that one way to reduce the optimism bias in official
growth forecasts and thus the ensuing effect on the
budget is delegation to a body that is protected against
political pressure. The task of producing forecasts of rel-
evant variables for the budgetary process could be
assigned to an independent institution with the commit-
ment by the Ministry of Finance to use these forecasts in
the planning of the official budget. A less clear-cut route
to safeguard the forecast against political pressure could
be to expose it to outside scrutiny by consultation proc-
esses with independent forecasters and, after publica-
tion, provide comparisons with other forecasts. The fre-
quency of the forecasts is also important: while the
forecasts are often timed to the budget preparation with
two exercises per year, in the execution phase of the
budget more frequent updating could be useful, given the
time lags in making adjustments on the expenditure side.
For example, there could be two major official forecast-
ing exercises per year, which are updated twice after the
release of quarterly data.
2.3.8. Conclusion
The EU Treaty calls upon Member States to ensure that
national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to
meet their obligations deriving from the Treaty. The
recent Council agreement on improving the implementa-
tion of the Stability and Growth Pact has confirmed the
importance of this issue and has included references to
national fiscal rules, national institutions, and realistic
and cautious macroeconomic forecasts. In this context,
this section has reviewed the interaction between domes-
tic budgetary rules and institutions and budgetary out-
comes. Overall, the data seem to provide a certain sup-
port to the view that deficit bias, overoptimistic
budgetary projections, creative accounting and one-off
measures may all be linked to underlying institutional
weaknesses. Given that the literature stresses that both
budgetary outcomes and budgetary institutions may also
be related to political priorities, it seems that a virtuous
circle of improved policy outcomes across all these indi-
cators may require improved national ownership of com-
mon objectives as well as institutional reforms of
national budgetary processes. 125
3. Sustainability analysis in EU multilateral 
surveillance: what has been done, 
what should be done?
3.1. Introduction
During the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, signif-
icant rises in the level of public debt increased concerns
about the sustainability of deficit spending policies in
the very long run. For the EU-15 countries on average,
public debt shifted from around 30 % of GDP in the
mid-1970s to almost 75 % of GDP in the mid-1990s.
During the same period, the old-age dependency ratio
(measured as population aged 65 and over as a share of
population aged 15 to 64) increased only slightly, from
20.6 % to 23 %, showing that the majority of the shift
in debt ratios could not be attributed to demographic
pressure (1). In the second half of the 1990s, prelimi-
nary estimates of the budgetary impact of ageing popu-
lations pointed to an additional risk (2). This has been
the backdrop for the increased focus on long-term fiscal
sustainability.
In EU countries, sustainability of the public finances is
typically analysed with a long-term perspective (3).
Available demographic and budgetary projections show
increases in budgetary expenditures driven by demo-
graphic changes in all countries over the next 30 years.
A currently sustainable position may thus easily turn
unsustainable if the expected cost of ageing is not
anticipated somehow, for example through budgetary or
structural reforms or through accumulation of budget
surpluses.
Monitoring the likely trends of public finances is there-
fore of paramount importance in preventing the burden
of public debt from becoming unsustainable. The revised
code of conduct on the content and format of the stability
and convergence programmes (July 2001) commits
Member States to include information on the quality and
sustainability of public finances, including long-term
budgetary projections on the implications of ageing pop-
ulations (4).
However, fiscal surveillance of long-term sustainability
entails a high degree of uncertainty. The results may dif-
fer according to assumptions on future trends of, for
example, demographic developments, macroeconomic
developments (mainly growth conditions), and budget-
ary development of age-related expenditures. In addi-
tion, sustainability depends on the impact of structural
reforms that may affect either the potential growth rate
or the budgetary profile of certain expenditure categories
(see Part III).
In the reformed SGP, sustainability is at the core of
budgetary surveillance. Sustainability concerns are
reflected in several ways: (i) in formulating an opinion
¥1∂ Source: Eurostat’s NewCronos database.
¥2∂ See the work conducted at the OECD by Roseveare et al. (1996). 
¥3∂ This is not the case, for instance, for emerging economies where debt sus-
tainability is mainly a short- to medium-term issue. See IMF (2002).
¥4∂ Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/
sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf . In the last part of the second paragraph under
the heading ‘Objectives’ it is stated ‘… furthermore, appropriate medium-
term budgetary targets, consistent with the general and country-specific rec-
ommendations in the BEPGs, should also take into account the need to cater
for the costs associated with population ageing’; the last paragraph of the
heading ‘Measures’ says ‘furthermore, the programmes should outline the
countries’ strategies and provide summary information on the countries’
short- to medium-term concrete measures to tackle the long-term budgetary
implications of ageing’; the second paragraph of the heading ‘Time horizon’
lays down that ‘given the impact of longer-term demographic developments
on the sustainability of public finances, information over a longer period
should be included in the annual updates of the programmes in summary
form. However, more detailed information should be included and updated
regularly, at least every three years, …’.126
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gramme; (ii) the definition of the medium-term objective
for a Member State’s budgetary position will take
account of the Commission and Council assessment of
the sustainability risks; (iii) if a Member State introduces
a major reform that has direct long-term budgetary sav-
ing, for example a reform of the pension system, then a
deviation from the medium-term objective or the adjust-
ment path towards it can be allowed; and (iv) in applying
the excessive deficit procedure, the net cost of pension
reforms that introduce a mandatory fully funded pillar
will be considered carefully, as such reforms involve a
short-term budgetary cost, while the long-term impact is
positive (1); (v) there will be an increased focus on the
debt criterion set down in the Treaty. In particular, Mem-
ber States with high debt-to-GDP ratios should make
great efforts to reduce them rapidly, thus contributing to
the sustainability of the public finances.
The increased relevance of longer-term issues in the con-
text of the Stability and Growth Pact requires a well-
established methodology to gauge possible sustainabil-
ity risks. This chapter presents the state of the art of long-
term sustainability analysis and its use in fiscal surveil-
lance at EU level. It both discusses how the methodology
has developed since the first round of assessment in
2001, and presents possible future developments.
3.2. The current assessment of sustainability 
of public finances in the stability 
and convergence programmes
Since 2001, long-term sustainability of public finances
has been examined in the context of the annual assess-
ment of the stability and convergence programmes and
their updates. Sustainability is thus discussed both in the
technical assessment prepared by the Commission serv-
ices (2) and in the Council opinions.
These assessments are based on both quantitative and
qualitative tools which try to capture the degree of budg-
etary risks associated with current policies and ageing
populations. Sustainability refers to the capacity of a
country to be solvent now and in the future given current
legislation and policies and without major corrections of
the budget. The assessment of sustainability is a matter
of judgment of what a ‘major correction’ is: this depends
on the size of the required correction and the specific
conditions linked to the country (its past history, the
presence of reserves, the level of taxation, etc.). As
underlined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
‘no framework can dispense with the need for making
judgments: at best, it can help inform such judg-
ments’ (3). The Commission’s and the Council’s assess-
ment of sustainability of public finances takes into con-
sideration both quantitative information (sustainability
indicators based on the projected evolution of the debt-
to-GDP ratio, see Section Debt projections) and qualita-
tive considerations. In Part I, Chapter 3, the latest assess-
ment is described.
The experience accumulated during the four rounds of
sustainability analysis in the context of the SGP allows
some preliminary conclusions. Four particular aspects of
the Commission’s approach merit consideration: (i) the
cooperation with Member States in the Ageing Working
Group attached to the Economic Policy Committee
(EPC); (ii) the yearly sustainability analysis in the context
¥1∂ The terminology used when distinguishing between different pension ‘pil-
lars’ characterising the pension arrangements prevailing in a country is not
universally agreed. In the EU, a three-pillar terminology is generally used:
(i) first pillar: consisting of statutory basic schemes; (ii) second pillar: con-
sisting of occupational schemes; and (iii) third pillar: consisting of individ-
ual pension plans. A pension system might be statutory, comprising both a
PAYG part and a funded part. This could be seen as a statutory two-tiered
first-pillar pension system, comprising a public PAYG part and a funded
part being privately managed. The different ‘pillar terminologies’ do not
have any direct legal implications. The World Bank has instead developed
a multi-pillar terminology as follows: 0 pillar: social assistance schemes;
first pillar: earnings-related schemes; second pillar: mandatory savings;
third pillar: occupational schemes; fourth pillar: individual pension plans;
and fifth pillar: family plans (World Bank, 2005, ‘Terms behind pension
discussions’, http://www.worldbank.org/). However, a pension reform that
introduces a ‘mandatory fully funded pillar’ has a special significance in
terms of the Ecofin report of 20 March 2005 on the reform of the SGP (see
Part II, Chapter 1). Such a reform normally involves a partial shift to fund-
ing within the statutory pension system. According to Eurostat’s decisions
of 2 March and 23 September 2004, contributions to a funded defined-con-
tribution pension scheme should be classified outside government by
March 2007 at the latest (see Boxes II.5 and III.3). This normally implies a
loss of social security contributions recorded in government and therefore
a short-term deterioration in the general government budget balance when
such a scheme is introduced.
¥2∂ Available on the Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s website (http://
europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm). 
¥3∂ See IMF (2002, p. 6). As developed in ‘Public finances in EMU — 2004’,
sustainability is not a purely quantitative issue. For example, and this may
be a particular challenge in some recently acceded Member States on
which Part IV provides a specific focus, underinvesting today in environ-
mental protection and technologies may lower government expenditures in
the short term, and thus have a temporary positive impact on public
finances, but it would usually imply much larger spending in the future,
with an overall significant negative impact on intergenerational discounted
financial sustainability. Hence, the necessity to follow both a quantitative
and a qualitative approach.127
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input data of the sustainability analysis (the medium-term
scenario, the long-term budgetary projections and the
long-term macroeconomic assumptions); (iv) the debt
projections (the set of quantitative indicators, sensitivity
tests and qualitative factors used in the assessment).
3.2.1. The cooperation with EU Member States
In 1999, the Ageing Working Group (AWG) was estab-
lished as a technical working group attached to the EPC.
The purpose of the AWG was to build the framework for
monitoring and assessing the budgetary impact of ageing
populations. This framework included a first set of long-
term budgetary projections which took place in 2001 and
covered pension and healthcare expenditures (1). The
exercise was completed in 2003, when additional age-
related expenditures (education and unemployment trans-
fers) were added. This meant that, by the end of 2003,
long-term budgetary projections for EU-15 Member
States covered around two thirds of primary expendi-
tures (2). The projections were based on national quantita-
tive models for pension expenditures and common meth-
odologies for the other budgetary items. To project these
items, an agreed demographic scenario prepared by Euro-
stat and agreed macroeconomic assumptions were used.
The harmonised projections were based on consistent
assumptions across countries in terms of GDP and
demographic developments. However, the national
models used to produce pension projections remain to a
great extent unknown at EU level (see Section 3.2.3).
Comparability has also been reduced by subsequent revi-
sions of the national projections taking place without
peer reviews within the AWG.
In addition, the AWG became the forum to discuss meth-
odological aspects for the assessment of long-term sus-
tainability of public finances. An ex post evaluation of
the exercise from a methodological point of view has
allowed regular improvements in the methodology.
3.2.2. The annual assessment
The Stockholm European Council of March 2001 agreed
that ‘the Council should regularly review the long-term
sustainability of public finances, including the expected
strains caused by the demographic changes ahead. This
should be done both according to the broad economic
policy guidelines (BEPGs) and in the context of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes’. This has been
implemented by carrying out annual reviews of sustain-
ability in the context of the updated stability and conver-
gence programmes and including a summary assessment
in the BEPG implementation report.
The annual assessment has helped maintain political
pressure for structural reforms (in particular in the field
of pensions) and on running down debt (3). The pressure
has increased over the years given the higher relevance
devoted to the assessment of long-term sustainability in
both the technical Commission documents and the
Council opinions. While in the first two rounds of
assessment, sustainability analysis was presented as an
annex to the main Commission technical document, it
became part of the core assessment in the following
rounds.
However, the annual assessment has some drawbacks.
Because of timing and space limitations, it keeps the
analysis fairly general and based on few indicators. This
has raised some criticism and the issue of a possible need
for a more in-depth assessment of underlying budgetary
risks. As the long-term budgetary projections are not
updated every year, and as major reforms generally take
place rather infrequently, only very limited changes in
the assessment of public finance sustainability can be
expected from one year to the next.
3.2.3. The input data
Input data in the sustainability analysis are a key concern
to produce reliable estimations of sustainability risks.
Three types of input are necessary to perform the analy-
sis:
• the budgetary profile for the medium term;
• the long-term budgetary projections;
• the long-term macroeconomic assumptions.
¥1∂ See Economic Policy Committee (2001).
¥2∂ For the methodology applied to project education expenditures, see Mon-
tanino et al. (2004). For an overall view of the budgetary projections, see
Economic Policy Committee (2003). 
¥3∂ Pension reforms have taken place in a number of countries since 2001
(Germany, France, Italy and Austria) while other countries (notably Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) have aimed at running down
the debt. In other cases (such as Belgium, Spain and Ireland), Member
States have started accumulating reserve funds to deal with the ageing
problem in the future. 128
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Member States in their updated stability or conver-
gence programmes. This information includes primary
expenditures and total revenues, interest payments,
debt ratio and the stock-flow component, one-off meas-
ures with budgetary impact, and the cyclical compo-
nent of the budget balance. The main advantage of
using such data is that the sustainability analysis incor-
porates the planned policies for the medium term, mak-
ing it fully consistent with the overall strategy of the
government.
However, the medium-term scenario planned by govern-
ments in their updated programmes has in a number of
cases been fairly optimistic, underestimating sustainabil-
ity risks (see Part II, Section 2.1). The Commission serv-
ices therefore also analyse a scenario that assumes no
consolidation in the medium term (see Part I, Chapter 4).
Long-term budgetary projections and macroeconomic
assumptions may either come from a national source or
be the result of common projections carried out at EU
level. The sustainability analysis uses both sources.
Table II.5 shows the source of budgetary projections for
pensions (either national or EPC) used in the sustainabil-
ity analyses for EU-15 Member States. In most cases, the
common pension projections of 2001 are not used. This
is mainly because national projections are considered to
be more updated and more detailed on the country-spe-
cific pension systems.
Box II.4: Sustainability analysis carried out by the IMF
Sustainability analysis is carried out by the IMF under the Article IV reports. The standard template considers a five-year
horizon where debt dynamics are assessed (1). However, for industrialised countries, this standard approach is modified
somewhat to include the risks associated with ageing populations. The framework applied to EU countries consists of
three main elements. First, a baseline scenario for the public debt dynamics is defined, which includes estimates of age-
related expenditure trends provided either by the Member State or by the IMF staff. The main macroeconomic assump-
tions are set by the IMF staff. Projections are generally carried out up to 2050. Second, on the basis of this scenario, a
series of sensitivity tests is applied. The sensitivity tests mainly include macroeconomic shocks to GDP growth and real
interest rates (risks associated with exchange rates are of limited relevance in EMU). These sensitivity tests provide differ-
ent scenarios for the debt dynamics over the long term. Third, a judgment of the resulting debt dynamics under the base-
line and alternative scenarios is made. The interpretation of the debt ratio tries to answer the following questions: (i) Is the
debt ratio, either along the path or at the end of the horizon, so high that the country is vulnerable to a crisis? (ii) Can the
country plausibly generate and maintain the primary surpluses required over the medium term to at least stabilise the debt
ratio? (iii) Are the gross financing needs required along the path so large that the country may run into a funding crisis?
Clearly, the answers to these questions need to take into consideration the country-specific context and therefore a good
deal of judgment is needed. This is particularly true for EU countries, where crises are not associated with levels of public
debt similar to those of emerging countries and thus past crises cannot be used as a benchmark for assessing sustainability
risks (2).
Overall, the IMF’s and the Commission’s approaches are similar. Both are based on the public debt dynamics over the
long term, which includes estimates of age-related expenditures and some judgment of the sustainability risks associated
with the results. However, some differences should be underlined. First, the Commission produces sustainability analysis
for all EU countries on a regular basis, i.e. following the yearly submission of updated stability or convergence pro-
grammes, while the IMF covers around half of the countries on a regular basis. A second difference is the design of the
sensitivity tests. The Commission produces tests for an alternative medium-term scenario and higher (nominal and) real
interest rates, while the IMF tests real interest rates and GDP growth (and, if relevant, exchange rate shocks). Third, the
Commission publishes synthetic indicators (sustainability gaps and the required primary balance) to make more explicit
the budgetary effort needed to reach sustainable positions.
In terms of input, both institutions rely on national projections, although the Commission also uses some harmonised pro-
jections for education and unemployment transfers. It should be noted that the Commission will use harmonised projec-
tions for age-related expenditures and macroeconomic variables once updated projections are produced by the Economic
Policy Committee.
(1) The main references for the methodology used by the IMF are IMF (2002) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.htm
and IMF (2003) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sustain/2003/061003.htm.
(2) IMF (2003) reports that more than half of the sovereign debt crises have occurred at public (or external) debt ratios of below 40 % of GDP.129
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eral surveillance provides a regular update of the com-
mon projections. However, detailed information regard-
ing the differences between the national and common
projections is frequently lacking, making an analysis
based on the national projections more difficult. As illus-
trated in Table II.6, the future changes in pension expen-
ditures as reported in the updated stability programmes
are in a number of cases quite different from the 2001
EPC projections. Still, very little or no information is
available to explain and thus exert multilateral surveil-
lance with regard to these differences. Possible explana-
tions include different underlying assumptions on macr-
oeconomic variables or demographic trends, different
assumptions on agents’ behaviour, new reforms, or a
revision of actual data on pension expenditure.
National projections are also in a better position to incor-
porate relevant country-specific detail. In addition, com-
mon projections are normally not run every year because
of the complexity of setting the common framework.
In general, common projections still fit better with the
need of multilateral surveillance as they facilitate the
Commission’s and the Council’s interpretation of the
results. As there is, in principle, full transparency regard-
ing the methodology and the underlying assumptions,
the results are easy to compare across Member States.
Long-term macroeconomic and demographic assump-
tions must be coherent with budgetary projections. If
the latter incorporate national scenarios which are dif-
ferent from the common assumptions, this must be
explicitly spelled out and information should be pro-
vided in order to facilitate multilateral surveillance.
However, the use of national scenarios may risk pro-
viding long-term assumptions that are not consistent
with one another. This could go against expectations of
some convergence among EU countries as regards
labour productivity growth rates, life expectancy, and
interest rates on public debt.
3.2.4. Debt projections
As mentioned in Section 3.2, a country is often consid-
ered to be in an unsustainable situation if the debt-to-
GDP ratio reaches a level beyond which the country
faces difficulties in issuing new debt (1). Since this
maximum level of debt is not measurable ex ante, sus-
tainability is measured looking at the dynamics over
time, in particular whether debt is stable, declining or
increasing (2).
¥1∂ See Blanchard (1984). 
¥2∂ See Perotti et al. (1997). 
Table II.5
The source of pension expenditure projections in the sustainability analysis
2001 2002 2003 2004
BE National National National National
DK National National National National
DE EPC National National National
EL EPC National National National
ES National National National National
FR EPC EPC National National
IE EPC EPC EPC EPC
IT EPC National National National
LU EPC EPC EPC EPC
NL National National National National
AT EPC National National National
PT EPC National National National
FI National National National National
SE National National National National
UK National National National National
Sources: EPC, national stability and convergence programmes and European Commission technical assessments.130
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gross debt dynamics over the long term (1). This requires
the estimated trends of age-related expenditures (pen-
sion, healthcare, education, long-term care and unem-
ployment transfer). Such long-term debt projections take
account of future obligations that are not necessarily
backed by law but are very likely to translate into actual
government expenditure. These are often referred to as
implicit liabilities (2). While implicit liabilities are
highly relevant to sustainability analysis, their definition
and measurement are in general not straightforward (see
Box II.5).
In the first two waves of assessment (2001 and 2002), the
budgetary position of the last year of the programme was
measured in nominal terms (not adjusted for the cycle).
This implied that temporary budgetary effects due to the
cycle or to one-off measures were assumed constant over
time. In the subsequent rounds of assessment, the way
debt is projected has been modified to better take into
account the underlying budgetary position. Since the
2003 assessment, the budgetary figures have been cor-
rected for the cycle and in the 2004 assessment they were
also corrected for one-off measures. Below-the-line
operations which affect the debt have, on the other hand,
always been included in the medium-term debt develop-
ment and from the first year of projection onwards a zero
stock-flow adjustment has been assumed.
The revenue-to-GDP ratio and ratio of other primary
expenditures to GDP are in general held constant over
the projection period. However, projections of national
revenue dynamics based on legislation already in place
are taken into account. This largely concerns deferred
tax revenues from contributions to funded pension sys-
tems as well as accumulated earnings prior to disburse-
ment (3).
The definition of debt
For the assessment of sustainability, different definitions
of public debt can be envisaged. The definition also
depends on statistical conventions. The debt concept
used by the Commission, Maastricht gross debt, is
defined in the protocol on deficit and debt to the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Although gross debt is only a partial indi-
cator of sustainability, the concept entails the advantage
of being measurable with a high degree of certainty and
being comparable across countries in the EU and across
time. The choice of focusing on gross debt keeps the
analysis simple and transparent while giving enough
information on sustainability risks.
However, it has been argued that governments may hold
assets which might guarantee the sustainability of public
finances even at a very high level of outstanding gross
debt, or they may decide to use budget surpluses to accu-
mulate assets instead of repaying the stock of gross debt.
In those cases, the gross debt ratio may not decline or
decline at a slower pace without signalling a deteriora-
tion in sustainability.
To remedy this, an adjusted gross debt measure was used
for several countries in the 2004 assessment round. This
elaboration of the Maastricht gross debt measure takes
into account the financial position of public pension
funds, in particular those funds that are established and/
or legislated with a strict purpose of using them only to
cover the future pension-related public expenditures (see
Box II.6).
Synthetic indicators
On the basis of the debt dynamics, three synthetic indi-
cators of the so-called sustainability gaps have been cal-
culated in the 2004 round of assessments.
S1 indicates the difference between the constant tax ratio
required to reach a debt ratio in 2050 of 60 % of GDP
and the current tax ratio. If the difference is positive, the
Member State concerned is not able to ensure respect of
the 60 % reference value over the very long run on the
basis of the current policy. An increase in the primary
balance is therefore required. However, even a zero or
negative value of this indicator does not ensure sustain-
ability after 2050 since debt dynamics can be on an
explosive path. The intertemporal budget constraint may
then not be respected.
¥1∂ See European Commission (2002a) for the way public debt is projected.
¥2∂ See European Commission (2004a). 
¥3∂ In Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, projected tax revenues vary as
they can largely be attributed to the deferred tax revenues from contribu-
tions to funded pension systems as well as accumulated earnings prior to
disbursement. For Germany, the projected rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio
was additionally influenced by the path of social security contributions
which follows the laws that govern the social security system resulting
from unchanged legislation including the ‘pension insurance sustainability
law’. In the countries that implemented systemic reforms of pension sys-
tems, total revenue projections were adjusted for the expected dynamics in
the pension contributions to the funded pillar (Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia), in order to ensure consistency with the public pension expenditure
projections where such delimitation was made available. Changes in non-
age-related expenditures over time were incorporated only in the UK, as
several transfer payments from the government are indexed to inflation
and should therefore fall in relation to GDP.131
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constraint. It indicates the change in the tax ratio that
would equate the present discounted value of future pri-
mary balances to the current stock of gross debt (Blan-
chard, 1990). Given the government intertemporal
budget constraint, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio
is a reflection of (i) the inheritance from the past, in the
form of the product of the ratio of accumulated debt to
GDP times the difference between the real interest rates
and the growth rate, and of (ii) the current spending pol-
icies, in the form of a primary balance.
The value of the S2 indicator depends on the differential
between the interest rate and the growth rate, i.e. on the
discount factor, the level and the profile of age- and non-
age-related expenditures, the current stock of gross debt
and the current tax-to-GDP ratio (1).
The indicators S1 and S2 both have a long-term char-
acter. Thus, while the size of the two indicators points
to the required magnitude of change in the tax policy
if the respective sustainability conditions are to be ful-
filled at some point, their informational content with
regard to the short- to medium-term policy-making
may be limited.
The required primary balance (RPB) is an indicator with
a medium-term focus that has been introduced to trans-
late the messages of the S2 indicator into requirements
for medium-term policy-making. Calculated on the basis
of the fulfilled sustainability condition for the indicator
S2, the RPB indicates the average required primary bal-
ance to be maintained over the first five years of projec-
tions after the end of the programme period.
The time profile of the RPB is negatively correlated to
the projected dynamics of the age-related expenditures.
Given a previously set tax rate that would ensure sustain-
ability and assuming an increasing path of the age-
related expenditures, the RPB time profile will be down-
ward sloping. The steeper the time profile, the higher the
¥1∂ In more practical terms, as an assumption during the calculation of the
indicator, the interest rate growth differential is positive.
Table II.6
Change in government expenditure on pensions over the period 2005–50 
(% of GDP)
EPC 2001 2001 update (1) 2002 update 2003 update 2004 update
Difference between 
2004 update and 
EPC 2001
BE 3.8 3.9 2.9 3.7 4.0 0.2
DK 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.3 3.0 1.0
DE 5.5 4.8 5.4 3.9 2.7 – 2.8
EL 12.4 9.8 10.2 10.2 10.2 – 2.2
ES 8.2 8.3 5.1 5.1 5.1 – 3.1
FR (2) 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.2 2.2 – 1.4
IE 4.5 4.5 3.9 3.8 3.8 – 0.7
IT 0.3 – 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0
LU 1.9 : 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.0
NL 5.3 5.3 3.6 3.7 3.3 – 2.0
AT 2.5 0.7 1.8 0.4 – 0.6 – 3.1
PT 2.5 4.4 2.3 1.2
FI 5.0 5.1 3.1 3.2 3.6 – 1.4
SE 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.1 0.9 – 0.5
UK – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.5
EU-15 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.4 2.2 – 1.1
(1) The starting year for Greece, Spain and Portugal is 2000 instead of 2005.
(2) The projections end in 2040.
Sources: Economic Policy Committee (2001), Commission services’ technical assessments of the stability and convergence programmes and Commission services’ 
calculations.132
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ing. Thus, the change in the policy needs to be more sub-
stantial in the Member States that are projecting a higher
increase in the age-related expenditures in the period.
The evolution of sustainability indicators across 
different rounds of assessments
During the different rounds of assessments, these indica-
tors have developed over time to better summarise sus-
tainability risks in the EU context. Table II.7 presents the
methodological evolution of these indicators. In the first
three rounds of assessments (from 2001 to 2003), the
main indicator was the so-called T1 (in 2003 renamed
S1), which was based on the SGP requirement of keep-
ing a close-to-balance or in-surplus budgetary position
every year up to 2050 (1). Clearly, this indicator leads to
a convergence towards zero of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Despite the fact that low levels of debt reduce the vulner-
ability of public finances and risks of big policy changes
to correct imbalances, a zero debt ratio may even be
counterproductive (2). Therefore, the policy advice
derived from this indicator may imply a more restrictive
budgetary policy relative to what would be needed to
ensure sustainability over time.
In addition, this indicator would lead to a stricter policy
than what is envisaged in the SGP, targeting a debt-to-
GDP ratio clearly below the Maastricht ceiling of 60 %.
The debt ratio in 2050 according to the T1 indicator (S1
in 2003) was for all countries far below the Treaty
threshold. In 2004, the AWG and the Commission there-
fore replaced this indicator with the new S1 which
explicitly includes the reference value for debt in the
long term.
The 2002 assessment also included an indicator called
T2 (see Table II.7 for an explanation). Experience
showed that this indicator did not add additional infor-
mation to that already available with the other two indi-
cators (renamed S1 and S2 in 2003). Thus, it has been
decided to discontinue its use.
Three lessons are derived from an evaluation of the use
of the sustainability indicators.
First, there is a clear need to translate the results of the
long-term indicators into short-term policy. The indica-
tion of a medium-term requirement to respect a sustain-
able path may help the conduct of economic policies.
Second, attention should be focused on the sign of the
indicators and their magnitude, not the exact value. The
sign gives information on whether a budgetary consoli-
dation is needed to cope with sustainability risks, while
the magnitude indicates whether a budgetary consolida-
tion is feasible or whether large structural reforms are
indispensable (3). The exact value of the indicator is
clearly highly sensitive to the underlying debt projec-
tions and, for what concern the S2, to the applied dis-
count factor.
Third, once correctly interpreted for their sign and mag-
nitude and not for their exact value, the two long-term
indicators S1 and S2 give broadly the same message.
Currently, the sustainability analysis provided by the
Commission presents six sustainability indicators for
¥1∂ See European Commission (2002a) for an explanation of the T1 indicator.
¥2∂ Bishop (2003) argues that government debt plays a role in determining the
structure of interest rates and it is also a risk-free investment for families
and pension funds. 
¥3∂ Clearly, the feasibility of a fiscal adjustment depends on the initial level of
revenues. Countries with a low level of revenue-to-GDP ratios may con-
sider it feasible to adjust on the revenue side because this may have a lim-
ited impact on the allocation of factors.
Box II.5: Different measures of implicit liabilities
A key factor for governments’ expected future expenditure commitments is the projected demographic change. In most
Member States, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to double over the coming decades (see, for example, Economic
Policy Committee, 2001, and Heller, 2004). Implicit liabilities linked to the projected demographic change have therefore
been given special attention and are an integral part of the EU’s multilateral budgetary surveillance. However, countries
also face other long-run budgetary risks, for example contingent liabilities in the form of bail-outs of insolvent companies,
disaster relief or climate change. One possibility would thus be to add implicit liabilities to the explicit liabilities or debt
(e.g. Wyplosz, 2004).
(Continued on the next page)133
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Pension debt arises in PAYG pension schemes when current liabilities are not met by current contributions. This could
result from a rise in the old-age dependency ratio while at the same time contributions to and disbursements from the pen-
sion scheme are kept unchanged. Franco et al. (2005) distinguish between three different definitions of pension liabilities:
accrued-to-date liabilities include the present value of pensions to be paid in the future on the basis of accrued rights. Nei-
ther the future contributions of existing workers nor their accrual of new rights are considered; current workers’ and pen-
sioners’ net liabilities also include the present value of both the future contributions of existing members and their new
rights; open-system net liabilities also include the present value of future contributions and pensions of new workers under
current rules. One can choose to include only children born, but not yet in the labour force, or to use an infinite perspective.
Among these three definitions, only accrued-to-date liabilities — or pension debt — could be linked to conventional
explicit public debt. The other two definitions are only potential liabilities, while explicit debt is backward-looking.
There are several different possibilities to measure accrued implicit pension debt, ranging from leaving the SNA
unchanged to including all unfunded pension obligations as liabilities. These issues are being discussed in the current
review of the system of national accounts (SNA) and the European system of accounts (ESA) (1). The latter approach could
very significantly change the government finance position compared with the current methodology (2). Moreover, there
may be considerable measurement problems involved, such as delimitations of expenditure and revenue linked to pension
obligations and its implications for discounting such future flows, which could compromise the reliability and usefulness
of the government accounts. In this context it should be borne in mind that the multilateral budgetary surveillance in the
EU, and in particular in the euro area, is based on the national accounts and the government finance statistics according to
ESA. Changes in the compilation of government finance statistics might therefore require a review of the budgetary sur-
veillance framework in the EU and in particular in the euro area.
In addition, pension debt is a rather different concept from conventional explicit debt: (i) the maturity and principal of pen-
sion debt are uncertain; (ii) pension rights are not always embodied in formal contracts; (iii) pension rights are not tradable
and therefore do not exert any direct pressure on financial markets.
An alternative possibility to acquire estimates of pension debt in the SNA/ESA framework could be to introduce such esti-
mates as a compulsory memorandum item or as specific satellite accounts. Such an approach would have the advantage of
leaving the national accounts unchanged, while at the same time providing important additional information. In addition,
the measurement problems involved would be kept separate from the government accounts.
The Commission services’ current approach to measuring implicit liabilities is to project expenditures over the long run,
given a demographic scenario. This means a flow concept is used, instead of an estimate of the stock of implicit liabilities.
This approach may be better suited to providing useful policy-relevant input for the purposes of assessing the fiscal position
over the long term. It takes the explicit debt and deficit situation of the country as the starting point and, on the basis of the
projected expenditures and revenues over the long run, extrapolates the evolution of deficit and debt for a given demo-
graphic scenario. In this sense, the analysis takes implicit liabilities into account from two strands: (i) the impact of accrued
pension rights, as well as other welfare payments, or provisions; (ii) the impact of projected future welfare payments. The
Ageing Working Group attached to the Economic Policy Committee has stated a preference for the flow approach as a
measure of the stock of implicit pension liabilities since it is (i) a narrower concept, as it does not include other age-related
expenditure items, and (ii) is very sensitive to starting conditions and underlying assumptions (3).
Nevertheless, estimates of implicit pension liabilities, for example in the form of calculating these as memorandum items
of satellite accounts in the SNA/ESA framework, can provide useful insights for other purposes. For example, they can be
used to provide an estimate of shifting implicit liabilities to explicit liabilities. This would contribute to raising awareness
of future fiscal obligations.
¥1∂ See the electronic discussion forum ‘The treatment of pension schemes in macroeconomic statistics’ set up by the IMF at the request of the Intersecre-
tariat Working Group on National Accounts (ISWGNA) (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ueps/index.htm).
¥2∂ Boskin et al. (1987) note that, referring to the United States, ‘moving all of the economic and demographic projections from intermediate to optimistic
or pessimistic [assumptions] results in a change which is larger than the privately held national debt’. 
¥3∂ Economic Policy Committee (2003).134
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scenarios — see Part I, Chapter 4). It may be considered
whether a reduction of the indicators may increase clar-
ity in the sustainability analysis.
Sensitivity tests
Debt developments are extrapolated up to 2050 under two
different scenarios. Under a baseline or programme sce-
nario, the starting position in terms of the underlying bal-
ance, level of debt, primary spending and tax revenues (all
expressed as percentages of GDP) corresponds to the final
year of the period covered by an update of the stability or
convergence programme. In order to fully consider the
impact of current budgetary policies on long-term sustain-
ability, the underlying balance is calculated net of the
cyclical component and one-off measures.  
This baseline scenario assumes that Member States actu-
ally achieve the budgetary targets (for the final year) set
in their programmes. However, such an outcome is by no
means assured. In order to assess the importance of the
medium-term consolidation process for the achievement
of long-term sustainability, an alternative scenario is run.
In this scenario, debt levels are extrapolated for the
period between the year in which the update was submit-
ted and 2050, assuming that no budgetary consolidation
is achieved. This means that the underlying primary bal-
ance in the last year of the programme period remains at
the same level as in the starting year and no stock-flow
operations take place.
In addition, a sensitivity test on interest rates has been
introduced for both scenarios. This is done by running
debt projections assuming an interest rate that is 50 basis
points higher throughout the projection period.
Qualitative considerations
Most, but not all, information regarding long-term sus-
tainability of public finances can be quantified. Besides,
the quantitative sustainability indicators should not be
interpreted in a mechanical manner. Table II.8 summa-
rises the various types of qualitative information used by
the Commission in reaching its policy recommendations.
For example, several Member States are implementing
structural reforms, in particular in the fields of pensions
and healthcare. While this is reflected in the quantitative
indicators through the country-specific budgetary pro-
jections of age-related expenditures, qualitative informa-
tion and analysis regarding the reform strategy and
implementation should also be considered. In this con-
text, the overall analysis is enriched with qualitative con-
siderations, which include an assessment of relevant
strategies/reforms and points to the risks that could jeop-
ardise their implementation and therefore their projected
benefits.
Such an approach also contributes to an evaluation of
whether the government strategy is sufficient to achieve
the medium-term policy objectives regarding govern-
ment balances, debt and, where relevant, planned imple-
mentation of structural reforms. In addition, it ensures
continuity in the qualitative assessments of the strategy,
and allows for a consistent and comprehensive analysis
as regards the changes in quantitative indicators over
time.
3.3. An EU-wide perspective of long-term 
sustainability of public finances
Sustainability concerns differ widely across EU coun-
tries. Focusing on the EU-15, Graph II.18 plots debt
dynamics in the EU-15 from the mid-1970s onwards,
including the projected path under the different rounds
of assessments. It also plots the old-age dependency ratio
over the same period (people aged 65 or more as a share
of people aged 15 to 64). All variables are indexed
(1977 = 100). As shown, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s, debt increased much faster than the old-age
dependency ratio, suggesting that demographic change
was not the main explanation for the increase in debt. In
fact, the old-age dependency ratio increased by around
10 % while the debt ratio increased by around 70 % dur-
ing that period. The debt ratio then declined somewhat in
the run-up to joining the euro for most of the EU-15
countries. For the coming decades, debt dynamics are
forecast to be less pronounced than the old-age depend-
ency ratio dynamics in all the baseline scenarios. Debt
dynamics are, on the other hand, more pronounced in the
alternative scenario, in which the planned budgetary
consolidation does not take place.
At country level, three main issues are relevant in the
context of the results of the sustainability analysis.
(i) Are public finances sustainable?
(ii) Do the budgetary measures in the programme
improve sustainability?
(iii) What are the key policy challenges?135
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Several Member States have established funds with a strict purpose of covering pension-related expenditure. Accumulating
financial assets has a similar effect on sustainability as reducing debt. In the assessment round of the 2004/05 updated sta-
bility and convergence programmes, the Commission services adjusted gross (i.e. Maastricht) debt by taking into account
certain financial assets when assessing the sustainability of public finances. In order to make this adjustment, three issues
need to be addressed: (i) which assets should be considered; (ii) which funds should be considered; (iii) how to distinguish
between national government bonds and other bonds.
In principle, all assets held by governments contribute to easing the pressure on the public finances in the longer term. For
some financial assets, such as shares in non-floated public enterprises, it may not be straightforward to determine their cur-
rent value or they may not be considered liquid. This is one reason why the adjusted gross debt concept used does not
include all assets. First, only currencies, deposits and tradable securities for which a market value can be determined are
considered as liquid assets. Second, public pension fund assets that are established or legislated with a strict purpose of
covering pension-related expenditure are included and not fund assets accumulated for other purposes. In principle, dedi-
cated pension funds should not be used for any other purpose and therefore explicitly ease the budgetary impact of ageing.
The sectoral delimitation within general government of pension fund assets is not uniform across Member States and a
case-by-case approach was followed to include all the relevant assets. Third, in order to avoid double-counting, the con-
solidated financial balance sheet is used, in which national government bonds have already been netted out when calculat-
ing gross debt. 
Some countries have chosen to accumulate liquid assets in public pension funds, and for these this adjustment had a con-
siderable impact (see Graph II.17). This is particularly true for Finland, Sweden and Denmark, where the accumulation of
funds has taken place for many years. Other countries have started accumulating funds recently, and in the Spanish case
the fund has only a small fraction in assets other than national government bonds, which are already netted out in the Maas-
tricht gross debt measure. At the EU aggregate level, the differences between the debt definitions are small, reflecting that
asset accumulation predominantly takes place in small Member States. Maastricht gross debt in 2004 in the EU-25 was
63.9 % of GDP, dropping to 62.2 % when looking at adjusted gross debt.
(Continued on the next page)
Graph II.17: Maastricht gross debt and adjusted gross debt, 2004
Source: 2004 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
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EU-15 Member States across rounds is provided in
Table II.9 (1). As can be seen, the assessments have
shown a high degree of stability in the judgment across
years for half of the EU-15 countries (i.e. Denmark,
Greece, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and Swe-
den). In some of these countries, reforms and/or a budg-
etary strategy to cope with budgetary pressures were
already implemented several years ago, while, in others,
such actions have yet to be taken.  
In the other half of the countries, some improvement can
also be observed.
Table II.9 essentially reflects the judgment of the Coun-
cil expressed in its opinion on the stability and conver-
gence programmes. The Council opinion implies judg-
ment on the likely future developments of the budgetary
Box II.6 (continued)
Table II.7
The evolution of the indicators in the Commission’s sustainability analysis
2001 2002 2003 2004
T1 (the difference between the 
current tax ratio and the constant 
tax ratio required to reach the 
same debt level in 2050 that 
would result from a balanced 
budget position over the entire 
projection period)
T1 (same as T1 in 2001) S1 (same as T1 in 2001 and 2002) S1 (the difference between the 
current tax ratio and the constant 
tax ratio required to reach a debt-
to-GDP ratio of 60 % in 2050)
T2 (the difference between the 
current tax ratio and the constant 
tax ratio required to reach a debt 
level of 40 % of GDP in 2050)
T3 (the change in the revenue-to-
GDP ratio that would guarantee 
respect of the intertemporal 
budget constraint)
S2 (same as T3 in 2002) S2 (same as T3 in 2002)
RPB (the average required primary 
balance in the first five years of 
projections needed to respect the 
intertemporal budget constraint) 
Source: Commission services.
Looking ahead, a review of the concept of adjusted gross debt could be considered. First, Eurostat’s decision of 2 March 2004
on the classification of pension schemes implies that funded defined-contribution pension schemes should be classified
outside government. The argument is that pensions to be paid depend on financial market developments (and on house-
holds’ investment choices), not on government decisions. According to Eurostat’s decision of 23 September 2004, Member
States are required to implement this by March 2007 at the latest. In the Swedish and Danish cases, this will in all likelihood
involve a reclassification of a part of their funds outside government. This will imply an upward revision of both Maastricht
gross debt and adjusted gross debt. The public pension projections would then, for reasons of consistency, need to be
adjusted downwards. Second, all liquid assets for which a market value can be determined when making the adjustment
could be considered. While public pension fund assets that are established or legislated with a strict purpose of covering
pension-related expenditure explicitly ease the budgetary impact of ageing, assets accumulated for other purposes also con-
tribute to reducing the net debt position. The issue of establishing a value would be feasible with the restrictions currently
used, i.e. liquid assets for which a market value can be determined. 
¥1∂ With regard to the assessment of the 2004 round of stability and convergence
programmes, these issues are analysed in Part I, Chapter 4, of this report.137
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5Table II.8
Qualitative factors taken on board by the Commission in reaching policy recommendations 
on the sustainability of public finances
Area Specific issue Concern about  
sustainability Explanation
Public debt High level of 
outstanding public debt 
well above 60 % of GDP 
reference value
Increases Vulnerability to negative interest rate shocks, and a deterioration 
in the underlying budget balance could lead to a more rapid 
accumulation of public debt.     
A higher-than-average primary surplus required for several 
decades which in practice may be hard to achieve given 
competing budgetary pressures.
Low debt levels Decreases Reverse of explanations above.
Debt-increasing 
financial operations 
(e.g. contingent 
liabilities)
Increases Large positive stock-flow adjustments linked to debt-increasing 
financial operations.     
Particularly relevant in MS where debt reduction is central to 
meeting the budgetary costs of ageing.
Budget balance One-off budgetary 
operations
Increases Only a transitory improvement in the budget balance and debt 
reduction. Measures of a structural nature required for a 
permanent improvement. 
Contribution to pension 
reserve funds and other 
budget reserves 
Decreases if large but 
no effect if small
Contributions to pension reserve fund may be recorded as 
current expenditure and thus increase the recorded deficit level; 
hence, the positive contribution of contributions to pension 
reserve funds to the sustainability of public finances needs to be 
taken on board. 
Robustness of age-
related expenditure 
projections
Sensitivity of projections 
to key parameters
Increases High sensitivity of results to demographic factors, indexation 
rules and numbers of cross-border workers.     
An appreciation of risk factors complements  the analysis of 
projected changes in public expenditure.
Underlying 
assumptions
Increases Earlier cut-off dates than 2050 may underestimate budgetary 
impact as effects of baby-boom generation on population size 
and age structure may not have peaked.    
Projections in some cases are based on assumptions of large 
increases in labour force participation rates. While in line with 
the upper limit of the AWG, increases of this magnitude may 
require additional policy measures to be taken.  
Tax ratio High tax ratio Increases The viability and desirability of high tax ratios (e.g. above 50 % 
of GDP) over the long term may be affected by increased factor 
mobility affecting tax bases. Also, some governments have the 
stated objective of lowering the tax burden. The challenge is to 
do so while preserving sustainable public finance positions and 
adequate provision of public services.
Low tax ratio Decreases A low tax ratio provides a greater margin to raise taxes (if 
necessary) to meet increased age-related expenditures.
The impact of structural 
reforms
Pension/healthcare 
system reforms 
Decreases Efficient, effective and streamlined pension and healthcare 
systems contribute to reduction of the budgetary risks.
Risk of implicit 
contingent liabilities 
related to performance 
of private occupational 
schemes
Increases     
Limited for now
In some MS, the performance of overall pension system will be 
increasingly reliant on private occupational schemes and 
individual pension savings. Pressure for higher public spending 
could emerge (implicit contingent liability) if such schemes have 
insufficient coverage or fail to generate returns that secure an 
adequate-level retirement income.     
In countries where success of reforms partially depends on an 
effective regulatory and fiscal framework for private 
occupational and individual pension schemes, and thus allow 
citizens to supplement their retirement income.
Source: Commission services based on Economic Policy Committee (2003).138
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budgetary situation, and the overall framework including
considerations on the evolution of this framework in the
past and on its likely future developments, as based on
legislated reforms.
Most countries have implemented strategies to deal with
sustainability issues. Budgetary measures in the pro-
grammes presented in the last few years have tended to
improve sustainability to a great extent. The tax reforms
implemented in Germany (2001) and Italy (2004) are
exceptions as their first-round effects are direct budget-
ary costs that worsen sustainability. This may be coun-
teracted if the reforms entail higher potential growth
over time.
Denmark, Finland and Sweden began to prepare for the
impact of the ageing population earlier than other Euro-
pean countries. They have devised similar approaches to
the ageing challenge. In order to ensure long-term sus-
tainability and intergenerational fairness, the govern-
ments have started to accumulate assets specifically allo-
cated to financing future pension expenditure. These
three countries are also making similar attempts to
shrink future public expenditure through streamlining of
their social security systems (both pension and health-
care). This approach is likely to find followers from
other Member States. For instance, Belgium has adopted
a law aiming to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to
long-term sustainability when a government defines its
fiscal policy. The same law has set up a fund, financed
by means of budget surpluses, to help match the
increased expenditure on pensions during the period
2010–30. Early in 1999, Ireland had already decided to
reform its pension system in order to address the ageing
challenge, and a National Pensions Reserve Fund was
established. In 2004, a new regulation affecting the pen-
sions of the public sector was introduced. Spain already
has, or plans to set up, different initiatives to face the
challenge of the ageing population. Amongst them is the
accumulation of assets in specific funds to be allocated
to financing future public spending on pensions, and the
creation of a complementary pension scheme.
Not all Member States have pursued the strategy of set-
ting apart specific assets in order to absorb the impact of
the increased age-related expenditure. Germany pursues
a comprehensive approach including reform of the social
security system and reform to curb healthcare costs. In
addition, reform of the labour market should help tackle
Graph II.18: Old-age dependency ratio against different rounds of assessments
Source: Commission services.
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employment rate and productivity. The Federal Ministry
of Finance has announced its intention to submit a report
on the long-term sustainability of public finances, in
order to increase awareness and the credibility of its
commitment.
This sustainability report should present the most
recent reform measures, set out the need for further
action and identify starting points for prompt counter-
measures both in fiscal policy (e.g. continued consoli-
dation, greater emphasis on future-oriented tasks, sub-
sidy cuts, sustainable tax policy) and in other areas
such as the social security systems. The strategy of
France is also based on a two-pronged approach: (i) fis-
cal policy aimed at a reduction of the government debt
thus lowering debt service charges; (ii) structural
reform of the social security system (enacted in 2003
and planned to be reviewed in 2005) and of the health-
care system. The effectiveness of this approach has not
yet been proved as many difficulties have been encoun-
tered in making the foreseen reforms operational.
Italy’s approach aims to gain control of the two main
age-related items. To ensure effective control of health-
care spending, the government will fully implement the
State–regions agreement, which calls for the stabilisa-
tion of healthcare expenditure at 6 % of GDP. Meas-
ures to this end are included in the finance bill for 2003.
As for the social security system, pension reforms have
been put in place (last one in 2004) aiming to curb the
dynamics of the pension expenditure. The Netherlands
relies on reducing the level of government debt. How-
ever, this reduction has not yet taken place. In 2003,
Austria adopted a pension system reform that will
decrease the future burden on the government finances.
Similarly, advances towards improved sustainability
are expected from a higher rate of participation in the
labour market in the next few years.
The United Kingdom seems to be in a very special situ-
ation as the ageing of the population will only have a fee-
ble impact on the public finances. Together with the fact
that the government gross debt is among the lowest in the
EU, this places the UK in a comfortable situation to face
the ageing challenge. The UK government has neverthe-
less not neglected the issue. Since 2002, it has produced
the yearly ‘Long-term public finance report’ providing a
comprehensive analysis of long-term economic and
demographic developments, and their likely impact on
the public finances.
Table II.9
Assessment of the sustainability of public finances across the period 2001–04
Are public finances sustainable?
2001 2002 2003 2004
BE + + = =
DK + + + +
DE – – = =
EL – – – –
ES – – + +
FR – – – –
IE + + + +
IT – – – =
LU + + + +
NL + + = +
AT – – = +
PT – – =
FI + + + +
SE + + + +
UK + + = +
NB: Ratings have been attributed as follows: + for ‘appear to face limited risks’,  = for ‘risks cannot be ruled out’, – for ‘risk of emerging budgetary imbalances’.
Source: Commission services.140
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lacking a serious approach to the challenge of the ageing
population. Reforms already enacted or even planned are
clearly not sufficient to face the forthcoming burden.
The S2 indicator discussed above can be used to indicate
whether budgetary strategies can be considered suffi-
cient to ensure sustainability. The size of the indicator
indicates the scale of the budgetary effort required. One
can assume that a large permanent increase in the reve-
nue-to-GDP ratio to ensure sustainability over time may
prove to be unwarranted and unfeasible. In such cases, a
broad-based approach based both on budgetary consoli-
dation and reforms that aim at, for example, increasing
labour force participation rates or reducing the dynamics
of age-related expenditures is vital. For the 2004 assess-
ment round, Table II.10 shows for which countries sus-
tainability concerns may be tackled solely through a
budgetary consolidation strategy and for which countries
this seems unfeasible, given that the limit is set at 2 per-
centage points. To do so, the S2 indicator according to
both the 2004 scenario of non-consolidation and the
baseline scenario of consolidation was used.
Countries are divided into three categories (1): (i) lim-
ited sustainability problems (S2 equal to 0.5 or less);
(ii) a sustainability problem that can be tackled solely
through budgetary consolidation (S2 between 0.5 and 2);
(iii) cases where budgetary consolidation may not be
sufficient (S2 higher than 2).
Table II.10 indicates that there could be sustainability
risks in about half of the Member States in the 2004
scenario. Moreover, there could be sustainability risks in
about a third of the Member States even if the planned
budgetary consolidation in the medium term is achieved.
This suggests that in these cases more than a budgetary
consolidation strategy may be required.
Even countries in the first two columns of Table II.10
should, of course, implement structural reforms if judged
beneficial to the functioning of the economy at large.
The grouping is purely meant to illustrate the size of the
challenge to public finances.
It is important to recall that the purpose of debt extrapola-
tion is to signal possible imbalances on the basis of current
policies and projected age-related expenditure trends.
However, being a mechanical, partial equilibrium analy-
sis, projections are in some cases bound to show highly
accentuated profiles. As a consequence, the projected evo-
lution of debt levels is not a forecast of likely or even pos-
sible outcomes and should not be taken at face value.
Instead, the indicators are a tool to facilitate policy debate
and at best provide an indication of the timing and scale of
emerging budgetary challenges that could occur on the
basis of ‘no policy change’. Qualitative considerations are
therefore central in order to enrich the information pro-
vided by the sustainability indicators.
3.4. Are the results stable?
Sustainability indicators help in assessing budgetary
risks over the long term. They will change with major
structural changes, such as shifts in demographic or mac-
roeconomic trends or major reforms affecting perma-
nently government revenues and expenditures. Relevant
structural changes do not take place every year; thus, in
principle, quantitative indicators of sustainability should
be stable for several years.
Table II.10
Assessing sustainability according to the S2 indicator, 2004 assessment round
Small or negative S2 Positive but limited S2 Positive and high S2
2004 scenario (1) BE, DK, EE, AT, FI DE, ES, IE, HU, PL, SE CZ, EL, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, 
SI, SK, UK
Baseline scenario (2) BE, DK, DE, EE, IT, MT, AT, PL, FI ES, IE, HU, NL, SE, UK CZ, EL, FR, CY, LV, LT, LU, SI, SK 
(1) No budgetary consolidation over the medium term.
(2) Budgetary consolidation achieved as planned in the stability or convergence programme.
NB: Where applicable, the S2 indicator was calculated on the basis of adjusted gross debt.
Source: Commission services. 
¥1∂ The values distinguishing these categories are arbitrary and are used as an
illustration.141
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2050 under the programme scenario. The last two col-
umns show to what extent the outcomes are stable. Debt
levels in 2050 are very different across different rounds
of assessments in most countries, in several cases the
change is more than 100 percentage points of GDP from
one year to the next.
Attempts to explain these differences need to distinguish
between the sources from which they stem. A first expla-
nation is methodological. Slightly different approaches
have been used to determine the starting value of the pri-
mary balance. In the 2002 round of assessments, the
budgetary position of the last year of the programme was
measured in nominal terms, implying that temporary
budgetary effects due to the cycle or one-off measures
were projected over the time. In the 2003 round, the
budgetary figures were corrected for the cycle, while in
the 2004 round they were also corrected for the one-off
measures reported in the updated programmes.
The importance of these differences can be illustrated by
calculating the debt dynamics that one would have
obtained under the 2002 round of assessments if the pri-
mary balance had been calculated in underlying terms as
in the 2004 round.
The following step is to identify the main sources of the
difference in debt dynamics once the same methodology
is applied over the different rounds of assessments. To
this end, it is useful to group the non-methodological
factors in three different categories (see Graph II.19):
• the medium-term scenario, i.e. the debt ratio and the
underlying primary balance at the end of the pro-
gramme period;
• the long-term budgetary projections, in particular
age-related expenditures (pensions, healthcare, long-
term care, education and unemployment benefits);
• elements that affect the long-term macroeconomic
scenario, for example long-term economic growth,
interest rates on public debt and the GDP deflator.
To calculate the relative contribution of each of these
elements, the 2002 macroeconomic scenario, long-term
budgetary projections and medium-term scenario (up to
2010) have been substituted one by one with the corre-
Table II.11
Projection of the debt level in 2050 in the EU-15 across the long-term projection exercises 
on the basis of the programme scenario
2002 2003 2004 2003 versus 2002 2004 versus 2003
BE – 108 – 5 29 103 34
DK – 51 – 35 18 16 53
DE 89 176 23 87 – 153
EL 160 151 403 – 9 252
ES 89 37 56 – 52 19
FR 248 72 219 – 176 147
IE 220 105 81 – 115 – 24
IT – 38 – 28 – 6 10 22
LU 51 1 74 – 50 73
NL 99 140 154 41 14
AT 123 16 – 19 – 107 – 35
PT 107 – 42 181 – 149 223
FI (1) – 39 6 – 14 45 – 20
SE (1) – 35 47 60 82 13
UK 78 139 90 61 – 49
(1) Government debt net of financial assets.
Source: Commission services.142
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ments. However, in the 2002 round, long-term projec-
tions were based almost exclusively on information
about pension and healthcare expenditure, while in the
2004 round information on education and unemploy-
ment benefits was also included. Therefore, it is not pos-
sible to apply the different dynamics to each single item
of the overall age-related expenditure. The dynamics of
the overall total age-related expenditure of 2004 have
thus been applied to the 2002 exercise.
Changes due to new macroeconomic scenarios are in
general minimal, underlying that the scenario set up by
the Economic Policy Committee in 2001 has remained
fairly stable and has been widely used by Member States
in evaluating long-term budgetary trends (see interest
rate growth differential in Graph II.20). Most of the gap
is instead due to either revisions in the age-related
expenditure projections or different medium-term out-
comes. Revisions of the age-related expenditure projec-
tions have contributed negatively in more than half of the
countries, with Germany and Austria as the most notable
exceptions.
However, a significant role is also played by the
medium-term scenario. In the majority of the EU-15
countries, the medium-term scenario has been revised
downwards, showing a lower primary surplus (or a
higher primary deficit) in 2004 than planned two years
earlier. This revision leads to unstable debt projections
since debt dynamics are greatly influenced by the struc-
tural primary balance in the medium term. It seems that
the stability and convergence programmes of most coun-
tries tend to overestimate their structural balance in the
medium term. Since projections are based on the
medium-term scenario provided by the Member State in
its programme, this reduces the stability of the long-term
debt projections.
At country level, the decomposition shows some inter-
esting features. For instance, no reforms were adopted in
Greece between 2002 and 2004 and a worsening of the
short- to medium-term budgetary position has thus led to
a considerable worsening of its long-term sustainability
position. In France, the worsening over the assessments
is mainly due to the long-term age-related expenditure.
These results are quite surprising considering that France
adopted a pension reform in 2003 which, according to
the more recent estimate, should bring savings amount-
ing to at least 1 % of GDP. The explanation can be found
in Table II.12: an increase in healthcare and long-term
care expenditures more than offsets the benefits of the
pension reform (1). In Table II.12 projected expenditures
in 2050 on healthcare and long-term care are reported
together, for simplicity. It should, however, be noted that
they are distinct separate expenditure items and that a
country with a possible need to reform its healthcare sys-
tem does not necessarily need to reform its long-term
care system.
In the case of Italy, Graph II.20 shows a positive contri-
bution of the revision of age-related expenditure projec-
tions despite the fact that both pension and healthcare
expenditures have been revised upwards. The likely
explanation relates to the particular structure of the pen-
sion reform in Italy, where savings are foreseen between
the time of the application and 2050, while at around
2050 the pension expenditure should be higher than prior
to the reform (2).  
3.5. Possible avenues for improving 
the assessment of long-term public 
finance sustainability
As noted above, remarkable progress has been made in
the EU over the last few years in terms of sustainability
analysis. The Commission, the AWG and the EPC have
gained considerable experience in terms of long-term
budgetary projections and the analysis of the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. The quantitative indicators have
been improved and greater effort has been made to incor-
porate qualitative considerations in a systematic manner
in order to enrich the sustainability assessment. This has
successfully contributed to an increased policy focus on
safeguarding the sustainability of public finances.
However, the assessment of sustainability could be fur-
ther developed through a more in-depth analysis of the
different sustainability risks.
¥1∂ It should be noted that in the 2004 update of the French stability pro-
gramme an improved, broadened estimate of healthcare expenditures was
provided. Therefore, despite a healthcare reform in 2004 in France, health-
care spending rises more up to 2040 according to the 2004 update com-
pared with the 2003 update.
¥2∂ From the 2004 update of the stability programme of Italy: ‘Compared with
the previous 2003 update (which did not take into consideration the effects
of the recently approved reform), the current projections of pension
expenditure as a percentage of GDP will be significantly lower for about a
30-year period starting from 2009, with a saving of around 0.7 percentage
points from 2012 to 2020 and 0.6 from 2020 to 2035. Then, until the end
of the forecast period, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio will be 0.3 percentage
points higher than that presented in the 2003 stability programme update.’143
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2 0 0 5Graph II.19: Analysis of the source of the difference in the long-term debt dynamics indicator
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.20: Graphic illustration of the difference in the debt ratio in 2050 across rounds 
of assessment
Source: Commission services.
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In order to have a comparable view of the long-term budg-
etary trends across EU Member States, it is crucial that
they have been calculated on the basis of commonly agreed
coverage, methodology and underlying assumptions. Fur-
thermore, information on how the long-term budgetary
trends are affected by changes in the underlying assump-
tions provides valuable insights into their sensitivity.
Based on the results of the common budgetary projection
exercise expected to be finalised at the end of 2005, a
comprehensive assessment of sustainability could be
made. Such an analysis concerning long-term issues
should remain valid for some time. This may imply an
in-depth assessment every three years.
At the same time, an annual update of the assessment in
the context of the stability and convergence programmes
may consider possible new information available and the
impact of short- to medium-term budgetary develop-
ments on sustainability.
3.5.2. A comprehensive assessment 
of possible risks to sustainability
The sustainability analysis based on debt projections
over the long term would benefit from additional sensi-
tivity tests in order to better highlight policy challenges
that a country may be facing.
In addition to the currently used budgetary ‘non-consol-
idation’ scenario, the impact of modifying long-term
macroeconomic assumptions (e.g. long-term growth,
employment, productivity) as well as budgetary projec-
tions (e.g. age-related expenditures) could add important
insights into possible sustainability risks.
3.5.3. Assessing the impact of structural reforms
A distinction needs to be made between reforms that
improve public finances by affecting directly the current
and future stream of government revenues and expendi-
tures (e.g. pension reforms) and those reforms whose
impact on public finances is mainly indirect, via
improved potential output.
The distinction between reforms having mainly a direct
or indirect impact on public finances is crucial with
regard to the methodological approach for their quantita-
tive assessment. The assessment of the long-term public
finance impact of reforms directly affecting revenues or
expenditures may involve updating revenue or expendi-
ture projections on the basis of the new policies. How-
ever, when reforms mostly have an indirect impact, it is
Table II.12
Comparison of 2050 pension and healthcare expenditure according 
to the 2002 and 2004 updates of the stability and convergence programmes
Pension expenditure Healthcare and long-term care expenditure
2002 update 2004 update 2002 update 2004 update
BE 11.4 13.0 8.2 10.6
DK 7.2 7.8 9.3 11.0
DE 14.9 13.8 7.1 9.5
EL 22.6 22.6 6.6 6.6
ES 13.0 13.0 n.a. 7.2
FR 15.8 14.5 8.9 12.6
IE 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.8
IT 14.1 14.4 7.6 8.1
LU 9.3 9.3 n.a. n.a.
NL 13.6 8.3 10.4 10.7
AT 16.4 13.6 7.9 7.9
PT 15.3 n.a.
FI 14.4 15.2 9.1 13.4
SE 10.9 9.4 14.4 13.1
UK 4.8 5.5 9.8 10.9
Source: Commission services.145
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permit the linking of the policy change to the determi-
nants of potential output.
Better knowledge on the impact of reforms with a direct
budgetary impact on public finances, notably pension
reforms but also healthcare reforms, can be obtained by
performing simulations with national models and a pro-
cess of peer review by the AWG. This would increase
transparency of how the projections are made. In this
way, consistency across Member States in terms of
underlying assumptions would be ensured while at the
same time the most recent reform measures would be
taken into consideration in the peer review by the AWG
and in the assessment of sustainability of public finances
by the Commission and the Council.
3.5.4. Sustainability considerations in the definition 
of budgetary medium-term objectives
The 20 March 2005 Ecofin Council emphasised in its
report that the Stability and Growth Pact should increase
the focus on safeguarding the sustainability of public
finances. To this end, the budgetary consequences in
light of ageing populations should be taken into account
when specifying the MTO for the Member States’ budg-
etary position, as soon as the criteria and modalities for
doing so are appropriately established and agreed by the
Council.
While it is premature to point to specific criteria and
modalities at this stage, some broad characteristics of
how sustainability risks to public finances could be taken
into account in the context of defining the MTO may be
identified.
First, the method should consider the risks to public
finance sustainability over the long term. This implies
that future projected developments on both the expendi-
ture and the revenue side should be taken into account,
as the overall budgetary position affects the debt position
over the long term.
Second, the method should lead to a stable solution so
that risks to the sustainability of public finances are not
unduly influenced by factors that can be expected to
have a non-lasting impact on public finances or that are
surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty. To this end,
sensitivity tests provide valuable information on how
changes in assumptions, including changes due to imple-
mented reform measures, impact on possible risks to the
sustainability of public finances.
Third, the method should be transparent and simple so as
to facilitate a broad understanding. In this regard, basing
the analysis of risks to the sustainability of public
finances on information which has been compiled in a
transparent and comparable way across the Member
States and conducting and using this analysis according
to a transparent and clearly defined method will lead to
greater acceptability and enforceability.
These very broad considerations will be duly explored
further and the Commission will prepare a report to the
Council on progress made in view of preparing a meth-
odology for incorporating the sustainability of public
finances into the medium-term objective before the end
of 2006.
3.6. Conclusions
The sustainability analysis conducted by the European
Commission during the last few years has demon-
strated that this is a multifaceted issue that needs sev-
eral indicators and a lot of qualitative judgment. Expe-
rience showed some drawbacks with the current
approach. First, common budgetary projections are
only available every three to four years. The previous
projections were published in October 2001 and the
new projections will be ready by the end of 2005. In
between, Member States have updated their projec-
tions as, for example, new national demographic pro-
jections have become available or reforms with an
impact on long-term budgetary trends have been
implemented. On the one hand, national projections
may have the advantage of being more up to date. On
the other hand, they may not be fully comparable
across countries in terms of the underlying assump-
tions, which is vital for the purposes of budgetary sur-
veillance in the EU. Second, the annual assessment of
the SCPs is constrained in terms of timing and space.
Very few sensitivity tests are used and the richness of
the analysis is therefore limited. This has raised some
criticisms and the issue of a possible need for a more
in-depth assessment of underlying risks to the sustain-
ability of public finances.
Experience so far demonstrates the importance of having
a comprehensive sustainability analysis to guide policy-
makers in the conduct of their budgetary policies and to
pursue structural reforms. A comprehensive analysis of
sustainability should have the following elements.146
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ble and comparable budgetary projection exercise is
made every three to four years by the Council commit-
tees (the AWG/EPC) and the Commission.
This exercise uses common methodologies, agreed mac-
roeconomic assumptions and agreed demographic pro-
jections. This makes projections comparable across
countries and sufficiently transparent to gauge sustaina-
bility risks on the basis of such projections. However,
common projections do not take place every year. To
this end, possible new information may be considered in
the context of the annual stability and convergence pro-
grammes.
A comprehensive assessment of possible risks to sustaina-
bility. The analysis of possible risks to sustainability can-
not be summarised in a single figure; several indicators
are necessary to support the judgment. Sensitivity tests
around a baseline scenario may help in assessing the
robustness of the main results to different hypotheses.
The sensitivity tests developed by the Commission and
the AWG provide insights into risks associated with
different scenarios. However, a more comprehensive
analysis may improve the capacity to gauge sustaina-
bility (1).
Assessing the impact of structural reforms. Assessing
risks to long-term budgetary projections involves formu-
lating a view of the probability that a certain outcome
will actually materialise.
In addition, expenditure projections are also affected by
the future impact of structural reforms currently under
way. Better knowledge on the impact of reforms with a
direct budgetary impact on public finances, notably pen-
sion reforms but also healthcare reforms, can be obtained
by performing simulations with national models and a
process of peer review by the AWG.
This would increase the transparency of how the projec-
tions are made. Such an assessment requires detailed
knowledge of the institutional functioning of the econ-
omy, not least with regard to the pension systems, and
would benefit from a close involvement of national
experts in the relevant Council committees.
Such a revised analysis would better serve the purpose
of increasing the focus on sustainability concerns and
could also increase the consistency between medium-
term budgetary strategies and longer-term sustainabil-
ity concerns.
¥1∂ To give an example, the UK report on long-term sustainability produced
by the HM Treasury is around 60 pages long. Also, in Sweden (the 2003/
04 long-term survey) and in Denmark (the Welfare Commission), compre-
hensive studies on long-term sustainability have been prepared recently.147

Part III
Structural reforms and budgetary objectives 

Summary
Structural reforms are at the heart of the EU’s economic
agenda. Reforms in the functioning of markets and the
government sector are perceived as a necessary ingredi-
ent for relaunching the growth potential of the Union in
accordance with the Lisbon agenda priorities. In addi-
tion, as a result of the revision of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), the focus is increasingly being
placed on the link between structural reforms and public
finances in implementing the EU framework for fiscal
policy. It is often claimed that the Stability and Growth
Pact neglects a possible trade-off between short-term
budgetary objectives and the implementation of reforms
that could durably improve public finances over the
medium to long term. Accordingly, it has been agreed in
the European Council that the Stability and Growth Pact
needs to be revised in such a way as to avoid a possible
short-term bias arising from neglect of the abovemen-
tioned trade-off (see Part II, Chapter 1, of this report).
The aim of this part of the report is to review and discuss
the arguments that budgetary discipline in the short term
may be achieved at the expense of the implementation of
reforms. It also conducts original analysis on EU coun-
tries to shed light on the links between budgets and
reforms in the short term, given that this is an under-
researched issue that is likely to become more relevant in
EU budgetary surveillance.
Reforms can improve budgets durably in the medium to
long term via alternative channels. Reforms directly
aimed at containing the dynamics of certain types of
government expenditure (for instance, pension or
healthcare reforms to enable the system to cope better
with ageing-related pressures) can have a relevant
impact on the future path of government budgets and
debt. Indirect positive effects can also be associated
with the adoption of reforms that improve potential out-
put and growth (as is the case for certain types of labour
and product market reforms). However, any ex ante
assessment of the indirect impact of reforms on public
finances is generally subject to substantial difficulties
and uncertainty.
A first reason why there could be a trade-off between
reforms and budgetary objectives is the fact that reforms
have direct budgetary costs. This is the case of pension
reforms that introduce a funded pillar classified outside
the government sector. In this case, budgets would nor-
mally undergo a temporary deterioration (due to lost
social security contributions by the government), offset
by long-term improvements (associated with saved pen-
sion payments by the government). A second broad rea-
son for a trade-off is the fact that reforms can be politi-
cally costly. This has two implications. First, loosening
budgetary policy could, under certain circumstances, be
a way of overcoming resistance to reforms via, for
instance, tax cuts or government transfers. Second, to the
extent that fiscal expansions are expected to produce a
positive short-run impact on economic activity and
employment, keeping an accommodating fiscal stance
could help ease the political cost of reforms. However,
arguments that there may be a complementarity relation-
ship between reforms and budgetary discipline should
also be considered. There are, in fact, instances in which
reforms aimed at improving the sustainability of public
finances already produce positive effects on the budget
in the short term (e.g. parametric pension reforms).
Moreover, a strengthened commitment towards budget-
ary discipline (because of looming critical public finance
conditions or as a result of participation in international
arrangements) reduces the political cost of reforms and
can have a positive impact on confidence under certain
circumstances.
This part of the report analyses the short-term relation
between the budgetary stance of governments and
product, labour and pension reforms. Two main issues
are investigated. First, what impact do reforms have on
budgets in the short term? Second, is there evidence
that fiscal consolidations prevent reforms? Although
the analysis suffers from limitations related to the qual-
ity and availability of data on structural reforms, there
are some results of interest that can be summarised as
follows.151
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primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is not
significantly different in the aftermath of reforms
compared with years not following reforms. Prod-
uct market reforms are associated with slower
growth in government revenues — accompanied,
however, by correspondingly slower growth in
expenditure. After pension reforms, social benefits
paid by the government grow at a significantly
slower rate, but the overall impact on the budget is
compensated by government revenues also grow-
ing at a slower rate. There is also evidence to sug-
gest that the impact of reforms can be quite
different depending on the characteristics of the
reform, notably whether it mainly introduces para-
metric changes or also allows for systemic changes
in the national pensions framework. Estimating the
budgetary impact of reforms after controlling for
the response of fiscal authorities to the cycle and
debt developments, there is evidence of a slight
deterioration in budgets (in the order of a few dec-
imal points of GDP) which is however statistically
different from zero only in the case of labour mar-
ket reforms.
• The expectation that reforms are less frequent in
years where a budgetary consolidation takes place is
not strongly supported by the data: product market
and pension reforms are actually more frequent in
these years. Moreover, there is no clear systematic
evidence that after the introduction of the EU fiscal
framework reforms became less frequent: while this
does seem to be true for labour market reforms, the
opposite holds for product market and pension
reforms. Once an attempt is made to control for
other possible factors explaining the implementation
of reforms, the analysis shows that fiscal consolida-
tions do not have a strong performance in explaining
the probability of reforms, and that the introduction
of the EU fiscal framework did not have any signif-
icant impact on this relation.
Overall, there is a strong indication that it is not easy to
make generalisations about the link between structural
reforms and budgets in the short run. Results differ
depending on the specific type of reforms considered.
Also, within a given type of reforms (e.g. pension
reforms), the fiscal implications are likely to differ con-
siderably depending on the main elements of the reform
and on how reforms are designed. The main implication
for policy is that, when taking account of economic
reforms in the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact, a mechanistic, one-size-fits-all approach
where all reforms, or all reforms belonging to certain
broad categories, are judged the same way should be
avoided. Judgment should be used on a case-by-case
basis, by assessing the relevant features of the various
reforms at issue.152
1. Introduction
This part of the report focuses on the interaction between
public budgets and structural reforms. A common criti-
cism of the EU fiscal framework is that it may prevent
the implementation of structural reforms with long-term
benefits for public finances. Improved public finances in
the long term may be associated either with a direct con-
tribution of certain reforms to containing the dynamics
of age-related expenditures or with an indirect effect,
acting via an increase in potential growth. The reasons
why structural reforms may be prevented by budgetary
targets and ceilings may be related to the possible pres-
ence of direct short-run budgetary costs or to the fact that
reforms are costly in political terms, so that higher
spending or tax cuts may help to obtain the necessary
consensus. However, one could also find opposing argu-
ments. There are pension reforms, in fact, that entail
short-term budgetary improvements. Furthermore, a
strengthened commitment towards budgetary discipline,
including through the participation in the EU fiscal
framework, improves the credibility of government
action and reduces the political cost of reforms.
This part of the report discusses the relationship between
structural reforms and the pursuit of budgetary objectives.
It also carries out original empirical analysis on EU coun-
tries aimed at addressing the following questions: Do
structural reforms generate budgetary costs in the short
term? Is there evidence that budgetary consolidations are
associated with a lower probability of structural reforms?
The remainder of this part of the report is structured as
follows. Chapter 2 discusses the main arguments in
favour and against the existence of a trade-off between
reforms and budgetary discipline in the short run. It sur-
veys the main reasons for why there could be resistance
to economic reforms in spite of benefits arising in the
medium to long term and highlights the main channels
through which economic reforms may improve public
finances in the long run. It also includes a discussion of
how the long-term impact of reforms could be measured
ex ante. Model simulations are performed to illustrate
how pension reforms that introduce a funded pillar clas-
sified outside the government sector may lead to a short-
run budgetary deterioration coupled with long-term
gains in terms of public finance sustainability. Chapter 3
presents empirical analysis on a sample of EU countries
on the link between short-term budgets and reforms in
labour and product markets and pensions. First, it analy-
ses whether in the aftermath of reforms budgets deterio-
rate and by how much. Subsequently, the analysis
focuses on the link between budgetary consolidation and
the probability of reforms being implemented.153
2. Is there a trade-off between structural 
reforms and budgetary objectives?
2.1. Defining reforms
The term reform is used with reference to rather different
types of policy interventions: trade reforms, labour mar-
ket reforms, tax reforms, pension reforms, health sector
reforms, etc. In general, compared with other types of
policies, reforms (i) have a long-lasting impact and (ii)
concern the general functioning of economic (market or
State) institutions rather than specific elements. The
adjective ‘structural’ often accompanies the word reform
to indicate the fact that the policy concerned is aimed at
affecting the structure of the economy.
Sometimes reform means a policy aimed at modifying
the institutional setting, shaping the interplay among pri-
vate economic agents. This is typically the case of
reforms changing the functioning of markets (product or
factor markets). In other instances, reforms may be
aimed at modifying the working of public institutions.
This is the case, for instance, of reforms affecting the
working of the welfare state (e.g. pension or healthcare
reforms) or the set-up of policy institutions (e.g. reforms
concerning the institutional set-up of monetary authori-
ties, or the status of authorities enforcing competition
policy or regulating public utilities).
Another relevant distinction is between reforms that
modify the features of existing policies and institutions
(e.g. pension reforms modifying social security rates)
and those that replace or complement existing policies
and institutions with new ones (e.g. pension reforms
introducing new pension pillars). The former are often
referred to as parametric reforms, the latter as sys-
temic (1). A further distinction is that between reforms
that concern all agents in a given sector or only particular
groups. An example is that of labour market reforms
extending to all labour market participants as opposed to
reforms addressed only to individuals entering the labour
market for the first time.
Reforms can be seen as the outcome of a continuous
effort to adapt market and public institutions to changing
fundamentals: technological progress, evolving needs of
individuals and society, demography, etc. In spite of
such a constant need for adapting institutions to funda-
mental changes, the process of reform of a given sector
of the economy is not always smooth and gradual.
Indeed, the reform process seems to be quite often char-
acterised by jumps and discontinuities: substantial pol-
icy changes are concentrated in a few periods of time.
For instance, in most advanced countries, reforms in the
banking sector were concentrated in the early 1980s,
while the deregulation of air transportation was mostly
achieved between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. A
common thesis is that reforms tend to follow periods of
crisis (2). Moreover, when evaluated over sufficiently
long periods of time, there is evidence that reforms in
one particular sector of the economy are quite often
accompanied by reforms in other sectors. In several
advanced countries, labour market, product market and
tax reforms occurred broadly at the same time (IMF,
2004a). Finally, the international dimension seems to
matter: reforms in a given country are more likely if
other countries have already carried out reforms in the
same sector or are in the process of doing so.
That reforms are not a smooth process has mainly to do with
the fact that the gains from reforms may be unevenly dis-
tributed across sectors, individuals, and time and this could
¥1∂ It should be stressed, however, that the distinction between systemic and
parametric reforms is often blurred. Quite often, systemic reforms also
introduce changes in specific features of the existing system. Moreover,
there are reforms affecting the incentive structure that may be difficult to
classify as purely parametric or systemic (e.g. pension reforms that intro-
duce a link between pension contributions and benefits).
¥2∂ See, for example, Drazen (2000) for a discussion of this thesis and for a
survey on empirical evidence. The point here is not so much that reforms
follow periods of unsatisfactory economic performance (‘[that] the reform
should follow crisis … is no more surprising than smoke following fire’
(Rodrik, 1996, p. 27). The thesis is rather that reforms are triggered only
by periods of exceptionally bad economic performance.154
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section). The fact that reforms in different sectors of the
economy tend to occur together could be explained by com-
plementarity relations that often characterise reforms (1).
For instance, a labour market reform aimed at increasing
the employment rate would be more effective if not acting
exclusively on one aspect of the labour market legislation
(e.g. only on legislation concerning firing practices) but
rather when considering several aspects at the same time
interrelated among them (e.g. both hiring and firing prac-
tices, unemployment benefits). Complementarities could
even be more far-reaching and concern reforms in different
sectors of the economy. For instance, product market
reforms that increase the degree of contestability of sectors
may trigger reforms in labour markets (2). The relevance of
the international dimension for economic reforms could be
due to several reasons, including international agreements
on reforming sectors for which cross-border spillovers are
relevant (e.g. trade and trade-related reforms as a result of
WTO agreements), peer pressure within the context of
regional arrangements (e.g. labour market reforms within
the context of the EU open method of coordination), pres-
sure to reform associated with the direct spillovers from
other countries’ reforms (e.g. as in the case of tax competi-
tion or deregulation of particular industries) or learning
spillovers occurring across the border.
European countries are currently focused on reforms
aimed at increasing growth and employment in line with
the goals of the Lisbon strategy and at making public
finances sustainable (3). The objective of improving the
growth potential is mainly pursued through reforms
strengthening the incentives for the supply of labour and
human and physical capital (e.g. via reforms in product
and factor markets), innovation and the contribution of
the public sector to growth (e.g. tax reforms, reforms in
the education sector, R & D, etc.). As far as the goal of
public finance sustainability is concerned, there is agree-
ment among experts and policy-makers on reforms
aimed at limiting the upward tendency in age-related
expenditures, increasing employment rates, and favour-
ing a reduction in public debt (4).
2.2. Why is there resistance 
to structural reforms?
One of the most salient features of economic reforms,
which has attracted the increasing attention of aca-
demic and applied economists, is the considerable
resistance that reforms could encounter in the policy-
making process. Even when there is quite widespread
perception that carrying out reforms in a given sector
would be in the general interest, action could be
delayed or blocked altogether, for the basic reason that
there can be particular groups in society that may
instead expect losses.
A series of specific explanations has been identified in
the economic literature for why reforms could be
delayed or blocked (5).
A first reason is the presence of uncertainty on the type
of reforms needed (technical uncertainty). Reforming
the functioning of markets or the way government
intervention works could be technically complex and
give rise to disagreement among policy-makers (6).
Such disagreement may in turn translate into delays and
the continuous postponement of reforms. This is espe-
cially the case when lack of knowledge concerns
whether a particular problem (e.g. high unemployment
levels) requires reforms (e.g. labour market reforms) or
is rather mainly related to adverse cyclical condi-
¥1∂ See, for example, Coe and Snower (1997) for an analysis of complementa-
rities in economic reforms applied to labour market policies. 
¥2∂ The reduction in the extra profits associated with entry barriers and anti-
competitive practices could reduce the incentives by organised labour to
capture part of these rents, thereby leading to a higher probability of suc-
cess for reforms aimed at better aligning wages to productivity. This argu-
ment has been put forward, for instance, by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003).
¥3∂ Objectives related to social cohesion and environmental quality are also
among those shared by European institutions. The Ecofin Economic Policy
Committee (EPC) in its 2005 annual report on structural reforms has iden-
tified seven key areas for refocusing the core goals of the Lisbon strategy,
taking into account the conclusions of the Ecofin Council of 16 November
2004 and the work of the high-level group chaired by Wim Kok. The areas
are as follows: (i) realising the knowledge society and boosting innova-
tion; (ii) keeping the commitments to the internal market; (iii) creating the
right climate for the entrepreneurs; (iv) building a labour market for higher
employment and stronger social cohesion; (v) working towards an envi-
ronmentally sustainable future; (vi) ensuring sustainability and quality of
public finances; (vii) enhancing external openness. The February 2005
Commission communication to the European Council ‘Working together
for growth and jobs — A new start for the Lisbon strategy’ proposes ‘a
new start of the Lisbon strategy focusing … on delivering stronger, lasting
growth and creating more and better jobs’ and aims at focusing European
action, better mobilising support for change, and simplifying and stream-
lining the instruments of the Lisbon strategy.
¥4∂ The Stockholm European Council of March 2001 agreed on a three-
pronged strategy for ensuring public finance sustainability: increasing
employment rates, reducing public debts, and reforming pension and
healthcare systems.
¥5∂ See, for example, Williamson (1994), Rodrik (1996) and Drazen (2000).
¥6∂ Rodrik (1996) quotes the healthcare reform proposed by the Clinton presi-
dency as an illustrative example of reform on which disagreement was
related, among other things, to uncertainty on whether the proposed one
was technically the best solution. See also Sachs (1994) for anecdotal evi-
dence on the frequent disagreement within governments on how to pro-
ceed with economic reforms in countries facing macroeconomic crises.155
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spread, it seems a relevant obstacle to reforms only
when the costs of non-reforming are not particularly
high. Moreover, this argument can mostly explain why
reforms are delayed rather than why reforms that are
largely judged as being beneficial could be blocked.
Political economy arguments can explain both why
reforms are delayed and why reforms are blocked. A
common explanation for why potentially beneficial
reforms could be blocked for a long time is the role of
lobbying in the policy-making process (2). According to
this explanation, reforms, even when they can poten-
tially benefit a majority of citizens, often produce losses
to particular groups in society, and resistance by such
groups cannot be fully eliminated through compensation
schemes (e.g. through targeted transfers and subsi-
dies) (3). The groups that expect to lose from reforms,
even if comprising a minority, could be better motivated
to organise resistance to reforms. In fact, reform losers
often have a relatively high stake in blocking reforms
(e.g. fear of losing jobs or extra profits). Moreover, the
group of reform losers, being relatively small, also tends
to have a small cost to organise itself into an effective
pressure group to convey its interest to the government.
Conversely, since reform winners are often many, with
quite limited individual gains, they will have less incen-
tives and higher costs to organise lobbies in favour of
reforms. Lobbies can explain quite successfully why
reforms aimed at reducing protection to given sectors of
the economy (e.g. trade protection, regulation of indus-
tries, etc.) are blocked (4). However, arguments based on
lobbying are probably less suited to explaining resist-
ance to reforms with effects on all sectors of the econ-
omy (e.g. labour market reforms, tax reforms).
An alternative political economy explanation for why
reforms could be blocked relies on uncertain reform pay-
offs at the individual level (5). When individuals are
uncertain about whether they will benefit from a given
reform, there could be ex ante a majority of individuals in
favour of blocking the reform even when ex post the
reform benefits a majority of citizens (6). Moreover, under
these conditions, compensation schemes would not be
credible and therefore could not help to ease resistance to
reforms. Ex post, in fact, the gainers are a majority of cit-
izens who would oppose the implementation of the redis-
tribution. Although it is quite difficult to assess the empir-
ical relevance of this argument, it provides an explanation
for the observed case of reforms that, after being blocked
for long times, find gradual support among the public
once, for some reason, the reform process is put in place.
An explanation for reform deadlocks that has received
much attention from both the experts and policy-makers
is based on uneven distribution of reform pay-offs over
time coupled with short-sightedness of governments (7).
In the presence of short-run costs from reforms and
reform gains materialising only in the long run, politi-
cians who base their decisions on a short time horizon
(because, for instance, of uncertainty about being re-
elected) may opt not to carry out welfare-enhancing
reforms. The fact that the reform gains could be delayed
could in turn be related either to the way reforms are
designed (e.g. pension reforms that modify only gradu-
ally the retirement age) or to the fact that the economic
effects of reforms need time to materialise (8). Short-run
costs from structural reforms could be associated with
several factors. First, there could be a temporary loss in
¥1∂ If the effects of reforms are to a large extent irreversible, it has been shown
in theory that the presence of uncertainty on the best way to tackle given
economic issues gives rise to ‘an option value of waiting’ (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). Namely, policy-makers would be induced to delay action
because this would permit the disposal of new information to better judge
the necessity of carrying out structural reforms. 
¥2∂ Such arguments were first put forward in Olson (1971).
¥3∂ Putting in place a scheme to compensate individuals losing from reforms
may be very costly for the budget or may lack credibility. In the case of
comprehensive reforms, the high costs could be related to the amount of
transfers necessary to avoid losses. Such costs are made worse by perva-
sive information asymmetries. The government does not dispose of all the
information necessary for putting in place a compensation scheme that
permits all reform losers to be compensated for their actual losses. Under
most conditions, this information asymmetry would translate into high
costs for the government (see, for example, Dewatripont and Roland,
(1992). The issue of the credibility of compensation schemes is related to
the possibility that the promise of compensation will not be kept ex post,
once the redistribution associated with the reform has taken place, because
at that point such compensation would not be politically profitable (see, for
example, Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, for a formal argument).
¥4∂ See Grossman and Helpman (2002) for theory and empirical evidence on
the idea that lobbies can explain the presence and persistence of protection.
¥5∂ This argument was first put forward by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).
¥6∂ The argument can be illustrated via an example. Consider two groups of
individuals. The first group is made up of 10 individuals who know with
certainty that they will gain one unit of income from the reform, while the
second group comprises 15 individuals who expect to lose one unit with
probability 2/3 and to gain one with probability 1/3. All people in the first
group will vote in favour of the reform, while all the people in the second
group will vote against (since for them the expected gain from the reform
is 1/3 – 2/3 = – 1/3). The reform will not pass. However, in case of adop-
tion, the reform would have benefited a majority of individuals and gener-
ated 10 – (1/3 x 15) = 5 additional units of income to the society.
¥7∂ In this vein, Alesina and Drazen (1991) show theoretically how governments
may be induced to delay reforms aimed at stabilising public finances. See
also Tabellini and Alesina (1990) for a model explaining the origin of a defi-
cit bias by governments on the basis of short-sighted politicians.
¥8∂ Available evidence shows that the timing of economic reforms on growth
depends quite crucially on the specific type of reform considered. Simula-
tions based on a small-scale econometric model contained in IMF (2004a)
show that while product and labour market reforms take time to produce pos-
itive effects on output, financial market and tax reforms already have effects
on output in the short term. Kim (2003) calibrates a model of corporate sector
restructuring on Japanese data and shows that product market reforms boost
output in the long term but have short-term costs. Econometric estimates in
Salgado (2002) point to a U-shaped impact of labour and product market
reforms on productivity growth. Mendoza et al. (1997) report that tax cuts can
already have significant positive effects on output in the short term.156
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sectors and firm restructuring after reforms take place
(as in the case, for example, of far-reaching trade
reforms or liberalisation and privatisation of economic
activities in transition countries). Second, there may be a
direct negative budgetary impact from the reform (e.g.
tax reforms). Third, there could be indirect budgetary
costs associated with the compensation of reform losers.
The argument explaining reform deadlocks on the basis
of an uneven time distribution of reform pay-offs is
based on few testable assumptions. Its validity depends
on the empirical assessment of a number of issues. To
what extent are reform gains delayed? Do reforms gen-
erate costs in the short term? Is the magnitude of these
costs relevant or negligible? Because economic reforms
are very different as regards their direct impact on aggre-
gate economic activity, income distribution and public
budgets, the overall time pattern of the effects of eco-
nomic reforms will mainly depend on the particular type
of reform considered.
The next sections discuss the implication for public
finances of the unequal distribution of reform gains and
losses over time. First, there is a review of the channels
through which economic reforms can affect public finances
in the long term. Afterwards, the short-term relationship
between reforms and budget balances is discussed.
2.3. The long-term effects of economic 
reforms on public finances
Most economic reforms produce an effect on the govern-
ment net worth, i.e. the difference between the expected
present value of government revenues and expenditures.
It is useful to distinguish between direct and indirect
effects of economic reforms on public finances. Effects
are direct when reforms cause a change in government
expenditures or government revenues. Effects are indi-
rect when the effect on public finances occurs through
changes in the overall economic environment. Indirect
effects arising through changes in potential output and
potential growth are of particular relevance, but indirect
effects may come also via other macroeconomic varia-
bles, for instance interest rates.
Among the reforms having a major direct positive effect
on public finances in the long term there are pension
reforms. These could concern parametric reforms,
namely reforms revising specific elements in govern-
ment pension schemes, for instance the criteria for the
determination of pension contributions and benefits, the
retirement age or the eligibility criteria of pension treat-
ment. Pension reforms could also be systemic, i.e. could
consist of changing the functioning of the pension sys-
tem, for instance the introduction of funded schemes in
addition to pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes. In addition
to pension reforms, other reforms in the functioning of
the welfare system, in particular healthcare reforms,
could help to keep public finances under control against
the background of ageing populations. This would be
achieved, for instance, by improving the cost-effective-
ness of welfare services and by reducing the agency
costs related to their provision (e.g. by reducing moral
hazard via an improved design of eligibility criteria).
Reforms having an indirect impact on public finances
mainly comprise all the reforms that could contribute to
increasing the growth potential. An increase in growth
potential would normally translate into long-term budg-
etary improvements associated with more favourable
dynamics for government revenues (1).
In general, product market reforms aimed at prevent-
ing anti-competitive practices and improving the con-
testability of markets (e.g. by reducing the administra-
tive burden for setting up new firms, etc.) would
contribute to improved potential output and growth.
Static gains would manifest with a one-off increase in
potential output associated with lower equilibrium
unemployment (2). In addition to such static gains,
product market reforms are also likely to bring about
gains in terms of higher productivity growth (3).
¥1∂ However, budgetary gains are certain only if the reaction of government
expenditures to increased potential output does not fully offset the increase
in revenues. If, for instance, government expenditures increase proportion-
ally with potential output (e.g. government employees’ wages and salaries
and government transfers grow in proportion to potential output) while
revenues increase less than proportionally (because, for instance, a change
in potential output translates into a less than proportional increase in the
tax base), higher potential output would be associated with worsening
budget balances. 
¥2∂ Enhanced competition would reduce markups and increase output in
imperfectly competitive sectors. Increased demand for labour in these sec-
tors would translate, in turn, into lower equilibrium unemployment (see,
for example, Pichelmann and Roeger, 2004).
¥3∂ The link between competition and innovation is a priori ambiguous. On the
one hand, the existence of monopolistic profits offers a bigger reward for
carrying out R & D. On the other hand, it is in competitive industries
where the incentive to defeat actual and potential competitors, including
through own innovation and the adoption of others’ innovations, is
stronger. Moreover, in industries characterised by lower barriers to entry,
productivity growth may be enhanced by the fact that firms’ turnover there
tends to be higher and that new entrants tend to be characterised by a
higher level of technology compared with incumbents. Overall, available
cross-country empirical evidence points to a negative relation between
measures of regulations limiting the degree of contestability of markets
and growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Furthermore, it has been
shown at the firm level that the growth rate of productivity is positively
related to measures of competition (Nickell, 1996).157
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static gains which appear as one-off increases in potential
output. These static gains are mainly related to the impact
of labour market reforms on the NAIRU and on participa-
tion rates (1). The impact of labour market policies on
potential output, however, may also show up in terms of
higher growth rates. Productivity growth is to a relevant
extent associated with the reallocation of resources
towards high-growth sectors. Reforms enhancing the effi-
ciency of labour markets, including via an improved
design of labour market institutions, would permit a
smoother reallocation of resources across sectors and the
achievement of higher productivity growth (2).
Reforms in capital markets would also have a positive
impact on potential output. Static gains associated with
more efficient capital markets would mainly correspond
to improved intersectoral allocation of resources. More-
over, improved possibilities for borrowing against future
incomes and for hedging risk would increase productive
investment. To the extent that new investments in phys-
ical capital tend to increase the average level of technol-
ogy embodied in the existing stock of capital, more effi-
cient capital markets would also be associated with
higher rates of productivity growth (3).
Reforms may have at the same time direct and indirect
effects on public finances. For some reforms, these indi-
rect effects reinforce the direct budgetary effects. For
instance, pension reforms increasing the retirement age
also tend to raise the participation rate in the labour force,
and therefore potential output. In other cases, the direct
and indirect budgetary effects of reforms could go in
opposite directions. This is typically the case of tax
reforms aimed at reducing the tax burden on production
factors. The direct negative impact on the budget (lower
government revenues associated with a given level of the
tax base) is accompanied by an indirect positive impact,
associated with a higher tax base. A reduction in the tax
burden normally results in improved incentives and then
in higher potential output. Moreover, higher-than-
expected business profits would lead to increased invest-
ment in physical capital or R & D, and then, via an endo-
genous growth mechanism, to higher potential growth (4).
Hence, in the long term, a lower tax burden tends to be
associated with an expanded tax base. A similar situation
of direct and indirect budgetary effects acting in opposite
directions could also occur in the case of reforms increas-
ing expenditures that could bring higher rates of potential
growth in the long term (e.g. reforms enhancing human
capital investment via an improved education system).
The measurement of the long-term public finance impact
of reforms requires estimates on the present and future
impact of reforms on government budgets and assets/lia-
bilities. Estimating the budgetary impact of reforms
could be particularly complex when the indirect effects
involved are relevant. In such a case, an estimate is also
needed of how reforms affect the overall economic envi-
ronment (e.g. economic activity, interest rates, exchange
rates) and how the change in the economic environment
affects public finances. Box III.1 provides a technical
discussion on the issue of assessing the long-term public
finance impact of economic reforms.     
2.4. Economic reforms and government 
balances in the short run: is there 
a trade-off?
In the policy debate, it is sometimes claimed that carry-
ing out economic reforms could go at the expense of the
respect of budgetary objectives, and criticisms have been
moved to the Stability and Growth Pact for not taking
properly into consideration this trade-off (5). In particu-
lar, it has been argued that an excessive focus on short-
term budgetary discipline could act as a constraint on the
pursuit of reforms that could improve public finances in
the long term. This could occur if reforms worsen the
budgetary position in the short to medium term while
gains appear mainly after some time, so that a choice has
¥1∂ See, for example, European Commission (2002b) for a review of argu-
ments as to why labour market reforms could translate into higher poten-
tial output via reduced NAIRU and increased participation rates.
¥2∂ A related argument supporting the view that efficient labour markets can
increase growth has been put forward by Saint Paul (2002). Labour mar-
kets characterised by high firing costs would, in fact, discourage risky
innovative activity by firms, reducing in this way the rate of productivity
growth. Such an argument has found some support from empirical analysis
(Bassanini and Ernst, 2002).
¥3∂ See, for example, Levine (2004) for a recent survey on theory and empirical
evidence on the links between the functioning of capital markets and growth.
¥4∂ Easterly and Rebelo (1993), in a cross-country growth regression includ-
ing both advanced and developing countries, find empirically that higher
taxation contributes negatively and significantly to per capita output
growth. Similar results are obtained by Kneller et al. (1999) for OECD
countries only and by Romero de Ávila and Strauch (2003) for a sample
limited to EU countries.
¥5∂ Among the first criticisms following this line of argument, see Eichen-
green and Wyplosz (1998). Razin and and Sadka (2002) develop a model
analysing the trade-off between the budgetary objectives of the Stability
and Growth Pact and social security reforms. Beetsma and Debrun (2003,
2005) analyse the trade-off between budgetary discipline and reforms in a
formal model comprising inefficiencies related both to governments’ defi-
cit bias (justifying the need for fiscal rules) and to lack of reforms.158
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There are several methods followed in practice for measuring the ex ante impact of reforms on public finances. It is com-
mon practice in Finance Ministries and other policy institutions to rely on non-behavioural simulation models. These tech-
niques are mainly used for estimating the impact on public finances of reforms that have a direct impact on government
budgets with relevant repercussions in the long term, for instance pension reforms or reforms concerning the health or edu-
cation sector or other social security programmes. 
Non-behavioural simulation models use detailed data on: 
• institutional characteristics of the sectors subject to reform (e.g. in the case of pension reforms, how pension contribu-
tions and pension benefits are structured depending on earnings, age, seniority at work, type of labour contract, etc.),
• elements of the reform (e.g. again in the case of pension reforms, how the regime governing the determination of pension
contributions and benefits changes, how entitlement provisions are modified, how retirement age is affected, etc.), and
• current and projected values for economic and social variables of direct relevance (e.g. still in the case of pension
reforms, projections on the demographic structure of population by cohorts, labour force statistics, statistics on wages
and salaries, etc.),
to obtain projections on how the future path of specific budgetary items would be affected by particular reforms (e.g. in
the case of pension reforms, how the time path of social contributions and pension reforms would be affected).
Given the estimated impact of the reform on the path of government revenues and expenditures, the impact of the reform
on future developments in government budget balances and debts can in turn be assessed on the basis of assumptions on
the future path of government budgetary items not directly affected by the reform and the future path of macroeconomic
variables of relevance (e.g. growth and interest rates).
The European Commission regularly performs an assessment of the long-term sustainability of public finances in EU
Member States on the occasion of the evaluation of stability and convergence programmes on the basis of projections on
age-related expenditures based on national models and assumptions on macroeconomic variables agreed within the EPC
Ageing Working Group (AWG) (see Part II, Chapter 3, of this report). The projections on age-related expenditures used
in this assessment are updated with different frequency depending on the specific country concerned. Revisions in the pro-
jections of age-related expenditures reflect, inter alia, the effect of newly introduced structural reforms. Hence, the com-
parison between recent and previous Commission sustainability assessments gives an indication of the impact of the whole
package of structural reforms enacted during a given period but is not informative on the impact of specific reforms. More-
over, such an indication is only indirect and imperfect, since between one assessment and another the fiscal variables
(included in stability and convergence programmes) used in the simulation are changed.
A more direct route for assessing the long-term public finance impact of reforms has been followed in Economic Policy
Committee (2002), which includes the assessment of alternative hypothetical parametric pension reforms in EU countries
(concerning the calculation of pension benefits and the effective retirement age) using simulations based on the national
non-behavioural models used in EU Member States. Results indicate that a reduction in the indexation of pensions by a
â percentage point would contribute to reducing pension expenditures projected for 2050 by a range of between 0.5 and
2 % of GDP in systems where pension benefits are earnings related, and by 0.6 to 3 GDP points in systems where pensions
are paid on a flat rate. Moreover, increasing by one year the effective retirement rate would lead to a reduction in pension
expenditures in 2050 in the order of 0.6 to 1 % of GDP.
Estimates of the long-term budgetary impact of various types of pension reforms have also been provided by EU Member
States in their updated stability and convergence programmes. All programmes report long-term budgetary improvements
associated with the reforms, which range between 0.6 and almost 2 % of GDP (stability and convergence programmes are
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/scplist_en.htm).
(Continued on the next page)159
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Simulations based on non-behavioural models have the advantage of including a large amount of information on the
institutional features of the sectors subject to reform. The disadvantage with this approach is the neglect of the reaction
in the behaviour of economic agents to the introduction of economic reforms, and of the associated implications for the
macroeconomic environment. This means that the range of effects considered by the simulations is generally incom-
plete. For instance, in the case of pension reforms, non-behavioural models would mainly focus on the impact of these
reforms on the time path of government revenues and expenditures. However, especially in the case of systemic reforms,
pension reforms will also affect individual retirement and saving decisions, thereby having an impact on the supply of
labour and capital, and therefore on potential output (1). Moreover, in the case of reforms whose impact on public
finances is mainly indirect, the recourse to models incorporating behavioural relations is a necessary step for performing
ex ante simulations.
Applied equilibrium models, calibrated to replicate the data of specific countries in given periods, permit the interaction
between public finances and the macroeconomic environment to be taken into account and therefore the analysis of the
indirect impact that economic reforms have on government revenues and expenditures. A relevant feature of applied mac-
roeconomic models for the analysis of the long-term public finance impact of structural reforms is the presence of an over-
lapping generations structure, which allows different cohorts of economic agents to have varying sizes and behaviour.
Overlapping generations models permit the impact of ageing populations on government accounts and on macroeconomic
variables like savings, investment, or labour supply to be accounted for and the analysis of the direct and indirect public
finance impact of reforms aimed at containing the impact of ageing on government budgets. The pioneering large-scale
applied model with an overlapping generations structure was developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for the United
States, and was further enriched in its structure and also applied to Japan, Germany and Sweden in Auerbach et al. (1989).
Simulations on the impact of pension reforms using overlapping generations applied macro models have been performed
by the OECD (Hviding and Merette, 1998) and the European Commission (McMorrow and Roeger, 2004). 
In spite of their advantages, behavioural models have limitations that must be taken into account. First, there is a fun-
damental uncertainty as to what concerns the best model to represent the functioning of a particular sector of the econ-
omy. For instance, labour market reforms could have a relevant impact on public finances via a reduction in the NAIRU
and a consequent improvement in potential output. However, involuntary unemployment may be associated with alter-
native explanations (e.g. minimum wages, the presence of unions, matching frictions in the labour market, etc.), each
one leading to alternative modelling. Depending on the specific model chosen to represent the labour market, the same
type of reform may have a quite different impact on the NAIRU, and then on potential output, government revenue and
public finances. Second, there is uncertainty concerning the value of structural model parameters (e.g. the elasticity of
labour demand). Third, there can be major difficulties in translating particular reforms into a shock to the parameters of
the model. Whereas in the case of, say, tax reforms, there is a clear model counterpart to real-world policies, this may
not be the case in other instances. This point can be highlighted via an illustrative simulation of labour market reform
performed with the European Commission’s QUEST model (2). The simulation considers a reform that helps to reduce
the excess of wages above the level that would be consistent with full employment. A major difficulty in performing
such a simulation is that no clear benchmark may exist for translating concrete reform proposals (e.g. a reform of the
conditions in which collective bargaining takes place etc.) into a shock to the parameters of the model. Given the par-
ticular representation of the labour market in the QUEST model, the following simulation assumes a downward shift in
the wage-setting curve resulting in a labour market characterised by imperfect matching (Pissarides, 1990) (3). Moreo-
ver, a great deal of uncertainty on the exact magnitude of the shock is inevitable. Graph III.1 illustrates how uncertainty
on the magnitude of the shock could translate into uncertain estimates of the public finance impact of reforms. Two sce-
narios are shown: one in which the shock to the wage-setting curve leads to a 0.5 % ex ante wage reduction and one in
which the ex ante reduction in the wage rate is 1 %. 
(1) Work is currently ongoing in the EPC AWG to incorporate the impact of pension reforms on the projections for labour force participation rates. On the
methodology of how to estimate the impact of pension reforms on participation rates, see Burnieaux et al. (2003). 
(2) See Roeger and in’t Veld (1997) for a description of the QUEST model.
(3) The shock is applied in all EU countries.
(Continued on the next page)160
P a r t  I I I
S t r u c t u r a l  r e f o r m s  a n d  b u d g e t a r y  o b j e c t i v e sto be made in the short term between implementing the
reform and keeping deficits unchanged.
There are several arguments that could provide a justifi-
cation for the claim that structural reforms could worsen
the budget in the short run in spite of an improvement in
the medium/long term in public finances.
The first argument is that reforms may entail direct
budgetary costs, at least in the short/medium term. A
notable example is that of systemic pension reforms
implying that the social contributions previously col-
lected by the government are diverted to a new pillar,
which may be privately run or classified outside the gov-
ernment. This type of reforms helps to contain the
impact of ageing on the dynamics of government
expenditure related to the payment of pensions. How-
ever, it will also normally entail a reduction in govern-
ment revenues not immediately compensated by reduced
pension payments. Box III.2 presents model simulations
illustrating that the negative budgetary impact of this
type of reforms can be quite persistent. A somehow
related argument rationalising short-term budgetary
losses associated with reforms is the possibility that eco-
nomic reforms have a temporary effect on output, and
therefore on the cyclical component of budgets.
A second reason for why reforms that could be beneficial
in the long run may imply budgetary deteriorations at
least in the short term is that the resistance to reforms
coming from reform losers can be overcome by means of
compensation packages having a cost on the budget.
This could either mainly take the form of increased
expenditures (government transfers and subsidies) or of
reduced revenues. A significant example of increased
government transfers related to the implementation of
structural reforms is that of several east European coun-
tries during the transition process. The liberalisation and
Box III.1 (continued)
Given the model set-up, wage moderation leads to lower unemployment and to an increase in potential output. This trans-
lates in turn into improved government budgets over time and falling debt/GDP ratios. Depending on the assumed magni-
tude of the shock, however, the estimated impact on debt will differ considerably. With a 0.5 % shock, after 20 years the
debt for the EU-15 aggregate would be reduced by between 4 and 5 GDP points, while with a 1 % shock the impact would
amount to about 10 GDP points. 
Graph III.1:  Assessing the long-term effects of labour market reforms on debt: 
simulation with the QUEST model
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5privatisation of economic activities were often followed
by the temporary provision of government subsidies to
permit the restructuring of firms. On the revenue side,
economic reforms were quite often implemented
together with tax cuts; this seems especially the case for
product and labour market reforms (IMF, 2004a).
A different argument is based on a trade-off between
budgetary adjustment and economic reforms associated
with political costs. Carrying out reforms could be costly
to governments in terms of lost consensus (due to resist-
ance by pressure groups, voters being averse to uncertain
effects of reforms, temporary losses in output and jobs,
etc.). Fiscal consolidations could, in fact, be politically
costly due to possible losses of output and jobs in the
short term (1). Given that governments dispose of ‘polit-
ical capital’ in limited supply, whenever part of this
political capital is allocated to carrying out economic
reforms, little could be left for adjusting budgets. By the
same token, expanding budgets could compensate for
using up political capital in carrying out reforms.
Although there could be some foundation for the above
arguments under given circumstances, generalisations
are difficult. In fact, there is also a series of reasons that
point rather to a positive relation between economic
reforms and short-term government budgets.
First, there are reforms with a direct positive impact on
budgets. This is, for instance, the case of many paramet-
ric pension reforms or of labour market reforms (e.g.
labour market reforms reducing the generosity of unem-
ployment subsidies).
Moreover, compensation packages to ease resistance to
reforms, if appropriately designed, are not necessarily
costly to the budget. Schemes could be found such that the
groups that lose from reforms are compensated via trans-
fers paid by the groups benefiting from reforms (2).
Second, a credible commitment by the government to
medium-term budgetary discipline could help to win the
resistance of groups opposing reforms. Once govern-
ments are credibly committed to sound public finances,
the adoption of reforms that permit structural improve-
ments in public finances in the medium/long term may
¥1∂ However, there have been documented cases in which the impact of fiscal
consolidation on economic activity has been positive rather than negative
as predicted by standard Keynesian models (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano,
1990, and Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). European Commission (2003a)
and Giudice et al. (2003) analyse cases in which fiscal consolidation peri-
ods were followed by increased growth in the EU.
¥2∂ There are anecdotal cases which seem consistent with this possibility. The
Dutch labour market reform which started in 1982 and aimed at supporting
wage moderation was accompanied by cuts in labour taxes and social
security contributions paid by employees. This permitted a reduction in
labour costs to businesses without losses in net wages. Employment
growth followed from 1984 onwards. At the same time, government
expenditure was cut substantially, so that, in spite of the tax cut, the gov-
ernment budget balance improved.
Box III.2: Systemic pension reforms and the trade-off between the short-term 
and the long-term impact on public finances: an illustration via simulations 
with the QUEST ageing model
This box illustrates, via model simulations, the possible trade-off between higher budgets and debt in the short term and
lower debt in the long term that may arise as a consequence of systemic pension reforms that shift pension contributions
to funded schemes privately managed or classified outside the government sector. 
The simulations are performed with the QUEST ageing model (see McMorrow and Roeger, 2004, for a description). This
model is a variant of the European Commission macro model, allowing for an overlapping generations structure where
households can be either workers or pensioners (as in Gertler, 1999). Demographic trends are explicitly modelled. The
demographic parameters are calibrated to the main features of the Eurostat projections until 2050. The model distinguishes
between a corporate sector, a household sector and a government sector. Income transfer across generations is governed
by a PAYG system. The corporate sector is modelled along standard neoclassical lines with firms maximising their market
value. The model distinguishes between various tax and expenditure categories and the government is constrained by an
intertemporal budget constraint.
(Continued on the next page)162
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The simulations are aimed at illustrating the debt implications up to 2050 of two alternative hypothetical strategies for financ-
ing additional pension expenditures related to ageing. The first alternative (the ‘no-reform scenario’) considers a PAYG sys-
tem in which pension contribution rates and replacement rates are kept constant over time. The second alternative (the ‘reform
scenario’) considers a partial move to a funded system, with a government guarantee of accrued pension rights for current
pensioners and the cohorts currently in the labour force that contributed to the PAYG system for a longer period. 
More precisely, the two scenarios are modelled as follows.
No-reform scenario: The government guarantees a constant pension contribution and replacement rate throughout the
whole period equal, respectively, to 16 % of the net wage and 75 % of the gross wage. 
Reform scenario: The government implements a reform that: (i) shifts pension contributions into a non-government funded
scheme so that the amount of contributions received by the government falls from 16 % to 11 % of the net wage; (ii)
reduces the pension benefits paid by the government, guaranteeing accrued rights to PAYG pensions. It is assumed that
young workers (aged under 40 years at the time of the reform) are entitled to pension benefits from the government equal
to 50 % of the gross wage (additional pension benefits being related to the stock of their contributions to the funded
scheme). At the opposite end, workers retiring at the time of the reform receive pension benefits from the government equal
to 75 % of the gross wage, as before the reform. The cohorts in between receive pension benefits from the government of
between 50 and 75 % of their gross wage in proportion to their age, i.e. to the length of the period during which they have
been contributing to the PAYG system. 
In the model, any difference between the amount of pension contributions received by the government in a given year and
the amount of pension benefits paid is financed in the model via deficits, i.e. an increased stock of government debt. It is
also assumed that at the date of the reform the PAYG system is in equilibrium (i.e. that the amount of pension contributions
received each year by the government exactly covers the amount of pension benefits paid) and that government deficits are
equal to zero. The initial debt/GDP ratio corresponds instead to that recorded for the EU-15 aggregate.
(Continued on the next page)
Graph III.2:  Debt dynamics with and without pension reform: simulations with the QUEST ageing model
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5become easier. Since voters and interest groups know
that governments will not loosen budgetary policy to
ease the resistance to reforms, there will be less resist-
ance to reforms in the first place. 
The credibility of government commitment to budget-
ary discipline is enhanced when there is a wide percep-
tion of the need to take action to reverse unsustainable
trends in public finances. The credibility of govern-
ment commitment is also strengthened when taken at
the international level. Experience with the pension
reforms in several EU countries in the run-up to EMU
(Spain, Italy and Portugal) seems consistent with this
argument.
Overall, whether a trade-off exists between budgetary
discipline in the short run and the adoption of reforms is
mainly an empirical question. Analysing empirically the
issue in the EU is the object of the next chapter of this
part of the report.
Box III.2 (continued)
Graph III.2 shows the evolution of government debt under the two alternative scenarios. The evolution of debt under the no-
reform scenario reflects a growing deficit in the PAYG system associated with rising old-age dependency ratios. With a con-
stant contribution rate, the share of pension benefits paid by the government covered by PAYG contributions would decline
from 100 % to about 66 % in 2050. This would imply an explosive path for the debt, exceeding 250 % of GDP by 2050. Under
the reform scenario, the path of the debt/GDP ratio differs considerably. Since this scenario implies an immediate reduction
in pension contributions coupled with a phased-in reduction in pension benefits, there will be an immediate increase in gov-
ernment deficits and a relatively fast accumulation of debt just after the reform. However, since the amount of pension benefits
paid by the government falls over time, deficits will also fall and the debt/GDP ratio will tend to stabilise.164
3. The short-term link between structural 
reforms and public budgets: a close look 
at the EU data
3.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to assess empirically the link
between fiscal consolidation and economic reforms.
The analysis focuses on EU-14 countries, given the
lack of systematic data for the new Member States.
Three types of reforms are considered: labour market
reforms, product market reforms, and pension reforms.
First, the issue of how reforms can be measured is dis-
cussed and the data used for measuring reforms in the
analysis are described. Second, the short-term impact
of economic reforms on budgets is assessed. This is one
of the most frequently alleged reasons for why a trade-
off may arise between budgetary discipline and the
adoption of reforms in the short run. The assessment
concerns the overall short-term impact on budgets,
without distinguishing between the direct and the indi-
rect effects (e.g. arising via the provision of compensa-
tion packages) of reforms. Third, since the presence of
budgetary costs associated with reforms is one but not
the only reason for a possible trade-off between budg-
etary discipline and reforms, the analysis also
addresses directly the link between fiscal consolida-
tions (measured by improvement in primary cyclically
adjusted budget balances) and the probability of imple-
menting reforms.
3.2. The measurement 
of structural reforms
A first necessary step for the analysis is the measurement
of economic reforms. Such measurement involves the
major difficulty of having to quantify the degree of
intensity of policies of very different types. Several
attempts have been made in recent times by academia
and policy institutions to collect data on economic
reforms and to develop indicators for the measurement
of the effectiveness of such reforms.
A first approach for measuring reforms consists of con-
structing indicators based on information on actual poli-
cies that have been implemented in given sectors, peri-
ods and countries. Information is generally provided on
the number of policy measures of certain types, possibly
accompanied by an evaluation of such policies according
to predefined criteria. This approach permits information
to be obtained on the action taken by governments with
the purpose of reforming the functioning of markets or
State institutions (1). A second approach consists of con-
structing indicators measuring the extent of existing dis-
tortions associated with government policies, for
instance the distortions associated with taxation or with
the presence of regulations in particular markets (2). The
impact of reforms is measured in this case by the change
in the level of the indicator measuring the degree of dis-
tortions. This second approach does not account directly
for government reform initiatives, but permits gauging
of the impact of such initiatives on the structural condi-
tions of the different sectors considered. This approach
also permits the assessment of the extent to which
reforms are needed.
¥1∂ Databases on policy measures of different types are constructed and main-
tained by national and international policy institutions and by independent
research centres (e.g. the Rodolfo de Benedetti Foundation (FRDB) as
regards labour market policies).
¥2∂ Abundant work in this area has been carried out by the OECD. See, for
instance, Nicoletti and Pryor (2001) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).165
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tions in particular sectors (as compared with other coun-
tries or periods), there is indication of a stronger need to
carry out reforms (1).
In the following analysis, indicators for labour and prod-
uct market reforms are constructed on the basis of struc-
tural indices measuring the degree of policy-induced dis-
tortions used in IMF (2004b), while pension reform
indicators are built on information collected and proc-
essed by the Rodolfo de Benedetti Foundation (FRDB)
reporting the year of adoption and the main characteris-
tics of reforms (2).
Table III.1 describes the sources of the original data and
the methodology followed for constructing the reform
indicators used in the analysis that follows. The indica-
tors take value 1 in countries and years in which reforms
took place and zero otherwise. Indicators constructed in
this way permit better comparison of results across dif-
ferent types of reforms starting from data representing
different types of information (indices summarising the
degree of distortions in the economy for labour and prod-
uct market and tax reforms, and dichotomic variables
reporting when and where reforms took place for pen-
sion reforms) (3). These indicators also account for the
discrete character of reforms, i.e. the fact that reforms are
generally not evenly spread across time and space (4).
The indicators constructed cover EU-14 countries
(except Greece as regards labour and product market
reforms). Data are available starting from the 1970s and
up to the late 1990s or early 2000 for product and labour
market reforms and for the 1985–2001 period for pen-
sion reforms.
Table III.1
Source and coverage of data on structural reforms
Source Description of data from which reform indicators have been constructed
Country 
coverage
Year 
coverage Reform indicator
Labour market 
reform
IMF Labour market index consisting of the unweighted 
average of indicators of employment restriction, 
unemployment benefit replacement rate and benefit 
duration. The index is normalised in such a way as to be 
between 0 and 1 and to increase as labour market 
restrictions are reduced. Original data sources: Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001), labour market institutions database and 
OECD data.
EU-14 
except 
Greece
1970–98 (1) The yearly change in the 
labour market index is 
positive and bigger than 
the median positive 
change.
Product market 
reform
IMF Index measuring entry barriers, public ownership, market 
structure, vertical integration and price controls in public 
utilities and transport services. The index is normalised in 
such a way as to be between 0 and 1 and to increase as 
product market restrictions are reduced. Original data 
source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
EU-14 
except 
Greece
1975–98 The yearly change in the 
product market index is 
positive and bigger than 
the median positive 
change.
Pension reforms FRDB Data indicating the years in which reforms in pension 
systems were approved by parliaments and the major 
characteristics of reforms.
EU-14 1985–2001 A pension reform making 
the system less generous 
took place in the year
(1) Except Austria (1973–98), Portugal (1975–98) and Finland (1971–98).
¥1∂ A further method for measuring reforms is the use of structural indicators
providing information on the functioning of the economy. For instance, in
the case of the measurement of the functioning of the labour market, this
approach would imply using a number of indicators concerning the magni-
tude and the characteristics of unemployment, job-creation and job-
destruction flows, etc. This approach has been followed at the EU level to
measure the progress towards the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Progress is
benchmarked against indicators measuring outcomes achieved in specific
sectors of the economy in EU Member States.
¥2∂ Xavier Debrun is gratefully acknowledged for providing the data on struc-
tural indices used in IMF (2004a).
¥3∂ Reforms in labour and product markets correspond to changes in the struc-
tural indices indicating a sufficiently big reduction in the degree of policy
distortions. A similar approach is followed, for instance, in Heinemann
(2004). By convention, it is assumed that reforms need to induce a reduc-
tion in the degree of distortions greater than the median reduction observed
across the sample. The choice of the median value as a benchmark allows
an easy interpretation (reforms are events leading to a reduction in the
degree of distortions belonging to the top 50 %) and implies a frequency of
events classified as reforms in the order of 20 to 30 % of the total, which
permits using statistical inference in the analysis of the links between
reforms and fiscal variables across the sample. 166
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types of reforms considered distinguishing between dif-
ferent decades. It shows that labour and product market
reforms were more frequent in the 1990s than in the
1980s and especially in the 1970s. As for pension
reforms, they were considerably more frequent in the
1990s than in the 1980s (information on the 1970s is not
included in the data set used).
3.3. Do reforms worsen government 
budgets in the short run?
The purpose of this section is to provide evidence on the
short-term budgetary impact of structural reforms. As
discussed in the previous section, the presence of short-
term costs to the budget could be one reason explaining
a possible trade-off between budgetary discipline and
reforms. A negative budgetary impact of reforms could
be due either to direct effects associated with the reform
(e.g. losses of pension contributions in the case of sys-
temic pension reforms) or to costs associated with the
need to win resistance to reforms via increased budgets
(e.g. via subsidies or tax cuts). Due to the absence of sys-
tematic evidence on the budgetary impact of reforms that
can be attributed exclusively to direct effects, in the fol-
lowing analysis no distinction is made between the direct
component and the component associated with the
implementation of compensation schemes.
3.3.1. Labour and product market reforms
There is no obvious way in which labour market and
product market reforms could impact directly on budg-
ets in the short term. Depending on the particular
reforms considered, the effect could be either negative
or positive. For instance, labour market reforms could
either contribute to containing government expendi-
ture if including reductions in unemployment subsi-
dies or raise expenditure if comprising active labour
market policies to promote employability (e.g. training
programmes). As for product market reforms, they
can, for instance, have a direct effect on budgets by
altering the size of government subsidies and transfers
to the corporate sector. Although the direct budgetary
impact of labour and product market reforms is likely
to be quite limited in the short run, one needs to take
into account the impact on public budgets that could be
associated with the implementation of compensation
schemes.
A first approach to assessing the short-term budgetary
impact of reforms is to look at the change in various
budgetary items in years immediately following reforms
and to compare them with that in years where no reforms
took place. Table III.3 reports average changes in pri-
mary cyclically adjusted budgets (primary CABs) and
selected components distinguishing between years
immediately following the adoption of reforms and
remaining years. T tests are performed to check whether
differences in reform and non-reform years are statisti-
cally significant.
Results indicate that neither in the case of labour market
reforms nor in that of product market reforms is the var-
iation in primary CABs significantly different in reform
or non-reform years. In the case of labour market
reforms, a weaker reduction in government investment is
observed on average. In the case of product market
reforms, the growth in cyclically adjusted revenues is
significantly lower in reform years, but the effect on
budgets is compensated by lower growth in primary
expenditures.
Table III.2
Frequency of different types of reforms in different time periods (EU-14)
Before 1980 Between 1980 and 1990 After 1990
Labour market reforms 0.1 0.24 0.38
Product market reforms 0 0.16 0.62
Pension reforms n.a. 0.16 0.31
NB: Figures represent the ratio between the total number of cases in which reforms occurred over the total number of years for which information is available on reform
indicators. See Table III.1 for the definition of reform indicators and for country/year availability.
¥4∂ However, the use of discrete reform indicators has the drawback of not per-
mitting the different intensity of the impact of policies in different countries
and periods to be taken into account, while this can be captured by using
directly indices summarising the extent of policy-induced distortions. 167
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port for the view that labour or product market reforms
are associated with short-term budgetary costs. How-
ever, the analysis so far has not controlled for other fac-
tors that may have affected government budgets.
A common way to perform such control is to estimate
‘fiscal rules’, describing the reaction of fiscal authorities
(in terms of chosen levels of budget balances) to key
macroeconomic developments, such as those related to
the cycle and the level of debt (1). The strategy followed
in the following analysis is therefore that of augmenting
fiscal rules with variables relating to the implementation
of reforms (2). The budgetary impact of reforms can be
gauged by looking at the regression coefficient of the
reform variables. 
Table III.4 reports the results for panel data estimation of
fiscal rules. The dependent variable is the primary CAB,
the explanatory variables are the output gap, the debt/
GDP ratio and a dummy variable taking value 1 if
reforms were implemented in the current or previous
year. Estimates have been performed separately for the
case of labour and product market reforms. In accord-
ance with existing estimates of fiscal rules for EU coun-
tries, results indicate a non-significant response of fiscal
authorities to output gaps and a significant positive
response to debt (3). As for reform variables, in the case
of product market reforms the coefficient is negative but
statistically insignificant (though close to the 10 % sig-
nificance level), while in the case of labour market
reforms the coefficient is negative and significant.
The size of the coefficients is also similar, indicating that
in correspondence with both labour and product market
reforms budgets are loosened by about 0.3 GDP points.
Table III.3
Average changes in budgetary variables during reform periods and periods where no reforms took place: 
labour and product market reforms (EU-14 except Greece, 1972–98)
Labour market reforms Product market reforms
Year-to-year change in fiscal 
variables (% of GDP), simple 
average 
No reforms
A reform took 
place in the 
current or 
previous year 
t test for No reforms 
A reform took 
place in the 
current or 
previous year 
t test for 
(1) (2) (1) ≠ (2) (1) (2) (1) ≠ (2)
Primary CAB 0.06 0.08 – 0.14 0.15 0.15 – 0.0
Cyclically adjusted revenues 0.43 0.3 0.65 0.54 0.01 2.89***
Social security contributions 0.17 0.08 1.3 0.12 0.017 1.7*
Primary expenditure 0.38 0.19 0.93 0.36 – 0.11 2.44**
Social benefits other than in 
kind
0.2 0.05 1.6 0.17 – 0.005 1.97**
Government subsidies – 0.003 – 0.048 0.85 – 0.033 – 0.072 0.79
N. obs 238 114 153 141
NB: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, t tests significant at the 10, 5 and 1 % level.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ The basic idea is that fiscal authorities are motivated by an objective of
output stabilisation (so that chosen budget balances should respond posi-
tively to expected output gaps) and by a debt stabilisation motive (so that a
positive response of budget balances to the existing stock of debt is
expected). For the estimation of fiscal rules for EU countries see, for
example, von Hagen et al. (2001), Gali and Perotti (2003), European Com-
mission (2004a) and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004).
¥2∂ An alternative analytical strategy is followed in Pirttila (2001) in analysing
the impact of reforms in transition countries (privatisation, price liberalisa-
tion, trade liberalisation) on fiscal adjustment. In that analysis, the change
in the budget balance is regressed against reform variables and on meas-
ures of growth, unemployment, private firms’ entry and initial conditions
(number of transition years). Results indicate that while privatisation has a
significantly negative impact on the fiscal balance, the impact of price lib-
eralisation was significant and positive.
¥3∂ However, it has been shown that the coefficients of output gaps and debt of
fiscal rules have not been constant over time (e.g. Gali and Perotti, 2003,
European Commission, 2004a, and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay,
2004). 168
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budgetary effect is a direct one or whether it is related to
the objective of policy authorities of winning resistance
to reforms by relaxing the budget. It should be stressed
that these results must be interpreted with care. In partic-
ular, they are likely to be affected significantly by the
chosen method for measuring structural reforms.
3.3.2. Pension reforms
The short-term direct budgetary impact of pension
reforms depends crucially on the elements touched upon
by the reform and on how the reform is designed. Para-
metric reforms in government pension schemes that
reduce the generosity of the system are likely to exert a
direct positive impact on budgets. This is generally the
case of reforms increasing pension contributions, revis-
ing the criteria for the determination of pension benefits
(e.g. modifying the indexation criterion of pensions),
tightening the entitlement criteria for pensions, or
increasing the statutory retirement age. As illustrated in
Section 2.4 of this part (Box III.2), systemic reforms
may have instead a short-term negative impact on budg-
ets even when having a possible long-term impact on
public finances if they imply the shifting of social contri-
butions into pension schemes privately run or classified
outside the government. It should also be taken into
account that the short-term budgetary impact of pension
reforms could be affected to a relevant extent by the fact
that reforms are quite often designed in such a way as to
take effect gradually.
Table III.5 compares average changes in primary CABs
and selected budgetary items in periods with and without
reforms. Results show that, in spite of a non-significant
difference in the changes in the primary CAB between
periods with and without reforms, there is a statistically
significant difference in the short-term dynamics of
social benefits other than in kind, which on average rise
in periods without reforms and fall immediately after the
implementation of reforms (1). The difference in the
change in social contributions in reform and non-reform
years appears instead negligible.
Since the short-term budgetary impact of pension
reforms could be quite different depending on the spe-
Table III.4
Budget balances and labour and product market reforms: 
estimating fiscal rules (EU-14 except Greece, 1972–98)
Dependent variable: primary CAB, Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Constant – 1.35*** – 1.58***
(– 5.49) (– 5.15)
Lagged dependent variable 0.75*** 0.76***
(23.74) (23.71)
Output gap – 0.21 – 0.06
(– 0.48) (– 1.43)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.032*** 0.036***
(6.78) (6.21)
Dummy for labour market reforms – 0.306*
(– 1.65)
Dummy for product market reforms – 0.29
(– 1.53)
N. obs 342 293
R sq. 0.73 0.76
Chi sq. 1 121 1 171
NB: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US lagged output gap.
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. Coefficients for country fixed effects are not
reported.
¥1∂ The ESA 95 item ‘social benefits other than in kind’ (D.62), comprises
four sub-items: social security benefits in cash (D.621), private funded
social benefits (D.622), unfunded employee social benefits (D.623), social
assistance benefits in cash (D.624). Pension reforms are likely to affect
especially the first two categories, that on average have constituted about
two thirds of the aggregate social benefits other than in kind in the EU-15
in the past 10 years.169
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2 0 0 5cific reforms considered, it could be helpful to look
closely at budgetary variables of interest in the years
before, during and after each one of the selected struc-
tural pension reforms. Of course, such an analysis would
not be very informative on the impact of reforms on
budgets (since there is no counterfactual analysis for
judging what would have been the evolution of budget-
ary variables without the reform), but it could help to
shed light on whether there are systematic differences in
the evolution of reforms depending upon the type of
reforms considered. The reforms included in the analysis
are all those reducing overall the generosity of the sys-
tem and classified as structural in the FRDB database,
i.e. reforms applying to the whole population and not
only to particular categories.
Table III.6 reports the value (as a percentage of GDP) of
the primary CAB, cyclically adjusted revenues, primary
expenditure, social security contributions and social ben-
efits other than in kind in the year before, during and in
the two years after each reform. Almost all the reforms
considered were mainly of the parametric type, aimed at
modifying the functioning of PAYG government pen-
sion schemes. The only exceptions are the 1996 reform
in the Netherlands, the 1998 reform in Sweden, and the
1987 reform in the UK.
The 1996 Dutch reform consisted in the privatisation of
the pension fund for civil servants. The reform carried
out in Sweden in 1998 was a broad reform, that implied,
inter alia, revising the functioning of the government
PAYG pension scheme (from defined benefit to notional
defined contribution) and the gradual introduction of an
additional funded, defined-contribution pillar (see Box
III.3). The 1987 UK reform introduced the possibility of
opting out of the government PAYG scheme and joining
individual private funded schemes (1). In almost all the
parametric reforms considered in Table III.6, elements
aimed at reducing pension benefits and increasing pen-
sion contributions were present, together with revisions
in the statutory retirement age (2).
The following points emerge from the data reported in
Table III.6. First, the evolution of the primary CAB in
correspondence with reform years was to a considerable
extent driven by changes in cyclically adjusted revenues
and primary expenditures not directly related to changes
in pension contributions and social benefits. Second, the
pension contributions as a share of GDP moved little
after the reform in almost all cases (never more than 1
GDP point between the year of the reform and the two
consecutive years).  
¥1∂ See http://www.frdb.org/documentazione/scheda.php?id=55&doc_pk=9027.
¥2∂ The FRDB reports as uncertain the impact of the German reform of 1992
on pension benefits, while in all other cases reforms are indicated as reduc-
ing benefits and increasing contributions. As for revisions in the retirement
age, all reforms include an increase in the statutory retirement age, gener-
ally introduced gradually, except for the 1995 Italian reform where the
retirement age was made more flexible compared with the regime intro-
duced in 1992. Moreover, the Italian reforms of 1992 and 1995 were not
purely parametric in that they also introduced fiscal incentives for the
accumulation of individual private pension schemes
Table III.5
Average changes in budgetary variables during reform periods and periods where no reforms took place: 
pension reforms (EU-14, 1986–2001)
Pension reforms 
Year-to-year change in fiscal variables 
(% of GDP), simple average
No reforms  
(1)
A reform took place in the 
current or previous year 
(2)
T test for (1) ≠ (2)
Primary CAB 0.012 0.18 – 0.87
Cyclically adjusted revenues 0.16 – 0.04 1.06
Social security contributions 0.02 – 0.015 0.6
Primary expenditure 0.11 – 0.23 1.54
Social benefits other than in kind 0.06 – 0.11 1.85*
Government subsidies – 0.08 – 0.09 0.11
N. obs 123 101
NB: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, t tests significant at the 10, 5 and 1 % level.
Source: Commission services.170
P a r t  I I I
S t r u c t u r a l  r e f o r m s  a n d  b u d g e t a r y  o b j e c t i v e sTable III.6
Budgetary variable evolution during structural pension reforms (EU-15, 1986–99)
(% of GDP)
Pension reform Budgetary items t – 1 t t + 1 t + 2
DE 1992 Primary CAB – 2.0 – 1.1 0.0 0.6
Cyclically adjusted revenues 42.6 44.1 46.2 46.5
Primary expenditure 44.3 44.8 45.9 45.6
Social security contributions 17.2 17.6 18.2 18.6
Social benefits other than in kind 15.7 16.3 17.4 17.7
ES 1997 Primary CAB 1.4 2.2 1.4 2.1
Cyclically adjusted revenues 40.0 39.5 38.7 39.2
Primary expenditure 38.4 37.0 37.1 36.7
Social security contributions 13.2 13.1 13.0 13.1
Social benefits other than in kind 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.4
IT 1992 Primary CAB – 0.5 1.7 3.7 2.8
Cyclically adjusted revenues 43.4 46.1 48.3 45.8
Primary expenditure 43.7 44.1 44.6 43.1
Social security contributions 14.8 15.1 15.3 15.0
Social benefits other than in kind 15.6 16.5 17.0 17.3
IT 1995 Primary CAB 2.8 4.0 4.7 7.1
Cyclically adjusted revenues 45.8 45.7 46.1 48.1
Primary expenditure 43.1 41.9 41.7 41.7
Social security contributions 15.0 14.8 15.0 15.3
Social benefits other than in kind 17.3 16.7 16.9 17.3
NL 1996 Primary CAB 2.7 4.7 4.3 3.3
Cyclically adjusted revenues 47.8 48.2 47.2 46.0
Primary expenditure 45.5 44.1 43.1 42.4
Social security contributions 17.2 16.6 16.6 16.4
Social benefits other than in kind 15.3 14.8 13.9 13.0
PT 1993 Primary CAB 2.8 0.3 0.1 1.6
Cyclically adjusted revenues 40.9 40.5 39.6 40.4
Primary expenditure 37.7 40.0 39.4 38.8
Social security contributions 10.4 10.7 10.8 11.0
Social benefits other than in kind 10.2 11.2 12.6 11.8
FI 1997 Primary CAB 3.8 3.1 4.0 3.9
Cyclically adjusted revenues 58.0 54.8 53.3 53.3
Primary expenditure 55.5 52.2 49.2 49.0
Social security contributions 14.2 13.4 13.1 13.2
Social benefits other than in kind 21.5 19.8 18.3 18.1
SE 1998 Primary CAB 6.5 7.7 6.4 7.2
Cyclically adjusted revenues 63.7 63.9 62.9 61.7
Primary expenditure 56.7 55.3 55.5 53.3
Social security contributions 14.5 14.5 13.2 15.1
Social benefits other than in kind 18.9 18.7 18.2 17.5
UK 1987 Primary CAB 2.9 2.1 1.7 2.5
Cyclically adjusted revenues 44.4 42.8 40.8 39.9
Primary expenditure 41.6 40.7 39.0 36.9
Social security contributions 8.35 8.4 8.1 8.0
Social benefits other than in kind 14.1 14.3 13.5 12.5
NB: Including only structural reforms decreasing the generosity of the pension system as reported in the FRDB database. Social benefit figures refer to the ‘social bene-
fits other than in kind’ category in the ESA 95 government accounts.
Source: European Commission computations on the FRDB and AMECO databases.171
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contributions differed depending on whether reforms
were mainly parametric or systemic. After all parametric
reforms, social contributions increased or stayed roughly
constant, while, in the case of the Dutch and UK reforms,
there was a slight reduction in pension contributions (see
Box III.3 for the Swedish reform). Third, social benefits
changed quite substantially after reforms. They fell after
all systemic reforms.
The case of parametric reforms is instead mixed: an
increase is observed after the German reform, the two
Italian reforms and the Portuguese reform, while, after
the Spanish and the Finnish reforms, a reduction in ben-
efits is observed. Overall, the evidence broadly supports
the expectation that the impact of reforms is likely to be
quite different depending on the specifics of the reforms
considered, in particular whether they are mainly para-
metric or systemic reforms.
Since short-term budgetary outcomes are determined
by a series of factors other than pension reforms, an
appropriate assessment of the impact of pension
reforms on budgets needs to control for such factors.
The estimation of augmented fiscal rules allows this
type of control to be performed. Table III.7 presents
the results for fiscal rules analogous to those estimated
previously for the case of labour and product market
reforms, introducing this time a pension reform
dummy that takes value 1 if a pension reform was
implemented in the current or previous year. The ana-
lysis in this case refers separately to the determinants
of the primary CAB, cyclically adjusted revenues and
primary expenditure. Results show that the pension
reform dummy has a negative but non-significant
impact on primary CABs. The coefficient indicates
that a reform implemented in the current or previous
year reduced the value of the primary CAB by about
0.2 GDP points. However, given the high uncertainty
surrounding this estimate (a high standard error of the
regression coefficient), it cannot be judged to be sig-
nificantly different from zero. By carrying out the
same analysis using a dependent variable, the cycli-
cally adjusted government revenues and primary
expenditure, one notices that most of the deterioration
in the primary CAB in the aftermath of pension
reforms is associated with a reduction in revenues
rather than with increased expenditure. Again, the
impact on revenues is however not statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, the analysis does not permit distin-
guishing whether the budgetary impact of pension
reforms is a direct one or whether it is related to a
budgetary relaxation to ease resistance to the imple-
mentation of the reform.       
Table III.7
Budget balances and pension reforms: results from the estimation of fiscal rules (EU-14, 1986–2001)
Dependent variables 
Explanatory variables Primary CAB
Cyclically adjusted government 
revenues
Primary government 
expenditure
Constant – 2.48*** 
(– 4.40)
8.14*** 
(5.54)
4.99*** 
(2.85)
Lagged dependent variable 0.71*** 
(17.57)
0.78*** 
(21.89)
0.91*** 
(22.76)
Output gap – 0.003  
(– 0.08)
0.14*** 
(3.65)
0.14*** 
(2.86)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.048*** 
(5.5)
0.034*** 
(4.21)
– 0.018**  
(– 2.18)
Dummy for pension reform – 0.24  
(– 1.18)
– 0.22  
(– 1.3)
– 0.05  
(– 0.24)
N. obs 224 224 224
R sq. 0.69 0.79 0.73
Chi sq. 1 128 405 731 255 782
NB: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US lagged output gap.
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported.
The pension reform dummy is constructed as an indicator taking value 1 if a pension reform was carried out in the current or previous year and zero otherwise.172
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statistical classification issues and its impact on the government budget
Following an almost decade-long political process, on 8 June 1998 the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag) adopted a deci-
sion on a new system for retirement pensions. The long process reflected the intention from the outset to obtain broad polit-
ical support in favour of a reform leading to a new pension system that could remain stable over a long time. The main
aspects concerned by the reform were as follows: (i) a revision in the functioning of the government PAYG system; (ii) the
creation of a new funded pillar. 
The implementation of the reform foresees a phasing-in period: pension beneficiaries born before 1937 are not affected by
the reform and are entitled to pension benefits according to the old system; generations born after 1953 will receive pen-
sions according to the new system; beneficiaries born between 1938 and 1953 will receive pensions computed according
to both the old and the new systems. The social insurance offices, the National Social Insurance Board and the Premium
Pension Authority (PPM) administer the system.
The main feature of the reform in the PAYG pillar is the introduction of an actuarially fair system for computing benefits
in terms of accrued contributions (1). The reform transformed the previous defined-benefit system into a notional defined-
contribution system. Pension contributions to the PAYG system amount to 16 % of income. The growth of pension rights
is calculated on the basis of the cohort-specific life expectancy and is indexed to income growth in the economy. Moreover,
the system includes an adjustment mechanism to the indexation of pension benefits to ensure financial sustainability.
Finally, the new PAYG scheme defines an upper limit on pension rights earned for high incomes and provides a minimum
pension regardless of contributions paid financed by the central government budget. 
As regards the funded defined-contribution pillar, it collects contributions equal to 2.5 % of income. For the funded part
of the system, future individual pension benefits are determined on the basis of the stock of contributions accumulated and
of the returns on the fund, whose assets are invested in financial markets. Due to the phasing-in of the reform, in the short
to medium run, when the scheme has not yet reached the steady state, contributions to the funded scheme will be larger
than disbursements, i.e. the scheme will exhibit surpluses.
Against the background of several countries implementing or being in the process of implementing multi-pillar pension
reforms, Eurostat set up a task force in 2003 on the classification of pension schemes with a view to interpreting the ESA 95
rules. The decision by Eurostat of 2 March 2004 on the classification of pension schemes implies that funded defined-con-
tribution (DC) pension schemes should be classified outside the government sector (2). The rationale underlying the deci-
sion is that these schemes, even when run by the government, should be considered as owned by the pension beneficiaries,
who are the ultimate economic owners, i.e. those bearing most of the risk (associated mainly with financial market devel-
opments). Member States are required to implement the Eurostat decision, by classifying funded, defined-benefit schemes
outside the government sector, by March 2007 at the latest (3). 
In the case of Sweden, the reclassification of the funded DC pension scheme introduced with the reform of 1998 will result
in a reduction in the general government budget balance estimated in the order of 1 % of GDP per year. Table III.8 reports
national source estimated figures for the balance of the funded DC scheme. Up to 2000, contributions were recorded in the
central government. In 2000, all the contributions paid up to 2000 were recorded altogether in the fund, and this explains
the large surplus for the fund in that year. In subsequent years, the surplus is estimated to be around 1 % of GDP. At the
time of the reclassification of the fund outside the government sector in line with the Eurostat decision, the government
budget balance will be reduced accordingly.
(1) Other elements of the reform concerned the revision of the minimum pension guarantee and the determination of the statutory retirement age. An over-
view of the Swedish pension system is provided in ‘The Swedish national pension system’, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and National Social
Insurance Board, September 2003, and can be found at http://regeringen.se/content/1/c4/05/07/aa589a7c.pdf.
(2) This principle means that the expected present value of pension contributions received by the government equals that of pension benefits paid.
(3) See Eurostat News Release 30/2004, 2.3.2004, available at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-02032004-BP/EN/2-02032004-BP-
EN.HTML
(Continued on the next page)173
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the adoption of reforms?
The previous section analysed whether reforms had a
negative impact on budgets in the short term. As argued
previously, a deterioration in budget balances associated
with reforms (either because of direct budgetary costs or
because resistance to reforms is contained via tax cuts or
increases in particular types of expenditures) is one rea-
son why budgetary discipline in the short term could
hamper the adoption of reforms, but is not the only one.
Fiscal consolidations could be perceived as politically
costly (mainly via their negative impact on economic
activity in the short term). If reforms are costly politi-
cally too and governments dispose of ‘political capital’
in limited supply, a trade-off may emerge between
adopting reforms and taking the necessary measures for
ensuring budgetary discipline. In this section, therefore,
the relation between the stance of budgetary policy and
the implementation of reforms is directly analysed.
A first approach to analysing whether fiscal consolida-
tions were negatively associated with the adoption of
reforms is to compare across the EU countries included
in the sample the frequency of reforms in years during
which there was an improvement in primary cyclically
adjusted budgets (primary CABs) with that in years in
which primary CABs deteriorated. Graph III.3 reports
such information. The difference is negligible in the case
of labour market reforms, it is slightly higher in consoli-
dation years for product market reforms, while in the
case of pension reforms there is a quite substantially
higher frequency of reforms in years in which primary
CABs improved (31 % of the cases as compared with
22 % when a reduction in the primary CAB was
recorded).
Additional useful prima facie information on the link
between fiscal consolidation and the implementation of
reforms is obtained by comparing the frequency of
reforms across the sample before and after the introduc-
tion of the EU fiscal framework. This permits a first
check on the presumption that the EU framework for fis-
cal discipline acts as a constraint on the implementation
of reforms.
Graph III.4 reports data on the frequency of reforms in
the 1990s, separately for the period before and after the
start of Stage II of EMU (i.e. 1994). The data suggest that
while labour market reforms became less frequent in the
EU countries covered by the sample, after the introduc-
tion of the EU fiscal framework, the opposite holds for
product market and pension reforms.  
Looking simply at the difference between reform fre-
quencies in years with and without budgetary consolida-
tion does not permit the taking into account of the impact
that factors different from budgetary policy had on the
timing of the adoption of economic reforms. There are
very few attempts to estimate empirically whether fiscal
consolidation has a negative impact on the probability of
carrying out economic reforms controlling for other fac-
tors. In IMF (2004a), regression analysis on a panel of
advanced countries is performed to assess the impact of
alternative determinants of various reforms, including
Box III.3 (continued)
Table III.8
General government budget and funded DC pension scheme balance, Sweden 
(% of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government budget balance 1.9 2.3 5.1 2.9 – 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8
Funded DC pension scheme balance 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
General government budget balance 
excluding the balance of the funded 
DC pension scheme
1.9 2.3 2.5 2.0 -1.2 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.3
Funded DC pension scheme assets, 
market value
0.0 0.0 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.8 4.6 5.4 6.2 7.1
Sources: Swedish budget bill for 2005 (September 2004), Swedish Ministry of Finance, national accounts and Statistics Sweden.174
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and years where primary cyclically adjusted budget balances worsened
Source: Commission services.
Graph III.4:  Frequency of reforms before and after Stage II of EMU
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 5budget balances (1). Results indicate that fiscal consoli-
dation could be negatively associated with tax reforms
and labour and product market reforms, while there is no
significant relation to financial market reforms and trade
reforms. Conversely, the level of the cyclically adjusted
budget balance is generally significantly and positively
related to structural reform indicators (2).
There is very little work which investigates the impact
that the introduction of the EU fiscal framework had on
the link between public budgets and the probability of
carrying out structural reforms in EU countries. Origi-
nal empirical analysis has therefore been undertaken in
this report with the aim of addressing this issue (see
Box III.4). The econometric specification adopted per-
mits the analysis of (i) whether the introduction of the
EU fiscal framework (identified with the start of Stage
II of EMU, i.e. 1994) had any direct impact on the prob-
ability of reforms and (ii) whether the effect exercised
by fiscal variables (the change in the primary CAB, the
level of the CAB, the level of debt) on the probability
of reforms changed after EMU. A negative sign for the
regression coefficient of the EMU variable would be
consistent with the view that there is a trade-off
between budgetary discipline and structural reforms in
the short term, and that the EU fiscal framework, by
introducing ceilings and targets for deficits, has shifted
the balance against structural reforms. There is no clear
a priori reasoning regarding the impact of the EU fiscal
framework on the way structural reforms are affected
by fiscal variables. This is because there are no clear ex
ante expectations on whether the presumed trade-off
between budgetary discipline and structural reforms
could have become more or less binding after EMU. On
the one hand, the need to consolidate public finances in
the run-up to EMU and adhere to numerical rules for
deficits thereafter may have led to ‘consolidation
fatigue’, so that policy authorities may now attach a
bigger weight to the political costs of fiscal consolida-
tion. According to this argument, the trade-off between
budgetary discipline and reforms could have become
more stringent. On the other hand, after EMU, the pol-
icy authorities’ commitment to budgetary discipline
has become more credible, and this contributes to
reducing the political costs associated with fiscal con-
solidation and to easing the supposed trade-off between
budgetary discipline and reforms.
Overall, the results from the analysis point to a negative
but non-significant relation between the consolidation
variable and labour and product market reforms and to a
highly insignificant relation between consolidation and
pension reforms. Moreover, the introduction of the EU
fiscal framework does not appear to have exercised
either a significant direct effect on the probability of
reforms or a systematic and significant impact on the
relationship between fiscal variables and the probability
of reforms.  
3.4. Summary of findings
The main messages from the empirical analysis on the
short-term budgetary impact of product market and
labour market reforms and of pension reforms can be
summarised in the following way.
• Looking at average changes in budget balances in
years with and without reforms, no significant dif-
ferences emerge concerning the evolution of the
primary CAB in the short term, irrespective of the
type of reform considered. Product market reforms
are associated with slower growth in government
revenues accompanied by correspondingly slower
growth in expenditure. In the aftermath of pension
reforms, social benefits paid by the government
grow at a significantly slower rate, but the overall
impact on the budget is compensated by govern-
ment revenues also growing at a slower rate. The
analysis of the evolution of budgetary variables
during the implementation of selected structural
pension reforms suggests that the impact of
reforms can be quite different depending on the
characteristics of the reforms, mainly on whether
the reforms mainly introduce parametric changes
or also allow for systemic changes in the national
framework for pensions.
¥1∂ The analysis concerns several types of reforms: labour product and finan-
cial market reforms, tax reforms and trade reforms. The following set of
explanatory factors are considered: initial structural conditions, variables
relating to international factors and openness, macroeconomic variables,
and factors affecting the policy-making process. The initial structural con-
ditions are captured by lagged variables of the structural indicators used as
dependent variables and by demographic variables. International factors
are captured by the share of trade on GDP (trade openness) and by a
dummy variable for EU membership. The macroeconomic variables used
include cyclically adjusted primary budget balances, both level and year-
to-year changes and dummy variables denoting years with very low
growth (bad years) and how many of the previous three years were bad
years. Factors affecting the policy-making process were captured by a list
of dummies capturing political variables (e.g. whether in the year there
were elections, electoral rule followed, etc.). 
¥2∂ Analogous analysis to that contained in IMF (2004a) has been carried out
in IMF (2004b) separately on a sample comprising EU countries only. It is
shown that when the analysis is restricted to EU countries, the impact of
fiscal consolidation on the implementation of reforms becomes signifi-
cantly weaker.176
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The approach followed to analyse econometrically the impact of fiscal consolidation on reforms has some distinguishing
features. First, discrete variables for labour and product market and pension reforms have been used as dependent variables
in regression analysis (see Table III.9). This means that the impact of the alternative explanatory factors of reforms is inter-
preted as affecting the probability of carrying out reforms (probit analysis). Second, since the aim of the analysis is to high-
light a possible trade-off between fiscal consolidation and reforms rather than to provide a whole assessment of the
determinants of structural reforms, only explanatory variables relating to cyclical and public finance conditions appear as
distinctive explanatory factors, all other factors (e.g. relating to the initial structural conditions, political and institutional
factors, etc.) being captured by country-specific trends (1). Third, the econometric specification chosen permits the assess-
ment of what impact the introduction of the EU fiscal framework had both on the probability of reforms and on the link
between fiscal variables and economic reforms. 
(1) It should also be noted that in the case of pension reforms there is no obvious measure of the initial state of structural conditions, being the reform indi-
cator constructed on the basis of policy measures implemented rather than on the basis of a sufficiently large improvement in structural indices as in
the case of labour market and product market reforms.
(Continued on the next page)
Table III.9
Public budgets and the probability of reforms: probit regressions
Dependent variables 
Explanatory variables
Labour market 
reforms indicator
Product market 
reforms indicator
Pension 
reforms indicator
Output gap 0.006 
(0.38)
– 0.0003 
(– 0.04)
– 0.01 
(– 0.70)
Change in output gap 0.021 
(1.05)
– 0.02 
(– 1.23)
– 0.001 
(– 0.05)
CAB (year<=1993) 0.027 
(1.08)
0.03*** 
(2.76)
– 0.016 
(– 1.56)
Change in primary CAB (year<=1993) – 0.02 
(– 1.31)
– 0.015 
(– 0.64)
0.008 
(0.26)
Debt (year<=1993) 0.009*** 
(4.22)
0.009 ***
(4.14)
0.0003 
(0.17)
CAB (∆ after 1993) – 0.09***
(– 2.76)
– 0.01 
(– 0.36)
– 0.003 
(– 0.11)
Change in primary CAB (∆ after 1993) 0.087 
(1.45)
– 0.012 
(– 0.2)
0.004 
(0.10)
Debt (∆ after 1993) – 0.003 
(– 0.87)
0.0019 
(0.89)
0.001 
(0.42)
Dummy year>=1993 – 0.24 
(– 1.17)
– 0.16 
(– 0.79)
– 0.13 
(– 0.46)
N. obs. 309 297 210
Pseudo R sq. 0.21 0.32 0.14
Log likelyhood – 143 – 124 – 109
NB: Estimation method: probit regressions on panel data, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries. Coefficients represent the marginal contri-
bution of the explanatory variables (measured at sample mean) to the probability of reforms being carried out. All equations include country-specific
trends, whose coefficient, significant in most cases, is not reported.
Z statistics for the significance of probit coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at 90, 95, and 99%
confidence.177
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the impact of reforms is not isolated from that of
other factors which may also have affected budget
balances.
• When the short-term budgetary impact of reforms is
evaluated after controlling for the response of fiscal
authorities to the cycle and debt developments, there
is evidence that labour market reforms, product mar-
ket reforms and pension reforms are associated with
a deterioration in budgets (due either to a direct
budgetary impact of reforms or to other reasons,
such as tax cuts or expenditure increases aimed at
easing resistance to reforms). The impact appears
rather weak (a primary CAB reduced by a fraction of
a GDP point) and statistically significant only in the
case of labour market reforms. This evidence, point-
ing to a possible trade-off between short-term budg-
etary discipline and structural reforms in the case of
labour market reforms, may be explained on the
ground of relatively strong resistance to the intro-
duction of this type of reforms.
• Budgetary deteriorations following reforms are not
the only reason why a trade-off between budgetary
discipline and reforms could emerge. Looking
directly at the relation between fiscal consolidation
variables and the frequency of reforms, the expecta-
tion that reforms are less frequent in years where a
budgetary consolidation takes place seems discon-
firmed by the data. On the contrary, product market
and pension reforms are more frequent in these
years. There is also no systematic evidence that after
the introduction of the EU fiscal framework (which
has corresponded in some Member States to consol-
idation efforts in the run-up to EMU and with a sub-
sequent prudent budgetary strategy) reforms became
less frequent: while this seems true for labour mar-
ket reforms, the opposite result is obtained for prod-
uct market and pension reforms.
• There are many factors that account for the adoption
of reforms: structural, macroeconomic, institutional.
Once an attempt is made to control for these factors
in assessing the role of fiscal variables in determin-
Box III.4 (continued)
The cycle is captured by the level and the year-to-year change in the output gap. Output gap levels become negative (pos-
itive) after consecutive years of growth below (above) trend. The expected sign of the variable is therefore negative, indi-
cating that a protracted disappointing growth performance is likely to trigger reforms. The change in the output gap is
negative (positive) if current growth is below (above) trend. There is no clear a priori reasoning for this variable. A positive
sign would signal that reforms are more likely to be implemented when growth picks up. The fiscal variables included are
the level of the CAB (aimed at capturing whether room in the budget to cater for reform costs facilitates the adoption of
reforms), the change in the primary CAB (which measures the stance of fiscal policy) and the debt/GDP ratio (to capture
the impact of structural and persistent fiscal imbalances on the probability of carrying out reforms). Both the variables cap-
turing the cycle and the fiscal situation are included with 1 year lag to avoid problems of simultaneity.
A dummy variable taking value 1 after 1993 (i.e. starting from Stage II of EMU) captures the direct impact of the EU fiscal
framework on reforms. Fiscal variables are included in the specification which also interacted with the EMU dummy var-
iable. The coefficient of the fiscal variables without interaction is interpreted as applying to the sample years up to 1993,
while the coefficient of the variables interacted with the EMU dummy measures the change in these coefficients after 1993. 
The results, reported in Table III.9, can be summarised as follows. First, the direct impact of EMU is negative but never
significant, irrespective of the type of reform considered. Second, the estimated impact of fiscal consolidation (i.e. the
change in the primary CAB) is negative for labour and product market reforms while it is positive in the case of pension
reforms. In no case is the coefficient of the fiscal consolidation variable significantly different from zero. Moreover, there
is no significant change in the coefficient of the consolidation variable after EMU. Third, there is evidence pointing to a
generally positive effect of the level of the CAB in the case of labour and product market reforms, while the coefficient is
negative for pension reforms. A statistically significant coefficient is obtained only for the case of product market reforms.
There is evidence that EMU changed significantly the impact of the CAB only for labour market reforms: the impact of
the CAB on the probability of reforms turned from positive to negative after EMU. Fourth, debt levels are positively related
to the probability of reforms, with significant coefficients in the case of labour and product market reforms but not in the
case of pension reforms. Finally, the variables capturing the effect of the cycle are never significant.178
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that the impact of the consolidation variable (the
change in the primary CAB) is negative, weak and
non-significant for labour and product market
reforms and positive and highly insignificant for
pension reforms. Moreover, the introduction of the
EU fiscal framework had a negative but not signifi-
cant impact on the probability of reforms and did not
change significantly the impact of consolidation on
the probability of reforms. Conversely, for product
market reforms, there is some support in the data for
the view that low deficits (more room in budgets to
accommodate possible budgetary costs of reforms)
contribute to increasing the probability of reforms.
Furthermore, for both labour and product market
reforms, high debts (stronger need to put an end to
unsustainable trends in public finances) increase the
probability of reforms.
The results from the empirical analysis suffer from the
fact that the data set is of limited size and because any
measurement of reforms involves to a certain degree
arbitrary choices which may, however, matter for
results.
Overall, there is a strong indication that generalisations
are not easy to make concerning the link between struc-
tural reforms and budgets in the short run. Results differ
depending on the specific type of reforms considered.
Also, within a given type of reforms (e.g. pension
reforms), the fiscal implications are likely to differ con-
siderably depending on the main elements of the reform
and on how reforms are designed. Furthermore, the weak
statistical significance of results reveals, in general, a
high degree of dispersion in results across the sample,
i.e. each reform case cannot be easily assimilated to the
average (1).
These results point to some lessons for policy. In the
implementation of the EU fiscal framework, there are
reasons for taking better into account the role of eco-
nomic reforms, especially when there is a strong ex ante
expectation that reforms may have a positive impact on
public finances in the long term coupled with budgetary
costs in the short term. However, a mechanistic, one-
size-fits-all approach whereby all reforms or all reforms
belonging to some broad categories are judged the same
way should be avoided. Judgment should also be made
on a case-by-case basis, on the ground of information on
the relevant specificities of the various reforms at stake.
¥1∂ The interpretation of results concerning the impact of Stage II of EMU on
the probability of reforms should be viewed with caution. In fact, mone-
tary integration in Europe was supplemented by other processes, notably
the European employment strategy (introduced in 1997) which presuma-
bly had a positive impact on labour market reforms. 179

Part IV
Fiscal challenges during convergence 
in the recently acceded Member States 

Summary
The Member States that joined the EU in May 2004 are
at different stages in the catching-up process towards
average EU levels of income and financial development.
Fiscal policy can make a key contribution in this process
through efficient tax and expenditure policies and also
through helping to stabilise the economy. Over the long
run, these two roles are complementary. Strong growth
enhances the economy’s debt-carrying capacity, while
stability is crucial for sustainable catching-up. In the
short run, though, policy-makers in the recently acceded
Member States may face difficult choices. Spending
more on infrastructure, training or R & D can make it
harder to contain deficits, and tax and pension reforms
involve upfront costs. In many cases, such costs can be
offset by restructuring existing programmes in ways that
benefit growth — reducing subsidies and streamlining
administration; and preliminary analysis suggests signif-
icant scope for such restructuring in the new Member
States that face major deficit challenges. Moreover, the
EU makes a significant contribution through the Struc-
tural Funds.
Still, there can be tensions between financing priority
programmes and safeguarding stability. Policy-mak-
ers in the new Member States have to make case-by-
case judgments on priorities, taking into account their
differing economic and financial circumstances —
stages in economic catching-up, the structure of the
public finances, and plans for adopting the euro. In
terms of such specifics, fiscal challenges in all the
recently acceded Member States except Cyprus and
Malta have been dominated by the transition from
central planning. This left the Baltic States and most
central European Member States with far to go in
catching-up with EU living standards, and their econ-
omies have also been somewhat more volatile as a
result. The most sweeping challenges of transition are
over, but there are still sources of volatility ahead. It
will be important to ensure room to cope with shocks
to the economy when setting medium-term fiscal
goals.
A relevant feature in most of the new Member States is
that the financial sector is now expanding rapidly, fol-
lowing crises and reforms in the 1990s. This deserves
special attention in assessing the environment for fiscal
policy. Healthy growth in credit is a key support for
catching-up, but it will be important to guard against
excessively strong cycles in credit, asset prices, the
external current account and the real exchange rate,
which could misallocate resources and jeopardise stabil-
ity. Banking supervision can play a valuable role here.
Also, monetary policy, where free to address specifically
domestic developments, can contribute by moderating
inflationary booms and discouraging unhedged borrow-
ing through exchange rate variability.
Fiscal policy can also contribute importantly to safe-
guarding stability at times when credit booms are under
way, and when strong private investment causes the
external current account deficit to widen. Here, varying
experience in other Member States is informative. In
some cases, policy-makers helped keep the economy sta-
ble by allowing strong booms to swing the budget
towards smaller deficits or a surplus. That required care
in not overestimating the sustainable growth trend, and
recognising that strong tax gains might in part prove
temporary. This helped to moderate booms, and pro-
vided a cushion when growth slowed down as a result of
external shocks or retrenchment by households and
firms. In some cases, periods of strong growth were used
to speed up fiscal consolidation. Prudent fiscal policy in
such cases helped complement and balance strong pri-
vate sector expansion.
Should fiscal policy, during an extended boom, go fur-
ther by temporarily running smaller deficits or larger
surpluses than required for debt sustainability or the free
play of stabilisers within the limits of the Maastricht
Treaty? The case for this is less clear-cut than the need
to avoid procyclical easing. Some additional headroom
could, however, be prudent if private sector exuberance
is setting the stage for a crisis — for example, if the cur-183
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fidence. Should one-off adjustments become necessary,
these can be costly if they fall on investment, and policy
lags mean that tightening may take effect just as the
economy is slowing down.
This highlights the case for fostering stability in comple-
mentary ways. Notably, there is scope to foster stable
expectations through transparent and credible medium-
term frameworks, which are well understood by markets
and can help protect strategic tax and spending priorities.
This is one way in which strong fiscal institutions can
help to improve the prospects for stability. It is also val-
uable to review microeconomic aspects of policy, such
as distortions resulting from subsidies to real estate
credit.
All of the new Member States need to take account of a
further element in the environment for fiscal policy:
actual and planned monetary and exchange regimes.
This is evident from recent experience. In the Baltic
States hard currency pegs have been underpinned by
goals of budget balance and low levels of public debt,
while in most central European economies flexible
exchange rates are associated with higher deficits and
debt. Monetary regimes are now evolving again, as the
new Member States approach euro adoption at varying
speeds. Where national currencies are retained for some
years, it will be particularly important to slow the build-
up of euro-denominated borrowing — which, over an
extended period, could expose economies to balance-
sheet risks in the event of depreciation. Monetary and
supervisory policies can contribute to this, as can fiscal
policy, by helping to avoid excessively high domestic
currency interest rates. On the other hand, where the
EU-10 progressively give up the freedom to use interest
rates for domestic purposes, there could be greater risks
of strong credit cycles — and thus of stresses for fiscal
policy during periods when adjustment through relative
prices may take place slowly.
An implication of regimes, such as ERM II, that involve
exchange rate targeting is that fiscal performance and
internal policy coordination are highlighted in terms of
market credibility. The possibility of contagion in finan-
cial markets means, moreover, that instability affecting
one economy could spread to another. The run-up to euro
adoption also places special demands on policy-mix —
the relative burden borne by fiscal and monetary policy
— to ensure that the euro conversion rate and the market
approach path correctly reflect fundamentals. For exam-
ple, a combination of tight money and an easy fiscal
stance during the approach to euro adoption could cause
both volatility and an overly appreciated entry rate.
In sum, fiscal policy needs to support growth through
expenditure and tax reforms, while also containing defi-
cits and debt as an insurance against risks to stability.
High potential growth rates and, in some cases, low pub-
lic debt are elements that suggest some deficit leeway as
policy-makers in the recently acceded Member States
seek to protect growth-supportive fiscal programmes.
But several factors also underscore the need for pru-
dence in formulating fiscal goals: the scope for some-
what greater volatility in the public finances; the risks of
overestimating potential growth and revenue buoyancy
during credit and asset price booms; and policy-mix and
credibility challenges during the run-up to euro adop-
tion. Also, where medium-term goals can be eased, it
will be important to avoid a stimulus at times of concern
about domestic and external imbalances. As policy-mak-
ers take these factors into account, actions to strengthen
fiscal institutions provide important scope to improve
possible trade-offs, thus helping to ensure that conver-
gence towards higher living standards is both strong and
sustainable.184
1. Introduction
The Member States that joined the European Union in
May 2004 have income levels below the average of the
EU-15. A majority of those in the Baltic region and central
Europe face a particularly steep convergence path, and
they also have financial sectors that are still developing
strongly. The challenge they face, from very differing
starting positions, is to ensure that macroeconomic and
structural policies are well designed and well coordinated,
so as to foster strong and sustainable convergence.
Fiscal policy can contribute to this in two ways. First, tax
and expenditure policies can help create conditions for
strong growth in the private sector — for example, ade-
quate infrastructure and education; a level and structure
of taxation that ensure incentives for investment and
employment; fiscal support, where required, for eco-
nomic restructuring; and social safety nets that help
cushion distributional hardships caused by economic
change and reorient those affected towards new jobs.
Second, fiscal policy can help preserve macroeconomic
stability — by offsetting fluctuations in private sector
activity, achieving a balanced policy-mix, and credibly
assuring sustainability of the public debt.
These priorities for fiscal policy are, over the long run,
strongly complementary. Sustained expansion in the pri-
vate sector makes a major contribution to public debt sus-
tainability, and vice versa. Tax and expenditure reforms
can both reduce public imbalances and, through a range of
channels, improve incentives for the private sector. None-
theless, tensions can arise in the shorter term between con-
taining deficits and implementing programmes to foster
growth. This may be especially so where there is a marked
scarcity of public goods, or where restructuring entails
sizeable fiscal costs — both of which apply in a majority
of the recently acceded Member States.
The possibility of trade-offs between growth and stabil-
ity in the EU-10 has been discussed in recent academic
and policy literature on the design of fiscal policy —
with varying conclusions regarding medium-term goals
and the pace of consolidation. For example, the Sapir
report (1) saw potential to support growth by accommo-
dating wider fiscal deficits in the EU-10 (by comparison
with SGP norms). On the other hand, an IMF report on
the central European new Member States (2) cautioned
that the potential for rapid domestic credit growth as part
of the convergence process, as well as the risk of
exchange market turbulence, should prompt a very cau-
tious fiscal stance.
In this context, it is important to recall that the EU-10
present a highly varied group in the profile of their public
finances. There are wide differences in taxation and
expenditure levels, deficit and debt trajectories, progress
with convergence, and the influence of monetary and
exchange regimes. Any analysis must take full account
of such differences — of course, without losing sight of
a common environment that includes the acquis commu-
nautaire, the priority of sustained convergence priorities
and, at some point in the future, the challenge and oppor-
tunity of euro adoption.
To shed light on such issues, this chapter provides a brief
review of fiscal trends over the past decade, and consid-
ers policy complementarities and trade-offs in the period
ahead. It focuses, in particular, on the scope to enhance
potential growth through tax and expenditure reforms
and strengthening fiscal institutions; and the stabilising
role of fiscal policy — including the implications of pri-
vate sector imbalances and of possible volatility in the
real and financial economy (which is explored in terms
of the components of a debt dynamics equation).
Against this background, it suggests, in conclusion,
some possible priorities for medium-term fiscal frame-
works and comments on complementarities and trade-
offs that deserve further study in light of country-spe-
cific circumstances. 
¥1∂ See Sapir et al. (2004).
¥2∂ See IMF (2004c).185
2. Macroeconomic and financial background
2.1. Key macroeconomic developments
The recently acceded Member States have made remark-
able progress in aligning their institutional and economic
features with those of longer-standing members of the
EU. This has been particularly marked in the former cen-
trally planned economies, where great strides have been
made in macroeconomic stabilisation and real and nom-
inal convergence since the beginning of transition. Nev-
ertheless, in spite of these advances, these economies
still show significant differences from the EU-15, of
which low per capita income and a less developed finan-
cial sector are of particular relevance (1).
Growth performance in the Baltic and central European
new Member States (except for the Czech Republic)
was consistently better than in the euro area during
1997–2004 (see Table IV.1). The three Baltic countries
with lower per capita incomes achieved notably high
growth rates. However, GDP per capita levels in the
EU-10 are still considerably below the euro-area level
— on average, half that level. Apart from the Baltic
States, the lowest level occurs in Poland, while the
highest levels are in Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, bring-
ing them close to some euro-area members. The rela-
tionship between growth and scope for catch-up is
illustrated in Graph IV.1.
Over the last decade, inflation in the EU-10 has fallen
substantially — in all cases to single-digit levels (see
Table IV.1 and Graph IV.2). This reflected a clear orien-
tation of monetary and exchange rate policies. Recent
fluctuations were mostly explained by cyclical and other
short-term influences, in particular the exchange rate,
food and commodity prices, and tax and administered
price adjustments. Although the cross-country disper-
sion of inflation has also fallen, there are still substantial
divergences. In 2004, HICP inflation figures ranged
from some 1 % in Lithuania to 7.4 % in Slovakia, with
the latter being a prime example of adjustments in
administered prices and indirect taxes. The containment
of inflationary pressures will remain a challenge as the
Balassa–Samuelson effects work their way through the
system, wage pressures remain strong, and indirect taxes
are further adjusted in line with EU legislation.    
Unemployment remains a major policy challenge in
many new Member States and, in particular, in Poland
and Slovakia (see Graph IV.2), due to, inter alia, labour
shedding during ongoing restructuring, which often is
not matched by absorption capacity and flexibility in the
labour market.
Interest rates have fallen substantially over recent years,
and have become less dispersed. This reflects favourable
inflation expectations, declining risk premiums, and
convergence plays with a view to euro adoption. How-
ever, Hungary in particular stands out as a case where
this tendency has recently been reversed.
The new Member States are very open economies. The
GDP share of exports and imports far exceeds 100 % in
most, with the exception of Poland. Their openness has
to some extent influenced past and present choices of
exchange rate regimes. The current gamut of regimes
ranges from a freely floating currency in Poland to cur-
rency boards with the euro in Estonia and Lithuania. The
Baltic States, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia have already
become members of ERM II.
Current account deficits have, in general, been significant
in most countries over recent years, which is typical for
converging economies. The Baltic countries, in particular,
have experienced large current account deficits. As the lat-
ter have also had relatively small general government def-
icits or, in the case of Estonia, a surplus, private sector net
saving has been particularly negative — in the case of
Estonia and Latvia notably also in 2004. In contrast, the
picture has been rather mixed in the central European new
Member States: while the Czech Republic, Hungary and
¥1∂ For a recent review of macroeconomic and structural developments in the
EU-10, see European Commission (2004b).186
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Source: AMECO database.
Graph IV.2:  Unemployment and inflation
Source: AMECO database.
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vate sector net saving was positive in Poland and Slovenia.
So far, relatively high current account deficits have been
financed to a considerable extent by foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). However, as privatisation-related FDI has
fallen to a trickle in some countries, and is declining in oth-
ers, current account financing may now rely more on short-
term capital inflows, thus increasing inherent volatility.
2.2. Macroeconomic volatility: 
recent experience
The EU-10 have, in general, enjoyed considerably
stronger growth than the euro area since the mid-1990s,
but rapid growth typically went together with greater mac-
roeconomic volatility (see Graphs IV.4 and IV.5). Part of
this may be due to the greater degree of openness of the
EU-10, but, in addition, they faced significant adjustment
costs in their transition from central planning to a market
economy. Unproductive industries had to be closed, bad
debts had to be assumed by the State, and social support
had to be provided for a growing number of unemployed.
In the early 1990s, this led to a considerable output loss
and pressure on public finances. For example, GDP con-
tracted in 1992 by more than 30 % in Latvia.
With the perspective of EU accession, the economic sit-
uation turned for the better. Strong growth rates were
realised, but remained vulnerable to shocks: large
swings in GDP growth were still observed. Several
recently acceded Member States experienced setbacks in
the late 1990s due to failed adjustment programmes,
while some proved particularly vulnerable to the Russian
crisis in 1998.        
Table IV.1
Selected macroeconomic indicators
GDP per 
capita
GDP growth Unemployment HICP 
inflation
GDP deflator Standard 
deviation 
of % 
change
Interest rates
(% of euro 
area, PPS)
% 
(annual 
average)
Standard 
deviation 
of growth
(% of civilian 
labour force)
(annual % 
change)
(% change) (long-term 
nominal)
2003 1997–2004 1997–2004 1997 2004 2004 1997 2004 1997–2004 2001 2004
CZ 64.3 1.8 2.0 4.7 8.3 2.6 8.3 3.7 3.4 6.3 4.8
EE 45.6 6.1 3.0 9.6 9.2 3.0 10.5 3.3 2.6 10.2 4.4
CY 76.0 3.6 1.3 4.9 5.0 1.9 2.8 2.2 1.0 7.6 5.8
LV 38.3 6.7 1.8 15.2 9.8 6.2 7.0 7.3 1.5 7.6 4.9
LT 42.8 5.7 3.4 12.5 10.8 1.1 14.0 3.3 5.0 8.2 4.5
HU 56.6 4.1 0.7 9.0 5.9 6.8 18.5 4.7 3.8 8.0 8.2
MT 68.3 2.4 2.9 6.3 7.3 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.6 6.2 4.7
PL 43.0 3.9 1.9 10.9 18.8 3.6 13.9 2.9 4.8 10.7 6.9
SI 71.8 3.8 1.0 6.9 6.0 3.6 8.8 3.0 1.9 n.a. 4.7
SK 48.9 3.8 1.3 12.3 18.0 7.4 6.7 4.6 1.5 8.0 5.0
EU-10 (2) 55.6 4.2 1.9 9.2 9.9 3.9 9.3 3.7 2.7 8.1 (1) 5.4
Baltic EU-10 (2) 42.2 6.2 2.7 12.4 9.9 3.5 10.5 4.6 3.0 8.6 4.6
Central European 
EU-10 (2)
56.9 3.5 1.4 8.8 11.4 4.8 11.2 3.8 3.1 8.2 (1) 5.9
Island EU-10 (2) 72.2 3.0 2.1 5.6 6.2 2.3 2.5 2.0 1.3 6.9 5.2
Euro area (2) 100.0 3.2 1.5 9.1 7.5 2.2 2.5 2.3 0.9 5.0 4.1
Standard 
deviation across 
EU-10 
13.7 1.6 — 3.5 4.8 2.1 5.1 1.6 — 1.5 1.2
(1) Excluding Slovenia.
(2) Unweighted average.
Sources: AMECO database and ECB annual public finance report 2004 (unpublished).188
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the future, particularly if special events occurred. In
the present analysis, when assessing volatility, the
early 1990s are excluded from the reference period,
since that was the time when transition shocks were
largest. The reference period used starts in 1997, when
‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union’ was
published (European Commission, 1997), offering a
concrete perspective of accession, though without yet
specifying a date.
The standard deviation of growth rates in the EU-10 can
be compared with that in euro-area countries calculated
over the same reference period, 1997–2004, during most
of which the euro existed (see Table IV.1). The focus
here is on two main macroeconomic drivers of fiscal
developments: growth and inflation. Greater volatility is
observed in the EU-10, which could weigh on the stabil-
ity of the public finances. In particular, a high volatility
in inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) is noted.
Of course, the euro may have had a stabilising impact on
the area economy, and it could be argued that the EU-10
should be compared with a period prior to the euro. To
allow for that, comparison can also be made with volatility
in euro-area economies in the period 1994–99, mostly
ahead of euro adoption and in that respect more similar to
the period that the EU-10 are presently experiencing. This
would begin after the exchange rate turmoil of 1992–93
and the associated recession and high fiscal deficits. From
1994, it gradually became clear that the euro would be
introduced, a similar situation to that today in most of the
EU-10. Using this reference period, the findings above are
confirmed. (In the euro-area countries, the unweighted
standard deviation of growth was 1.1, and that of the GDP
deflator was 1.2.) In general, macroeconomic volatility in
the EU-10 emerges as higher, even if one excludes the
early 1990s, when transition shocks were strongest.
At the country level, there are differences. The Baltic
States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) experienced
Table IV.2
Selected external indicators
Exchange rate 
(domestic currency per euro, % change)
Exchange rate 
regime
Openness (2) 
(exports + 
imports, 
% of GDP)
Current account balance 
(% of GDP)
1997–2003 2004 2005 (1)  2004 1997 2004
CZ – 3.4 – 6.4 – 1.3 Managed float 143.0 – 6.3 – 5.2
EE 0.3 0.0 0.0 ERM II, since 
28.6.2004
169.3 – 11.4 – 13.5
CY – 0.2 – 1.3 0.8 ERM II, since 
2.5.2005
97.0 – 4.8 – 5.6
LV – 3.7 2.9 – 0.1 ERM II, since 
2.5.2005
103.7 – 5.6 – 12.7
LT – 29.0 0.0 0.0 ERM II, since 
28.6.2004
112.1 – 10.0 – 8.4
HU 31.1 – 7.0 0.7 Euro peg, 15 % 
band
133.6 – 4.4 – 9.1
MT – 3.8 0.6 – 0.9 ERM II, since 
2.5.2005
158.1 – 5.9 – 2.7
PL 30.9 – 12.3 0.1 Float 80.0 – 3.5 – 1.9
SI 33.7 1.0 0.0 ERM II, since 
28.6.2004
120.4 0.3 – 0.7
SK 4.9 – 4.6 0.0 Managed float 156.3 – 8.7 – 3.5
Euro area (3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 — 71.3 1.6 0.8
(1) January to March 2005.
(2) Goods and services.
(3) Weighted average.
Source: AMECO database.189
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Sources: AMECO and Eurostat databases.
Graph IV.4:  GDP growth and growth volatility
Source: AMECO database.
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central European new Member States except Slovenia
saw marked fluctuations in inflation. Cyprus and Malta
were characterised by a high level of nominal stability as
illustrated by fairly low volatility in inflation, but output
variation was high in Malta.
2.3. Main financial sector characteristics
The level of domestic financial intermediation in the
Baltic and central European new Member States is char-
acterised by a still large gap with the euro area. Financial
intermediation in these countries occurs mostly through
the banking system. However, the size of the banking
sectors is small, relative to GDP, compared with the euro
area. This is evidenced by the low GDP ratios of broad
money and domestic bank claims on the private sector,
although the latter are now growing very rapidly in most
countries. Cyprus and Malta, by contrast, have a banking
sector broadly comparable to the EU-15.
The financial systems of the EU-10 that were formerly
centrally planned economies have only been built up
over the past 15 years. They have high degrees of inter-
linkage with the euro area, notably with regard to the
Graph IV.5:  Openness and growth volatility
Source: AMECO database.
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Table IV.3
Financial intermediation
M2
2004
Domestic bank 
claims to 
private sector 
2003
Domestic bank 
claims to 
private sector
 (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% change Dec. 
2003/Dec. 2002)
CZ 70.0 30.7 8.6
EE 42.2 33.1 32.6
CY 125.3 119.4 5.1
LV 39.8 34.6 45.3
LT 32.8 20.4 58.9
HU 48.1 43.0 33.3
MT n.a. 114.7 2.3
PL 42.1 29.0 6.7
SI 54.1 41.5 15.4
SK 59.7 31.6 13.9
EU-10 (1) 57.1 (2) 49.8 22.2
Euro area (3) 94.2 112.1 5.5
(1) Unweighted average.
(2) Excluding Malta.
(3) Weighted average.
Sources: IMF, IFS and national sources.191
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and deposit currency. Indeed, while strategies have var-
ied, almost all the new Member States have encouraged
the involvement of foreign investors in the restructuring
of their banking sector (1). Attracted by high margins and
growth prospects in the EU-10, foreign investment has
helped recapitalise banking systems, while transferring
important expertise and technology. Banking systems
are largely well capitalised and profitable, even if the
share of non-performing loans remains higher than in
other EU countries. The insurance, pension and mutual
fund industries are still very small, but fast growing. Fac-
ing constraints from underdeveloped domestic markets,
they have invested substantially in foreign assets in sev-
eral recently acceded Member States.
Although all the EU-10 have established domestic mar-
kets for money, bonds and equities, these are small in
absolute terms and relative to GDP, with a generally lim-
ited number of issuers and secondary market activity.
Indeed, both fixed-income and equity markets are still
small and illiquid. In terms of securities outstanding, the
EU-10 account for 2 % of the EU-25 fixed-income mar-
kets, with only the three biggest markets — i.e. Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary — larger than the Irish
market, which is currently the smallest in the euro area.
A common feature of fixed-income markets is the dom-
inance of central government issuance, which accounts
for between 80 and 100 % in most cases. Issuance by the
private sector represents a significant share only in the
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia.
Equity markets in the EU-10 are not yet a major source
for corporate financing. Market capitalisation in terms of
GDP is less than half that in the euro area for most of the
EU-10 and turnover is generally less than one sixth. Lev-
els of development vary widely, however, in part reflect-
ing the choice of privatisation method between voucher
and other schemes. Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary have the largest markets in absolute terms,
while Estonia has the largest markets in terms of GDP.
To acquire access to a wider investor base, and cheaper
capital, a significant number of companies in the new
Member States have been cross-listing abroad, mostly in
New York and London and to a much lesser extent
within the euro area. Several exchanges in the EU-10
have entered strategic partnerships with other
exchanges.     
¥1∂ Public banks have retained a significant share of the market only in Poland
and Slovenia.192
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Sources: ECB and ‘Banking structures in the new EU Member States’, January 2005.
Graph IV.7:  Basic characteristics of the EU-10 bond markets
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations; end-2003 data.
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Sources: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations; end-2003 data.
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3. Recent developments in the public finances
3.1. Fiscal deficits and public debt
Experience in managing the public finances has varied
widely across the recently acceded Member States. For
the former centrally planned economies, budget balances
were strongly affected by transition-related effects,
including bank restructuring operations — even to some
extent after 1997 (1). Apart from a few exceptions, gen-
eral government deficits have not shown a clear ten-
dency to decline.
In 2004, Estonia was exceptional in registering a budget
surplus, while the other Baltic States had deficits well
below 3 % of GDP — a performance that in part reflects
the context of hard-peg exchange regimes. Apart from
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the deficit of the other
countries exceeded 3 % of GDP by varying margins.
Slovakia came closest to this level, while Poland had the
highest deficit among the central European new Member
States. The deficits of Cyprus and Malta were around 4
and 5 % of GDP, respectively. The deficit-to-tax reve-
nue ratio in the central European countries (except Slov-
enia), in the islands and in Lithuania was significantly
higher than in the euro area, suggesting that it would be
more difficult to eliminate the deficit or part of it through
revenue measures.
Public debt ratios in 2004 were below the 60 % of GDP
Treaty reference value in all the new Member States
except Cyprus and Malta. Estonia had a very low debt
(some 5 %), whereas Hungary was close to 60 %. Taking
tax revenues as a reference point, the picture relative to the
euro area typically is less favourable. The interest burden
as a ratio of tax revenues is also higher than in the euro
area in Hungary, Cyprus and Malta, and close to the euro
area in Poland and Slovakia. Debt maturities show a fairly
high short-term share in the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Foreign-currency-denominated debt is particularly high in
the Baltic States, reflecting their currency arrangements
and advanced progress towards euro adoption, as well as
in Slovenia and Hungary.
Experience across the EU-10, finally, illustrates the
influence of monetary and exchange rate regimes on def-
icits and debt levels. In the Baltic States the introduction
of hard pegs was underpinned by medium-term goals of
budget balance and low levels of public debt. In most
central European Member States, by contrast, more flex-
ible exchange arrangements are associated with higher
deficits and debt.
3.2. Composition of public revenues 
and expenditures
About half of the EU-10 have reduced their revenue-to-
GDP ratios since 1997 (or the earliest year thereafter for
which data are available). A caveat applies here, since
data suffer frequently from inadequate consolidation
practices, in particular in the earlier years. As regards
direct and indirect taxes and social contributions, again
about half of the countries have reduced the ratio. In the
Baltic and central European countries, the largest com-
bined reductions are observed in Slovakia and Poland,
and also reflect an increase in the relative share of indi-
rect taxes. All the Baltic countries have also reduced tax-
ation. No reductions took place in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovenia. As for social contributions, any
reductions were relatively marginal.  
On the expenditure side, apart from the Baltics, only two
countries apparently reduced primary expenditure-to-
GDP ratios in the period from 1997 (or the earliest year,
for which data are available thereafter) to 2004 — with
some earlier reductions being reversed in the latter year.
Again, however, the caveat of potentially inadequate
consolidation applies. Examining individual expenditure
components reveals that only four countries managed to
reduce general government consumption, most notably
Estonia and Lithuania.
¥1∂ For a discussion of fiscal trends and issues in the late 1990s, see European
Commission (2002a).195
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Selected fiscal indicators
General government net borrowing General government gross debt General government interest payments
% of GDP % of tax 
revenues (1) % of GDP
% of tax 
revenues (1) % of GDP
% of tax 
revenues (1)
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
CZ 2.4 3.0 6.9 8.4 12.7 37.4 35.6 103.6 1.2 1.3 3.4 3.5
EE – 1.7 – 1.8 – 4.8 – 5.5 6.3 4.9 17.5 15.1 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.7
CY n.a. 4.2 n.a. 12.6 n.a. 71.9 n.a. 213.8 n.a. 3.4 n.a. 10.0
LV – 1.5 0.8 – 4.5 2.6 11.1 14.4 33.9 50.7 1.0 0.8 3.1 2.7
LT 1.2 2.5 3.9 9.0 15.8 19.7 53.0 71.8 0.8 1.0 2.8 3.7
HU n.a. 4.5 n.a. 11.3 63.9 57.6 166.6 145.4 n.a. 4.3 n.a. 10.8
MT n.a. 5.2 n.a. 14.6 48.1 75.0 n.a. 211.4 n.a. 4.1 n.a. 11.4
PL 4.5 4.9 11.7 14.0 n.a. 43.6 n.a. 123.7 4.4 2.6 11.3 7.8
SI n.a. 1.9 n.a. 4.7 n.a. 29.4 n.a. 73.8 n.a. 1.9 n.a. 4.7
SK 6.2 3.3 16.2 11.1 33.0 43.6 86.7 145.7 2.2 2.2 5.8 7.4
Euro area (2) 2.7 2.8 6.4 6.7 75.1 71.3 176.6 173.0 5.1 3.3 12.2 8.1
(1) Including social contributions.
(2) Weighted average.
Source: AMECO database.
Table IV.5
Government debt composition, 2003
Gross consolidated debt Of which initial maturity 
up to one year
Of which foreign-currency-
denominated
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
CZ 37.6 10.9 (1) 1.1
EE 5.3 0.3 2.9
CY 72.2 1.9 (2) 13.8 (2)
LV 15.3 0.8 (2) 9.4 (2)
LT 21.5 1.1 13.9
HU 59.0 11.7 14.4
MT 72.0 n.a. n.a.
PL 45.4 n.a. n.a.
SI 27.0 2.0 13.5
SK 42.8 5.8 6.7
Euro area (3) 70.6 9.2 1.0
(1) Figure refers to 2001.
(2) Figure refers to 2002.
(3) Weighted average.
Source: Commission services.196
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only in Latvia and Slovakia, and subsidies have been cut
sizeably only in Poland and Slovakia. Slovakia also
reduced considerably gross fixed capital formation
(GFCF), though from a very high level in 1997.
Taking 2003 as a reference year, two points are striking
as regards the overall expenditure share. First, in spite of
significantly lower per capita income, the GDP shares of
total and primary expenditure are in many cases in the
same range or above the euro-area average. This is out of
line with traditional theoretical considerations (e.g.
Wagner’s law), which imply a positive correlation
between income level and government size. Second, the
shares of key expenditure components vary considerably
among the new Member States, even those with similar
per capita income, although the Baltic States are closely
clustered. Indeed, the GDP shares of key expenditure
components among the EU-10 (even those with similar
income levels) vary by factors between roughly 1â and
6. The highest variation occurs in subsidies (around 3 %
of GDP in the Czech Republic and â % of GDP in
Poland) and in gross fixed capital formation (around
5â % of GDP in Malta and 1â % of GDP in Latvia).
More specifically, the GDP shares of total and primary
expenditure of the central European new Member
States (except Slovakia) and the two islands are in the
same range or above the euro-area level. By contrast,
the Baltic States and Slovakia cluster around a consid-
erably lower GDP share. Broadly similar results hold
for total government consumption, although here
Latvia and Slovakia join the group in the range of the
euro area level, while Poland (with low social transfers
in kind) forms a cluster with Estonia and Lithuania. The
GDP share of public employees’ compensation is typi-
cally high. Subsidies are higher in all central European
new Member States except Poland.
The GDP share of gross fixed capital formation is similar
to, or exceeds, that in the euro area, except in Latvia.
This could indeed be expected in catching-up econo-
mies, but across the EU-10 there does not seem to be a
close correlation between GDP per capita and the share
of capital formation, which varies widely.
3.3. Volatility in the public finances: 
recent experience
In some respects, the public finance situation in the
EU-10 compares favourably with that in the euro area.
Public debt ratios are in many cases lower, and strong
nominal growth contributes to virtuous debt dynamics.
Moreover, fiscal balances may be somewhat less sensi-
tive to the economic cycle. On the other hand, the econ-
omies of the new Member States have been subject to
somewhat greater macroeconomic and fiscal volatility.
Experience in recent years provides a number of indica-
tions in these respects, which are a useful context for
considering medium-term fiscal goals.   
Regarding fiscal performance and nominal growth, there
appears to be less of a link between these developments
than in euro-area members. This may reflect a lower size
of the public sector in the EU-10, the impact of structural
reforms, and the broad economic transformation that is
still under way in the EU-10.
The importance of nominal growth for revenue and
expenditure dynamics in the euro area and the recently
acceded Member States is different. The relationship in
the euro area is much stronger than in the recently
acceded Member States, as reflected in the steeper cross-
country regression slope between changes in nominal
revenues and nominal GDP (see Graph IV.11, mid-panel
and lower panel) (1). This is in part explained by the
higher weight that the government represents in the euro
area compared, on average, with the EU-10. Revenue
takes a share of 46 % of GDP (unweighted, 1997–2004)
in the euro area compared with 41 % of GDP in the
EU-10, while for total expenditures the figures are 47 %
of GDP versus 44.5 % of GDP. Furthermore, the transi-
tion process in the EU-10 led to structural change in the
economy and in public finances weakening the relation
between GDP growth and government revenue or
expenditure. Statistical revisions of the classification of
certain expenditure and revenue categories and the con-
solidation of the different levels of government may add
to the weaker relation between nominal developments
and public finances in the new Member States.
As in the euro area, a strong relation between govern-
ment revenue and expenditure is observable across the
EU-10. Both across euro-area countries and new Mem-
ber States, primary expenditure growth was on average
faster than total revenue growth in the period examined
(see Graph IV.11, top panel), and contributed to deficits.
¥1∂ However, there are important country differences. In Cyprus and Malta
expenditure and revenue grew more strongly than GDP, while in Slovakia
fiscal consolidation led to a reduction of the weight of the government in
the economy (see Graph IV.11, mid-panel and bottom panel).197
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2 0 0 5Graph IV.9:  Composition of general government revenues (% of GDP)
NB: Countries are ordered, within the main geographic regions, by per capita income (PPS) as a percentage of the euro area (EUR-12) in 2003, 
which is indicated below the country identifier.
Graph IV.10:  Composition of general government expenditure (% of GDP)
NB: Countries are ordered, within the main geographic regions, by per capita income (PPS) as a percentage of the euro area (EUR-12) in 2003, which is
indicated below the country identifier.
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2 0 0 5In the EU-10, Hungary stands out as a country where pri-
mary expenditure growth was particularly rapid com-
pared with revenue growth, while in Estonia the opposite
is noted.
Although the link between nominal growth and revenues
and expenditures appears weaker in the EU-10, there is
evidence that the public finances in the EU-10 are less
stable than those in the euro area. This can be gauged by
directly looking at the standard deviation of fiscal aggre-
gates over past years. The shares of both general govern-
ment revenues and primary expenditures in GDP were
much more volatile over the 1997–2004 period com-
pared with the euro area. The Baltic States, in particular,
experienced large swings and variability in government
expenditure and revenue, but the impact on volatility of
debt and primary deficit appeared to be contained. The
four larger new Member States (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) are characterised by rel-
atively large variability in primary expenditure which in
some cases fuelled instability in the primary deficit. As
regards the two islands (Cyprus and Malta), the public
finances appeared subject to shocks to revenues in
Malta, and both countries saw some debt volatility.
Interest rates, especially short-term interest rates, have
been very volatile in the EU-10. However, this has not
led to a large difference with the euro area in volatility as
far as the implicit interest rate on government debt is
concerned. Volatility in the debt ratio is about the same
size, but behind this is a rising trend in the EU-10, while
the debt ratio has declined in the euro area.
In general, however, volatility measured by the annual
standard deviation is wider in the recently acceded
Member States compared with the euro-area countries.
The difference is most striking for nominal expenditure
and revenue growth, which is partly explained by higher
inflation in the EU-10. The primary balance also dis-
plays a higher volatility in the new Member States.
Table IV.6
Volatility in fiscal variables, 1997–2004
General government 
primary deficit 
(% of GDP)
General government 
debt 
(% of GDP)
General government 
revenues 
(% of GDP)
General government 
primary expenditure 
(% of GDP)
Implicit interest rate 
on debt 
(%)
Avg. Standard deviation Avg.
Standard 
deviation Avg.
Standard 
deviation Avg.
Standard 
deviation Avg.
Standard 
deviation
CZ 4.4 3.0 23.9 10.0 39.9 1.3 44.3 3.8 6.7 2.4
EE – 0.8 2.0 5.3 0.6 38.9 1.3 38.1 2.1 6.5 1.3
CY 0.7 1.5 64.0 5.1 36.2 2.7 36.9 3.3 5.7 0.4
LV 1.0 2.0 13.0 1.8 36.2 2.5 37.2 2.5 7.7 1.2
LT 1.2 1.3 20.7 3.0 34.8 2.3 36.0 3.2 7.2 1.0
HU 1.0 2.9 57.9 3.9 44.9 2.1 45.9 3.0 9.0 1.1
MT 2.9 1.8 60.8 9.1 40.5 5.0 43.4 4.8 6.4 0.7
PL 0.7 0.8 40.6 3.5 44.3 0.9 45.0 1.4 7.4 1.1
SI 0.3 0.4 27.5 2.4 45.4 0.6 45.7 0.2 9.0 1.4
SK 3.2 2.3 42.8 6.3 46.7 8.8 50.0 9.5 8.2 1.5
EU-10 (1) 1.5 1.8 35.7 4.6 40.8 2.8 42.2 3.4 7.4 1.2
Baltic EU-10 (1) 0.5 1.8 13.0 1.8 36.6 2.0 37.1 2.6 7.1 1.2
Central European 
EU-10 (1)
1.9 1.9 38.5 5.2 44.2 2.7 46.2 3.6 8.1 1.5
Island EU-10 (1) 1.8 1.7 62.4 7.1 38.4 3.9 40.2 4.1 6.1 0.6
Euro area (1) – 2.9 1.5 66.0 4.7 46.1 1.0 43.1 1.4 5.8 0.9
(1) Unweighted average.
Sources: AMECO database and ECB.200
4. Financial challenges during convergence
4.1. Introduction
A key question, particularly in the Baltic region and cen-
tral Europe, is whether the recent economic and financial
environment for fiscal policy is a relevant guide to the
future. Many sources of economic volatility now lie in
the past, and the structure of economies and the public
finances have matured greatly during the course of tran-
sition over the past decade and a half. However, signifi-
cant structural transformations are still under way. In
both trade and financial terms, these economies are very
open, and those in the Baltic region and central Europe
also have fairly small and undiversified financial sys-
tems. They are thus particularly dependent on financing
from international capital markets, and, as privatisation-
related FDI tapers off, the composition of this financing
may become more volatile. A number of these econo-
mies, moreover, have sizeable public sector borrowing
requirements, in addition to the financing needs of the
private sector.
As regards the setting for fiscal policy, three elements of
financial market dynamics are potentially important in
this regard: a further expansion of debt-creating capital
inflows; an associated rapid catch-up in levels of domes-
tic credit to the private sector; and, at varying points in
the future, the approach to euro adoption.
To shed light on these challenges, this chapter explores
aspects of financial convergence and private sector
imbalances, and considers the potential fiscal impact of
shocks in the real and financial economies. It then brings
these elements together in the framework of a standard
debt dynamics approach. This places in a single perspec-
tive several key elements that will influence public debt
developments in the EU-10 over the period ahead —
including possible shocks to interest rates and exchange
rates, as well as output, emanating from financial mar-
kets. Finally, the scope of contingent liabilities is dis-
cussed. These elements thus provide an input to the
analysis of sustainable medium-term fiscal goals, with
an emphasis on potential financial risks.
4.2. Credit booms and private sector 
imbalances
In the Baltic States and the five central European
recently acceded Member States, levels of credit to the
private sector are likely to rise sharply over the coming
decade from levels that are currently very low, even rel-
ative to GDP. This process has the potential to accelerate
real sector convergence through investment financing
and consumption smoothing. However, experience in
other countries illustrates potential hazards in rapid
financial sector growth. Capital markets could place eco-
nomic gains at risk by transmitting external shocks. In
addition, financial market imperfections, including
swings in risk assessment, could lead to a misallocation
of resources or jeopardise the funding of fiscal and exter-
nal deficits.
Research on credit booms suggests that most systemic
stresses result from common exposures across institu-
tions to macroeconomic risk factors, and that this type of
financial distress carries the more significant and longer-
lasting real costs (Borio, 2003). The trigger for a down-
turn may be in the financial sphere (e.g. asset price cor-
rection) or in the real economy (e.g. unwinding of an
investment boom). A key difference in recent models of
credit cycles compared with traditional ones is that the
boom–bust dynamics are largely endogenous. The boom
sows the seeds of the subsequent bust (Borio et al.,
2001). In particular, investors’ attitude towards risk
tends to behave procyclically, supporting the building-
up of large financial imbalances and then aggravating
the correction. Moreover, economies at an intermediate
level of financial development may be more unstable
than either very developed or underdeveloped econo-
mies in terms of the impact of shocks and of cyclical
behaviour (Aghion et al., 2004). Fully open capital
accounts, moreover, can complicate the goals of stabili-201
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of financial systems and the composition of asset portfo-
lios become more diversified.
These considerations underscore the need to evaluate
possible risks to financial stability when forming a judg-
ment on the optimal fiscal stance. Two financial scenar-
ios for convergence may help illustrate this. In a benign
scenario, favourable rates of return to capital in the
EU-10 (due to low capital/labour ratios) lead to high
investment. Together with consumption smoothing, this
results in external current account deficits that could be
sizeable but are financed by stable capital inflows.
Including a high share of FDI, this import of savings
induces beneficial microeconomic effects through
improvements in know-how, technology spillovers, etc.
As a setting for this process, the strengthening legal and
institutional framework helps create an enabling envi-
ronment for efficient financial intermediation. Risk pre-
miums act as a balancing influence that helps keep credit
growth, capital accumulation and expanding consump-
tion on a sustainable path. This helps ensure sustainable
domestic counterparts to the current account deficit and
avoid volatility in financial and economic conditions.
There are, however, financial risks to this scenario. A
core concern is that market imperfections (asymmetric
information, moral hazard, procyclical behaviour of risk
premiums) could result in risks to stability. In other
words, domestic and foreign creditors’ perception of
income prospects and economic risks could initially be
‘exuberant,’ resulting in credit expansion above an equi-
librium path, in an environment of strong foreign capital
inflows. Procyclical behaviour of risk premiums might
lead to a misallocation of credit (e.g. a bias towards prop-
erty and consumption), asset price bubbles, and exposure
of non-financial firms to unhedged foreign currency bor-
rowing. At the macroeconomic level, the counterparts of
these distortions would be unproductive investment and
unduly strong consumption. These could drive the exter-
nal current account deficit into unsustainable territory,
while market financing could become more short term
and volatile. At some point, this cycle could go into
reverse in a potentially disruptive fashion. This could
result in currency and financial market turbulence, and,
depending on rigidities in real sector markets and
unhedged financial exposures, it could lead to deep and
protracted losses of output. Since the sources of such
volatility would lie in risk premium problems in the pri-
vate sector, they could emerge even if fiscal policy were
observing the reference values of the Treaty.
While the risks of increased interest and exchange rate
volatility may be especially relevant before euro adop-
tion, credit booms can occur in any economy, including
under the euro. Under monetary union, the risk of an
exchange market crisis is partially transformed into a
risk of unwarranted real appreciation (through relative
price movements) that could be hard to reverse, due to
the downward stickiness of wages and prices. Damage to
growth through this route would also impact on the pub-
lic finances.
4.3. Potential sources of financial risk
In general, progress in macroeconomic stabilisation and
the perspective of EU accession have supported increas-
ingly stable financial market conditions in the EU-10
over recent years. While the financial systems of the
EU-10 are at present generally considered to be
sound (2), there is nevertheless a set of potential vulner-
abilities that can be identified for several Member States
of the EU-10, such as increased interest rate volatility,
foreign currency exposures, high domestic credit growth
rates and contagion risks.
Driven by economic convergence, progressive capital
account liberalisation and the medium-term perspective
of euro adoption, long-term government bond yields in
the new Member States have already converged signifi-
cantly towards euro-area levels. Any emerging stress in
the financial system may be reflected first in the devel-
opment of short-term interbank rates. The evolution of
domestic three-month interbank spreads to the euro has
varied among the EU-10, with, for example, rather nar-
row spreads in recent years for Estonia, Lithuania, the
Czech Republic and Latvia, and wider spreads in Hun-
gary, Poland and, until very recently, Slovakia.
In practice, a reversal in market sentiment — leading to
a reduction in capital inflows or even capital outflows —
could be triggered by either a specific event in the coun-
try itself, or a sudden or sharper-than-expected rise in
¥1∂ In this latter context, it is important to keep in mind the broader global
context of abundant liquidity and low inflationary pressures: the recent
compressed risk premiums in global bond and credit risk markets will typ-
ically not be sustained over the economic cycle.
¥2∂ See IMF FSAP country reports (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/
fsap.asp#cp).202
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emerging markets. Efforts to constrain exchange rate
movements would then trigger interest rate responses
and — if market sentiment failed to recover — a possibly
sharp realignment of the exchange rate. As fixed-income
markets in the EU-10 are generally small and illiquid,
they are potentially vulnerable to reversals in capital
flows. Moreover, there is a danger that, in illiquid bond
markets, prices signal imperfectly and probably with a
lag changes in financial market views.
The impact of interest rate and exchange rate variability
on the real economy depends on the extent to which spe-
cific sectors are exposed — including through unhedged
foreign currency borrowing by corporations and house-
holds. The share of net foreign liabilities to GDP is
above 60 % in Estonia and Latvia, and relatively high in
some others. Facilitated by cross-ownership with euro-
area Member States, the share of foreign currency lend-
ing — mainly in euro — is notable in Estonia, Lithuania
and Hungary, while Latvia has a high dollar exposure.
Only in the Czech Republic can the share of foreign cur-
rency loans in total be described as low. While foreign
currency deposits partly counterbalance exposure in the
EU-10, it is probable that foreign currency borrowing by
some firms and by households is unhedged, creating an
exposure to depreciation.
A further common characteristic of the EU-10 has been
a rapid credit expansion over the past few years. Even
though this expansion started from very low levels and is
an integral part of the progressing economic catching-up
process as well as the deepening of financial intermedi-
ation, the development of exposures of different sectors
and the allocation of capital have to be monitored care-
fully over the next few years. While the convergence
process started off mostly with a strong expansion of
FDI and government debt, strong credit growth in the
private sector is now fuelled by the decline in domestic
interest rates and the compression of credit spreads, as
well as the economic recovery and associated shift in
expected earnings. In many of the EU-10 countries, the
credit expansion is at present mostly dynamic in the
household sector, mainly in the form of mortgages, but
also in the form of consumer loans and credit cards.
Although risks are mitigated by the low starting levels
and the expectations of rising income levels, sustained
dynamic credit growth might, over time, raise questions
about the quality of credit allocation, the indirect vulner-
ability of the financial system via exposures of borrow-
ers vis-à-vis exchange rate movements as part of the bor-
rowing is foreign currency based and — ultimately —
the sustainability of the level of indebtedness in case of
an economic downturn. Moreover, there are risks of
fuelling asset price bubbles, notably in the housing sec-
tor. If credit booms suddenly end, for example related to
banks abruptly tightening credit conditions or in the
event of a sharp and unexpected rise in interest rates, the
ensuing potentially significant deterioration in banks’
loan portfolio could weaken the financial system and
dent real convergence and economic growth.
A final common risk in the EU-10 is the transmission
of financial instability via contagion in capital markets
— a phenomenon that is not unusual across countries
which share similar characteristics. This could be par-
ticularly damaging during ERM II participation, as this
is a critical phase of economic and financial conver-
gence in view of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria.
Moreover, even though the foreign ownership of the
EU-10 banking system is, in principle, a main asset for
a sustained convergence process, special attention has
been drawn to circumstances where the concentration
of foreign ownership could become a liability to new
Member States with a specifically high exposure. Even
though currently this risk seems of theoretical rather
than practical relevance, it nevertheless highlights the
more general need to improve cross-border and cross-
sector supervision in an increasingly integrated EU
financial system.
To put these issues in perspective, it is important to
weigh a number of core financial strengths in the EU-10,
which differentiate them from the experience of many
other economies at this stage of financial development.
First, financial supervision has been developing strongly
as a result of the observance of international standards
and codes and the alignment of domestic frameworks
with the acquis communautaire. Second, banks are on
average well capitalised, leverage in the household and
corporate sectors is typically low, and foreign currency
borrowing is at this point still modest relative to GDP —
implying that unhedged exposure is smaller still. Third,
comprehensive assessments under the IMF–World Bank
financial stability assessment programme in the early
years of this decade indicated that systems were typi-
cally resilient to shocks. Therefore, since the issues dis-
cussed in this section raise potential concerns, these
relate mainly to the scope for dynamic trends to emerge
over time, posing challenges for policy-makers during
the course of the convergence process.203
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sector imbalances may shape the setting for fiscal policy,
past experience of converging economies within the EU
is a valuable reference point. In some cases, the public
sector balance played an important compensating role
during phases of strong expansion, but there was also
experience of an easy fiscal stance during booms result-
ing in a need for restraint at a later stage, thus precluding
flexibility when there was a sharp slowdown in activity.
Experience with private sector dynamics during conver-
gence in Portugal and Spain sheds interesting light on
this topic (see Box IV.1). In terms of the financial market
setting, it underscores the importance of policy-mix
issues as these affect the exchange rate in the run-up to
euro adoption, and also the concern that potential growth
and revenue buoyancy may be overestimated in the late
stages of a credit and asset price boom.
As regards the contribution of fiscal policy specifically,
the experience in Portugal and Spain also highlights
important opportunities, risks and limitations. There is
the scope — in a context of falling interest rates and the
elimination of liquidity constraints under monetary
union — to advance with needed budgetary consolida-
tion. There is the risk of an ‘exit problem’ from a boom
in the form of simultaneous retrenchment in both the pri-
vate and the public sectors. Finally, as this experience
underscores, there are also limits to what fiscal policy
can deliver in any given monetary and real sector setting.
Sound fiscal policy, by itself, can only go so far in con-
taining economic imbalances and cushioning shocks to
growth or problems with competitiveness over the
medium or long term.
      
Box IV.1: Financial imbalances on the road to EMU: lessons from Portugal and Spain
Since the late 1990s, Portugal and Spain have shared a number of economic features associated with accession to EMU
and the related convergence process (1). Strong anti-inflationary commitment, coupled with structural reforms, under-
pinned the credibility of policies in a setting of economic expansion. GDP grew in both countries by more than 3.5 % annu-
ally. Rising income expectations linked to the run-up to the euro, together with supply-side developments in financial
markets (including factors such as tax incentives for house purchase), supported a very strong momentum in private con-
sumption and investment, and, in particular, construction. Although real estate was the main target of the credit boom, con-
sumer credit also grew rapidly, from a low base. A decline in saving and rising private indebtedness were evident. In Spain,
real estate appreciation was a factor (2). 
Both economies experienced adverse cost developments in this phase. In Spain, there was a positive inflation differential
relative to the euro area, apparently due to higher markups in sheltered sectors, in a context of wage moderation. In Portu-
gal, wage increases in excess of productivity gains occurred in a tight labour market. Unit labour costs, which rose at 1 %
annually in the euro area, rose by close to 4 % annually in Portugal and nearly 2.5 % in Spain.
One differentiating aspect lay in exchange rate policies during the run-up to the euro. While Spain experienced depreciation
until 1995, Portugal supported an appreciated currency. In fact, Portugal was almost the only country in the current euro
area whose real effective exchange rate did not depreciate in the second half of the 1990s. The result was a worse external
competitiveness position in Portugal than in Spain. Consequently, the external balances performed differently in the two
countries. In 2000, Portugal registered a peak current account deficit of above 10 % of GDP, the highest in the euro area,
and the State’s net lending worsened to some 9 % of GDP from a situation of close to balance in 1995. In Spain, during
the 1995–98 high-growth period, a balanced position on the current account was registered, coupled with a net lending
position of the nation of 1 % of GDP (see Graph IV.12). 
(1) See Banco de España (2003) and European Commission (2004d).
(2) See Malo de Molina (2003).
(Continued on the next page)204
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Against a similar backdrop of strong internal demand, the stance of fiscal policy differed markedly (see Graph IV.13). In
Spain, balancing the public finances was a key tenet of policy. Adjustment was based on a reduction in the current expend-
iture (e.g. civil servants’ salaries were frozen in 1994 and 1997) and a restructuring of revenues, including a full reform of
personal income taxation. Moreover, the government promoted an important privatisation policy. Gross debt, and the debt
service burden, continued to fall. Spain reached a position of budgetary balance in 2001, which was maintained during the
following years. This consolidation effort allowed policy to work as a stabilisation instrument. Despite a fall in private sav-
ing, national saving was maintained. Fiscal policy in Portugal, by contrast, amplified the effects of easy monetary and
financial conditions over the second half of the 1990s. Current primary expenditure was kept on a clearly expansive path
until 2001, mainly reflecting higher pay and numbers in the public service, and also non-cash social transfers. Strong rev-
enue growth resulting from lively domestic demand, together with falling interest expenditure, provided sufficient margin
to meet the Maastricht requirements. With no fiscal offset to private sector developments, the national savings rate gradu-
ally declined.
In Portugal, after a period of strong credit growth, high indebtedness and rising interest rates triggered a sharp reassessment
by private sector agents amid a more gloomy growth outlook. Household consumption decelerated and the savings rate
started to increase. Almost simultaneously, corporations also started boosting their savings rates. The strongest effects were
felt in 2003, the year in which Portugal went into a recession, as real GDP fell by 1.1 % on account of a shrinking domestic
demand. After 2001, Portugal registered improvement in its external imbalance. But the loose fiscal stance pushed Portugal
into a situation of excessive deficit in 2001, and in mid-2002 policy was shifted — with a sharp slowdown in current
expenditure, mainly reflecting near-freezes of public wages and employment, coupled with one-off revenue measures.
Against the background of weak domestic demand and an adverse external outlook, fiscal policy continued to amplify the
business cycle, but now in its downturn.
In Spain, since budgetary adjustment had been relatively intense since 1995, there was no need to tighten policy at a time
of sluggish growth. Still, private sector imbalances have left a legacy in terms of economic vulnerability. Easy monetary
and financial conditions have continued to stimulate household spending. In this sense, the ratio of household debt to dis-
posable income has risen more rapidly throughout the cycle — reflecting the major importance of housing finance, mainly
at short-term variable interest rates. The demand for credit has shown strong inertia, with growth rates persistently higher
than 15 % throughout 2004, for instance. These factors confer certain elements of risk to the sustainability of financial bal-
ances in the household sector. In fact, financial wealth has been shrinking progressively as a result of increasing indebted-
ness (currently above 100 %). As a consequence, the saving capacity of households has been neutralised, showing a net
borrowing capacity since 2004 (see Graph IV.14). Consequently, in Spain, no adjustment in domestic demand has so far
been observed. Savings rates of both households and enterprises have continued to decrease throughout the period and until
the present. Other signs of risk in Spain relate to an intensification of the unbalanced growth pattern noted above. Exports
and investment in equipment have been losing dynamism. A gradual deterioration of competitiveness is driven by persist-
ent differentials in unit labour costs. Low relative productivity of market goods has persisted. Since 2000, a weakening of
the balance of payments has emerged (see Graph IV.12). This has led to measures to increase productivity in sectors such
as energy, transport, and telecommunications.
From this comparative overview, several elements emerge. Firstly, strong domestic demand — in a context of falling inter-
est rates and the elimination of liquidity constraints under monetary union — presents a favourable scenario to advance
budgetary consolidation. Secondly, there are risks of facing multiple imbalances, the simultaneous correction of which may
trigger a slump in output as the economy shifts abruptly from overheating to subdued growth. Thirdly, it is important to
enhance competitiveness and productivity as lasting routes to growth.
(Continued on the next page)205
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(Continued on the next page)
Graph IV.12:  Competitiveness and external balance
Source: Commission services.
Graph IV.13:  Cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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debt sustainability
4.4.1. Volatility and public finances
The preceding discussion explored past economic and
financial volatility, and went on to consider possible
sources of future volatility — including in the course of
financial sector convergence. A key aspect of the set-
ting for fiscal policy lies in the potential impact on the
public debt of volatility in key variables such as interest
rates, exchange rates and output as well as contingent
liabilities.
The impact of such developments on the recently
acceded Member States is strikingly diverse. Starting
levels of debt are very low in some cases — but in others
shocks to the public debt could result in serious risks to
private confidence and thus to strong and sustained
growth. This sheds light on the complementarities and
trade-offs facing fiscal policy. This section considers
these issues in the framework of a standard debt dynam-
ics equation, and presents an overview of contingent lia-
bilities. It thus pulls together a number of strands in the
discussion so far, and sets the stage to consider policy
priorities.
A country’s public finances are sustainable (1) if it is able
to continue servicing debt without unrealistically large
adjustment efforts. Thus, sustainability is not associated
with a particular debt ratio, but is conditional on a
number of factors, some of which are not under the full
control of the authorities. Key factors include the cost of
market financing, policy with respect to income and
expenditure, and variables such as growth, inflation and
the exchange rate. Vulnerability is the risk that debt sus-
tainability can only be maintained with large corrections
to the balance of income and expenditure which are
socially or politically difficult to bear.
Stress tests are valuable in assessing the vulnerability of
the debt position to potential shocks. With a standard debt
Box IV.1 (continued)
   
Graph IV.14:  Private saving and net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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relative importance of the main driving forces of public
finances under conditions of uncertainty. The sensitivity
of the debt position is analysed by applying a series of
shocks to the baseline. The shocks are assumed to be tem-
porary, so that the relevant time horizon is the medium
term (2005–10).
Before turning to the nature of the shocks, the baseline
has to be explained. It is assumed in the baseline that the
debt/GDP ratio does not change with respect to the year
2004. In other words, the baseline represents a constella-
tion of macroeconomic variables which keeps the debt/
GDP ratio constant. This may not in certain countries be
the most plausible scenario (see Commission’s spring
2005 forecasts), but it facilitates the analysis of the
shocks. Where continuing fiscal deficits are projected,
for example, baseline projections of the public debt
would need to incorporate these.
Constructing the most useful type and size of shock
poses difficult issues. Shocks should be sufficiently
large to capture most of the risk. On the other hand, if the
shock is too extreme, the likelihood of its occurrence is
very small and not of great practical significance. The
probability of a shock larger than two standard devia-
tions from the mean is rather small (assuming a normal
distribution, the probability is about 2 %). This suggests
that two-standard-deviation shocks encompass most of
the risks. A low sensitivity to such a shock is an indica-
tion of a certain degree of robustness of public finances.
The sensitivity of the debt/GDP ratio is examined here
with respect to six shocks: (i) the historical averages for
the key variables observed are substituted in the period
2005–10 to check the realism of the baseline scenario of
an unchanged debt ratio; (ii) a negative shock to GDP
growth; (iii) a rise in the interest rate; (iv) a negative
shock to the primary balance; (v) a depreciation of the
domestic currency by 25 % against all the other curren-
cies; (vi) a combination of shocks (ii), (iii) and (iv) to
which is added shock (v) in the case of floating curren-
cies (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). The his-
torical averages are calculated on the available data for
the period 1997–2004 and the standard deviations as
well (see Table IV.7).
For shocks (ii) to (iv), the simulations concern two
standard deviations from the historical mean, applied to
two consecutive years (2005–06), followed by a return to
the baseline constellation. The justification for a fixed
depreciation (shock (v) in a particular year (2005) is that
in fixed-rate regimes the volatility of the exchange rate
may be rather low (resulting in a small standard devia-
tion). The motivation for shock (vi) is that usually
shocks do not occur in isolation; this combined shock
can be considered a worst-case scenario.
Table IV.7
Macroeconomic and public finance performance and volatility in the recently acceded Member States
CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL SI SK
Annual average 1997–2004
Real GDP (% change) 1.8 6.1 3.6 6.7 5.7 4.1 2.4 3.9 3.8 3.8
GDP deflator (% change) 4.8 5.9 2.9 4.4 2.7 10.2 2.5 5.9 6.8 5.5
Primary deficit (% of GDP) 4.4 – 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.0 2.9 0.7 0.3 3.2
Implicit interest rate on debt (%) 6.7 6.5 5.7 7.7 7.2 9.0 6.4 7.4 9.0 8.2
Exchange rate (USD/domestic 
currency, % change)
1.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 4.9 – 2.7 0.8 – 3.3 – 3.7 0.1
Annual standard deviation 1997–2004
Real GDP (% change) 2.0 3.0 1.3 1.8 3.4 0.7 2.9 1.9 1.0 1.3
GDP deflator (% change) 3.4 2.6 1.0 1.5 5.0 3.8 1.6 4.8 1.9 1.5
Primary deficit (% of GDP) 3.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.3 2.9 1.8 0.8 0.4 2.3
Implicit interest rate on debt (%) 2.4 1.3 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.5
Exchange rate (USD/domestic 
currency, % change)
11.8 11.4 10.3 4.8 7.5 13.4 8.1 9.2 11.5 13.2
Source: Commission services.208
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there are marked country differences. The Baltic States
(see Graph IV.15) are characterised by low debt levels
which make public finances in general less sensitive.
Vulnerability to growth variations as well as interest rate
volatility is low. If the recent past were to recur, debt
developments would remain benign on the whole; only
in Latvia would the debt/GDP ratio increase to a certain
extent on account of lower growth, a higher primary def-
icit, but also lower inflation, which have been observed
in the reference period compared with 2004.
In the Baltic States, sudden shocks to the primary bal-
ance represent the largest risk. Compared with the other
EU-10 countries, the impact is not negligible. Given
high shares of foreign currency debt in total debt (more
than 90 % in Estonia, about 75 % in Latvia and 60 % in
Lithuania), the public finances would be vulnerable to a
depreciation. However, the solid track record of these
countries, which have now all joined ERM II, makes
such an event rather implausible. In a ‘realistic’ worst-
case scenario where growth would be significantly
lower, the primary balance wider, the interest rate
higher, but the exchange rate peg would be maintained,
the debt ratio would nonetheless increase considerably.
Higher debt/GDP ratios make the public finances in the
four large new Member States (see Graph IV.15) more
vulnerable than in the Baltic States. The proximity of the
60 % reference value (particularly in Hungary) adds to the
concerns. Based on experience in 1997–2004, notably a
small and stable primary deficit (see Table IV.7), the
Polish public finances appear more shock resistant than
those of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, but
remain more sensitive to variations in output and interest
rates than the Baltic States. However, recent difficulties
with consolidation in Poland, and notably with the imple-
mentation of the Hausner plan, require some caution.
Debt developments in Hungary would in theory be
favourable in the medium term if historical macroeco-
nomic conditions occurred again. But it is unlikely and
undesirable that the high inflation rate (the average GDP
deflator was 10.2 % in 1997–2004 — see Table IV.7),
which was one of the drivers of the favourable debt
dynamics in Hungary, would recur. 
In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, a recur-
rence of past conditions would lead to a sharp increase in
the debt ratio — in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
even beyond the 60 % reference value (see Table IV.8).
High interest rates are a source of vulnerability in Hun-
gary, as well as volatility of the exchange rate, because
of the large share of foreign currency (about 33 % of
total debt). In Poland, also, a depreciation would weigh
on public finances despite the considerable reduction of
the foreign currency share in total debt from about 55 %
in 1997 to 30 % in 2004. Exchange rate volatility is less
of an issue in the Czech Republic, where foreign cur-
rency debt represents only 5 % of total debt, and in Slo-
vakia where the foreign currency share is limited to
about 20 %. Output swings could be a concern in the
Czech Republic and Poland. Difficulties in containing
primary expenditure, and hence the primary balance,
appear for all four countries (including Poland based on
recent developments) the largest source of vulnerability.
The sensitivity of the public finances is further high-
lighted if several shocks would occur at the same time,
including a depreciation of the currency in the case of the
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.
Among the EU-10, the two islands have the highest
debt ratios. The Maltese public finances, in particular,
appear vulnerable if the output volatility and relatively
high primary deficit observed in the past were to occur
again. The outlook would remain benign in Cyprus if
recent developments in the economy and in the primary
balance were to continue. Nevertheless, if the past debt-
increasing stock-flow adjustments would become a fea-
ture of the future, the benign outlook may have to be
qualified. Due to the high foreign currency share in
total debt (about 55 %), Cyprus is sensitive to a depre-
ciation of the currency, while this is not an issue in
Malta (foreign currency debt is about 7 % of total debt).
However, exchange rate vulnerability has to be
assessed in light of the good track record of currency
stability in the two countries.
Slovenia has a low debt and is the most stable economy
among the new Member States — with only a small pri-
mary deficit in the period considered here, and relatively
stable government expenditure and revenue flows. It
had, however, an inflationary past leading to high inter-
est rates and a continuous depreciation of the currency.
With the successful ERM II entry in June 2004, there
came an end to this type of uncertainty. In consequence,
the vulnerability to exchange rate volatility stemming
from the relatively high share of about 55 % of foreign
currency debt in total debt is mitigated. Even in a worst-
case scenario, vulnerability of public finances appears
contained.    209
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acceded Member States
The EU-10 countries, like many other countries, face
major fiscal risks as a result of contingent liabilities
which are not recorded in government debt or effectively
captured in budget documentation. While the ESA 95
definition of the government debt, like most such defini-
tions, includes government obligations backed by law
and that will arise in any event, contingent liabilities are
obligations that are triggered by the occurrence of a spe-
cific but uncertain event. In general, such liabilities are
politically more attractive than budgetary support, as
their fiscal cost remains invisible until they are realised.
However, they increase risks for the public finances in
the long run. Quite often, contingent liabilities may arise
from fiscal opportunism. As they strive to comply with
the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and
target a reduction in their government deficits below the
reference value of 3 % of GDP, some of these countries
may be tempted to shift part of the budgetary cost of their
Box IV.2: Determinants of the debt/GDP ratio
The standard debt equation reads as follows:
Where
D: total general government debt;
i: nominal interest rate on debt (total interest divided by outstanding debt in previous year);
ε: depreciation of the domestic currency (indicated by an increase in the exchange rate expressed as units of domestic
currency for one unit of foreign currency);
α: share of foreign currency debt in total debt;
PB: primary balance, equal to primary expenditure (PE) minus total receipts (TR);
OD: other debt, including privatisation (reduces debt), debt assumption by the State;
t: (subscript) time dimension of the variables without time dimension are in t+1.
Dividing the debt equation by GDPt+1 and some rearranging in order to obtain the determinants of the change in the debt/
GDP ratio results in:
= (real interest rate)
(real GDP growth)
(exchange rate)
(primary balance)
(other debt)
Where
d, pe, tr, od: (small letters) debt primary expenditure, total receipts, other debt as % of GDP;
π: GDP deflator;
g: real GDP growth;
gpe-gtr: nominal growth of primary expenditure and total receipts.
Dt 1+ 1 i+( )Dt ε  α+ 1 i+( )Dt PBt 1+ ODt 1++–=
dt 1+ dt–
1 π–( ) 1 g+( )
1 π+( ) 1 g+( )---------------------------------- dt
– g
1 π+( ) 1 g+( )---------------------------------- dt
+ α  ε 1 i+( )
1 π+( ) 1 g+( )---------------------------------- dt
– 
1 gpe+( )
1 π+( ) 1 g+( )---------------------------------- pet
1 gtr+( )
1 π+( ) 1 g+( )---------------------------------- trt+
+odt 1+210
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NB: Impact of following simulations on debt/GDP ratio :
Average (growth, deflator, prim. bal., int. and exch. rates) 1997–2004 in 2005–10 
Growth, prim. bal., interest rate: average 1997–2004 in 2005–06 plus 2 standard deviations
Exchange rate: 25 % depreciation in 2005
Combined shock: growth, prim. bal., int. rate plus 2 st. dev. and 25 % deval. in CZ, PL, SK
Source: Commission services.
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NB: Impact of following simulations on debt/GDP ratio :
Average (growth, deflator, prim. bal., int. and exch. rates) 1997–2004 in 2005–10 
Growth, prim. bal., interest rate: average 1997–2004 in 2005–06 plus 2 standard deviations
Exchange rate: 25 % depreciation in 2005
Combined shock: growth, prim. bal., int. rate plus 2 st. dev. and 25 % deval. in CZ, PL, SK
Source: Commission services.
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ernment support. The analysis of fiscal risks stemming
from such liabilities is particularly relevant for the
EU-10 as they tend to accumulate obligations outside the
budgetary framework. There are several types of contin-
gent liabilities which may threaten the stability of the
public finances. They can be either explicit or implicit,
depending on the existence of a legal basis.
Explicit contingent liabilities are government obliga-
tions defined by law or contract that arise only if a par-
ticular event occurs. State guarantees and financing
through State-guaranteed institutions represent the most
prominent form of explicit contingent liabilities in the
EU-10. State guarantees can be either credit guarantees
to State-owned companies or private entities, or govern-
ment guarantees issued on debt or other obligations of
local governments. Other types are statutory guarantees
on liabilities of financial institutions, or State guarantees
issued to private sector investors and service providers.
State insurance schemes are another common example
of explicit contingent liabilities in the EU-10. In Lithua-
nia, deposit insurance schemes represent a significant
source of contingent liabilities. Also, nearly all the
recently acceded Member States that undertook exten-
sive pension reforms (Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia) have provided insurance schemes to private pen-
sion funds, guaranteeing to pensioners minimum
benefits or minimum returns on their contributions.
Finally, in some countries (Poland and Slovakia), contin-
gent liabilities stem from litigation cases, often concern-
ing the restitution of property taken by the State or aris-
ing from privatisation or restructuring.
Implicit contingent liabilities are obligations triggered
by uncertain events which do not have a legal basis, but
may arise as a result of expectations created by past prac-
tice or political pressures. A common example is the
bail-out of defaulting public sector or private entities
(e.g. State-owned companies, local governments, banks
or other financial institutions such as pension and social
security funds or credit and guarantee funds). Other
forms of implicit contingent liabilities identified in the
new Member States are possible obligations related to
environmental damage (e.g. decommissioning of the
Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania) and non-con-
tractual claims arising from private investment, for
instance in infrastructure (e.g. possible claims arising
from public–private partnerships for motorway con-
struction in Hungary).
Table IV.8 provides an overview of contingent liabilities
in the EU-10, together with a tentative estimate of their
potential fiscal costs, based on the information reported
in the December 2004 updates of the convergence pro-
grammes. Overall, State guarantees appear to constitute
the main source of fiscal risk in most EU-10 countries.
The stock of government guarantees is particularly high
in Malta (17 % of GDP), Cyprus, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia (10 % of GDP), and somewhat lower in
Slovenia (7.5 % of GDP) and Hungary (around 5.5 % of
GDP). In the past, transition and privatisation have con-
tributed to the accumulation of public guarantees and
other off-budget support in the former centrally planned
economies. As restructuring and privatisation are typi-
cally far advanced, the stock of guarantees will likely
start to fall. However, in Poland, contingent support to
State-owned companies in the sectors in need of restruc-
turing (i.e. in coal mining, the steel industry and rail-
ways) is expected to remain a significant source of risk
in the coming years.
Although transition is no longer a major source of contin-
gent liabilities, new sources of risk have emerged in the
recent period. In particular, Polackova Brixi (2004) has
highlighted two factors that will likely lead to increased
risk exposure in the future: the need to close the infrastruc-
ture gap, and fiscal decentralisation. First, many recently
acceded Member States tend to promote private participa-
tion in financing infrastructure investments by establish-
ing public–private partnerships. However, experience
shows that these frequently require government support
through explicit guarantees or other disguised subsidies.
Second, the growing autonomy and involvement of local
governments in promoting regional development may
generate contingent liabilities. Most EU-10 countries have
established strict limits on local borrowing, but forms of
off-budget finance are available. These contingent liabili-
ties as well as the debt of local governments often expose
the central government to risk.
In recent years, the new Member States have achieved a
number of improvements in recording and monitoring
contingent liabilities. In accordance with ESA 95
requirements, all have made considerable progress in
incorporating the activities of extra-budgetary funds and
off-budget agencies into the general government, thus
converting their liabilities from contingent to direct lia-
bilities for the government. Also, these countries have
made efforts to reveal and assess fiscal risks emerging
from State guarantees. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
have assessed most or part of their outstanding govern-213
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value as government debt (ESA 95 definition). In the
case of Poland, the risk-weighted stock of outstanding
guarantees is included in the public debt (national defi-
nition). Other countries, like Hungary, provide detailed
information on the expected cost of the guarantees in the
documents attached to the budget. Moreover, in most
countries, the volume of guarantees issued by the gov-
ernment is limited by law. Nonetheless, effectively cap-
turing contingent liabilities in the fiscal framework and
assessing related fiscal risks remain key challenges for
these countries.
Table IV.8
Contingent liabilities in the recently acceded Member States
Explicit (government obligation defined by law or contract) Implicit (government obligation arising from public 
expectations or political pressures)
CZ • State guarantees (10 % of GDP) and  liabilities of the Czech 
Consolidation Agency (CKA) (7.5 % of GDP) — included in 
the ESA 95 government debt     
• State guarantees (0.7 % of GDP) — not included in the 
government debt
• Liabilities of the National Property Fund associated with 
the removal of ecological damage in privatised properties    
• Bail-outs related to hospital arrears
EE • State guarantees (3.3 % of GDP) — student loans, export 
guarantees, loan contracts
 
CY • State guarantees on borrowing provided to semi-
government organisations and domestic institutions (10 % 
of GDP)
LV •  State guarantees  (2.1 % of GDP)  
LT • Government-guaranteed loans (2 % of GDP)   
• Credit guarantees to SMEs   
• Deposit insurance (25.6 % of GDP)   
• Restitution of rouble savings and property rights 
(4.4 % of GDP)
• Municipal budget arrears (0.4 % of GDP)   
• Decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant
HU • State guarantees (5.4 % of GDP) —  including guarantees 
to the Hungarian Railway Company
•  Potential liabilities arising from public–private partnership 
arrangements (motorway construction, construction of 
student hostels and prisons)
MT • State guarantees (17 % of GDP) — mainly to public sector 
entities
 
PL • State guarantees (3.9 % of GDP) — mainly to State-owned 
companies    
• Litigation (legal claims concerning 1944–62 property losses: 
6.6 % of GDP)
• Debt relief in the health sector (0.7 % of GDP)   
• Potential liabilities arising from the restructuring of 
industries (railways, coal mining, steelworks)   
• Possible claims arising from private investment in 
infrastructure (motorway construction co-financed by 
international financial institutions)
SI • State guarantees (7.5 % of GDP) — mainly to public sector 
entities for the financing of infrastructure and export 
guarantees
• Debt of State-controlled financial institutions and their 
guaranteed debt to third parties (4.1 % of GDP)
SK • State guarantees (approximately 10 % of GDP) — out of 
which more than half included in the ESA 95 government 
debt. 
Litigation (legal claims by Ceskoslovenka Obochdni Banka 
and the Slovak Gas Company)
• Debt relief in the health sector 
NB: The figures refer to the outstanding stock of State guarantees and other contingent liabilities at the end of 2003.
Sources: December 2004 updates of the convergence programmes, Commission services and Polackova Brixi (2004). 214
5. Fiscal policies for stable convergence
5.1. Introduction
Major progress has been achieved in strengthening the
public finances of the recently acceded Member States
— most strikingly so in cases where systemic transfor-
mation was required in the transition from central plan-
ning. Significant challenges still lie ahead during the
course of steep real and (in most cases) financial conver-
gence, and as the EU-10 move at varying speeds towards
euro adoption. This chapter discusses several issues for
fiscal policy that arise in this setting.
First, it will be important to assure scope for growth-sup-
portive expenditure priorities, while exploiting the scope to
achieve fiscal savings by reforming existing programmes
— an approach evidenced in various ways in the recent
convergence programmes of the new Member States.
Second, medium-term fiscal plans need to assure public
debt sustainability, keeping in mind the possibility of
future shocks to the economy and the public finances.
Most of the recently acceded Member States face major
demographic challenges: they are typically moving to
address these through growth-oriented approaches based
on structural reform of pension systems — though action
is still needed in some cases, and supportive labour mar-
ket reforms are also crucial.
Third, those new Member States with developing financial
sectors may face extended periods of rapid credit expan-
sion and wide private sector imbalances. It is important not
to overestimate underlying trends in potential growth or in
revenues: an unintentionally procyclical stance could
cause external financing risks, and limit the scope for fiscal
flexibility during a subsequent slowdown.
Fourth, monetary and exchange regimes influence the
way that risks for policy crystallise. In the run-up to euro
adoption, there are special demands on market credibil-
ity and the macroeconomic policy-mix during a period
of exchange rate targeting. If, on the other hand, national
currencies are retained for an extended period, it will
remain important to guard against a build-up of risks
through unhedged foreign currency borrowing by the
non-bank private sector (which could be accelerated by
high domestic interest rates associated with fiscal ten-
sions). Under the euro, exchange rate risks disappear, but
external adjustment challenges do not: sound fiscal pol-
icy in ‘good times’ can increase flexibility at times of
setbacks to growth.
Fifth, there are questions as to how to address possible
market tensions during convergence — including the
risk of a loss of access to international capital markets, or
of market pressures in the run-up to euro adoption.
Responding to shocks and emerging risks through dis-
cretionary fiscal adjustment has costs, such as the risk
that budgetary cuts fall on investment. This argues for
setting prudent medium-term goals, with adequate safety
margins. But it also highlights the case for strengthening
fiscal institutions — and thus improving the underlying
trade-offs for policy.
Finally, the situation in the public finances differs widely
across the EU-10. Encouragingly, those economies which
face the tougher fiscal deficit and debt challenges may
also have the greater scope to meet these through struc-
tural fiscal reforms that are themselves growth enhancing.
Effective fiscal strategies need to be developed on a case-
by-case basis, and the convergence programmes will con-
tinue to provide a valuable vehicle for this.
5.2. Tax and expenditure strategies 
consistent with stable convergence
There is wide consensus that fiscal policy can make a
contribution to potential growth through supply-side
effects (1). The strong catching-up potential of the
EU-10 and the need to complete restructuring suggest
¥1∂ See, for example, Bleaney et al. (2001) and Kneller et al. (1999) for an
empirical analysis of OECD countries, and Romero de Ávila and Strauch
(2003) for an application to EU countries. European Commission (2004a)
provides a literature survey.215
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this regard. So far, total factor productivity and capital
accumulation have been key sources of growth. In the
period ahead, both will remain important, while — with
the right skills available and sufficient mobility —
labour input should shift towards a positive contribution.
To support this process, the public sector needs to
commit adequate resources to key priorities such as
infrastructure investment, and education and training.
Policy-makers should also be mindful of research and
development needs, while taking full account of rates
of return and the role of the private sector. Pension
reforms can improve employment incentives and the
profile of the public finances, and these too entail
upfront costs. It is the need to assure adequate financ-
ing for such areas that has raised questions whether
growth would be enhanced by tolerating wider fiscal
deficits (e.g. Buiter and Grafe, 2002). Indeed, the
important medium-term contribution of pension
reforms has led to their special treatment under the
revised Stability and Growth Pact (see Box IV.3).
A second element in support of growth is the incentive
effects and signals to the private sector that result from
structural features of policy. These can enhance the set-
ting for investment and job creation. Taxation needs to
be broad-based and to avoid distorting economic activ-
ity. Tax and social security charges together should not
represent an unduly heavy burden on labour income.
Marginal rates of taxation and benefit withdrawal need
to avoid discouraging employment. Well-targeted bene-
fits can facilitate restructuring by easing adjustment
strains. Also, transfers to firms that distort resource allo-
cation need to be phased out. A number of these
approaches can increase public savings even in the short
run. It would thus be wrong to equate growth-oriented
reform of the public finances, mechanically, with a net
widening of fiscal deficits.
In this connection, key features of the composition of the
public finances in the new Member States, as these
emerge from Chapter 3 above, can be summarised as fol-
lows:
• Despite a cut in taxes on capital and labour over the
past decade, the total burden on labour often remains
high compared with other countries of similar per
capita income.
• Primary expenditure as a share of GDP in the central
European new Member States (except Slovakia) and
the island economies is in the same range as in euro-
area members, despite substantially lower income
levels. This contrasts with the Baltic States.
• Collective consumption and employee costs are rel-
atively high (including in the Baltic States) — sug-
gestive of overstaffing.
• Cash social transfers do not exceed the euro-area
level, but show wide variations across the EU-10.
Some countries such as Poland and Slovenia exhibit
high shares compared with other countries with sim-
ilar per capita income.
• Subsidies are fairly high in some cases, but the pic-
ture is very differentiated across countries.
Both the relatively high GDP share of certain key
expenditure categories and the variation in these shares
across countries suggest, at least prima facie, that there
is still scope for revenue and expenditure rationalisation,
in particular in the central European new Member States.
However, this pattern also highlights that expenditure
challenges cannot be reduced to a rule-of-thumb formula,
or just achieved through a compression of rates of pay.
The nature of the expenditures that could be reduced sug-
gests that structural reforms are required. Similarly, it is
tax bases, not tax rates, that need to be strengthened.
Countries, moreover, show major differences: tailor-made
approaches are called for. Given the structural nature of
the challenges, this may imply a multi-year approach.
On the revenue side, most recently acceded Member
States have been reducing personal, and especially corpo-
rate, income tax rates with the aim of supporting private
sector growth. While this trend is not likely to continue at
the same pace, it is also not likely to be reversed. Notably,
most new Member States still have high taxation of per-
sonal incomes, typically resulting from social security
contributions on wages and salaries higher than in other
countries with similar per capita income, including EU
cohesion countries. Moreover, in some of the EU-10
countries (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), pension
reforms introducing funded pillars will cause a loss of
contributions for the government (since these are to be
recorded outside the government sector according to the
2 March 2004 Eurostat decision after a transition period).216
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be found in several areas. Excise rates can be raised in
line with the typically higher rates in the EU-15. Sav-
ings can also be achieved by expanding the tax base and
rationalising the tax system. Stronger tax administra-
tion may increase collections, especially of VAT. Rev-
enue sources can be broadened via the introduction of
taxes on bases that are not taxed or taxed at a low rate,
and also by reducing exemptions and preferential rates
— especially for indirect, but also for direct taxes.
While VAT rates are relatively high compared with the
EU-15 countries, there are more exemptions and
reduced-rate items. There is also rather extensive
recourse to tax expenditures for personal and corporate
income tax rates, i.e. exemptions to promote goals sim-
ilar to those of traditional expenditures. Moreover,
Box IV.3: The Stability and Growth Pact — 2005 reform package and its consequences 
for the recently acceded Member States
The agreement on a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact endorsed by the EU Heads of State or Government on
22 March 2005 introduces more economic rationale and greater differentiation reflecting the increased economic hetero-
geneity in the enlarged EU of 25 Member States. While all changes introduced by the reform will, of course, apply to the
EU-10, the following elements of the reform are of particular importance.
Country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives. The reform foresees that medium-term budgetary objectives
(MTOs) will be differentiated across countries according to their debt ratio and potential growth (and, later, sustainability
of government finances). This has a clear implication for the new Member States, which in many cases have relatively low
debt ratios and high potential growth, and may therefore need to pursue less ambitious MTOs to comply with the reformed
SGP than would have been the case previously. The reform specifies that new Member States participating in ERM II (and,
later, in the euro area) will have an MTO in a range between – 1 % of GDP for countries with low debt and high potential
growth and balance or in surplus for countries with high debt and low potential growth; if they have not achieved the MTO,
they should pursue, as a benchmark, an annual adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP, net of one-off and other temporary measures.
For EU-10 countries not participating in ERM II, the MTO will be set at a level providing a safety margin with respect to
the 3 % of GDP deficit limit, ensuring rapid progress towards sustainability, and allowing room for budgetary manoeuvre,
in particular taking into account the need for public investment. 
Deeper and more differentiated assessment of budgetary developments in the excessive deficit procedure. The new
agreement specifies a set of ‘other relevant factors’ that the Commission and the Council will take into account when decid-
ing on the existence of an excessive deficit and when determining the deadline for its correction. These factors include,
inter alia, developments in potential growth but also considerations with respect to debt sustainability, and can be taken
into account in all the steps of the excessive deficit procedure (except abrogation). For the same reasons as mentioned
above, this may be relevant in the case of the recently acceded Member States. The reformulation of the exceptionality
clause of a ‘severe economic downturn’ is also important for the EU-10. Both the Commission and the Council, when
assessing and deciding on the existence of an excessive deficit, may consider an excess above 3 % as exceptional as long
as it remains ‘close to the reference value’ and ‘temporary’ and if it results from a negative growth rate or from the output
loss accumulated during a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential growth. While the EU-10 have usually
higher potential growth and should only extremely rarely face periods of negative growth, they may, like other Member
States, face protracted periods of very low growth.
Taking into account systemic pension reforms. The Commission and the Council, in all budgetary assessments in the
framework of the EDP, will give due consideration to the implementation of these reforms. This is particularly relevant for
the EU-10 since several of them have introduced such reforms in recent years or plan to introduce such reforms. The agree-
ment stipulates, in particular, that an excess close to the deficit reference value which reflects the implementation of a pen-
sion reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar should be considered carefully.
Consideration will be given to the net impact on the EDP deficit of multi-pillar pension reforms for the initial five years
after a Member State has introduced a mandatory fully funded system, or five years after 2004 for Member States that have
introduced such a reform before 2005, in a regressive way over five years. This is potentially important for decisions on
euro adoption.217
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‘revenue churning’ associated with overlapping
income transfer flows via preferential taxation, and
social transfer schemes (Cavalcanti and Li, 2000;
Burns and Yoo, 2002a, 2002b).
On the expenditure side, there are some constraints that
affect potential reforms to increase savings: accession-
related expenditures (including those in connection with
environmental standards, transport infrastructure and
administrative costs), the need to improve infrastructure
throughout the catching-up process, and the impact of
population ageing, which (even with pension and health
reforms) will trigger pressures on social security systems
over time. Moreover, healthcare spending is generally no
higher than in the other cohesion countries.
Substantial savings, however, can be found in contain-
ing wage dynamics and limiting the growth of health
expenditures and social transfers. The first typically
requires structural approaches along the lines of civil
service reform and/or a hiving-off of functions. On
average, the earnings of public employees have been
lower in the EU-10 than in the EU cohesion countries
(Funck, 2002). Moreover, strong dynamics in private
sector earnings will increase upward pressures on pay
scales (Kohler-Toglhofer et al., 2003). In healthcare,
most gains are to be found through more effective
expenditure control mechanisms and improved cost
efficiency. In pensions, reform of social security sys-
tems recently implemented in most EU-10 countries
will contribute to containing the increase in benefits
associated with ageing populations — though further
action may be needed in some countries to ensure
dynamics of pension payments consistent with budget-
ary objectives.
Importantly also, the discussion above pointed to the
scope for curtailing subsidies to firms and rationalising
transfers to persons, including through a better targeting
of benefits. The former can imply significant adjust-
ments in the real economy, while well-targeted social
transfers can to some degree ease the strains associated
with such adjustments.
The updated convergence programmes of the EU-10 set
out priorities for tax and expenditure reform, as well as
consolidation goals. They reflect several strategic con-
cerns: the scale of adjustment to respect the Maastricht
deficit criterion; the need to support private sector
growth during catching-up (e.g. containing the tax bur-
den on capital and labour); phasing out subsidies and
‘extra-budgetary’ funds; adaptation of institutions and
services to changing conditions (e.g. pension, health and
education reforms).
In their updated programmes, all the EU-10, with the
exception of Lithuania and Latvia, plan to cut expendi-
tures over the programme horizon (see Table IV.9). While
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Malta plan to
reduce the government revenues/GDP ratio, others base
their strategy on higher revenue shares. Among those cur-
rently in the excessive deficit procedure which committed
to ambitious consolidation paths, strategies differ. Cyprus
and Poland foresee increases in revenues relative to GDP,
while Hungary and Malta foresee a decline.
Table IV.9
Projected change in government revenues and expenditures over the 2004–07 period 
(changes over the programme horizon in, respectively, the government revenues/GDP ratio 
and the government expenditures/GDP ratio are indicated in parentheses)
Government revenues/GDP  
Government expenditures/GDP Cut Increase
Cut CZ (– 1.8, – 3.7)  
EE (– 3.5, – 2.5)  
HU (– 1.2, – 3.7)  
MT (– 1.8, – 5.6)
CY (+ 1.6, – 2.3)  
PL (+ 0.8, – 2.4)  
SI (+ 0.2, – 0.8)  
SK (+ 0.5, – 0.3)
Increase LV (+ 0.8, + 0.5)  
LT (+ 1.5, + 0.5)
Source: 2004 updates of the convergence programme.218
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expenditures are expected especially in terms of lower
collective consumption, and cash and non-cash social
benefits. Savings in collective consumption (mainly
government wage bills) are foreseen especially in the
Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. Ambitious health
reform packages have been announced in the pro-
grammes of Cyprus and Hungary. Social transfers are
planned to be reduced considerably, especially in the
Czech Republic, Malta and Poland.
On the revenue side, plans are broadly consistent with
the considerations discussed above. Improvements asso-
ciated with enhanced tax administration and rationalisa-
tion of the tax system, for example, are foreseen in Esto-
nia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland.
Finally, when assessing the impact of convergence prior-
ities on deficits and the public debt, account needs to be
taken of the availability of EU budgetary transfers. Such
transfers should help substantially in financing growth-
enhancing expenditures (Hallet, 2004; Hallet and Keere-
man, 2005). Together with the volume of co-financing
and fully nationally financed expenditures, however,
they may in some cases test the limits of absorption
capacities, and they do not fully offset the external
impact of associated public expenditures.
5.3. Debt sustainability and ageing
Credible fiscal policy can help ensure that convergence
is not interrupted by financial or real sector stress, and
that investment is not held back by risk perceptions in the
private sector. In this respect, the most fundamental
requirement is to target a primary balance that assures
satisfactory debt dynamics in terms of a public debt ratio
that declines rapidly to — or remains below — the
Treaty value of 60 % of GDP.
Discussion earlier in this chapter highlighted risks to the
public debt that could arise from volatility in key real and
financial variables. Among these is the possibility that
future stresses during the expansion and transformation
of the real and financial sectors could add to contingent
liabilities. In all economies, it is prudent to allow public
debt headroom for possible shocks. Among the EU-10,
this is operationally most important in the larger econo-
mies of central Europe — given present debt ratios, the
extent of future economic and financial transformation,
the relatively high stock of contingent liabilities, and the
sensitivity of debt levels to shocks originating in the real
and financial economy. The extent of headroom below
the 60 % debt ratio that is prudent on these grounds is an
issue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
The long-run sustainability of public finances embraces
broader issues, some of which cannot be assessed in iso-
lation from strategies for structural reform. A key issue
in this respect is population ageing — and this is an area
in which the underlying demographic situation and pros-
pects of the EU-10 are typically unfavourable (see Box
IV.4). Experience so far supports the view that the new
Member States will opt for a growth-friendly strategy,
based mainly on structural reforms rather than a higher
primary surplus. But to contain risk in the economy, far-
reaching action is still needed in some cases (see Graph
IV.16). More generally, credible progress will need to be
maintained in implementing reforms under way, and
flanking measures are needed in the labour market.     
Box IV.4: Long-term sustainability of public finances in the new Member States
Demographic projections show a particularly troubling outlook in the EU-10. At present, most have relatively low fertility
rates and lower, though increasing, life expectancy at birth than the EU-15, and frequently also a negative migration bal-
ance. The age profile is typically more favourable, but the situation is expected to worsen much faster on average by the
middle of the century. While the average old-age dependency ratio of the EU-15 is projected to double by 2050, it is
expected to more than double in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Slovenia and even triple in Slovakia (see Graph IV.16).
These three countries and Poland are projected to face the most significant worsening in the dependency ratio among the
EU-10. In other EU-10 countries, on the other hand, the dependency ratio is forecast to be closer to or even below the EU
average. Nevertheless, this outlook also implies serious consequences for labour supply and growth unless a rise in total
factor productivity compensates. 
(Continued on the next page)219
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The budgetary impact, illustrated in the latest convergence programmes, is a large increase in age-related spending in coun-
tries where old-age dependency ratios worsen most steeply, and in those that have not so far significantly reformed pension
or healthcare systems (see Graph IV.16 — depicted by the location of the centre of the bubble in relation to the two axes).
This is evident in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Slovenia, although the parametric measures adopted in the last in 2000
have mitigated risks. On the other hand, many new Member States have already implemented reform strategies in part or
in full. In Slovakia, the ongoing pension reform is projected to result in a relatively low increase in spending compared
with the Czech Republic. Estonia and Cyprus have similar dynamics in the old-age dependency ratio, but Estonia shows
an actual decrease in pension and healthcare system expenditures over time, and a similar outcome may result from reforms
planned in Poland (once technical details are available). 
Sustainability risks from ageing can be seen from long-term debt projections, assuming that medium-term reform plans in
the convergence programmes are implemented. While the highest debt levels in 2050 (depicted by the width of the bubble)
are projected in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the debt level in Cyprus is, given the projected increase in age-related
spending, relatively low. This is mainly due to a relatively high constant revenue level over the entire projection period. In
line with the projected fall in the age-related expenditures in Estonia and Poland, the debt ratio would fall to zero.
Comprehensive reform strategies to contain age-related spending are beneficial for both debt sustainability and growth —
requiring lower primary balances than otherwise. In this context, the EU-10 have made considerable headway. Most of
them have already introduced a three-pillar system, while others have adjusted parameters of their existing systems. To
fully contain budgetary risks, additional and simultaneous structural reforms, particularly in labour market policies, are
required. Pension measures such as postponement of retirement and/or restrictions on early retirement require a setting of
increasing employment and participation rates to absorb the labour force. Higher participation rates of older people, a par-
ticular problem in the EU-10, as well as lower unemployment, can also mitigate the challenges of ageing populations. 
Graph IV.16:  Budgetary pressures in the new Member States arising from population ageing
NB: Projected government debt in 2050 is depicted by the width of the circle. The grey colour indicates negative gross debt in 2050. For Cyprus, 
it concerns the adjusted gross debt.
Sources: Eurostat, News Release 48/2005, 8.4.2005, 2004 updates of the stability and convergence programmes and Commission services’ calculations.
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The stabilising role of fiscal policy also operates through
the role of the public sector saving–investment balance
in dampening economic fluctuations, including by
ensuring a sound macroeconomic policy-mix. The core
requirement in this regard, common to all Member
States, is to create sufficient room for manoeuvre for the
free play of automatic stabilisers over the business cycle
without endangering policy credibility or SGP limits
(see Box IV.5).
A more difficult issue, during catching-up, is how fiscal
policy should respond to strong cycles in private sector
activity lasting much longer than typical business cycles
and frequently associated with rapid credit growth.
These could give rise to sizeable external imbalances,
with the counterparts being some mix of household con-
sumption and private investment. This has been illus-
trated in the Baltic States, where large external current
account deficits have been wholly or partly driven by the
private saving–investment imbalance associated with
strong credit growth. Ultimately, the impact of such
cycles on sustainable growth will depend on factors that
reflect the frameworks for private sector decision-mak-
ing — the sound allocation of resources and prudent
appraisal of funding risks. Nonetheless, the discussion in
Chapter 4 of this part, with the aid of two country exam-
ples, highlighted the role that the public sector balance
can play in moderating such cycles and assuring resil-
ience during downturns. Its impact depends in part, of
course, on the size of the sector relative to the economy.
This role of fiscal policy in dampening longer cycles
during convergence depends on policy-makers avoiding
procyclicality by correctly analysing elements in fiscal
performance that are permanent as against those that are
transient. This is relevant not only as regards the poten-
tial growth rate but — as recent literature has highlighted
— also the performance of revenues relative to GDP dur-
ing a strong private sector boom, especially where asset
prices are rising strongly (Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2004).
Fiscal receipts are frequently swollen by factors that
reflect the ongoing credit and asset price boom: capital
gains levies, securities transaction taxes, etc. The impact
on revenues of booms related specifically to asset prices
has been estimated at levels of 1 % of GDP. During such
periods, it could be prudent to aim for a higher nominal
surplus (or lower deficit) on this account.
More generally, where growth is well above its medium-
term trend, this is also an opportunity to accelerate fiscal
consolidation towards medium-term goals. Also, where
there is a risk of downside shocks — such as shake-out
costs in the real or financial sector after a protracted
boom, or risks of a loss of access to international capital
markets — it could also be prudent to allow for these in
setting medium-term goals.        
Box IV.5: The elasticity of fiscal balances to economic activity
Budgetary elasticities play an important role in assessing fiscal policy. They serve, inter alia, as an indicator for the strength
of the countercyclical or stabilising effect of policy. Mainly because of data constraints, there have been no studies so far
providing robust empirical estimates of budgetary elasticities in the EU-10 based on a common approach. 
In 2004, OECD and Commission staff started work towards budgetary elasticities for the EU-10 following the more com-
plex approach developed by van den Noord (2000). The elasticity includes two components. The first measures the impact
of GDP on the tax base (or the macroeconomic variable more closely related to expenditure, for example unemployment
in the case of unemployment benefits). It is estimated econometrically using time-series data. The second component links
the tax or expenditure base to the budgetary component, derived from tax legislation and related fiscal data. 
Very preliminary results of the joint OECD and Commission estimation work, including an update of the elasticities for
the EU-15, were made available at the end of 2004. Before commenting on the figures reported in the table below, two
qualifications should be noted. The presentation is limited to average tax and expenditure elasticities across groups of coun-
tries because of the preliminary nature of the estimates. Current results for all countries should thus be seen as work in
progress.
(Continued on the next page)221
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Due to the lack of available data in the EU-10, the OECD methodology had to be adapted. In particular, the first component
of the overall budgetary elasticity, which links the tax or expenditure base to GDP, was not derived from econometric
regressions. By way of approximation, the OECD set it to the average of the small EU-15 countries. While this solution
has the advantage of simplicity, it may be argued that countries undergoing major structural change are unlikely to exhibit
elasticities similar to those of small open EU-15 economies. As an alternative, the Commission services estimated the first
component of the budgetary elasticities for each individual EU-10 country econometrically and took the average across
countries. 
On this basis, fiscal balances in the EU-10 show on average a lower sensitivity to the cycle than those in the EU-15. This
reflects the lower progressiveness of income taxes and their lower share in total revenues, less generous unemployment
insurance, and labour market variables that are less responsive over the cycle, though there are some reservations on econo-
metric robustness.
A further conclusion concerns the stabilising effect of the budget over the cycle. In addition to lower budgetary elasticities,
the EU-10 have on average a smaller size of government than the EU-15, as measured by the expenditure-to-GDP ratio.
Since most expenditure items do not vary automatically over the cycle, this implies a lower countercyclical impact.
These features, in the abstract, could seem to suggest that the EU-10 need less scope for the play of automatic stabilisers
than the EU-15. Such a conclusion needs to be heavily qualified in three respects. It leaves out the possibility that fluctu-
ations in output, the second ingredient of the budgetary safety margin, may be wider in the EU-10. The features of the econ-
omy that drive fiscal elasticity vary quite widely across the EU-10. Also, of course, these estimates by definition leave out
the possible exposure of these economies to specific, non-cyclical demand shocks.
Table IV.10
Average budgetary elasticities and sensitivities in the EU-10 and EU-15 
Preliminary estimates based on OECD methodology as described in van den Noord (2000)
Budgetary elasticities Budgetary sensitivity
Output elasticity of total 
taxes
Output elasticity of 
current primary 
expenditure
Tax 
burden
Total 
current 
primary 
expenditure 
to GDP ratio 
(2004)
Overall budgetary 
sensitivity
OECD (1) COM (2) OECD (1) COM (2) OECD (1) COM (2)
A B C D A*(C/100)-B(D/100)
Average of EU-10 countries 0.90 0.71 – 0.07 – 0.03 34.1 36.1 0.33 0.25
updated previous(3) updated previous(3) updated previous(3)
A B C D A*(C/100)-B(D/100)
Average of EU-15 countries 0.94 0.84 -0.30 -0.14 41.9 40.8 0.50 0.41
(1) The link between output and the tax or expenditure base is set as equal to the average of the small EU-15 countries.
(2) The link between output and the tax or expenditure base is set to the average of individual estimates of the EU-10 excluding Malta and Cyprus. 
(3) Released in 2000.
Source: Commission services.222
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The contribution of fiscal policy to preserving stability
needs to be evaluated in the context of other policy
regimes. Monetary and exchange rate frameworks, in
particular, are highly relevant to the way financial stress
affects the real economy. They also influence private
sector risk behaviour: for example, variability in the
exchange rate encourages hedging of currency exposure,
thus reducing the potential cost of financial stress in
terms of the real economy. Monetary regimes thus affect
the risks to output against which fiscal prudence can be
seen as a form of insurance.
Monetary regimes vary markedly across the EU-10, and
are set to change as they move at differing speeds
towards euro adoption. Three examples help to highlight
the risk characteristics of monetary frameworks, and
related fiscal challenges.
• Under inflation targeting, monetary policy can help
contain credit growth and dampen swings in private
sector activity to the extent these are threatening the
attainment — or tractability — of inflation over the
central bank’s time horizon. Financial stresses,
meanwhile, typically crystallise in the exchange
market. This may facilitate adjustment in the real
economy. But if easy fiscal policy results in high
domestic currency interest rates, and if the exchange
rate is in practice somewhat rigid, these factors can
encourage unhedged borrowing among firms and
households, giving rise to potentially serious bal-
ance-sheet risks. While the stabilising role of mone-
tary policy can ease the task of fiscal policy,
unhedged exposure can increase adjustment costs
and the burden on the public finances in a crisis.
• Exchange rate targeting regimes such as ERM II
highlight the importance of a sound fiscal policy.
They also place special demands on the policy-mix
to help ensure that the exchange rate for euro adop-
tion reflects economic fundamentals. Tight money
and an easy fiscal policy, for example, could result
in an overly appreciated exchange rate. Credibility
also falls under a market spotlight, and evidence of
contagion across some of the EU-10 countries
underscores that this is potentially a matter of
common concern. (As under inflation targeting, the
extent of the associated risks to output would depend
in part on the extent to which unhedged foreign cur-
rency liabilities had built up.)
• Under the euro and wholly credible pegs, there is
no latitude to use interest rates to address asymmet-
ric upswings in the domestic economy or to cush-
ion negative shocks on output. Meanwhile,
external adjustment plays out through relative
price changes. Thus, problems associated with
exchange markets are eliminated, but external
adjustment can be a slow process if real sector mar-
kets are rigid — increasing some potential chal-
lenges for fiscal policy.
Such features of the monetary setting thus affect the
challenges facing fiscal policy. Also, changes in mone-
tary regime over time are important, including notably
the shift towards ERM II and the euro. At a deep level,
this transition can be taken to signal a growing maturity
in monetary transmission channels and decisive progress
in nominal convergence — factors that are clearly
favourable to stability. However, reduced degrees of
monetary freedom have implications for the challenges
to fiscal policy. Fiscal trade-offs may need to pay greater
heed to stabilisation issues. If fiscal policy is not yet well
placed to engineer room for manoeuvre — for example,
adequate safety margins in terms of the Maastricht crite-
ria or policy-mix requirements — then policy-makers
will need to weigh this carefully before shifting to a more
constraining monetary regime.
In these respects, it is crucial to distinguish between
Treaty requirements and the principles of prudent fiscal
management — which will normally take account of
financial market risks to the convergence path and the
desirability of keeping stabilisers available at all times. It
is prudent management that suggests minimising risks of
a last-minute market disturbance (for example, follow-
ing a shock to the public finances) during the approach
to euro adoption, and also that adequate room for stabi-
lisers within the SGP limits be built in at the time when
Member States become members of the euro area. These
considerations may imply a more ambitious consolida-
tion path in the approach to ERM II and euro adoption
than implied by a mechanical observance of the Maas-
tricht reference value.
In addition to monetary policy regimes, the goals of
supervisory policies in the financial sector, which
address the health of institutions, are supportive of finan-
cial stability. Prudential frameworks can contribute par-
ticularly where supervisors internalise systemic risks in
evaluating institutions’ credit and market exposures.
Concerns about stability during convergence arise in part223
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problems (for example, underpricing indirect exposure
to currency risks, or the perception of implicit guarantees
on funding). Several supervisory approaches — such as
stress tests — can reduce risks, and so can close and
active cooperation between home and host supervisors
of systemically important foreign establishments.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind the influence on
financial stability of governance standards and of real sec-
tor frameworks. Regarding the former, a range of official
policies and private codes of conduct relating to govern-
ance in the non-financial sector affect the efficient and sta-
ble functioning of non-financial corporations. This is a
question that deserves more attention in light of structural
shifts which are under way in the distribution of risk in the
economy: there is a tendency in all economies for finan-
cial institutions to pass on to clients financial risks that for-
merly they themselves bore. Regarding flexible real sector
markets, these are clearly crucial in reducing the potential
costs to growth when the economy needs to adjust to real
or financial shocks. They are thus a key element in influ-
encing the extent of output risks against which prudent fis-
cal policy is a form of insurance.
5.6. Risks, safety margins 
and fiscal institutions
A number of factors differentiate the EU-10 from other
EU Member States. Most obvious, on the favourable
side, is the potential for higher output growth, which will
enhance debt-carrying capacity, and the fact that, in
some cases, these Member States enjoy a much lower
initial public debt ratio. On the more cautionary side,
there may be continuing risks of economic and financial
volatility affecting debt dynamics and output stability,
especially in those cases where structural transforma-
tions and financial catching-up are still under way.
There is also a risk, during rapid convergence, of overes-
timating potential growth and, particularly, the durability
of revenues associated with credit and asset price booms.
This latter factor is especially relevant to the EU-10 coun-
tries that are likely to experience a very rapid growth in
credit towards equilibrium levels over the next few years.
These are arguments not for a more restrictive policy dur-
ing convergence, but for a stance that takes underlying
developments and their variability correctly into account.
There are, by contrast, two factors that could argue — on
grounds of prudent fiscal management and market sig-
nals in some specific situations — for a fiscal stance
more restrictive than those implied by the Maastricht fis-
cal criterion or by medium-term SGP goals. These are,
first, the possibility that sizeable current account deficits
could trigger, in the future, a rise in risk premiums that
threatens capital market access, and, second, the need to
pay close regard to issues of credibility, safety margins,
and policy-mix in the run-up to euro adoption.
There are drawbacks in discretionary adjustments to fis-
cal policy to respond to such market risks at the time they
emerge. In particular, ad hoc cuts in spending may fall
heavily on investment, and time lags mean that the with-
drawal may be mistimed. The uncertainties and costs of
discretionary action underscore the case for prudent
medium-term goals, but they also prompt the question as
to what are complementary routes to help preserve sta-
bility. One obvious option to exploit is the stabilising
role of strong fiscal institutions.
In this respect, a key challenge for fiscal authorities in the
EU-10 is to establish credibility in sticking with budgetary
plans and fulfilling commitments. A common source of
slippage is the failure of spending ministers and local
authorities to internalise the social costs of their demands,
the so-called ‘common pool problem’. Fiscal institutions
can be designed in ways that help limit this source of
expenditure bias (see Part II, Section 2.3). One such
approach is to delegate formation, monitoring and imple-
mentation of the budget to a single policy body — for
instance, a finance minister with a leading role in the
budgetary process (the ‘delegation approach’). Fragmen-
tation of the process can also be limited by increased coor-
dination among spending ministers and levels of govern-
ment, possibly through formalised rules and procedures
(the ‘commitment approach’). Most EU-10 countries
seem to have embarked on reforms in their fiscal institu-
tions in line with this approach (Ylaoutlinen, 2004).
Most EU-10 countries, in recent years, have also intro-
duced multi-year budgetary frameworks to better inter-
nalise the medium-term consequences of decisions on
spending programmes in the formation of the budget and
to improve ex post monitoring. Many had already moved
to better integrate the activities of extra-budgetary funds
in the budgetary process and to increase the coordination
of spending decisions across levels of government
(Gleich, 2003; Ylaoutlinen, 2004).
In spite of this progress, there is still room to strengthen
fiscal governance in the new Member States. First, the224
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than-expected budgetary outcomes in ‘good times’ will
be helpful to avoid loosening the stance of fiscal policy
during periods of strong growth. Second, future reforms
could contribute to reducing the high share of so-called
‘mandatory expenditures’ in some EU-10 countries, i.e.
those that need to be changed require additional legisla-
tion on top of the budget law, thus improving the ability
of budgets to react to shocks. Third, strengthened prac-
tices in evaluating expenditure (e.g. via cost–benefit
analysis techniques in project selection, periodic reviews
of programmes, establishment of output-oriented indica-
tors of government actions) could contribute to increas-
ing the effectiveness of government expenditure and
achieving cost savings.
In addition to strengthening institutions, a further
approach may help improve potential trade-offs for fis-
cal policy: microeconomic aspects of policy that influ-
ence economic stability. A key priority in this regard is
to avoid creating distortions that could amplify boom–
bust cycles in the private sector (such as untargeted
mortgage subsidy programmes and interest rate deducti-
bility schemes).
Such institutional and microeconomic priorities need to
be pursued over a medium-term time horizon. Nonethe-
less, they can offer important routes to strengthen the sta-
bilising quality of fiscal policy for any given level of def-
icit and public debt. They thus can improve considerably
the potential trade-offs or complementarities between
stability and growth that face policy-makers during the
convergence process.
5.7. Fiscal challenges 
and country situations
When assessing trade-offs or complementarities, a final
key consideration is the wide variety of economic and
fiscal circumstances in the EU-10.
• A number of the EU-10 economies in central Europe
face significant challenges in keeping public debt
ratios within prudent bounds. In these economies too,
it is plausible that the elasticity of fiscal balances to
output is close to that in the EU-15, albeit perhaps
somewhat less. Larger fiscal deficits in some cases
also pose policy coordination challenges that could
affect the exchange market. Output costs of exchange
rate variability have proved a concern. Seen from a
stability perspective, these factors suggest significant
challenges ahead in ensuring that fiscal policy con-
tributes fully to economic stability. On the other hand,
these economies may also have greater scope for a
restructuring of existing expenditure programmes
that is itself growth enhancing. Recent reforms in Slo-
vakia (see Box IV.6) illustrate the scope for enhanc-
ing both growth and consolidation.
• Stability risks show a different profile in the Baltic
States. Deficit and debt levels are on average far
lower. The scope required for automatic stabilisers
may be less, and the stabilising impact of fiscal pol-
icy is limited by the size of the public sector. Current
constraints on policy result mainly from the need to
underpin the credibility of currency-board-style
exchange regimes, to provide assurance to financial
markets that wide external current account deficits
do not have their source in any misallocation in the
public sector, and to avoid fiscal amplification of
trends towards real appreciation.
• In the two island economies, debt and deficit chal-
lenges are coupled with the need to ensure the mar-
ket credibility of their exchange rate pegs. These
economies, like those in central Europe, appear to
have significant scope for expenditure reforms in
achieving consolidation. A factor that differentiates
them from the other EU-10 economies is that their
financial sectors are already much more fully devel-
oped: potential risks that could arise from rapid
credit growth are less relevant for them.
The challenges for fiscal policy over the next few years
will not be static. As the EU-10 countries, at different
times in the future, enter ERM II and adopt the euro, the
evolving monetary setting will modify fiscal challenges.
Six of the EU-10 countries now participate in ERM II,
but these do not include the four larger EU-10 countries
in central Europe which currently have flexible
exchange rates. For those four countries, policy-mix and
credibility risks may come more strongly to the fore in
the run-up to euro adoption. This could occur in an envi-
ronment of rising levels of euro-denominated liabilities,
and hence of balance-sheet risks. Moreover, contagion
within the group could be an issue. Once they have
adopted the euro, some of these economies may still face
challenges to ensure scope for automatic stabilisers and
to keep public debt on a credibly sustainable path.
In the Baltic States, by contrast, stability concerns may
ease somewhat after euro adoption: the issue of hard-peg225
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liser profiles will remain undemanding. The potential
challenge will lie more in how policy should respond to
the scale and composition of private sector imbalances.
A key will be to ensure that potential growth and revenue
performance are assessed prudently. The outlook for
public debt and potential growth may allow somewhat
less constrained fiscal balance positions within the
framework of the reformed SGP. However, in the proc-
ess of transition, it would be crucial to avoid a fiscal
stimulus at cyclically inappropriate times.
A stylised analysis along these lines is thus somewhat
encouraging from a policy perspective. Taking into
account the differing profiles of the EU-10, it is plausible
that complementarities exist, even in the short run,
between growth-enhancing tax and expenditure reforms
and decisive progress with consolidation where this is
needed.
If such a conclusion were borne out by in-depth country
assessments, it would be very important: there is no
escaping the urgency, particularly in certain cases in cen-
tral Europe, of improving substantially both the pros-
pects for growth and the outlook for the fiscal balance.
The convergence programmes prepared by the EU-10
offer a vehicle to explore these issues, including dimen-
sions that are matters of common concern.  
Box IV.6: Slovakia: fiscal reforms, strong growth and a declining deficit
Slovakia illustrates the feasibility of far-reaching public finance reforms, combining growth orientation with fiscal consol-
idation. Since end-2002, it has implemented a comprehensive tax reform package and a broad array of structural expend-
iture reforms, while strengthening fiscal institutions. The fiscal deficit and the expenditure ratio fell substantially (to 3.3 %
of GDP and 38.5 % of GDP in 2004, respectively), while growth accelerated (to 5â % in 2004). A strong flow of (green-
field) FDI bodes well for future growth performance. This should facilitate further fiscal consolidation, in combination
with a reorientation of expenditure towards Lisbon goals. Achievement of the Maastricht deficit reference value in 2007
is within reach.  
(Continued on the next page)
Graph IV.17:  GDP growth and general government deficit and expenditure
Source: Commission services.
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On the revenue side, the tax reform package led to a considerable shift from direct to indirect taxation, simplified the sys-
tem and increased transparency, strengthening incentives and enhancing growth. Based on preliminary estimates, the
reform package appears to have been broadly revenue neutral. Key elements were: the introduction of a flat tax rate of 19 %
for both individual and corporate income taxation, coupled with the removal of tax exemptions; introduction of a unified
VAT tax rate of 19 %; increases in several excise taxes; and abolition of some less significant taxes (inheritance tax, gift
tax) and amendments to some other smaller taxes (real estate tax, vehicle tax). In addition, health and social insurance con-
tribution rates for employers and employees have been reduced, albeit to a still relatively high total level of some 48 % of
gross wages. 
On the expenditure side, reforms focused, in particular, on the targeting and incentive aspects of social transfers — improv-
ing the growth-enhancing quality and the sustainability of the public finances. Key measures were: (i) reform of pensions:
changes in key parameters of the pay-as-you-go pillar (benefit formula with a closer link between contribution history and
pension claims, stepwise increase of the retirement age, indexation based more on inflation), and introduction of a sizeable
funded pension pillar (diversion of contributions of 9 % of gross wages to that pillar); (ii) other changes to social insurance
(e.g. unemployment and sickness benefits), benefits (e.g. child benefits), and assistance, emphasising targeting and incen-
tives; and (iii) changes to healthcare systems (e.g. introduction of co-payments, introduction of individual private health
insurance, streamlining of the health benefit package, better incentives and harder budget constraints for healthcare pro-
viders). 
On the institutional side, as part of a comprehensive public finance management reform project supported by the World
Bank, Slovakia has improved all steps of the budget cycle. In particular, the medium-term orientation has been strength-
ened and, together with the 2005 budget, a detailed multiannual budgetary framework for the years 2005 to 2007 was elab-
orated. The obligation to submit annual convergence programmes in the context of EU surveillance procedures acted as an
additional catalyst for reforms.227

Part V
Member State developments

1. Belgium
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2004, the general government accounts posted a slight
surplus of 0.1 % of GDP, close to the original target of a
balanced budget in the 2003 update of the stability pro-
gramme. However, this hides a considerable overrun in
health expenditure (which grew by some 7.8 % in real
terms instead of the planned 4.5 %). The (one-off) pro-
ceeds of the tax amnesty law (0.2 % of GDP) were 0.1 %
of GDP lower than anticipated in the budget. These neg-
ative developments were more than compensated by
higher-than-expected tax income (mainly VAT and
direct taxes), supported by strong economic growth
(2.7 % against 1.8 % projected in the 2003 update of the
stability programme). In 2004, the debt-to-GDP ratio
decreased further by 4.4 percentage points to 95.6 %,
which is lower than foreseen in the 2003 update of the
stability programme (97.6 %), mainly as a result of
higher-than-anticipated economic growth and a number
of financial operations such as the sale of government
participations in the telephone company Belgacom and
the Brussels airport corporation BIAC.
The 2005 budget was presented in October 2004 and
finally approved by Parliament on 23 December 2004.
The budget aims at limiting the real growth in federal
primary expenditure to 1 % and at maintaining a balance
in the social security system through improved expendi-
ture control and a broadening of the tax base, while
avoiding new taxes on labour. Although less than in
2004 (0.7 % of GDP), one-off measures still account for
some 0.3 % of GDP in the 2005 budget. The initial target
of a balanced budget for 2005 was confirmed in the latest
update of the stability programme (1) (submitted on
6 December 2004). The Commission services’ spring
2005 forecast foresees a small deficit (0.2 % of GDP),
based on somewhat less optimistic growth assumptions
(GDP growth of 2.2 % against 2.5 % in the budget) and
because of some uncertainty regarding the impact of new
measures to control spending in healthcare. Accord-
ingly, it projects the cyclically adjusted balance to
decrease to 0.3 % of GDP in 2005 (same figure as that
based on the latest update of the stability programme).
As for 2006, a deficit of 0.6 % of GDP is projected in the
Commission services’ 2005 spring forecast, on the basis
of a no-policy-change scenario. At this stage, no one-off
measures are planned for 2006. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of the 2001 direct tax reform will have its
main impact in 2006 (over 0.3 % of GDP). So far, the
government has not yet announced any new measures
that could compensate for these income losses in 2006.
This explains the difference with the latest update of the
stability programme, which foresees a balanced budget
for 2006. For 2007, the government is planning a surplus
of 0.3 % of GDP.
According to the spring forecast, the debt ratio is
expected to decrease to 94.9 % of GDP in 2005, despite
the takeover of an EUR 7.4 billion debt (2.5 % of GDP)
from the national railway company SNCB (2). In 2006,
the debt ratio is forecast to reach 91.7 % of GDP, as also
foreseen in the 2004 update of the stability programme.
The ageing fund
As in many European countries, Belgium will be con-
fronted with the budgetary impact of an ageing popula-
tion. The Belgian authorities estimate that the share of
people older than 60 will increase from 22 % in 2003 to
31 % by 2030. As a result, the dependency ratio (i.e. the
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ The Belgian programme law of 24 December 2002 stipulates a number of
conditions for the takeover of the SNCB debt, among which the condition
that it can only take place if it does not affect the deficit and does not
increase the debt ratio above 100 % of GDP. According to the programme
law of 22 December 2003 and the corresponding royal decree of
30 December 2004, the debt transfer to the State-owned Fund for Railway
Infrastructure has been effective since 1 January 2005. 231
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to the number of people between 20 and 59) is expected
to increase from 82 % to 106 %.
The Belgian High Finance Council has estimated the
direct annual budgetary impact of ageing at 3.4 % of
GDP by 2030, mainly as a result of increased pensions
Table V.1
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Belgium
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2003 2004 2005 2006
General government balance 0.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.6
— Total revenues 51.3 49.6 49.1 48.5
  Of which:  — current taxes 29.9 30.3 30.7 30.3
— social contributions 16.5 16.0 15.8 15.5
— Total expenditure 50.9 49.5 49.3 49.0
Of which: — collective consumption 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.1
— social transfers (2) 30.6 30.4 30.4 30.2
— interest expenditure 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2
— gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0
Primary balance 5.7 4.8 4.3 3.6
Pm Tax burden 45.7 45.9 45.8 45.1
Government debt 100.0 95.6 94.9 91.7
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance 1.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
Pm  Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 6.5 5.3 4.7 4.0
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.3
Stability programme (4) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6
Primary balance 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.7
Government debt 100.0 96.6 95.5 91.7 88.0 84.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Belgium.       
Table V.2
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Belgium
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Continued implementation of the 2001 tax reform (– 0.2 % of 
GDP)
• Real growth in federal primary expenditure limited to 1 % 
(zero growth in defence, reduced expenditure by ministries, etc.)
• Reduction of social security contributions on labour, especially 
for low-income workers (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Several measures to limit real growth in healthcare expenditure 
to 4.5 %, for example by freezing medical fees or by reducing 
the cost of medicine and medical treatment in hospitals (+ 0.2 % 
of GDP)
• Broadening the base for revenue of the social security system, for 
example social security contributions on the use of corporate cars 
and a levy on tobacco (+ 0.2 % of GDP)
• Rearrangement of the budgetary calendar for a number of government programmes, both on the revenue and expenditure side, 
for example some planned tax cuts on energy products have been delayed (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
  Sources: Commission services and 2005 budget.232
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This should be partly compensated by lower expenditure
in other social benefits (– 1.8 % of GDP, mainly as a
result of lower unemployment and family benefits). Indi-
rectly, the demographic evolution could also reduce the
budget for education by some 0.7 % of GDP. However,
the High Finance Council’s estimate of the budgetary
impact of ageing can be considered somewhat optimis-
tic, since it would entail a significant drop in the annual
real growth rate of healthcare expenditure to 2.8 % on
average for the period 2008–30. The official target for
2003–07 is still 4.5 %, whereas in 2004 this figure was
overrun with an annual growth rate of 7.8 %. OECD pro-
jections also suggest that the Belgian authorities’
assumptions on the increase in the employment rate and
productivity growth could be on the high side. More cau-
tious estimates lead to an additional 1 % of GDP impact
stemming from ageing.
In order to prepare for the budgetary impact of ageing,
the Belgian High Finance Council has estimated that
increasing the structural budget balance to 0.3 % of GDP
in 2007 and further to 1.5 % of GDP over 2011–18
would put public finances on a sustainable path. The
structural balance would then fall back to close to zero
by 2030, affected by the increasing effects of ageing.
Meanwhile, the government debt would fall from about
94 % of GDP in 2007 to around 30 % of GDP by 2030,
when it would stabilise.
The Belgian authorities reduced the debt considerably
from 137.9 % of GDP in 1993 to 95.6 % in 2004
(according to the latest EDP notification), mainly by
securing relatively high primary balances and by using
the proceeds of a number of ‘below-the-line’ one-off
operations. The proceeds of these one-off operations
could have been used to reduce the debt directly, but
instead the Belgian authorities decided to direct most of
them to the ‘ageing fund’.
The Belgian ageing fund was created by a law of 5 Sep-
tember 2001. It was to be funded with the proceeds from
(below-the-line) one-off operations and/or from budget
surpluses. A medium-term objective was formulated in
2003 in an agreement between the government partners,
when a target of EUR 10 billion (some 3.2 % of GDP) by
2007 was envisaged. In 2004, the government increased
its target to EUR 13 billion (about 4.1 % of GDP) by
2007. The ageing fund law of 2001 provided for the fund
to be gradually dissolved starting at the moment when
the debt ratio falls below 60 %, in order to ‘finance’ the
increasing cost of pension schemes over the period
2010–30. However, the law of 2001 did not foresee any
form of yearly mandatory funding, which remained at
the full discretion of the federal government.
In 2001, the starting capital of the fund was EUR 615
million (0.2 % of GDP — see Table V.3). In the follow-
ing years, the fund benefited from the proceeds of sev-
eral one-off operations. Major contributions came from
the sale of the State mortgage credit corporation Credibe
(1 % of GDP) in 2003 and the proceeds from the Fadels
operation (in which a State-owned social housing financ-
ing corporation was dissolved) in 2004 (0.1 % of GDP).
The most important source of funding so far stemmed
from the transfer of the Belgacom pension fund (1.9 %
of GDP) in 2004. However, contrary to all previous
cases, this transfer to the ageing fund was accompanied
by a similar increase in government pension liabilities.
In 2005, the ageing fund could also benefit from the pro-
ceeds of a number of one-off operations, such as the sale
of Belgacom shares (0.2 % of GDP), the tax amnesty law
(0.2 % of GDP) and the privatisation of the Brussels air-
port operator BIAC (0.2 % of GDP, including the trans-
fer of the BIAC pension fund). For a number of meas-
ures, the government has not yet decided to what extent
the proceeds will be used to finance the ageing fund, but
the target of EUR 13 billion is well within reach. On 25
February 2005, the government proposed to change the
ageing fund law, to provide a fixed contribution to the
ageing fund in the period 2007–12. Hence, in 2007 the
fund should grow by 0.3 % of GDP. This amount would
be increased by 0.2 % of GDP annually to reach a yearly
contribution of 1.3 % of GDP in 2012. The share of
below-the-line operations would be limited to EUR 250
million (some 0.1 % of GDP) annually until 2010 and to
EUR 500 million (0.2 % of GDP) afterwards. The rest of
the contribution should come from the government sur-
plus. On the other hand, since the proposed contributions
are less than the surpluses considered necessary by the
High Finance Council to put Belgian public finances on
a sustainable path, additional direct debt reduction will
be required.
Assessment
From an economic point of view, investing in the ageing
fund is similar to a direct debt reduction. In the case of a
direct debt reduction, the government uses a surplus or
the proceeds from a below-the-line operation to repay
outstanding debt. In the case of an investment in the age-
ing fund, the public debt is converted into a debt to the233
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Treasury bond’.
Since the ageing fund falls within the government perim-
eter, the debt of the Treasury to the ageing fund is inter-
nal to the government sector. Consequently, according to
the Maastricht definition, the Belgian debt ratio is net of
all assets owned by the ageing fund (contrary to an
‘external’ pension fund, which constitutes an additional
buffer against the cost of ageing). When the ageing fund
is used for age-related spending in the future, the debt
will increase accordingly.
Nevertheless, although an investment in the ageing fund
is equivalent to a direct debt reduction of the same mag-
nitude, it has the advantage that it reinforces the political
commitment of the Belgian government to maintain the
necessary (primary) surplus to prepare for the budgetary
impact of population ageing.
The strategy for coping with the budgetary cost of an
ageing population outlined by the Belgian High Finance
Council is mainly based on gross debt reduction through
building up budget surpluses (itself relying primarily on
primary expenditure restraint) and an ageing fund. Con-
taining primary expenditures might prove difficult, espe-
cially in the healthcare sector, but is important in view of
the government’s strategy of reducing the tax burden in
order to create employment. Given the projected
increase in the old-age dependency ratio, pursuing this
broad strategy with determination is crucial to the
achievement of long-term sustainability.
Table V.3
Financing sources of the ageing fund until 2004, Belgium
(million EUR)
Year  Source  Amount  Cumulative
 2001 UMTS 
Surplus value of gold reserves of the national bank 
Short-term interests
437.8 
177.1 
9.2
  
 
624.0
 2002 Profits of the national bank 
Short-term interests
429.0 
2.7
  
1 055.8
 2003 Dividend 2002 Belgacom 
Value of unreturned Belgian banknotes after the introduction 
of the euro 
Credibe
237.3 
 
214.0 
2 645.7
  
 
 
4 152.7
 2004 Dividend 2003 Belgacom 
Short-term interests 
Belgacom pension fund 
Fadels
290.0 
6.2 
5 000.0 
2 500.0
  
 
 
11 948.9
Source: 2005 budget.234
2. Czech Republic
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
Developments in public finances in 2004 were better than
expected, as a result of stronger growth and of a change in
budgetary rules in mid-2004 which made it possible for
the first time to carry over unspent funds to 2005. This
change in budgetary rules led to more prudent behaviour
of spending departments. The general government deficit
was 3.0 % of GDP, far below the target foreseen in the
May 2004 convergence programme (5.3 % of GDP).
The State budget for 2005 was approved by Parliament
on 15 December 2004. It reflected the fiscal measures
presented in the May 2004 convergence programme.
The 2005 budget is the second based on medium-term
expenditure ceilings for central government.
On the expenditure side, several discretionary cuts were
introduced in order to meet the 2005 expenditure ceiling.
On the revenue side, personal and corporate tax relief is
to some extent offset by an increase in revenues from
VAT and excise duties, partly linked to tax harmonisa-
tion after EU accession.
The deficit target for 2005 set in the most recent conver-
gence programme (submitted on 1 December 2004) is
4.7 % of GDP (1). This target is likely to be increased by
about 0.3 % of GDP as a consequence of the recent deci-
sion to consider the spending on military jets as one-off
expenditures in 2005. Given a track record of expendi-
ture overestimation and revenue underestimation in the
Czech budget, the Commission services’ forecast for the
2005 general government deficit is 4.5 % of GDP. This
projection assumes that half of the funds carried over
from 2004 will be spent in 2005 and it also takes into
account one-off military expenditures. If, however, the
budget is implemented rigorously and the room for
spending, as foreseen in the 2005 budget, is not fully
used, as in 2004, the deficit could be lower.
The deficit target for 2006 set in the December 2004 con-
vergence programme is 3.8 % of GDP. The Commission
services’ projection for that year is a deficit of 4.0 % of
GDP, based on the no-policy-change assumption. In the
absence of specific measures which are necessary to
reach the official target in the election year 2006, the
expenditure ceilings for 2006 are not taken into account
in the spring forecast. The convergence programme fur-
ther foresees a reduction in the deficit to 3.3 % of GDP
in 2007 and to below 3 % of GDP by 2008.
Gross public debt is expected to decline in 2005 to
36.4 % of GDP, mainly due to privatisation proceeds. In
2006, debt is projected to reach 37.0 % of GDP.
Quality of the central government budgetary process
Fiscal targeting through medium-term expenditure ceil-
ings was formally introduced by the new law on budget-
ary rules as of 2005. The introduction of expenditure
ceilings is a major institutional innovation which should
considerably enhance the quality of the budgetary pro-
cess, in particular the medium-term budgetary planning.
The Czech government intends to use expenditure ceil-
ings as a key instrument for deficit reduction. The
expenditure ceilings apply only to the central govern-
ment. The reason is not only the direct control of the cen-
tral government over those expenditures, but also the
fact that the central government is the subsector of gen-
eral government which historically exhibits the highest
deficits. Medium-term ceilings thus apply to total expen-
ditures of both the State budget and seven State ‘extra-
budgetary’ funds (State Fund for the Environment, State
Fund for Land Fertilisation, State Fund for Culture, State
Fund for Czech Cinematography Support and Develop-
ment, State Fund for Transport Infrastructure, State Fund
for Housing Development, State Agriculture Interven-
tion Fund).    
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.235
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expenditures are not under the full control of the Minis-
try of Finance which directly controls only the State
budget expenditure. The spending of the seven State
funds is under the control of individual ministries. This
is also reflected in the process of budgetary approval.
The budgets of the seven State funds are approved both
by the government and by Parliament not only separately
from the State budget, but often also individually. This
prevents their joint consideration in the context of the
overall central government budget. Whereas the State
budget is usually subject to an intense political debate,
the State funds’ budgets are usually passed without sig-
nificant opposition, which allows their managers to bid
Table V.4
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Czech Republic
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance  – 11.7  – 3.0  – 4.5  – 4.0  
 — Total revenues  41.6  42.7  41.8  41.0  
 Of which: — current taxes  21.1  21.3  20.1  19.7  
— social contributions  15.1  14.8  14.8  14.6  
— Total expenditure  53.3  45.7  46.3  45.1  
   Of which: — collective consumption  12.3  11.6  11.7  12.1  
 — social transfers (2)  24.0  23.2  22.7  21.9  
— interest expenditure  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4  
 — gross fixed capital formation  4.2  3.9  3.9  3.9  
 Primary balance  – 10.3  – 1.8  – 3.2  – 2.6  
 Pm  Tax burden  36.2  36.1  34.9  34.4  
 Government debt  38.3  37.4  36.4  37.0  
 Pm Real GDP (3)  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.2  
 Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  – 12.6  – 5.2  – 4.7  – 3.8  – 3.3
 Primary balance  – 11.3  – 4.0  – 3.3  – 2.3  – 1.7
 Government debt  37.8  38.6  38.3  39.2  40.0
 Pm Real GDP (3)  3.1  3.8  3.6  3.7  3.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of the Czech Republic.
Table V.5
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Czech Republic
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
Personal and corporate tax relief (– 1.1 % of GDP): 
• a decrease in the corporate income tax rate from 28 % in 2004 to 
26 % in 2005 
• shortening of depreciation periods for investment 
• tax allowances for R & D (up to 10 % of the company’s tax base) 
• joint income taxation for married couples (lowering average 
taxable income) 
• replacing tax-deductible child allowances with tax credits
• Reduction of social expenditures, notably in the areas of low-
income support and unemployment and sickness benefits (0.15 % 
of GDP) 
• Discretionary measures in order to meet the 2005 expenditure 
ceiling (0.1 % of GDP)
 Sources: Commission services and December 2004 convergence programme.236
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to result in underspending as was particularly observed
for the largest fund (State Fund for Transport Infrastruc-
ture). This may lead, on the one hand, to an overestima-
tion of central government expenditures, thus lowering
the quality of the Ministry of Finance’s medium-term
budgetary planning. On the other hand, if budget alloca-
tions are unrealistically high, this creates difficulties for
the assessment of progress towards the fiscal targets.
The absence of voting on the central government budget
as a whole does not fully match the requirements of the
central government expenditure ceilings. In particular, it
reduces the transparency of the budgetary procedure by
making the trade-offs between individual spending items
less explicit.
Another major innovation of the budgetary process
introduced by the law on budgetary rules is the possi-
bility to carry over unspent funds to the following year.
The main motivation of this modification was to
change the behaviour of the spending ministries, in par-
ticular to minimise wasteful spending towards the end
of the fiscal year.
As a result of this change, State budget allocations of
about 1 % of GDP were unspent in 2004 and led to a
better-than-expected deficit. However, the possibility
to carry over the unspent funds creates a challenge for
the fulfilment of the budgetary ceiling in 2005 and
possibly in the following years. To mitigate this, the
government agreed that, at most, 50 % of the expendi-
tures unspent in 2004 can be carried over to 2005.
While the change in the budgetary rules was designed
to avoid overspending at the end of the year, the sur-
prisingly large amount of unspent allocations in 2004
questions the economic efficiency of some expendi-
tures.237
3. Denmark
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
Public finances in Denmark in 2004 were substantially
stronger than expected. In the March 2005 EDP notifica-
tion, the general government surplus is estimated to have
been 2.8 % of GDP, compared with the target of 1.3 %
of GDP estimated in the 2003 update of the convergence
programme. The main factors behind this outcome were
higher-than-expected revenues from corporate taxes as
well as from the pension fund yield tax, which tend to be
volatile as they are linked to financial market develop-
ments. The level of the debt ratio continued to decline
and stood at 42.7 % of GDP in 2004.
The budget for 2005 was adopted on 15 December 2004.
The expenditure measures in the budget were limited
and included setting up a high technology fund and
spending targeted at health and education (see Table V.7).
On the revenue side, the tax reform was fully imple-
mented in the context of the March 2004 spring fiscal
package. The so-called tax freeze remains in force (see
following section). Against the background of an
expected continued robust GDP growth, a general gov-
ernment surplus of 2.0 % of GDP is foreseen in 2005.
This is close to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast. As measured by the change in the cyclically
adjusted balance, the fiscal stance in 2005 in the spring
2005 forecast is an easing, but this needs to be inter-
preted with caution (1).
In 2006, a general government surplus of 2.1 % of GDP is
foreseen in the Commission services’ spring 2005 fore-
cast. This is overall in line with the projection in the
November 2004 update of the convergence pro-
gramme (2). Beyond 2006, the projected evolution of the
general government balance in the convergence pro-
gramme update is of surpluses between 1ã % and 2 % of
GDP. This is within the government’s medium-term aver-
age target interval for the general government balance.
As a consequence of the successive general government
surpluses, the government debt ratio is set to decline fur-
ther and according to the spring 2005 forecast reach
around 38 % of GDP in 2006.
Achieving the objective of modest real public 
consumption growth
In order to address the long-term challenge of an ageing
population, Denmark’s fiscal strategy aims at substan-
tially reducing the gross government debt ratio between
2000 and 2010 by running yearly general government
surpluses of 1â to 2â % of GDP on average to 2010.
General government surpluses have been recorded since
1998 and continued sizeable surpluses are foreseen in
the coming years. This strategy also foresees a lowering
of taxes. To this end, income taxes were reduced in 2004
to the tune of â % of GDP in the context of the tax
reform. In addition, the burden of taxation is being con-
tinuously lowered in real terms as a consequence of the
so-called nominal principle of the tax freeze in force
since 2002, which implies that taxes, whether expressed
in fixed nominal krone terms or in percentage terms,
cannot be raised. This includes residential property value
taxes, where a nominal ceiling has been set for tax pay-
ments of homeowners. The revenues from these taxes
and duties are thus eroded as a share of GDP as a conse-
quence of inflation and growth.  
An important element in the fiscal strategy to create
room for the tax reductions is to set strict targets for the
growth of real public consumption. Public consump-
¥1∂ Based on the fiscal projections at the time of the presentation of the
budget, the budget for 2005 was set to be broadly neutral. However,
mainly due to the exceptionally high tax revenues in 2004 mentioned
above (not necessarily linked to the cycle), the surplus in 2004 has been
revised upwards and the fiscal stance in 2005 thus appears as an easing.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.238
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its development therefore has a large impact on public
finances. Looking back, average yearly real public con-
sumption growth since 1980 has been some 1.6 %. This
is only slightly less than real GDP growth (1.7 %). In
the present strategy, the targets for public consumption
are a maximum growth of 0.5 % a year on average from
2005 to 2010. The target is thus markedly lower than
the projected growth of the economy. The projected
modest real growth rate of public consumption is a key
target variable in the fiscal strategy and failure to com-
ply with the targets could compromise the strategy,
Table V.6
Budgetary developments 2003–10, Denmark
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
General government balance (2)  1.2  2.8  2.1  2.2   
— Total revenues  56.6  57.7  56.5  55.7   
 Of which: — current taxes  46.8  47.9  47.0  46.5   
— social contributions  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.6   
 — Total expenditure  55.3  55.0  54.3  53.5   
   Of which: — collective consumption  7.6  7.6  7.5  7.4   
— social transfers (3)  37.1  36.9  36.5  36.0   
 — interest expenditure  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.0   
 — gross fixed capital formation  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.7   
Primary balance  3.8  5.1  4.3  4.2   
Pm Tax burden  48.9  50.1  49.1  48.6   
Government debt  44.7  42.7  40.5  38.2   
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  2.0  3.4  2.5  2.4   
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  4.5  5.7  4.7  4.4   
Pm  Real GDP (4)  0.4  2.4  2.3  2.1   
Convergence programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2010
General government balance  1.2  1.2  2.0  1.6  1.7  2.0
Primary balance  4.6  4.3  4.8  4.5  4.6  4.4
Government debt  44.7  42.3  39.4  37.4  35.3  28.8
Pm  Real GDP (4)  0.5  2.2  2.5  1.3  1.9  1.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In line with the transition period granted by Eurostat for the implementation of its March 2004 decision on the classification of second-pillar pension funds, these funds
can continue to be classified inside the general government sector until the March 2007 EDP notification. This is the case in Denmark and has an estimated positive
effect on the general government balance of 1.1 % of GDP in 2003, 1.0 % in 2004 and 1.0 % in 2005 and 2006 and on the debt of 1.2 % of GDP in 2003–06.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in November 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Denmark.
Table V.7
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Denmark
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Adjusted excise duties (within the framework of the tax freeze), 
for example lower duties on beer and wine, higher duties on 
cigarettes 
• Lower taxes on ‘green’ fuels (– 0.04 % of GDP) 
• High-technology fund (impact in 2005: 0.2 % of GDP) 
• Increased pension and health spending  (0.04 % of GDP) 
• Strengthening science education (0.05 % of GDP) 
 Sources: Commission services and Danish Ministry of Finance.239
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implemented.
The largest share of public consumption, including
healthcare and elderly care, is the responsibility of local
governments. Direct control by the central government
of local government public expenditure is therefore dif-
ficult. Aggregate public expenditure at local government
level is determined in a system of formalised coopera-
tion in the framework of the yearly budget negotiations
between the local government associations and the cen-
tral government. The agreements resulting from these
negotiations include the aggregate expenditure levels
and tax rates as well as the size of the block grants from
central to local governments. This agreement is then part
of the basis for the central government budget and the
projections for the development of government finances
as a whole.
Danish local governments have autonomous taxing pow-
ers. Against this background, a key instrument for
achieving expenditure restraint is the tax freeze, in force
for all levels of government since 2002. As borrowing by
local governments is restricted, the tax freeze implies
that local governments cannot raise taxes to finance
additional expenditure and it thus promotes a stricter pri-
oritisation of expenditures. Apart from preventing tax
increases, the tax freeze is thus also intended as a disci-
plining factor in achieving the objective of modest
growth in public consumption. However, the tax freeze
is an indirect instrument and does not legally bind indi-
vidual local governments. A sanction mechanism was
therefore introduced, also as from 2002, which implies
that local governments and counties could be penalised
if they fail to respect the tax freeze. If the local govern-
ments’ budgets imply a breach of the tax freeze, the
block grants to local governments may be reduced or
postponed. To keep total public sector revenues unaf-
fected, central government taxation will in such a case be
lowered correspondingly.
Overall, compliance with the expenditure and tax agree-
ments across government levels seems to have improved
in recent years and there have been no significant
breaches of the tax freeze by local governments. Real
public consumption growth has been on a downward
trend since 2003. From 2.1 % in 2002, it fell to 0.7 % in
2003. While this outcome exceeded the official target of
an average yearly growth of 1 % for 2002 and 2003,
there seems to have been a shift towards more modest
growth. This is confirmed by the growth of real public
consumption in 2004 which is estimated to have been
around the 0.7 % target for that year. The tax freeze thus
seems to have been successful as a disciplining force for
public consumption expenditure at local government
level. Nevertheless, in view of past trends, the targets for
the coming years remain ambitious. Restraining the
growth of public consumption substantially below the
growth of income and overall standard of living may
prove challenging over time.
In this context, structural factors may also play a role.
Increased efficiency in public services could potentially
alleviate the pressure on public consumption spending.
In this vein, a reform of Denmark’s public sector struc-
ture has been adopted and will be implemented in 2007.
In order to create larger units, more appropriate for deal-
ing effectively with the tasks assigned to them, the
number of municipalities will be reduced from 271 to
around 100 and the 13 counties transformed into five
regions. While spending increases in a context of a tran-
sition phase cannot be excluded, by creating larger
administrative units this reform has the potential to
improve efficiency in the provision of public services in
the medium term through economies of scale.240
4. Germany
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government deficit edged down to 3.7 % of
GDP in 2004 against a target of 3.3 % according to the
2003 update of the stability programme. The major
measure on the revenue side was the income tax cuts
worth 0.7 % of GDP implemented at the beginning of
2004 as part of the tax relief laws passed in 2000, which
were partly financed by a broadening of the tax base. The
deviation from the target has several causes. The
increase in the tobacco tax rate in March 2004 did not
generate as much revenue as expected. A tax amnesty,
aimed at repatriating savings currently deposited unde-
clared abroad, fell short of plans by 0.2 % of GDP. Also,
the Bundesbank profit of 2003 was below government
expectations. Expenditures on transfers such as unem-
ployment and social assistance benefits were higher than
expected but this was offset by savings on the public sec-
tor wage bill. The deficit slippage translated into public
debt at 66.0 % of GDP, higher than expected in the 2003
update of the stability programme.
The federal budget for 2005 was adopted retroactively
on 18 February 2005. Tax receipts will be dampened by
the implementation of the last stage of the tax relief law
dating back to 2000, whereas the introduction of the road
toll will add to revenues. Subsidy repayments by several
Landesbanken add to several Länder budgets. The mod-
erate wage agreements in the public sector, concluded in
February 2005, were anticipated in the 2005 draft federal
budget. Finally in 2005, the cash settlement office for the
former postal civil servants plans to securitise future
transfer income from the post office’s successor compa-
nies, so that the cash office would not require a transfer
from the federal budget to cover its liquidity deficit. If
compatible with ESA 95 accounting rules — a specific
Eurostat decision is still pending — this transaction
would reduce government expenditure by 0.25 % of
GDP. The 2004 update of the stability programme (1)
targets the general government deficit at 2.9 % of GDP,
compared with the Commission services’ spring forecast
at 3.3 % of GDP. The update projected the cyclically
adjusted balance to decline by 0.6 percentage points in
2005, broadly in line with the Commission services’ pro-
jection of a decline by 0.5 percentage points. Compared
with the 2004 update of the stability programme, the
widening of the headline deficit as projected by the
Commission services is consistent with the estimated
impact of the considerable downward revision of GDP
growth since then.
The Commission services’ spring forecast expects the
deficit to fall to 2.8 % of GDP in 2006, compared with
the update’s projection of 2â % of GDP. Growing pri-
vate consumption is expected to bolster tax revenues,
while the forecast assumes no further tax cuts, consistent
with the usual assumption of unchanged policies. Subse-
quently, on 4 May 2005, the government presented a
draft law proposing to reduce the corporate tax rate from
25 % to 19 % from 2006 onwards. It expects the rate cut
to be financed by repatriation of taxable income, by lim-
iting tax set-off from loss carry-forward and closed-end
funds and by tax incentives for uncovering hidden real
estate assets. A further draft law proposed inheritance
tax relief upon transfer of business to relatives. The pub-
lic sector wage agreements concluded in 2005 also pro-
vide budgetary relief in 2006. Expenditure growth
should accelerate moderately. The 2004 update of the
stability programme projects the deficit to decline to
1â % of GDP in 2008. This path of budgetary adjust-
ment seems rather optimistic, in particular as regards the
expected surpluses of the social security system. Fur-
thermore, tax revenues seem to be estimated somewhat
favourably from 2006 onwards. It should also be noted
that the one-off measure by the postal pension cash
office has a negative impact on the budgetary position in
the later years.  
¥1∂ The programme (submitted on 1 December 2004), as well as its assess-
ment by the Commission and the Council, can be found at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.241
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lic debt to increase to 68.0 % of GDP in 2005, compared
with the 2004 update’s target of about 66 %. About
1 percentage point of the difference is due to the consid-
erably lower GDP growth expected by the Commission
services. The remaining difference can be explained by
the different deficit projections and by below-the-line
operations. In contrast to the update, the Commission
services expect the debt ratio to increase further to
68.9 % of GDP in 2006.
Health sector reform: cost reduction in 2004, 
but more efforts needed
The public health system has been subject to repeated
reforms in the past, with the most recent having
entered into force in 2004, in response to an ageing
population and technical progress in health technol-
ogy. Rising expenditures by the system, which is
organised as pay as you go and covers about 90 % of
the population, are driving up non-wage labour costs
and contribute to the increasing wedge between gross
and net wages.
Expenditure by the public health system rose from 6.3 %
of GDP in 1991 to 7.0 % in 1995, then dropped to 6.6 %
after several cost-cutting measures but rose again to
6.8 % in 2003. The 2000 reform of the public sector
strengthened global budgeting in the sectors ambulatory
treatment, medication and hospitals, but also contained
extensions in refundable services. In 2003, it emerged
that the public health insurers had accumulated debt of
about 0.5 % of GDP (according to the national accounts)
between 2001 and 2003. By law, the public health insur-
ers are independent units setting their own contribution
rates, and were in general not allowed to run a deficit at
the end of any year.
Table V.8
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Germany
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  – 3.8  – 3.7  – 3.3  – 2.8   
 — Total revenues  45.0  43.8  43.6  43.4   
  Of which: — current taxes  22.6  22.1  22.0  22.1   
 — social contributions  18.6  18.2  18.0  17.8   
 — Total expenditure  48.8  47.5  47.0  46.2   
Of which: — collective consumption  7.9  7.7  7.5  7.3   
— social transfers (2)  31.1  30.4  30.2  29.7   
— interest expenditure  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0   
 — gross fixed capital formation  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.4   
 Primary balance  – 0.7  – 0.6  – 0.3  0.2   
 Pm Tax burden  40.7  39.9  39.6  39.5   
 Government debt  64.2  66.0  68.0  68.9   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 3.2  – 3.3  – 2.8  – 2.3   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  – 0.1  – 0.3  0.3  0.7   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 0.1  1.6  0.8  1.6   
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
 General government balance  – 3.8  – 3ã  – 2.9  – 2â  – 2.0  – 1â
 Primary balance  – 0.7  – â  0.0 â  1â  2.0
 Government debt  64.2  65â  66.0  66.0  6â  65.0
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 0.1  1.8  1.7  1 ã  2.0  2.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure. Note that the data do not include the recalculation of ‘financial intermediation services indirectly measured’ (FISIM) in GDP.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Germany.242
P a r t  V
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t sThus, further health reforms became one of the central
elements of the ‘Agenda 2010’ announced by the gov-
ernment in March 2003. The law on modernisation of the
health sector was passed in October 2003 and entered
into force on 1 January 2004.
Overall, the draft law foresaw relief for the health sec-
tor budget amounting to EUR 9.8 billion (0.5 % of
GDP) in 2004, of which EUR 7.2 billion (0.3 % of
GDP) is expenditure related. The total relief is expected
to rise to EUR 23 billion in 2007 (also roughly 0.5 % of
GDP then) compared with an unspecified baseline (1).
However, from the draft law, it appears that the
expenditure savings arise to a large extent in 2004, with
only small lasting ‘structural effects’ from independent
benefit analysis of medication (see below). The draft
law further reckons on savings of ‘several billion euro’
from better incentives for service providers and con-
sumers. However, as illustrated below, after 2004 the
expenditure dynamics can be expected to be roughly
unchanged from the trend before 2004. The expected
rising nominal budgetary relief after 2004 is almost
entirely due to expected receipts from increasing the
tobacco excise duty and, from 2006 onwards, higher
contributions.
The insurers were obliged by law to pass on the savings
to patients via lowering of the contribution rates; how-
ever, they were also required to reduce their debt by at
least one quarter annually until the end of 2007.
In detail, the 2004 law involved cuts in the catalogue
of goods and services refundable by the system, a bet-
ter incentive structure to raise cost-awareness of
patients and providers, and some steps to strengthen
competition in the sector. In the public health system,
expenses for medical treatment are usually fully set-
tled between service providers and insurers without
the involvement of patients. To mitigate disincentives,
a fixed quarterly fee for ambulatory health services
was introduced. In addition, patients were offered the
choice of switching to a system in which they receive
the bill first and get reimbursed by the public insurer,
which met with faint response. Although the number
of medical consultations fell in 2004, incentives for
cost-containment do not seem strong enough without
some financial participation of patients for each ambu-
latory treatment.
Table V.9
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Germany
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Third and last stage of the 2000 tax reform enters into force. 
The linear-progressive income tax rate falls from 16 % to 15 % 
at the bottom, while falling from 45 % to 42 % at the top (– 0.3 % 
of GDP).
• Introduction of road toll for lorries (0.1 % of GDP)
• Old-age income law: gradually from 2005 onwards, pension 
contributions will be tax free for all pillars and types of pensions, 
while pension payments will be fully taxed (in 2005: – 0.05 % 
of GDP)
• Changes in contribution rates to social security: the pension 
sustainability law (adopted in 2005) aims at a medium-term rate 
of 19.5 % (same as in 2004). From 1 July 2005, the contribution 
rate for persons insured in the public health system rises by 0.9 % 
to cover dental replacements. The law expects public health 
insurers to lower the contribution rate by the same amount for 
other health services as a consequence of the 2004 health reform. 
The contribution rate to the old-age care insurance rises for 
pensioners and persons without children.
• Länder budgets: subsidy repayments by Landesbanken (0.1 % 
of GDP)
 • One-off measure by the postal pension office will require no 
transfer from federal budget to the office (– 0.25 % of GDP)
• A ‘sustainability factor’ is introduced in the public pay-as-you-go 
pension system that should automatically dampen pension 
payments (and hence the contribution rate) when the number of 
recipients rises relative to the number of contributors. However, 
the factor is capped so that nominal decreases in individual 
pension payments do not occur. With low nominal wage growth, 
the dampening effect of this factor is likely to be low in 2005.
• The wage agreement for the federal and local levels was 
concluded in February 2005 and will be implemented on 1 
October 2005 and last until December 2007. It foresees a fixed 
payment for employees for each year in the federal service and in 
municipalities in western Germany and a gradual wage increase 
for employees in eastern German municipalities. Bonus payments 
are frozen at current levels. Working hours are extended slightly.
 Sources: German Federal Ministry of Finance and Commission services’ estimates.
¥1∂ Draft law of 8 September 2003, Bundestags-Drucksache No 15/1525.243
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tal replacements would be taken out of the statutory pub-
lic health system and funded through a separate, still
mandatory, system. Patients would have had to pay an
amount per head (thus independent of the individual
wage), having the choice between public and private
insurers. As a result of the ongoing controversy over the
financing mode of the system, this reform element was
reversed before it was implemented.
Co-payments for prescribed medication were increased
and the price regulation on prescription medication
extended. Also, the remuneration of chemists was
altered such as to provide incentives to sell lower-priced
medication of the same class. Yet, despite permitting
mail-order and small chains of pharmacies, barriers to
entry into the retailing of medication remain. A newly
established institute will provide producer-independent
benefit analysis of medication and guidelines for treat-
ment. The public health system is still characterised by
collective contracting of fees between insurers and serv-
ice provider organisations. Although a fair amount of
competition takes place between public health insurers,
it is almost non-existent between service providers. Indi-
vidual contracting has now been permitted in limited
areas, but this is only a first step in the right direction.
In 2004, expenditure in the public health sector fell by
3.3 % compared with 2003 (in financial accounts),
equalling a year-on-year expenditure reduction of about
0.2 % of GDP. A reduction in medication expenditure by
9.5 % provided the largest contribution, reflecting both
cost-cutting measures and reduced demand due to co-
payments. Expenditure on ambulatory treatment
declined by 5.8 % year on year, reflecting the positive
allocation effect of the fixed quarterly fee. This matches
roughly the projected expenditure reduction by 0.3 % of
GDP compared with the (unspecified) ‘baseline’ as pro-
jected in the draft law, if it is assumed that without
reform expenditures would have risen by 0.1 % of GDP,
as they did annually between 2000 and 2003.
According to the financial accounts, the public health
insurers ran a surplus of almost 0.2 % of GDP in 2004.
This points to a debt reduction of more than the mini-
mum legal requirement. Whether in 2005 contribution
rates will indeed fall is not certain, however. If most of
the expenditure savings in 2004 were indeed a one-off
effect with unchanged dynamics, expenditures could be
expected to continue rising by 0.1 % of GDP annually. It
is not certain whether this leaves enough room for low-
ering contribution rates, in particular as the contribution
base, the gross wage sum, is expected to rise only
slightly. To hold future healthcare expenditure below
past growth rates, further efficiency-enhancing measures
are necessary in the medium term, not only for patients
but also for healthcare providers and insurers.
At the same time, this underlines the still unresolved
structural problem of the public health system, namely
that its funding depends on the gross wages. This will
have to be tackled by future reforms.244
5. Estonia
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government posted a surplus of 1.8 % of
GDP in 2004. This compares with a targeted surplus of
0.7 % of GDP in the 2004 budget. The overshooting was
due to public revenues being boosted by stronger-than-
anticipated real growth coupled with nominal expendi-
ture ceilings, and improving tax collection (see special
topic section on e-tax below). The country’s public debt
ratio further declined to 4.9 % of GDP at the end of 2004,
which is the lowest in the EU.
The budget for 2005 was adopted by Parliament on 8
December 2004. The main measures on the revenue side
were a cut of the flat income tax rate by 2 percentage
points to 24 %, combined with an increase in the tax-free
threshold both of which entered into force on 1 January
2005. On the expenditure side, EU co-financing require-
ments and increases to family allowances as well as
funding of an ongoing labour market policy package are
the main budgetary measures.
The target for the general government balance in 2005
according to the December 2004 update of the conver-
gence programme (1) is a balanced position, whereas
the Commission services’ 2005 spring forecast expects
a surplus of 0.9 % of GDP, allowing for the upside risk
to the cautious macroeconomic scenario underlying
the Estonian budget forecast, which suggests that rev-
enues could be higher and expenditure somewhat
lower than budgeted. A strong echo effect from
delayed VAT tax collection related to EU accession
can be expected to provide an additional boost to budg-
etary revenues. On the other hand, unexpected revenue
shortfalls from the tax cut or an adverse impact on
growth from exogenous shocks cannot be excluded
altogether. Although committed to continued fiscal
discipline, the recent coalition agreement of a centre-
left government which took office in April 2005
increases the possibility of a supplementary budget
later in the year, using up some of the fiscal room for
manoeuvre contained in the 2005 budget forecast to
finance pension increases which are still planned this
year. But on the whole, the new government will have
little impact on the implementation of the 2005 budget,
given the nominal expenditure ceilings. It will be
rather with the 2006 budget currently under discussion
that an impact will be made.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the general government balance in 2006 is
expected at a reduced surplus of 0.5 % of GDP. Again,
this is somewhat more optimistic than the December
update of the Estonian convergence programme, which
projects balanced budgets over the entire period 2005–
08. The rationale for this assumption in the Commission
services’ forecast lies with Estonia’s track record of pru-
dent forecasting and repeated overshooting of fiscal tar-
gets over the past few years. Accordingly, the same
caveats as for 2005 apply. The Commission services’
forecast is based on the customary no-policy-change
assumption. The 2005 income tax cut by 2 percentage
points was planned as a first step of three successive tax
cuts, which should lead to a 20 % flat tax rate by 2007.
However, the new government’s programme foresees a
more gradual reduction in the tax rates from 2006
onwards, by just 1 percentage point per year, thereby
reaching the 20 % rate by 2009 instead, while raising the
tax-exempt threshold.  
On the whole, there is still a considerable amount of
uncertainty surrounding the economic policy of the new
Estonian government, notably with regard to the possi-
ble introduction of a motor vehicle tax from 2006, in
order to create higher revenues for increased expenditure
on pensions, disability and other social benefits. Local¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/ectivities/sgp/main_en.htm245
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be expected to decline further as a result of a new legal
framework which will enter into force in 2006.
Estonia’s public debt is forecast to decline further to
4.3 % of GDP in 2005 and to 4 % in 2006, according to
the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast.
Table V.10
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Estonia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  3.1  1.8  0.9  0.5   
 — Total revenues  38.9  40.9  40.8  39.2   
Of which: — current taxes  21.9  21.4  21.2  20.4   
 — social contributions  11.5  11.2  11.2  10.9   
— Total expenditure  35.8  39.1  40.0  38.7   
Of which: — collective consumption  8.8  8.7  9.0  8.8   
— social transfers (2)  19.5  20.2  20.9  20.8   
— interest expenditure  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2   
— gross fixed capital formation  3.4  3.6  4.3  4.2   
 Primary balance  3.3  2.0  1.1  0.7   
 Pm Tax burden  33.4  32.9  32.7  31.7   
 Government debt  5.3  4.9  4.3  4.0   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  5.1  6.2  6.0  6.2   
 Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
 General government balance  3.1  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
 Primary balance  – 3.4  – 1.3  – 0.2  – 0.2  – 0.2  – 0.2
 Government debt  5.3  4.8  4.6  4.3  3.1  2.9
 Pm Real GDP (3)  5.1  5.6  5.9  6.0  6.0  6.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Estonia.
Table V.11
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Estonia
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Personal income tax: increase in tax-free threshold for low income 
bracket (– 0.3 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax: lowering of tax deduction limit  by half 
(effective from 2006 only: + 0.05 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax: reduction in income tax rate from 26 % to 
24 % (– 0.8 % of GDP)
• Increases in excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and fuel (+ 0.2 % 
of GDP)
• Increase in gambling taxes (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in various labour market measures (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in family allowances (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in agricultural subsidies and support to farmers (+ 0.2 % 
of GDP)
• Support to local governments including investment grants etc. 
(+ 0.3 % of GDP) 
 Sources: Commission services and Estonian Ministry of Finance.246
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Tax collection in Estonia is probably the most
advanced e-government feature in place in the EU. In
2000, the government established the so-called ‘e-tax
board’, allowing for the entire tax declaration and col-
lection cycle to be processed over the Internet, via e-
mail, and through Internet banking. Both the income
and corporate flat tax and VAT are collected through
simple and partly pre-filled forms which are available
both in electronic and paper versions. The electronic
version can be downloaded from the government’s
websites or via the Internet portals of the country’s
leading banks. The forms for income tax are identical
for employees and the self-employed, and thus compa-
nies are not burdened with the income tax administra-
tion of their employees. After just five years following
its introduction, the e-tax system enjoys wide popular-
ity among taxpayers. In 2005, already 78 % of total per-
sonal income tax returns for the year 2004 are being
collected over the Internet. Also, companies rapidly
embraced the new system. In 2004, 65.8 % of income
and social tax declarations and 74.8 % of VAT declara-
tions were submitted electronically to the tax authori-
ties. The system is completed by a highly efficient Tax
Fraud Investigation Centre, which has been granted
powers of surveillance and pre-trial investigation. In
order to counteract tax evasion, a statistical risk analy-
sis of the average tax duties per industry and company
size is carried out each year by the tax authorities.
Companies or individuals that deviate strongly from
these benchmarks or fail to declare at all receive a
warning letter from the competent tax authority, and
become the focus for onsite inspections. Sanctions are,
however, not applied immediately, so the tax subject
has a period of grace for filing a new tax return after the
expiry date. The system has not only simplified the bur-
den of tax administration for both sides, but it has also
greatly speeded up the process. Repayments of tax to
individuals are processed within a maximum of three
working days following reception of the electronic dec-
laration, although in reality this is often done within
just one or two days. There are no hard estimates avail-
able on the impact ofthis taxpayer-friendly system on
tax returns. However, the high flow of revenues in both
2003 and 2004 (which was one reason for the higher-
than-forecast budget surpluses in each of these years) is
most likely partly accounted for by these improvements
in tax collection. A desirable side effect is that parts of
the country’s grey economy (which is still estimated at
12 to 15 % of GDP) are being successfully ‘whitened’
by this combination of simplicity in declaration and
efficiency in surveillance.247
6. Greece
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the March 2005 EDP notification commu-
nicated by the Greek authorities but not validated by
Eurostat (see Box I.1 in Part I, Section 2.3.1), the general
government balance recorded a deficit in 2004 of 6.1 %
of GDP, despite strong economic growth of 4.2 %
achieved during the year. This compares with a deficit
target of 1.2 % of GDP in the December 2003 update of
the stability programme. The slippage of 4.9 % of GDP
is only partly attributed to the statistical revisions of Sep-
tember 2004 amounting to 1.1 % of GDP. The bulk is
explained by tax shortfalls and expenditure overruns, of
which Olympic Games account for 0.7 % of GDP. On
top of the slippages unveiled in the September 2004 EDP
notification, which at that time estimated a deficit of
5.3 % of GDP, the EDP March 2005 notification shows
additional slippages stemming from higher interest pay-
ments (0.3 % of GDP) and tax shortfalls (0.1 % of GDP),
as well as primary expenditure overruns (0.5 % of GDP).
In 2004, the debt ratio reached 110.5 % of GDP, well
above the figure of 98.5 % projected in the 2003 update
of the stability programme. The difference is the result of
the statistical revisions in the debt figures over the period
2000–03 (7.7 % of GDP on average per year) and a
higher deficit.
On 22 December 2004, Parliament adopted the 2005
budget. Based on an optimistic growth forecast of 3.9 %,
the 2005 budget targets a general government deficit of
2.8 % of GDP and a debt ratio of 109.5 % of GDP. The
2005 budget includes a number of new measures. On the
revenue side, a tax reform will be carried out, the main
characteristics of which are: an increase in the non-taxa-
ble income threshold of certain categories of employees,
a gradual reduction in corporate tax rates over the next
three years, and the implementation of Law No 3259/
2004, providing for a settlement of tax disputes includ-
ing delinquent obligations to the State. On the expendi-
ture side, the policy measures include a permanent
reduction in expenditure following the completion of the
Olympic Games, a reduction in investment grants, mod-
erate increases in wages and pensions and an extremely
restrictive hiring policy in the public sector.
On 29 March 2005, the government announced a pack-
age of additional measures, which should lead to a deficit
reduction of 0.5 % of GDP in 2005 and 0.9 % in 2006.
The target for the general government deficit in 2005 set
in the March 2005 update of the stability programme (1)
is 3.7 % of GDP with economic growth at 2.9 %. In the
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, a similar
growth rate is projected for 2005 but the projected deficit
outcome is significantly worse, at 4.5 % of GDP. The
difference is explained partly by the budgetary impact of
the additional fiscal measures to be implemented in
2005, which were announced after the cut-off date of the
Commission forecast and partly by a more cautious
assessment of social security contributions and expendi-
tures on public health and wages.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) in 2005
will improve by 1.6 percentage points of GDP. Despite
this improvement, the deficit, net of cyclical factors, will
be above 5 % of GDP, still far from a budgetary position
of close to balance or in surplus. The estimated improve-
ment in the CAB in 2005 according to Commission serv-
ices’ calculations on the basis of the projections in the
updated stability programme is 2.6 percentage points.
The difference of 1.0 percentage point with the Commis-
sion services’ forecasts is due to (i) the fact that the addi-
tional fiscal package was not taken into account in the
Commission services’ forecasts and (ii) a lower Com-
mission services’ estimate of potential output.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.248
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Commission services’ spring forecast expects a marginal
improvement in the deficit in 2006 reflecting the moder-
ate acceleration of economic growth. The general
government deficit is projected to reach 4.4 % of GDP
compared with a target of 2.9 % of GDP in 2006 set in
the reference scenario of the March 2005 update of the
stability programme According to the update, the gen-
eral government deficit is projected to reach 2.4 % of
GDP in 2007.
Table V.12
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Greece
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006  
General government balance  – 5.2  – 6.1  – 4.5  – 4.4  
— Total revenues  43.5  43.9  44.3  44.3  
Of which: — current taxes  23.5  23.2  23.2  23.1  
— social contributions  15.5  16.3  16.8  17.2  
— Total expenditure  48.0  50.0  48.8  48.7  
Of which: — collective consumption  10.2  10.9  10.8  10.5  
— social transfers (2)  24.1  24.8  25.7  26.4  
— interest expenditure  5.8  5.8  5.5  5.5  
— gross fixed capital formation  4.0  4.1  3.3  3.1  
 Primary balance  0.6  – 0.4  1.0  1.0  
 Pm Tax burden  36.5  36.9  37.4  37.6  
Government debt  109.3  110.5  110.5  108.9  
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 5.7  – 7.1  – 5.5  – 5.3  
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  0.1  – 1.4  0.0  0.1  
Pm Real GDP (3)  4.7  4.2  2.9  3.1  
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
General government balance  – 5.2  – 6.1  – 3.7  – 2.9  – 2.4
Primary balance  0.6  – 0.4  1.8  2.7  3.3
Government debt  109.3  110.5  109.5  107.2  104.7
Pm Real GDP (3)  4.7  4.2  2.9  3.0  3.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2005.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Greece.
Table V.13
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Greece
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Gradual reduction in corporate tax rates over the period 2005–07
• Implementation of Law No 3259/2004 (settlement of tax disputes 
including delinquent obligations to the State
• Streamlining of the existing system of tax exemption
• Restructuring of tax brackets and increase in the non-taxable 
income threshold of certain categories of employees
• Increased efforts to fight tax evasion, illegal trade and financial 
crime
• Permanent reduction in expenditure linked to the completion of 
the Olympic Games
• Reduction in investment grants
• Moderate increase in public wages
• Restrictive hiring policy and reductions in current operating 
expenditure
• Moderate increase in pensions
  Source: Commission services.249
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forecast, the debt ratio is expected to stabilise at 110.5 %
of GDP in 2005 and to decline slightly in 2006 to
108.9 % of GDP. This compares with the projections in
the updated stability programme of 109.5 % of GDP in
2005 and 107.2 % in 2006. The difference is due to
higher deficit projections and to lower nominal growth
featured in the Commission services’ outlook.250
7. Spain
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2004, according to the March 2005 EDP notifica-
tion, the general government deficit is estimated to
have been 0.3 % of GDP. This compares with a close-
to-balance position projected in the 2004 budget law
and a surplus of 0.1 % of GDP in the January 2004
updated stability programme. However, by the end of
2004, the authorities expected a deficit of 0.8 % of
GDP due to one-off statistical operations. The better-
than-expected outturn of the most recent estimation is
explained by unexpectedly higher revenues, partially
offsetting the effect of two one-off statistical opera-
tions, consisting of the reclassification of RTVE (the
public broadcasting company), as requested by Euro-
stat, and the assumption of RENFE’s (the railway net-
work company) debt, decided by the government.
Except for the annual RTVE deficit (at around 0.1 %
of GDP), the reclassification of RTVE does not affect
the general government balance and translates directly
into a debt increase by the amount of RTVE’s cumu-
lated debt (about EUR 8 billion or around 1 percentage
point of GDP).
Conversely, the assumption of RENFE’s debt results
in higher-than-initially-planned gross fixed capital
formation and capital transfers by the general govern-
ment sector with an impact on the 2004 deficit of
0.7 % of GDP. This reclassification neither involves
any backward revision nor has carry-over effects in the
coming years. After netting out such one-off opera-
tions, the budgetary outcome would have been a sur-
plus of a â percentage point of GDP. Regarding the
composition of the 2004 balance, the deficit of central
government (1.3 % of GDP) is partially compensated
by the surplus of the social security sector (1.0 % of
GDP), whereas regional and local authorities are
broadly in balance. Public debt is estimated at 48.8 %
of GDP in 2004.
In 2005, according to the most recent update of the sta-
bility programme (1), a surplus for the general govern-
ment of 0.1 % of GDP is projected. This coincides with
the target set in the 2005 budget law adopted by the gov-
ernment on 27 December 2004. The central government
presents a deficit of 0.6 % of GDP, whereas regional and
local authorities are in balance and the social security
sector expects a surplus of 0.7 % of GDP. This is in line
with the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast,
which projects a balanced budget in nominal and cycli-
cally adjusted terms for the general government.
In more detail, according to the 2005 budget law, revenues
should increase by 6.4 % in nominal terms. Direct taxes
and social security contributions are expected to grow by
9.4 % due to strong job creation, while economic growth
should increase indirect tax revenues by 8.1 %. Total
expenditures are targeted to grow by 6.6 %. Particular
efforts are devoted to productivity-enhancing budgetary
measures on the expenditure side, which will concentrate
on R & D, innovation, education and investment in infra-
structure. Specifically, the budget encompasses a 25 %
increase in funds devoted to R & D policies, including an
endowment of EUR 3 billion (about 0.4 % of GDP),
which will be allocated to research on information tech-
nologies (IT). Most of this endowment is meant to trans-
late into loans to selected projects at low or zero interest
rates. The government is committed to doubling expendi-
ture on R & D within four years in order to catch up with
the euro-area average. Expenditure on education will
increase by 6 % with respect to the total amount allocated
in the previous year. Most of this increase will translate
into more and higher grants. Finally, the budget gives pri-
ority to investment in infrastructure, with spending
planned to increase by 9.1 %. Special attention will be
paid to improving terrestrial transport, notably motorways
and the promotion of a high-speed railway network.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.251
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targets a surplus of 0.2 % of GDP for the general govern-
ment. This is comparable to the Commission services’
spring 2005 forecast, in which, under a no-policy-change
scenario, the general government balance is expected to
achieve a surplus of 0.1 % of GDP. In 2007 and 2008,
small but increasing surpluses are projected in the updated
stability programme, reaching 0.4 % of GDP in 2008.
As regards gross public debt, the Commission services’
spring 2005 forecast foresees a gradual decline over the
forecast horizon, towards around 44 % of GDP in 2006.
Table V.14
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Spain
(% of GDP
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  0.3  – 0.3  0.0  0.1   
 — Total revenues  40.0  40.2  40.4  40.5   
 Of which: — current taxes  22.6  23.1  23.2  23.3   
— social contributions  13.7  13.6  13.7  13.7   
— Total expenditure  39.7  40.5  40.4  40.4   
 Of which: — collective consumption  n.a.  7.9  8.0  8.1   
— social transfers (2)  n.a.  22.6  22.7  22.7   
 — interest expenditure  2.5  2.2  2.1  2.0   
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.6  3.7  3.7  3.7   
 Primary balance  2.8  1.9  2.1  2.1   
 Pm Tax burden  36.3  36.6  36.8  36.8   
 Government debt  51.4  48.9  46.5  44.2   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance (3)  0.2  – 0.3  0.0  0.2   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  2.7  1.8  2.1  2.2   
 Pm Real GDP (4)  2.5  2.7  2.7  2.7   
 Stability programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
 General government balance  0.4  – 0.8  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4
 Primary balance  2.9  1.5  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.3
 Government debt  50.7  49.1  46.7  44.3  42.0  40.0
 Pm Real GDP (4)  2.5  2.6  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Calculated using the HP filter.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Spain.
Table V.15
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Spain
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Freeze of non-taxable income threshold  (0.06 % of GDP) 
• Freeze of fuel duties (– 0.03 % of GDP)
• Increase in R & D spending (0.06 % of GDP)
• Increase in investment in transport infrastructure, namely roads 
and railways (0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in minimum non-contributory pensions (0.04 % of GDP) 
Sources: Commission services and 2005 budget law.252
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programme.
Is public consumption too high?
Since 2000, public consumption has been growing above
GDP, feeding both government total expenditure and
domestic demand. This increase has so far been compat-
ible with a consolidation process, which allowed Spain
to reach the close-to-balance fiscal position already in
2003. The rise in public consumption has been offset by
savings from interest payments. However, according to
the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, this
might not be the case in the medium term. Furthermore,
the expansion of public consumption is taking place in a
context in which a buoyant domestic demand translates
into higher imports, widening the trade deficit.
The story of public consumption during the last decade
can be divided into two periods. Between 1995 and
1999, when within a process of strong expenditure
retrenchment, public consumption fell, albeit margin-
ally, in terms of GDP. This contrasts with the 2000–04
period in which the previous trend was reversed and gov-
ernment consumption accelerated sharply to come back
to the levels observed in 1995 (see Graph V.1). Within
this context, the issue of the compatibility of high rising
public consumption with the maintenance of the close-
to-balance position and with the need to rebalance the
external sector appears relevant since government con-
sumption encompasses not only the operational costs of
the administration, but also items subject to long-run
trends or drifts, such as healthcare and public wages,
which may be difficult to revert.
Public consumption and fiscal consolidation
Between 1995 and 1999, public consumption fell from
18.1 % in 1995 to 17.4 % in 1999, the strongest phase of
the consolidation process leading to a drastic deficit
reduction. Total expenditures fell by 4.8 percentage
points of GDP, from 45.0 % of GDP in 1995 to 40.2 %
of GDP in 1999. With a reduction of only 0.7 percentage
points of GDP, the contribution of public consumption to
spending retrenchment was not particularly relevant.
Interest payments, social benefits and capital expendi-
ture each reduced its share in the nominal GDP by
around 1.5 percentage points. During this period, the
components of public consumption showed different
behaviour. Whereas social transfers in kind remained
roughly stable in terms of GDP at around 10 % (which
include among others healthcare and education), collec-
tive consumption fell from 8 % of GDP in 1995 to 7.3 %
in 1999 (1).
In line with its decreasing participation in GDP, public
consumption grew in real terms by 2.9 % per year, which
compares with a real GDP growth rate of 3.6 % per year
(see Graph V.2). The contribution of public consumption
to growth between 1995 and 1999 reached 0.5 percent-
age points per year. With a positive output gap during
this first period, the behaviour of public consumption
remained therefore anticyclical and helped to contain
domestic demand. Public consumption explained around
one sixth of domestic demand growth between 1995 and
1999, while private consumption explained around a half
and gross fixed capital formation the rest, i.e. one third
(see Graph V.3) (2).
A dynamic economy
Between 2000 and 2004, government final consumption
gained momentum (0.6 percentage points of GDP along
the period) to reach 18.2 % in 2004, 0.1 percentage point
above the level recorded in 1995. In parallel, govern-
ment total expenditure retrenchment had been fading
since 2000. Total expenditures remained barely
unchanged in terms of GDP during the period and a
recomposition took place between interest payments and
public consumption. While interest payments were fall-
ing, driven by debt reduction and decreasing interest
rates, no other spending items recorded a significant
reduction. In fact, savings from interest payments were
used to finance government consumption. 
During this period, the two main components of public
consumption, collective consumption and social trans-
fers in kind, increased from 7.6 % of GDP in 2000 to
7.9 % in 2004 and from 10.1 % in 2000 to 10.4 % in
2004 respectively.  
In real terms, public consumption grew by 4.3 % per year,
well above the average growth rate of 2.9 % per year
recorded by real GDP. Consequently, the contribution of
public consumption to GDP growth jumped from 0.5 %
over the period 1995–99 to 0.8 % per year between 2000
and 2004. Public consumption explained around one fifth
¥1∂ Public wages, which are also part of public consumption and are included
in both social transfers in kind and collective consumption, fell from
11.3 % of GDP in 1995 to 10.6 % in 1999.
¥2∂ It is worth noting at this point that the external balance of goods and serv-
ices deteriorated along the period, entering negative territory in 1999
(- 1.3 % of GDP) after three consecutive years in surplus.253
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2 0 0 5Graph V.1:  General government total expenditure and government consumption 
as a percentage of GDP
Sources: IGAE and Commission services’ 2005 spring forecast.
Graph V.2:  Comparison between real GDP, domestic demand 
and government consumption growth
Sources: AMECO and database Commission services’ 2005 spring forecast.
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the period before. This is less than half the contribution of
private consumption and slightly below the contribution
of gross fixed capital formation. Consequently, the expan-
sion of public consumption has been feeding more than in
the previous period an already highly dynamic domestic
demand, which is not fully translating into higher growth
but into higher imports, thus steadily deteriorating the
external position of the country.
The future outlook
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, public consumption is expected to increase by
0.5 percentage points of GDP until 2006 (1). Specifi-
cally, public consumption should reach 18.5 % of GDP
in 2005 and 18.7 % in 2006, compared with 18.2 % in
2004. In contrast, interest payments are projected to fall
by only 0.2 percentage points of GDP (2.1 % of GDP in
2005 and 2 % in 2006, from 2.2 % in 2004), while no
other expenditure item is projected to decrease signifi-
cantly in terms of GDP. Therefore, since the fiscal posi-
tion is projected to remain at close to balance, three fifths
of the increase in public consumption will be financed by
additional revenues, coming from a particularly tax-
friendly growth composition. Supported by strong
domestic demand, total revenues are expected to
increase slightly in terms of GDP (from 40.2 % in 2004
to 40.4 and 40.5 % in 2005 and 2006 respectively). This
is enough to finance the public consumption increases
along the forecast period. However, should this trend
continue in the future, keeping a balanced budget would
require higher tax rates. Both collective consumption
and social transfers in kind are projected to grow above
nominal GDP, each increasing by around a ä percentage
point of GDP along the forecast period.
Public consumption is expected to grow in real terms
by 4.5 and 4.2 % in real terms in 2005 and 2006
respectively, while GDP would grow by 2.7 % in both
years. In parallel, domestic demand should grow at
around 4 and 3.5 % in 2005 and 2006 respectively. At
slightly over one fifth, the relative contribution of pub-
lic consumption is projected to remain broadly stable
compared with the period 2000–04, while the trade
Graph V.3:  Private and public consumption — Contribution to domestic 
demand growth at 1995 constant prices and at current prices
Sources: AMECO and database Commission services’ 2005 spring forecast.
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¥1∂ Commission services’ projections for 2006 are based on the usual no-pol-
icy-change scenario.255
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and 8.3 % of GDP in 2006, compared with 6.8 % in
2004. Therefore, there might be a case to ask whether
such trends in current public consumption are adequate
at the current juncture when a dynamic domestic
demand is widening external imbalances, while high
inflation and low productivity are dragging competi-
tiveness.256
8. France
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government deficit declined from 4.2 %
of GDP in 2003 to 3.7 % of GDP in 2004, in line with
the Commission services’ autumn 2004 forecast. In
view of the robust growth performance, the cyclically
adjusted deficit improved by only 0.4 percentage
points of GDP in 2004, as against a targeted 0.8 per-
centage points of GDP. The limited improvement in
the 2004 deficit despite the additional revenues stem-
ming from higher-than-expected growth (actual GDP
growth was 2.6 % compared with 1.7 % expected in
the December 2003 update of the stability pro-
gramme) is due to a number of factors. First, the 2003
deficit estimate was revised slightly upwards (0.1 %
of GDP), causing an unfavourable base effect. Sec-
ond, the government decided not to compensate for
the loss of revenues (0.1 % of GDP) triggered by the
non-validation by the Conseil d’État of the tightening
of eligibility conditions of the unemployment insur-
ance system. Finally, although the expenditure target
was met in the State sector, there were expenditure
overruns in other subsectors and notably in the local
authorities sector.
The increase in the 2004 general government debt ratio
from 63.9 % of GDP in 2003 to 65.6 % of GDP was
0.3 percentage points of GDP larger than projected in the
2003 update of the stability programme. This was due to
a higher deficit (0.15 percentage points of GDP) and
higher stock-flow adjustment, partly offset by a more
negative contribution stemming from stronger nominal
GDP growth.
The budget for 2005 adopted by Parliament in Decem-
ber 2004 plans a marked slowdown in public spending
through: (i) a stabilisation of State expenditures in
real terms; (ii) a deceleration in health expenditure
growth (to 3.2 % from 4.9 % in 2004); and (iii) a
slowdown in local authorities’ expenditures. On the
revenue side, exonerations of taxes on intergenera-
tional transfers and alleviation of social charges have
been introduced. However, because of the introduc-
tion of other measures the overall tax burden would
rise by 0.1 percentage point of GDP: notably,
increases in social security contributions from civil
servants and contributions of electricity and gas com-
panies’ (EDF/GDF) employees following the transfer
of the responsibility for the payment of their pensions
to the general social security regime. Finally, non-fis-
cal revenues are planned to increase by 0.5 percentage
points of GDP, due to one-off measures related to the
abovementioned transfer of EDF/GDF pensions. The
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
the general government deficit in 2005 at 3 % of GDP,
against an estimate of 2.9 % of GDP by the French
authorities. The slight difference between the two def-
icit forecasts stems from two factors: (i) a more cau-
tious macroeconomic scenario (2.0 % GDP growth
foreseen by the Commission services as against 2.0 to
2.5 % by the French authorities); (ii) a smaller posi-
tive impact of the health insurance reform in the short
term. The macroeconomic and budgetary projections
of the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast are
consistent with an improvement in the cyclically
adjusted balance by 0.8 percentage points of GDP (in
line with the adjustment included in the 2004 update
of the stability programme), the largest part of which
reflects the impact of the one-off measures cited
above.  
In 2006, based on the usual no-policy-change assump-
tion, the Commission services project the general gov-
ernment deficit to increase to 3.4 % of GDP despite
expected real GDP growth close to its potential rate. This
reflects the fact that the exceptional payments contribut-
ing to the deficit reduction in 2005 will vanish in 2006
and that tax cuts are planned for that year (0.2 % of GDP
based on the information available so far). Accordingly,
real government expenditures are assumed to increase by
about 2 % in the spring forecasts, compared with a pro-257
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5Table V.16
Budgetary developments 2003–08, France
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
General government balance  – 4.2  – 3.7  – 3.0  – 3.4   
— Total revenues  50.4  50.8  51.5  51.1   
Of which: — current taxes  26.3  26.7  26.9  26.8   
— social contributions  18.5  18.2  18.4  18.4   
— Total expenditure  54.6  54.5  54.5  54.4   
Of which: — collective consumption  9.5  9.4  9.3  9.3   
— social transfers (2)  33.2  33.2  33.2  33.0   
— interest expenditure  2.9  2.9  2.9  3.0   
— gross fixed capital formation  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.4   
Primary balance  – 1.3  – 0.8  – 0.1  – 0.4   
Pm Tax burden  43.8  44.1  44.3  44.2   
Government debt  63.9  65.6  66.2  67.1   
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 4.0  – 3.6  – 2.8  – 3.1   
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  – 1.0  – 0.7  0.2  – 0.1   
Pm Real GDP (3)  0.5  2.5  2.0  2.2   
Stability programme (4)   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
General government balance   – 3.6  – 2.9  – 2.2  – 1.6  – 0.9
Primary balance   – 0.7  0.1  0.8  1.5  2.2
Government debt   64.8  65.0  64.6  63.6  62.0
Pm Real GDP (3)   2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and stability programme of France.
Table V.17
Main measures in the budget for 2005, France
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Increase in social contributions to finance the health  reform 
(0.2 % of GDP)
• Increase in pension contributions of public employees (0.2 % of 
GDP)
• Exonerations of taxes on intergenerational transfers
• Alleviation of social charges (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• One-off additional revenue (0.5 % of GDP) as a counterpart of  the 
transfer to the general social security sector of the pension 
payments of the employees in public electricity and gas companies
• Stabilisation of State expenditure in real terms  
• Specific measures aimed at curbing the rapid growth in healthcare 
spending (stricter reimbursement of medicines, increase in the 
forfait hospitalier and in consultation prices by EUR 1, etc.)
Sources: Commission services and French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry.258
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bility programme (1); the update targets a general gov-
ernment deficit of 2.2 % of GDP in 2006, which the
government revised to 2.7 % of GDP in March 2005 (2).
In the subsequent years, the deficit is projected in the sta-
bility programme update to decline steadily by 0.6 to
0.7 percentage points of GDP per year to 0.9 % of GDP
in 2008. Based on Commission services’ calculations,
the cyclically adjusted balance would accordingly also
improve by 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points per year to reach
– 0.7 % of GDP in 2008.
The Commission services project the debt-to-GDP ratio
to increase further in 2005–06. This ratio would reach
66.2 % in 2005 and 67.1 % in 2006. Developments in the
debt are projected to reflect those of the deficit and nom-
inal GDP, since no significant stock-flow operations are
incorporated into the forecast. This is worse than pro-
jected in the 2004 update of the stability programme,
where the debt ratio is envisaged to stabilise, reflecting
the higher deficit and lower GDP growth rate in the
spring 2005 forecast.
Ageing of the population: a major challenge ahead
As in many other EU countries, large demographic
changes will occur in the next few decades in France as
a result of several developments: (i) post-war baby-
boom cohorts will enter their retirement years; (ii) life
expectancy is expected to continue increasing by
approximately one year per decade; (iii) past fertility
rates, although slightly better in France than in some
other countries, have been insufficient to stabilise the
age structure of the population implying notably that
smaller cohorts will enter the labour force in the coming
decades; (iv) net inward migration flows, which could
partially offset the impact on the age structure of the pop-
ulation, are expected to remain limited.
According to INSEE (3), these developments will have
two major consequences. First, the population of work-
ing age will start declining as from the end of the current
decade. In its most recent projections, INSEE forecasts a
decline in the population aged between 15 and 64 by
about 2.5 millions between 2007 and 2040. Second, the
number of persons aged 65 or over will increase faster in
the coming decades (4). The changes in the rate of
growth of these two groups have not yet started. They
will occur simultaneously in a short transition period
between 2010 and 2015.
As a consequence, the old-age dependency ratio (per-
sons aged 65 or over to persons of working age, 15 to 64)
is projected to increase from 24 % today to 46 % in
2040. Consequently, the ratio of working-age to elderly
citizens will increase from four to one at present to two
to one by 2040.
These changes in the demographic structure will exert
strong pressures on government expenditure on pen-
sions, healthcare and long-term care. In order to limit the
magnitude of the shock, France has implemented in
recent years major reforms so as to curb the dynamics of
pension and health expenditure.
The pension and healthcare reforms
In summer 2003, France adopted a comprehensive
reform of the pension system, which increased the
number of contribution years for entitlement to a full
pension in two steps. First, until 2008, the number of
contribution years will progressively increase by six
months per year in the public sector from 37.5 years to
40 years, the level currently prevailing in the private sec-
tor. In a second step, starting in 2008, the contribution
period is foreseen to increase for all workers proportion-
ally with life expectancy, with the aim of keeping con-
stant the ratio between the number of contribution years
and the number of pension years. The reform also aims
at raising the financial incentives for workers to remain
active until and after the legal retirement age, although
this age has been maintained at 60 (5).
Following the pension reform, a reform of the health sys-
tem was adopted in summer 2004 aimed at reaching
budgetary balance by 2007 (from a deficit of about 0.8 %
of GDP in 2004). About one third of the effort is planned
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ Figures mentioned in the March 2005 report ‘Perspectives économiques
2005–06’ published by the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and
Industry. 
¥3∂ The demographic projections used here represent the baseline projection
of INSEE, in which the fertility rate is projected to remain at 1.8 per 1 000
in line with the average level of the last 25 years, life expectancy is pro-
jected to rise by about seven years by 2050 and net inward migration is
projected to be of 50 000 persons annually over the projection period, in
line with the average of the last 10 years.
¥4∂ Of this group, the biggest increase will be amongst the very elderly, that is
persons aged 80 or over, whose number will triple from now to 2050. This
is relevant because this group is the most intensive user of healthcare and
long-term care services.
¥5∂ This is among the lowest legal retirement ages in the OECD countries.259
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GDP and the remainder through expenditure savings.
These savings are supposed to stem notably from: (i) the
introduction of a charge of EUR 1 payable by patients for
every medical consultation; (ii) measures aimed at tack-
ling fraudulent sick leave and at facilitating the develop-
ment of generic drugs; and (iii) better control of medical
cost, deriving mainly from financial incentives for
patients to use general practitioners rather than going
straight to specialists and from the introduction of a per-
sonal medical record in order to improve cooperation
between health professionals. The reform also aims at
improving the management of the system through a clar-
ification of the roles of the different parties involved
(government, social partners, health insurance schemes)
and the creation of an independent alert committee in
charge of formulating recommendations in case of slip-
pages from the official target.
Impact of the reforms on government finances
According to the French authorities, the pension reform
will reduce by around 40 % the financial needs of the
pension system in 2020. The remainder is expected to be
financed through two channels. In the private sector,
social contributions will be increased. In the public sec-
tor, the remaining financial needs will be met by a
decline in other government expenditures. Expressed in
terms of reduction of the tax gap, budgetary savings
resulting from the pension reform would be equivalent to
a permanent reduction in the deficit of 1.5 percentage
points of GDP, 0.5 percentage points of which can be
attributed to a rise in the participation rate.
The quantification of the effects of the pension reform in
the long term appears plausible. However, these effects
are subject to some uncertainties. First, after 2008 the
increase in the contribution period for entitlement to a
full pension foreseen by the reform will not be fully auto-
matic since it will be conditional upon the agreement of
an independent commission. Although unlikely, it can-
not be excluded that this commission may not endorse
the foreseen increases in the contribution period. Sec-
ond, there are some uncertainties regarding the reaction
of workers to the incentives introduced by the reform to
postpone retirement. This is especially relevant since the
reform did not modify the legal retirement age (60 years)
which is relatively low.
Although the health reform is also likely to trigger sub-
stantial savings, the precise budgetary impact of some
measures is more uncertain. While an impact should be
visible in the short run, notably through the effect of the
tax increases and of some well-defined measures on the
expenditure side, assuming that new financial incentives
and improvement in the governance of the system will
imply a permanent reduction in the pace of growth of
health expenditure appears overly optimistic. Notably,
the large savings expected from the control of medical
cost — representing one third of the total expected sav-
ings over 2005–07 — are conditional on a change in
behaviour of the economic agents. The changes intro-
duced in the structure of incentives will not be sufficient
to trigger a permanent modulation of the growth rate of
health expenditure.
On the basis of the 2004 update of the stability programme
and additional information provided by the EPC (1), age-
related spending is foreseen to increase by 5.5 % of GDP
between 2009 and 2050, despite the expected impact of
the 2003 pension reform. Indeed, the increase in public
spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term care will
be only partly compensated by a decline in expenditure on
education and unemployment benefits.
France adopted important measures on pensions and
health that should help improve the long-term sustaina-
bility of public financing without, however, fully secur-
ing it. Given the projected increase in the old-age
dependency ratio, fiscal consolidation along with struc-
tural reforms are key factors in putting France on a sus-
tainable path.
¥1∂ In October 2003, the Economic Policy Committee provided an overview
of analyses carried out at EU level on the impact of ageing populations on
public finances. The report took into account the expected impact of the
2003 pension reform, not obviously that of the 2004 health reform. 
Table V.18
Projected budgetary impact of ageing on public 
expenditures between 2009 and 2050, France
(% of GDP)
 Total impact
Total age-related spending  5.5
Of which:        
— pension expenditure  1.6
— healthcare expenditure  4.6
— education expenditure  – 0.4
— unemployment benefits  – 0.3
Sources: Ageing Working Group of the EU Economic Policy Committee and 
2004 update of the stability programme.260
9. Ireland
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
For 2004, the general government is estimated to have
recorded a surplus of 1.3 % of GDP, compared with the
deficit of 1.1 % of GDP targeted in the December 2003
update of the stability programme.
This significantly better-than-expected outturn is mainly
due to a sizeable tax overshoot, including the impact of
one-off factors, notably receipts arising from the special
investigations (of potential tax evasion) by the revenue
commissioners (estimated to have yielded around 0.5 %
of GDP). General government expenditure in 2004 is
also estimated to have been lower than budgeted, espe-
cially investment and interest expenditure.
The budget for 2005 was unveiled on 1 Decem-
ber 2004 (1) (2) together with the stability programme up-
date covering the period to 2007. The target for the
general government deficit in 2004 in the updated stabil-
ity programme is 0.8 % of GDP (3). The main 2005
budget measures on the revenue side include an upward
adjustment of the standard tax band for personal income
and some relief through changes in stamp duty. On the
expenditure side, the increase in current discretionary
spending (4) (of 10.1 % after 6.7 % in 2004) reflects a
somewhat more generous social welfare package than in
2004. A significant rise in capital spending has also been
budgeted, focusing, in particular, on improvements in
transport infrastructure. Given the measures in the bud-
get, in 2005 the Commission services’ spring forecast
projects the general government position to turn into a
deficit of 0.6 % of GDP (5). Nevertheless, risks exist. In
particular, a February 2005 court ruling on nursing home
payments might entail significant government costs,
though the exact implications are not yet known. On the
other hand, the general government deficit might turn
out to be lower than projected because of stronger-than-
expected receipts from strengthened tax compliance
(particularly as a consequence of further revenue com-
missioners’ special investigations) and some
underspending in capital outlays.
For 2006, the Commission services’ spring forecast
projects a deficit of 0.6 % of GDP, identical to the target
set in the updated stability programme. This target
includes a contingency provision against unforeseen
developments of 0.4 % of GDP. Given the non-indexed
nature of the tax and social benefit systems, the fore-
cast’s no-policy-change assumption is made operational,
in the absence of previously announced measures, by
freezing average tax rates and adjusting social transfer
payments by the forecast of CPI inflation (with a small
top-up).
Government gross debt is projected to stabilise at
around 30 % of GDP. In the absence of the accumula-
tion of non-general government assets in the National
Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) (6), which was estab-
lished in 2001 to pre-fund future pension liabilities, the
gross debt ratio would be falling over the period to end-
2006. ¥1∂ The detailed Exchequer cash data for 2004 reveal that personal income tax,VAT and stamp duty significantly exceeded budget forecasts, while corpo-
ration tax and excise duties were broadly on target.
¥2∂ The 2005 finance bill was signed into law by the president of Ireland on
25 March 2005.
¥3∂ In the March 2005 reporting of government deficits and debt levels, the
Irish authorities forecasted for 2005 a slightly lower deficit of 0.7 % of
GDP. 
¥4∂ This refers to the concept of ‘voted’ current spending, for which annual
approval by Parliament is needed and which excludes, inter alia, the serv-
ice of national debt and the contribution to the EU budget.
¥5∂ The cyclically adjusted balances presented in Table V.19 show planned
fiscal loosening of around 1ã % of GDP. However, one-off factors boost-
ing revenues in 2004 should also be taken into account (see above).
¥6∂ The National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) receives annually around
1 % of GNP from general government resources. At the end of 2004,
assets represented around 8 % of GDP.261
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Frequent expenditure overruns associated with the mas-
sive increase in government spending in the second half
of the 1990s raised concerns about the effectiveness of
control and management of public expenditure.
This created the basis for the recommendation in the
2003–05 broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs)
that Ireland should ‘enhance the efficiency of public
expenditure and improve revenue and expenditure
planning in a stability-oriented medium-term frame-
Table V.19
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Ireland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006  
General government balance  0.2  1.3  – 0.6  – 0.6   
— Total revenues  34.6  35.7  34.5  34.0   
Of which: — current taxes  24.8  25.7  24.8  24.5   
— social contributions  6.0  6.2  6.2  6.1   
— Total expenditure  34.4  34.3  35.1  34.6   
Of which: — collective consumption  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6   
— social transfers (2)  19.2  19.6  19.9  19.6   
— interest expenditure  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0   
— gross fixed capital formation  3.9  3.6  3.9  3.9   
Primary balance  1.5  2.5  0.5  0.5   
Pm Tax burden  30.0  30.9  30.0  29.7   
Government debt  32.0  29.9  29.8  29.6   
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  0.2  1.6  – 0.1  0.1   
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  1.5  2.8  1.0  1.1   
Pm Real GDP (3)  3.7  5.4  4.9  5.1   
Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
General government balance  0.1  0.9  – 0.8  – 0.6  – 0.6
Primary balance  1.4  2.1  0.6  0.6  0.7
Government debt  32.1  30.5  30.1  30.1  30.0
Pm Real GDP (3)  3.7  5.3  5.1  5.2  5.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Ireland.
Table V.20
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Ireland
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Personal income tax measures: a widening of the tax band for 
personal income and an increase in employee and personal tax 
credits (– 0.4 % of GDP)
• Stamp duty measures: relief for first-time purchasers of existing 
properties (less than – 0.1 % of GDP)
• Social welfare package: increase in social welfare benefit rates 
and measures to reinforce equal participation in society by people 
with disabilities (0.4 % of GDP)
• Investment: addition to the available envelope for Exchequer-
funded capital spending (around 0.2 % of GDP) plus a carry-over 
from unspent allocations in 2004 (0.2 % of GDP)
Sources: Commission services and Department of Finance, Ireland (2005 budget).262
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duced to improve the planning, management and con-
trol of expenditure’.
Measures taken by the Irish government up to 2002 to
address the occurrence of spending overruns and con-
cerns about securing ‘value for money’ have been previ-
ously reviewed (1). In 2003 and 2004, measures to
strengthen the monitoring and control of expenditures
included (2):
• the publication of intra-year monthly profiles of
expenditures (published in January);
• monthly expenditure management reports on the
trends in the public finances submitted by the minis-
ter for finance to the Cabinet;
• bimonthly reports submitted by the four key govern-
ment departments (3) to the Cabinet on emerging
spending trends;
• improvements in risk assessment measures and con-
tingency planning to cater for unforeseen intra-year
expenditure pressures;
• further structural measures to improve expenditure
management and control, including revised arrange-
ments for managing capital spending and the provi-
sion of incentives for departments to produce
savings.
The Irish authorities have also taken several steps to
improve the multiannual medium-term framework for
capital expenditures. In particular, the system of rolling
five-year spending envelopes was extended from public
transport to all areas of capital spending as from 2004,
which should significantly strengthen the efficiency of
planning of infrastructural investment. In addition, from
2004, departments were permitted to carry over to the
following year up to 10 % of their voted capital alloca-
tions (4).
The figure below compares targets and actual outturns
for discretionary spending and tax revenues. Taxes
appear to be much more volatile than discretionary
expenditure (5), but this reflects frequent swings in eco-
nomic growth and unexpected one-off revenues (6). On
the other hand, as regards the management of expendi-
ture, discretionary spending has been maintained closer
to plans in recent years.
The outturns for discretionary spending have gradually
become closer to target over time, being marginally
below target since 2002. In 2004, the detailed Exchequer
cash data revealed that the outturn in 2004 was, in partic-
ular, due to capital underspending. This was partly due
to the new provision for limited carry-over of capital
expenditure (see above) (7).
In conclusion, the measures taken to improve public
expenditure management have proven to be successful
and have delivered an improvement in expenditure con-
trol. The introduction of the multiannual capital enve-
lopes should allow for better budgeting of infrastructural
projects, but the medium-term planning of current
spending still requires ongoing attention since
announced multiannual targets are apparently routinely
revised. On a positive note, several initiatives are contin-
uing in order to analyse in a more systematic manner the
expenditure impact and to ensure the delivery of high-
quality services, in particular in the health sector (8).
¥1∂ For a review of the measures taken between 1997 and 2002 aiming at
improvements in expenditure management, see the section ‘Ireland’ in
European Commission (2003a). These measures included, in particular,
moving to multiannual budgeting, the expenditure review initiative (ERI)
and the setting-up of an Independent Estimates Review Committee
(IERC).
¥2∂ Measures announced by the minister for finance in his 2003 budget speech
(http://www.budget.gov.ie/2003/speech03.asp). 
¥3∂ The four departments with the largest current spending allocations are:
(i) Education and Science; (ii) Health and Children; (iii) Justice, Equality
and Law Reform; and (iv) Social and Family Affairs.
¥4∂ The Finance Act 2004.
¥5∂ The deviations from revenue targets led the Irish authorities to a review of
tax forecasting procedures. In particular, a new provisional methodology
for forecasting corporation tax revenues in the multiannual projections was
introduced in the budget for 2004 (BEPGs — 2004 implementation
report).
¥6∂ A significant one-off factor that significantly influenced tax revenues in
2004 was receipts arising from the special investigations by the revenue
commissioners, currently estimated to have yielded EUR 685 million (just
below 0.5 % of GDP).
¥7∂ The carry-over under the multiannual capital envelope from 2004 to 2005
was around 4 % of the 2004 discretionary capital allocation or 0.2 % of
GDP.
¥8∂ For further details, see Chapter 7 of the stability programme update of Ire-
land (December 2004).263
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and tax revenues (Exchequer cash accounts; deviation in %)
Sources: Commission services and Department of Finance, Ireland.
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10. Italy
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the EDP notification communicated by the
Italian authorities on 1 March 2005 but not validated by
Eurostat (1), the general government balance recorded a
deficit of 3.0 % of GDP in 2004, compared with a tar-
geted deficit of 2.2 % of GDP set in the 2003 update of
the stability programme.
Overestimation of economic growth and the upward
revisions of the deficits in the years from 2001 to 2003
largely explain the slippage from the budgetary objec-
tive.
At the Ecofin Council of 5 July 2004, Italy agreed to
undertake additional fiscal measures worth around â %
of GDP, including expenditure cuts amounting to around
0.3 % of GDP. Despite these savings, a postponement of
wage agreement renewals and lower-than-officially-pro-
jected interest payments, overall spending ended up
1.1 % of GDP higher than targeted in the 2003 update of
the stability programme. Part of the slippage was due to
higher-than-expected healthcare expenditure and signif-
icantly lower-than-expected proceeds from sales of pub-
licly owned real estate (classified as negative capital
expenditure). In contrast, on the revenue side, some
receipts (mainly a temporary rebate of taxation on capi-
tal gains from revaluation of firms’ assets and revenues
from lotteries) turned out higher than initially planned by
the government. Thus, total revenue was 0.3 % of GDP
above the amount expected in the 2003 update of the sta-
bility programme. The primary surplus decreased to
2.0 % of GDP, down from 2.4 % in 2003. Overall, the
impact of temporary measures on the 2004 budgetary
position is estimated at around 1â percentage points of
GDP, down from around 2 percentage points in 2003.
Also due to privatisation proceeds amounting to around
0.6 % of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio declined by
0.5 percentage points to 105.8 %. The original target in
the 2003 update of the stability programme was 105.0 %.
The 2005 budget law was adopted by Parliament on
29 December 2004. Measures aiming to reduce expend-
iture include a 2 % cap on the annual increase in nominal
expenditure (excluding pensions, healthcare and local
government expenditure), a new system of ceilings on
subnational government expenditure and further sales of
publicly owned real assets, including some State roads.
On the revenue side, the budget law comprises cuts in
personal income tax, an increase in indirect taxation and
a strengthening of the schemes that aim at widening the
tax base of small companies and self-employed people.
On 29 April, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance
released a new target of 2.9 % of GDP for the general
government deficit in 2005, while in the meantime list-
ing a series of circumstances which could lead the def-
icit to reach 3.5 % of GDP. The Italian authorities
explain the revision of the deficit target from the pre-
vious target of 2.7 % of GDP, set in the 2004 update of
the stability programme (2), to 2.9 % of GDP on the
basis of a lower growth forecast (1.2 % as against
2.1 %), the postponement of the renewal of the public
wage agreements from 2004 to 2005 and lower divi-
dend receipts. The negative impact of these items on
the deficit would be partially offset by interest pay-
ments which are expected to be lower than previously
projected. According to the Italian authorities, the def-
icit could increase from 2.9 % of GDP to 3.5 % of
GDP as: (i) the capital injections into the State-owned¥1∂ Eurostat did not validate the deficit figures for Italy notably because of:
(i) the recording of payments by concessionari d'imposta; (ii) a securitisa-
tion operation; (iii) transactions with the EU budget; (iv) the classification
of government-owned entities; (v) inconsistencies between cash and
accrual data; and (vi) large statistical discrepancies. The clarification of
these issues may lead to an upward revision in the deficit figures, notably
for 2003 and 2004.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.265
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have to be classified as capital transfers; (ii) ANAS,
the joint-stock company in charge of the maintenance
of the State road network, could not meet the criteria
to be classified outside the public administration, thus
increasing the deficit by 0.14 % of GDP; (iii) the sale
of publicly owned real assets could fall short of 0.35 %
of GDP; and (iv) some government institutions may
not respect the 2 % cap on the annual increase in nom-
inal expenditure introduced by the 2005 budget law,
Table V.21
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Italy 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)
 2003  2004  2005  2006   
General government balance  – 2.9  – 3.0  – 3.6  – 4.6   
— Total revenues  46.3  45.4  44.6  44.0   
Of which: — current taxes  28.2  28.2  28.0  27.7   
— social contributions  13.0  12.9  12.9  12.9   
— Total expenditure  49.2  48.4  48.2  48.5   
Of which: — collective consumption  7.6  7.4  7.3  7.2   
— social transfers (2)  29.1  29.2  29.2  29.1   
— interest expenditure  5.3  5.0  4.9  5.0   
— gross fixed capital formation  2.6  2.6  2.4  2.9   
Primary balance  2.4  2.0  1.3  0.4   
Pm Tax burden  42.9  41.9  41.1  40.6   
Government debt  106.3  105.8  105.6  106.3   
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 2.6  – 2.4  – 2.9  – 4.0   
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  2.7  2.6  2.0  1.0   
Pm Real GDP (3)  0.3  1.2  1.2  1.7   
Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
General government balance  – 2.4  – 2.9  – 2.7  – 2.0  – 1.4  – 0.9
Primary balance  2.9  2.4  2.5  3.3  4.0  4.7
Government debt  106.2  106.0  104.1  101.9  99.2  98.0
Pm Real GDP (3)  0.3  1.2  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Italy.
Table V.22
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Italy
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Reduction in the number of personal income tax rates and 
increases in tax deductions (– 0.3 % of GDP)
• New schemes aimed at widening the tax base of companies and 
self-employed people (studi di settore) (0.3 % of GDP)
• Postponement to 2005 of the tax amnesty for zoning regulation 
violations originally foreseen in 2004 (0.2 % of GDP)
• Savings on healthcare expenditure (0.3 % of GDP)
• Disposal of publicly owned real assets (0.5 % of GDP)
• Implementation of a 2 % cap on the  annual increase in nominal 
expenditure (0.4 % of GDP)
 Sources: Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance.266
P a r t  V
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t swith a negative impact on the fiscal balance of 0.1 %
of GDP. All these factors would increase the deficit to
3.75 % of GDP; however, the renewal of some wage
agreements concerning public employees could be
postponed to 2006, thus improving this figure by
0.25 % of GDP.
In the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, the
projected budgetary outturn is a deficit of 3.6 % of
GDP (1). The difference of one decimal point with
respect to the upper range limit of the deficit target of
3.5 % of GDP is explained by the different assessment of
several items, which partially offset one another (pro-
ceeds from the sale of real estate, interest payments,
compensation of public sector employees, intermediate
consumption, revenue, ANAS’s expenditure and capital
transfers of the railways company).
One-off measures are estimated to improve the budget
balance by around a ã percentage point of GDP. Net of
cyclical factors, both the deficit and the primary balance
are projected to worsen by around a â percentage point
of GDP. By contrast, the cyclically adjusted budget def-
icit resulting from the application of the commonly
agreed methodology by the Commission services to the
projections in the most recent update of the stability pro-
gramme remains unchanged compared with 2004, while
the cyclically adjusted primary surplus worsens by
0.2 percentage points of GDP.¥1∂ This forecast is based on the 2004 deficit notified on 1 March 2005. It does
not include possible carry-over effects of potential upward revisions.
Table V.23
General government: decomposition of stock-flow adjustment, Italy
(% of GDP)
 Stability programme Average
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2000–04
 2005–
07
Difference due to time of recording: cash and accruals 
1. Differences in the recording of revenue and 
primary expenditure (accounts receivable and 
payable) and statistical discrepancies
 1.4  1.6  1.2  1.1  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.9    1.2  0.9
2. Difference between cash and accrual interest 
expenditure 
 – 0.5  – 0.5  – 0.7  – 0.5  – 0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2  – 0.2  – 0.5  0.1
3. Total (1 + 2)  1.0  1.1  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.9  1.0  1.1    0.7  1.0
Accumulation of financial assets 
                      
4. Liquidities  – 0.7  0.3  0.0  – 0.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0    – 0.1  0.0
5. Securities other than shares  0.1  – 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0
6. Loans  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.7    0.2  0.6
7. Capital injections in State-owned companies  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.3    0.1  0.4
8. Privatisation proceeds  – 0.4  – 0.4  – 0.1  – 1.3  – 0.6  – 2.1  – 2.0  – 1.9  – 0.6  – 0.5  – 2.0
9. Other shares and equity  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0    0.1  0.0
10. Total (4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9)  – 0.2  0.1  0.0  – 1.6  0.1  – 1.1  – 0.9  – 0.9    – 0.3  – 1.0
Valuation effects and residual adjustments
                      
11. Redemption effects  0.0  0.0  – 1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0    – 0.3  0.0
12. Exchange rate adjustment  0.1  0.0  – 0.3  – 0.3  – 0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1    – 0.1  0.1
13. Other  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0
14. Total (11 + 12 + 13)  0.1  0.0  – 2.0  – 0.3  – 0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1    – 0.5  0.1
15. Stock-flow adjustment (3 + 10 + 14)  0.9  1.2  – 1.5  – 1.3  0.4  – 0.1  0.2  0.2  2.1  – 0.1  0.1
16. SFA excluding changes in liquidities, 
privatisation proceeds, and valuation effects 
and residual adjustments (15 – 4 – 8 – 14)
 1.9  1.2  0.6  0.9  0.8  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.7  1.1  2.1
Sources: Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s calculations on March 2005 reporting of government deficits and debt levels (Table 3A), information provided by the 
Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and 2004 updated stability programme.267
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legislation currently in force. This approach does not
account for increases in some spending items, namely
compensation of public sector employees and govern-
ment investment, to be adopted by the next budget law
and thus tends to underrate expenditures compared with
plausible developments. On this basis the deficit would
reach 4.6 % of GDP, reflecting the expiry of one-off
measures and the higher cost of the 2005 personal
income tax relief in the year 2006. A very sizeable budg-
etary correction would be needed to achieve the official
target of a deficit of 2 % of GDP set in the stability pro-
gramme update submitted in December 2004. The latter
plans the deficit to decline gradually to reach 0.9 % of
GDP in 2008.
In the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, the
(gross) debt ratio is projected to decline marginally to
105.6 % of GDP in 2005, while the new target set on
29 April is 105.3 % of GDP, up from the 104.1 % in the
2004 update of the stability programme. The difference
between the new official target and the Commission
services’ projection reflects the higher deficit forecast by
the Commission services. Based on unchanged legisla-
tion, the debt ratio is expected to increase in 2006 to
106.3 % of GDP, well above the 101.9 % of GDP tar-
geted in the stability programme.
The pace of debt reduction 
and the stock-flow adjustment
Since the late 1990s, the pace of debt reduction in Italy
has been slower than warranted by the size of the pri-
mary surplus and privatisation proceeds. The inertia
chiefly reflects persistent debt-increasing components in
the so-called stock-flow adjustment (SFA). The SFA is
the difference between the Maastricht deficit, which is
recorded in accrual terms, and the change in the govern-
ment debt, which is recorded in cash terms and gross of
financial transactions. A positive SFA is the normal out-
come for low-debt countries with a surplus, as they
invest their surpluses and accumulate financial assets.
By contrast, persistent debt-increasing components in
the SFA are a cause of concern in a high-debt and high-
deficit country like Italy (see also Part II, Chapter 2, Sec-
tion 2.1). To understand the underlying debt dynamics, it
is essential to analyse the different components of the
SFA. The SFA can be divided into three aggregate com-
ponents: (i) difference due to time of recording: cash and
accruals; (ii) accumulation of financial assets; (iii) valu-
ation effects and residual adjustments. Table V.23 pro-
vides a detailed breakdown of the actual SFA in Italy
over the 2000–04 period. It also includes the available
indications about future SFA developments as presented
in the stability programme update submitted in Decem-
ber 2004 and details made available by the Ministry of
the Economy and Finance.
The upward revision of the deficit-to-GDP ratio in
2001–03 included in the notification of March 2005
resulted from moving a part of debt-increasing SFA
above the line. In particular, capital injections into the
State-owned railway company, Ferrovie dello Stato, are
now considered as capital transfers and not as financial
transactions. In spite of these reclassifications,
debt-increasing elements of the SFA continue to be par-
ticularly high in Italy.
As regards the recent past, the data show that in the
2000–04 period the debt-reducing components of the
SFA amounted on average to 1â % of GDP per year.
They chiefly consisted of (i) privatisation proceeds real-
ised in part thanks to the classification of Cassa Deposi-
tie Prestiti (the State-owned savings and loans bank) out-
side the general government sector in 2003, (ii) an
exceptional conversion of Treasury bonds held by the
Bank of Italy in 2002, and (iii) interest expenditure
accrued but not yet paid on postal bonds.
However, over the same 2000–04 period, the abovemen-
tioned debt-reducing factors were offset by components
producing the opposite result, i.e. an average increase in
the government gross debt of 1â percentage points of
GDP per year. Specifically, around 1ä% of GDP per
year was due to the difference between cash versus
accrual accounting in primary items and large statistical
discrepancies. This represents a cause of concern and
was also mentioned in the Eurostat press release of 18
March 2005 (see footnote 192). In addition, accumula-
tion of financial assets (excluding liquidities and privati-
sation proceeds) affected the government gross debt on
average by a ä percentage point of GDP per year.
Data about future years presented in the 2004 update
of the stability programme suggest that the pattern
observed over the recent past is expected to persist. In
particular, cash versus accrual accounting in primary
items is expected to continue producing a debt-increas-
ing effect at least until 2007.
An indicator gauging the actual debt dynamics is the so-
called cash borrowing requirement (fabbisogno delle
amministrazioni pubbliche). It is regularly used by the268
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the Maastricht deficit, the indicator includes the differ-
ence between cash and accrual accounting and the accu-
mulation of financial assets excluding privatisation pro-
ceeds. As shown in Graph V.5, the cash borrowing
requirement has been above the 3 % of GDP reference
value over the past few years.
As regards future years, the implicit cash borrowing
requirement, i.e. the derived indicator excluding from
the projected change in the gross debt level the effect of
the privatisation proceeds envisaged in the 2004 update
of the stability programme, continues to stay signifi-
cantly above the targeted EDP deficit. As depicted in
Graph V.5, the difference would even seem to increase
in 2008.
If the difference between the deficit and the cash borrow-
ing requirement continued to be as high as implicitly
assumed in the 2004 update of the stability programme,
it would represent a serious cause of concern for the
quality of statistical indicators in Italy and above all for
the sustainability of public finances over the medium
and long term.
Graph V.5:  Comparison of different definitions of deficit (1)
(1) Excluding UMTS receipts    
(2) Interest on accruals
Source: Commission services.
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11. Cyprus
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the March 2005 EDP notification, the
general government deficit for 2004 reached 4.2 % of
GDP. Compared with the 2003 deficit outturn, this fig-
ure represents a reduction of more than 2 percentage
points. Moreover, it is better than the estimated 4.8 %
of GDP in the updated convergence programme sub-
mitted on 7 December 2004, which, in turn, is better
than the 2004 deficit target of 5.2 % of GDP in the May
2004 convergence programme. This positive outcome
is attributed to the impact of the fiscal consolidation
measures affecting both expenditure and revenue.
Extra revenues came from a more domestic-demand-
based growth composition, which more than offset
some revenue shortfalls arising from delays in the
introduction of a number of measures initially planned
for 2004. The debt ratio in 2004 reached 71.9 % of
GDP, still higher than the 69.8 % of GDP recorded in
2003, but lower than the 74.9 % estimated in the
updated convergence programme. This difference is
explained by extra debt repayment in that year and by
the lower-than-expected deficit.
The 2005 budget was approved by Parliament on
10 December 2004. It is consistent with the commit-
ments and plans set out in the convergence programme
to bring down the budget deficit to 2.9 % of GDP for
2005 and in line with the Commission services’ spring
2005 forecast. The deficit reduction is achieved both
through revenue increases and expenditure restraint.
Some of the expenditure measures are permanent. This
is the case of the increase in the retirement age for pub-
lic sector employees. Caps on current expenditures
have also been introduced. Overall, nominal expendi-
ture growth is kept at 3 %. However, two items are pro-
jected to grow above this ceiling. Nominal wages and
salaries, which account for 25 % of government
expenditure, are set to grow by 5 % in 2005, while cap-
ital expenditure is planned to rise by 6 %. The budget
foresees a nominal revenue increase of 9.5 %. Main
revenue growth elements are social security contribu-
tions and indirect taxes. VAT rates were revised
upwards, in line with the EU acquis, which indeed has
carry-over effects in 2005. Revenues from direct taxes
and social security contributions are expected to be
pushed up by higher GDP growth. Additional revenues
would be provided by some one-off measures (such as
a tax amnesty and the introduction of fees for issuance
of title deeds for certain real estate). It should also be
noted that the updated convergence programme pru-
dently takes revenues from a number of measures, not
included in the 2005 budget, as a safety margin to offset
the impact of possible delays in other measures planned
for 2005. As a consequence, the deficit target of 2.9 %
of GDP is considered as an ‘upper limit’.
For 2006, based on the usual no-policy-change scenario,
the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
a further reduction in the deficit to 1.9 % of GDP. This
figure is marginally above the deficit target of 1.7 % of
GDP set in the update of the convergence programme.
The difference arises from the Commission services’
slightly lower GDP growth projection for 2006. For
2007 and 2008, the updated convergence programme
targets a further deficit reduction to 1.5 and 0.9 % of
GDP respectively.
The spring 2005 forecast projects the general govern-
ment debt level for 2005 to decrease to 69.1 % of GDP,
with a further decline to 66.6 % by 2006. This drop is
mainly driven by positive primary balances and an
annual nominal GDP growth above the average nominal
interest rate over 2005–06. Furthermore, debt-reducing
stock-flow adjustments (SFAs) further push the debt
ratio down, reversing earlier debt-increasing SFAs in
2000–03. The projected debt path in the Commission
services’ forecast is similar to that in the updated conver-
gence programme, although the levels in the former are
lower because the forecast already incorporates the
lower starting debt level in 2004. 270
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Budgetary developments 2003–08, Cyprus
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
General government balance  – 6.3  – 4.2  – 2.9  – 1.9   
— Total revenues  39.1  39.4  39.4  38.9   
Of which: — current taxes  26.6  25.3  25.97  25.5   
— social contributions  7.1  8.4  8.2  8.0   
— Total expenditure  45.4  43.6  42.3  40.7   
Of which: — collective consumption  11.0  10.1  9.9  9.7   
— social transfers (2)  20.4  19.9  19.8  19.2   
— interest expenditure  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.2   
— gross fixed capital formation  3.4  3.9  3.6  3.5   
Primary balance  – 2.8  – 0.9  0.4  1.4   
Pm Tax burden  33.3  33.9  34.1  33.6   
Government debt  69.8  71.9  69.1  66.6   
Pm Real GDP (3)  2.0  3.7  3.9  4.2   
Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
General government balance  – 6.3  – 4.8  – 2.9  – 1.7  – 1.5  – 0.9
Primary balance  – 2.8  – 1.3  0.7  1.8  2.0  2.5
Government debt  69.8  74.9  71.9  69.2  65.7  58.1
Pm Real GDP (3)  1.9  3.6  4.0  4.4  4.5  4.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Cyprus.
Table V.25
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Cyprus
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Implementation of legislation on bank secrecy and a tax amnesty 
on undeclared bank accounts (0.6 % of GDP)
• Regularisation of dividend income policy for semi-government 
organisations (0.6 % of GDP)
• Issuance of title deeds for buildings erected with minor 
irregularities (0.4 % of GDP)
• Introduction of overall annual ceilings on current expenditure 
increases (of at most 3 %) and on capital expenditure growth (of 
at most 4 %)
• Freeze on public sector employment and wage increases (0.3 % of 
GDP) and increase in the retirement age in the public sector (0.2 % 
of GDP)
• Increase in the minimum retirement age for eligibility for outlays 
from the Social Insurance Fund (0.2 % of GDP)
• Containment of current transfers and subsidies (pensions, 
allowances) in line with inflation (0.2 % of GDP) 
Sources: Commission services and updated convergence programme of Cyprus.271
12. Latvia 
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2004, according to the March 2005 fiscal notification,
the general government deficit was 0.8 % of GDP. This
is about 1ä percentage points lower than the targeted
deficit of 2.1 % set in the May 2004 convergence pro-
gramme and more than 1 percentage point better than the
budgeted deficit of 2.2 %. The difference was mainly
due to better-than-expected tax revenues coming from
output growth significantly higher than foreseen (8.5 %
instead of 6.7 % foreseen in the 2004 budget law) and
improvements in tax collection. The 2004 budget was
amended twice, in August and in December. The first
budget amendments, with a cost of nearly 0.9 % of GDP,
provided for additional increases in teachers’ salaries
and subsidies to farmers. The second set of amendments,
with a cost of more than 0.4 % of GDP, included a
number of one-off payments previously intended for
2005, such as direct payments to farmers, contributions
to the 2005 EU budget and advances for financing devel-
opment and structural projects. The debt-to-GDP ratio at
end-2004 was 14.4 %. The 2005 budget law was pre-
sented to Parliament on 13 December 2004 and adopted
on 20 December. The budget, in line with the December
2004 convergence programme, targets a deficit of 1.6 %
of GDP, which is significantly more ambitious than the
2.2 % of GDP deficit target set in the May 2004 conver-
gence programme though with an unchanged underlying
growth assumption of 6.7 %.
Compared with the May programme, in the 2005 budget
both expenditure and revenue ratios are projected to
increase substantially. This is, most importantly, a result
of the frontloading of EU funds-related budgeting pro-
grammed for the period 2004–07. Furthermore, starting
from 2005, the government plans to commence the mod-
ernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system,
requiring a 10 to 15 % annual increase in public financ-
ing over the medium term. Strong growth, changes to the
spending structure including administrative reform,
improved tax collection and VAT increases implied by
EU accession are expected to finance these reforms. In
the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, the pro-
jected outcome is in line with the targeted deficit. None-
theless, it is based on higher growth assumptions (a
7.2 % annual growth rate rather than 6.5 %) and a more
cautious estimate of revenues from EU funds.
Based on a no-policy-change assumption, the Commis-
sion services’ spring 2005 forecast projects the general
government deficit to decrease slightly to 1.5 % of GDP
in 2006. This is in line with the December 2004 conver-
gence programme (1) that aims at a slight reduction in the
general government budget deficit from 1.6 % of GDP in
2005 to 1.4 % of GDP in 2007.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain broadly sta-
ble in 2005 and 2006 (with a small fall to 14.0 % in 2005
before rising to 14.3 % in 2006), a profile that is slightly
more optimistic than in the December 2004 update of the
convergence programme.
Public expenditure prospects: the case of a strongly 
growing catching-up economy
The 2005 budget is the first to be legally embedded
within a multiannual budgetary framework, in this
case covering the period 2005–09 in line with the gov-
ernment’s policy document, ‘Medium-term key con-
cepts for macroeconomic development and fiscal pol-
icy, 2005–09’. This document sets out key funding
priorities and outlines annual general government def-
icit and debt targets. For the period up to 2007, this
document largely corresponds to the December con-
vergence programme update. The 2005 budget pro-
vides for more funding for the defence, healthcare and
education sectors. This is consistent with the govern-
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.272
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obligations related to EU accession and NATO mem-
bership. However, the budget preparation process in
Latvia still shows signs of a relatively weak planning
process, in particular an unclear link between policy
priorities and the allocation of resources. Budget allo-
cations tend to be subject to inertia and structural
rigidities, with only marginal adjustments. Achieve-
Table V.26
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Latvia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
General government balance  – 1.5  – 0.8  – 1.6  – 1.5  
— Total revenues  34.2  35.2  35.4  35.3  
Of which: — current taxes  19.9  19.7  19.4  19.2  
— social contributions  9.2  8.8  8.2  7.8  
— Total expenditure  35.7  35.9  37.0  36.8  
Of which: — collective consumption  11.0  10.9  10.7  10.5  
— social transfers (2)  20.3  18.9  18.5  18.1  
— interest expenditure  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  
— gross fixed capital formation  1.5  1.7  2.6  3.1  
Primary balance  – 0.7  0.0  – 0.8  – 0.7  
Pm Tax burden  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Government debt  14.4  14.4  14.0  14.3  
Pm  Real GDP (3)  7.5  8.5  7.2  6.9  
Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
General government balance  – 1.5  – 1.7  – 1.6  – 1.5  – 1.4
Primary balance  – 0.7  – 0.9  – 0.9  – 0.8  – 0.7
Government debt  14.4  14.2  14.5  14.8  15.0
Pm Real GDP (3)  7.5  8.1  6.7  6.5  6.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Latvia.
Table V.27
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Latvia
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Increase in the personal income tax-free threshold from LVL 21 per 
month to LVL 26 per month and the setting of income tax rebates 
for dependants at LVL 18 per month (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Application of the reduced VAT rate (5 % instead of 18 %) to 
domestic public transport services (– 0.08 % of GDP)
• Increase in excise duties on oil and tobacco products (+ 0.3 % of 
GDP)
• Expenditures based largely on financing from EU Structural Funds 
and other financial instruments (+ 3.6 % of GDP)
• Reform of the national armed forces and NATO integration-
related requirements (+ 1.9 % of GDP mainly financed through 
restructuring of the budget)
• Modernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system (+ 0.4 % 
of GDP)
• Increased teachers’ salaries (+ 0.3 % of GDP)
• Other measures to improve social conditions including pension 
indexation (+ 0.7 % of GDP)
Sources: Commission services and the explanations to the 2005 budget law (2005 gada budžeta paskaidrojumi).273
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rationing of resources for line ministries. Adjustments
of expenditure in the form of freezing of programmes
take place during the budget year, even without reve-
nue shortfalls. This indicates underestimation of some
expenditure categories during the budget preparation
phase. The practice of putting on hold programmes
that have been approved by Parliament and govern-
ment dates back to the 1998 Russian crisis. These
accumulated ‘frozen’ commitments are the main rea-
son why budget negotiations are so cumbersome
despite high growth rates of nominal and real expend-
iture.
Access to EU funds could help in the very short term
to achieve closer alignment of policy priorities and
budget expenditure. However, budgetary expansion
implies a further stimulus to demand (1).
While the general government deficit is capped at some
1â % of GDP, spending (financed largely by EU grants)
is budgeted to increase substantially. In all, the annual
EU grants and related expenditures are expected to total
some 5 to 7 % of GDP over the next few years.
These EU-financed expenditures do not widen the meas-
ured deficit; nonetheless they represent a sizeable
increase in claims on available resources that could add
to pressures on inflation and the external balance. Thus,
the challenge for fiscal policy is not only to aid restruc-
turing of the economy, but also to avoid or contain cycli-
cally undesirable stimuli. The savings necessary to
increase funding for priority programmes will have to be
addressed in a manner conducive to sustainable, cost-
effective results without disruptions to service delivery. 
The announced government priorities include: the mod-
ernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system; sup-
port for institution building and strengthening of public
administration to ensure greater efficiency (including the
civil service pay reform initiated in 2002 but stalled for
lack of resources); a significant increase in the financing
of fundamental research and higher education; pension
indexation; and an increase in childcare allowances. Pres-
sure to implement these various reforms arises from rela-
tively low salaries in the public sector, the high share of
employment in that sector (estimated at 40 % of total
employment), unfavourable health outcomes and the very
high share of private financing of healthcare (affecting
vulnerable social groups), and a dangerously low fertility
rate (in 2003, the total fertility rate in Latvia was 1.29
compared with 1.52 in the EU-15).
Inflexible expenditures, those budget components that are
either non-discretionary or not adjustable within the span
of a few months, include the wage bill, interest payments,
¥1∂ However, the disbursement on EU-supported programmes can be expected
to directly impact mainly on the domestic business sector, and within this
sector on less tradable subsectors (in particular, construction) with access
to currently unused or underused resources. While there will clearly be
some primary and secondary effects in terms of higher imported inputs and
bidding-up of factor costs, these should be more muted relative to a ‘clas-
sic’ budget deficit expansion in a fully employed economy.
Table V.28
General government expenditure by function, Latvia 2003, the EU-15 2002
 % of GDP  % of total expenditure
  Latvia  EU-15  Latvia  EU-15
 General public services  5.3  6.8  15.0  14.3
 Defence  1.3  1.8  3.6  3.8
 Public order and safety  2.4  1.7  6.8  3.6
 Economic affairs  3.7  4.1  10.3  8.6
 Environment protection  0.4  0.7  1.2  1.5
 Housing and community amenities  0.9  0.9  2.6  1.9
 Health  3.3  6.5  9.1  13.6
 Recreation, culture and religion  1.4  0.9  3.8  1.9
 Education; total expenditure  6.2  5.2  17.3  10.9
 Social protection  10.8  19.1  30.2  40.0
 Total expenditure  35.7  47.7  100  100
 Sources: Eurostat and World Health Organisation.274
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subsidies, and transfers are primarily to households (social
protection) and grants for healthcare. As is evident
from Table V.29, the inflexible part of the budget is rather
substantial although proportionally smaller than in the
EU-15. While these obligations are to be expected, they
limit the government’s margin for manoeuvre in the event
of exogenous shocks or a decision to fund new policies.
The budget’s non-discretionary portion is growing as a
result of EU accession. Most importantly, the portion of
the capital expenditure covering counterpart funds for
implementation of the EU-fund-financed project can be
considered as non-flexible expenditure. Furthermore, ever
increasing participation of Latvia in various international
organisations and projects claims a growing share of the
budget (estimated at 1.2 % of GDP in 2005). Unless
action is taken to review sector policies in the direction of
increased cost-effectiveness, pressures on the overall fis-
cal stance will be felt.
Two expenditure items, in particular, stand out, namely
collective consumption expenditure and compensation
of employees. The former could be curbed by rationalis-
ing and restructuring the currently prolific system of
State-managed agencies (more than 200) and companies
(mainly utilities). The wage bill can only be curbed by
reducing the total number of public sector employees.
The share of public sector employment in total employ-
ment is rather high: according to the Central Bureau of
Statistics, the public sector accounted for around 40 % of
total employment. Nonetheless, high growth and the
recent inflation hikes will intensify pressures to increase
wages for public sector employees. Thus, savings from
reducing the number of employees might be outweighed
by increases in wages. In this respect, the current discus-
sion among the Latvian authorities on future budgetary
planning seems to favour restricting growth of expendi-
tures on wages, goods and services, and transfers to
below nominal GDP growth.  
Table V.29
General government expenditure by national account categories in 2003, Latvia and the EU-15
 % of GDP  % of total expenditure
  Latvia  EU-15  Latvia  EU-15
 Collective consumption expenditure  11.0  8.3  29.7  17.3
 Social transfers in kind  10.8  12.7  29.0  26.6
 Final consumption expenditure of general government  21.8  21.0  58.7  44.0
 — Of which compensation of employees  11.1  11.0  29.8  23.0
 Other current expenditure  0.8  2.1  2.0  4.3
 Social benefits other than social transfers in kind  9.6  16.6  25.8  34.8
 Subsidies  0.8  1.2  2.4  2.6
 Interest  0.8  3.2  2.2  6.7
 Gross fixed capital formation  1.5  2.4  4.0  5.1
 Other capital expenditure, including capital transfers  1.9  1.3  5.1  2.6
 Total expenditure, general government (1)  37.1  47.8  100.0  100.0
 Inflexible expenditures (2)  22.3  32.0  62.4  67.0
(1) The definition of government expenditure differs from the harmonised definition used in Table V.28.
(2) Inflexible expenditures, i.e. budget components that are either non-discretionary or not adjustable within the span of a few months, include the wage bill, interest
payments, subsidies and social benefits other than transfers in kind.
 Source: Eurostat.275
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Sources: Eurostat and World Health Organisation.
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13. Lithuania
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government deficit increased from 1.9 % of
GDP in 2003 to 2.5 % in 2004. The outturn was slightly
better than the 2.7 % of GDP target set in the budget for
2004. The main factor underlying the lower-than-pro-
jected deficit was a cautious forecasting of several cate-
gories of budgetary revenues by the authorities. As in
recent years, revenues (excluding EU funds) were higher
than expected, while expenditure related to co-financing
of EU funds turned out lower than budgeted. These fac-
tors more than offset additional expenditure decided in
June and December. A budgetary amendment allocated
some 0.3 % additional spending in June, while in
December, when it was clear that the deficit target would
be met very comfortably, the decision was taken to raise
2004 spending by some 0.7 % of GDP. The major share
of these expenditure adjustments were outlays related to
compensations for lost savings and real estate restitu-
tions. Despite the increase in the general government
deficit, the debt ratio decreased slightly in 2004, due to
strong growth and privatisation receipts, and remained
relatively low at 19.7 % of GDP.
The budget for 2005 was approved by Parliament on
9 November 2004. The budget did not contain signifi-
cant tax changes, apart from the planned abolition of the
turnover tax in July 2005, which has not been replaced
so far through compensating measures. In addition to a
substantial increase in public investment and the costs of
the pension reform, several measures are foreseen to
entail significant additional spending in 2005 (e.g.
increases of subsidies to agriculture, salary increases for
public sector employees and payments related to the res-
titution of real estate assets and lost savings). Tax reve-
nue growth, particularly that of corporate and personal
income taxes, is expected to remain strong and, together
with increasing EU transfers, broadly compensate for the
expected increase in expenditure. The authorities’ target
for the general government deficit in 2005, as estab-
lished in the January 2005 update of Lithuania’s conver-
gence programme, is 2.5 % of GDP (1). The target is in
line with the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast.
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast foresees
the general government deficit to decrease to 1.9 % of
GDP in 2006. The forecast was derived on a no-policy-
change basis. The projected deficit is marginally higher
than the 1.8 % of GDP target set in the January 2005
update of Lithuania’s convergence programme. The
update foresees a further reduction in the deficit to 1.5 %
of GDP in 2007.
The debt ratio is expected to remain close to 21 % of
GDP in 2005 and 2006 according to the Commission
services’ spring 2005 forecast.
The compensation for lost savings and restitution 
of property rights
In the aftermath of independence, the government
decided to restore real estate assets confiscated during
the Soviet times. In 1991, a law regulating the procedure
and conditions for restoration of property was published.
An amendment to the law in 1996 established that liabil-
ities related to residential houses should be fully paid by
2011. Restoration of property has been primarily made
in actual or equivalent property, or by pecuniary com-
pensations. The outstanding amount to be repaid in rela-
tion to the restitution of real estate assets was estimated
at 1.7 % of GDP in December 2004. 
During the early years of transition, the Lithuanian econ-
omy endured a difficult process of hyperinflation, short-
ages of consumer goods and administrative restrictions in
the form of freezing of savings deposits. Deposits denom-
inated in roubles (and the surrogate currency talonas)
depreciated rapidly during that period. Following the
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.277
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to compensate for the losses of savings held in State banks
by Lithuanian citizens due to the sharp currency deprecia-
tions. Initially, there was no formal calendar for repay-
ments. A first wave of compensations started in 1993 and,
after some interruptions, saving restitutions continued
under the 1997 law on the restoration of savings of the
population. Privatisation receipts were used as the main
source of financing for these liabilities. As of December
2004, the amounts of savings compensations pending pay-
ment were estimated at some 2.5 % of GDP.
Compensations related to both real estate property con-
fiscations and lost savings have so far taken place
according to a schedule decided each year by the govern-
ment, and the repaid amounts have typically differed
from the budgeted amounts. In recent years, the govern-
ment was flexible in the repayment of the savings and
real estate liabilities in order to contain expenditure dur-
ing cyclical downturns. This was particularly evident
during the period following the 1998 Russian crisis,
when the savings compensation and real estate restitu-
tion programmes were almost fully interrupted. In con-
Table V.30
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Lithuania
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
General government balance  – 1.9  – 2.5  – 2.4  – 1.9  
— Total revenues  32.3  31.8  32.3  31.6  
Of which: — current taxes  19.9  19.0  18.5  18.1  
— social contributions  8.7  8.4  8.6  8.5  
— Total expenditure  34.2  34.3  34.8  33.6  
Of which: — collective consumption  7.6  7.3  7.3  7.0  
— social transfers (2)  20.0  19.6  19.5  18.8  
— interest expenditure  1.3  1.0  0.9  0.9  
— gross fixed capital formation  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.4  
Primary balance  – 0.6  – 1.5  – 1.5  – 1.1  
Pm Tax burden  28.6  27.4  27.1  26.6  
Government debt  21.4  19.7  21.2  20.9  
Pm Real GDP (3)  9.7  6.7  6.4  5.9  
Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
General government balance  – 1.9  – 2.5  – 2.5  – 1.8  – 1.5
Primary balance  – 0.6  – 1.5  – 1.4  – 0.8  – 0.5
Government debt  21.4  20.1  20.9  20.3  20.1
Pm Real GDP (3)  9.7  6.5  6.5  6.2  6.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted on 14 January 2005.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Lithuania.
Table V.31
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Lithuania
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Abolition of the turnover tax (– 0.4 % of GDP) • Increase of subsidies to agriculture (0.6 % of GDP)
• Compensations for lost property and savings  (0.4 % of GDP)
• Salary increases for public sector employees (0.2 % of GDP)
 Sources: Commission services and January 2005 update of the convergence programme.278
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budgeted amounts during the cyclical upswing of the last
few years.
In Lithuania’s first convergence programme submitted
to the European Commission in May 2004, the govern-
ment presented for the first time a medium-term plan for
the payment of lost rouble savings and real estate assets
for the period 2004–07, increasing transparency about
the medium-term budgetary plans.
The January 2005 update of the convergence programme
foresees the amounts to be paid related to compensations
for lost savings and restitution of property rights to
account for 0.4 % of GDP in 2005, 0.8 % in 2006 and
1.2 % in 2007.
Compensations for lost savings and confiscated real
estate assets have so far been recorded in the government
accounts as government expenditure in the year when
they are paid, therefore increasing the general govern-
ment deficit in the same year. The amounts yet to be paid
are not included in the government debt at this moment.
Classification changes in the future cannot be excluded,
as there are ongoing discussions between Eurostat and
Lithuania’s statistical authorities on the recording of
transactions related to the compensations. According to
the Eurostat news release of 18 March 2005 (1), such
classification changes could lead to a downward revision
of the government deficit for 2004 and earlier years and
a corresponding adjustment in the debt. It would also
entail a revision of the budgetary and debt targets pre-
sented in the update of the convergence programme, as
payments related to these liabilities are included in the
budgetary targets (under the assumption that no other
categories of expenditure would be increased to compen-
sate for the statistical effect of removing these liabilities
from the budgetary targets).
¥1∂ Eurostat: Euroindicators News Release 39/2004, 18.3.2005, ‘First notifica-
tion of deficit and debt data for 2004’.279
14.  Luxembourg
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
Following a sharp reduction in the general government
surplus from a record 6.2 % of GDP both in 2000 and
2001 to 0.5 % of GDP in 2003, a deficit of 1.1 % of GDP
was recorded in 2004, according to the March 2005
reporting by the Luxembourg authorities. This is, how-
ever, better than the 1.8 % of GDP deficit projected in
the 2003 update of the stability programme and the
1.4 % deficit estimated in the 2004 update: tax revenues
significantly exceeded projections whereas, at the same
time, investment expenditure figures had to be revised
upwards in order to take into account some big projects
based on a public–private partnership that previously
had not been recorded in the government sector; as a
result, public spending figures were pushed up by about
a â percentage point of GDP.
The final outcome for 2004 might well be even more
favourable than the March reporting indicates since,
according to data made available since then, the State
(excluding the special funds — see footnote 1 this page)
recorded a 0.3 % of GDP surplus in 2004, while a 0.3 %
of GDP deficit had been initially projected in the budget.
The debt ratio was also revised upwards for the same rea-
son as government investment. It reached 7.5 % of GDP
in 2004 instead of 5.0 % as indicated before (e.g. in the
2004 update of the stability programme), a slight
increase with respect to 2003 (from 7.1 % of GDP).
The 2005 budget was adopted by Parliament on
9 December 2004. It foresees an increase of about 8 %
both in the revenues and the expenditure of the State (1).
According to the budget, the general government should
record a 1.2 % of GDP deficit in 2005, with the central
government (including the State and the special funds)
deficit reaching 3.0 % of GDP, the social security sur-
plus 1.8 % of GDP and the finances of local authorities
being broadly balanced. These projections are close to
those presented in the 2004 update of the stability pro-
gramme, submitted on 30 November 2004 (2), where the
2005 general government deficit was projected at 1.0 %
of GDP, a 0.4 percentage points of GDP improvement
with respect to the 2004 deficit as estimated at that time.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecasts, based on the current policy stance, the general
government deficit is expected to widen from 1.1 % of
GDP in 2004 to 1.5 % in 2005. Reflecting the relatively
strong growth in output and employment, government
revenues would be buoyant (and even more than in the
recent past), rising by about 6 %, compared with 4 % in
2003 and 5 % in 2004. However, government spending,
though decelerating (it rose by 9 % in 2004), is still pro-
jected to increase by about 7 %. The main difference
between the projections of the stability programme and
the Commission services’ forecasts is in the evolution of
the revenues ratio, which the programme projects to
increase by 1.2 percentage points of GDP in 2005, while
the Commission services forecast it to decrease slightly.
In cyclically adjusted terms, the deficit should deterio-
rate by 0.3 percentage points of GDP in 2005, a broadly
neutral budgetary policy stance after the 1.6 percentage
points of GDP worsening recorded in 2004. However,
due to the very specific features of the economy, esti-
mates of cyclically adjusted balances in Luxembourg are
surrounded by a very high degree of uncertainty. 
For 2006 and 2007, the 2004 update of the stability pro-
gramme does not present a detailed budgetary strategy
but rather a technical projection, where the expendi-
¥1∂ It is difficult to estimate developments in central government spending from
the budget because a large part of public investment in Luxembourg is not
made by the State itself but by special funds, financed by the State budget on
a pluriannual basis. Investments made by these funds do not necessarily take
place in the year the financing is provided and do not closely reflect develop-
ments in capital spending as presented in the budget. 
¥2∂ The budget was adopted later, on 9 December, but the projections pre-
sented in the stability programme are more recent than those of the budget
since the draft budget was submitted to Parliament on 20 October. The
updated stability programme can be found at http://www.fi.etat.lu/
6th_update_of_the_luxembourg_stability_and_growth_programme_2003
_2007.pdf. 280
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broadly constant. Consequently, the deficit is projected
to fluctuate in a narrow margin around the 1.0 % of
GDP level forecast for 2005, decreasing to 0.9 % of
GDP in 2006 and coming back to 1.0 % in 2007. For
2006, the Commission services’ spring forecasts, based
on a no-policy-change assumption, project the general
government deficit to deteriorate from 1.5 % of GDP in
Table V.32
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Luxembourg
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
General government balance  0.5  – 1.1  – 1.5  – 1.9  
— Total revenues  45.5  44.9  44.4  44.2  
Of which: — current taxes  29.3  28.9  28.7  28.7  
— social contributions  12.4  12.2  12.0  11.9  
— Total expenditure  45.1  46.0  46.0  46.0  
Of which: — collective consumption  7.3  7.2  7.1  7.1  
— social transfers (2)  26.7  26.7  26.8  27.1  
— interest expenditure  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  
— gross fixed capital formation  4.9  5.0  5.1  5.1  
Primary balance  0.8  – 0.9  – 1.3  – 1.7  
Pm Tax burden  41.3  40.9  40.5  40.4  
Government debt  7.1  7.5  7.8  7.9  
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  1.3  – 0.3  – 0.6  – 0.6  
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  1.6  – 0.1  – 0.3  – 0.5  
Pm Real GDP (3)  2.9  4.2  3.8  4.0  
Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
General government balance  0.8  – 1.4  – 1.0  – 0.9  – 1.0
Primary balance  1.0  – 1.2  – 0.9  – 0.8  – 0.9
Government debt  5.3  5.0  5.0  4.6  4.5
Pm Real GDP (3)  2.9  4.4  3.8  3.3  4.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in November 2004.
Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Luxembourg.
Table V.33
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Luxembourg
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Rise in the excise duty on diesel fuel (EUR 0.01 per litre)
• Increase from 12 % to 15 % in the VAT on car fuel and tobacco 
products.
According to the budget, these measures should yield  together about 
0.2 % of GDP.
Moreover, it was decided in November to raise contributions for 
healthcare in kind from 5.1 % to 5.4 % of gross compensations, which 
should also yield about 0.2 % of GDP. 
• Encouragement of alternative sources of energy (0.1 % of GDP)
• Investments in railway infrastructure (0.1 % of GDP)
• It was also decided to reduce health expenditure by 0.1 % of GDP 
(with respect to its ‘spontaneous’ increase as previously projected)
• Pensions of the private sector were raised by 2 % in January 2005 
in order to follow the rise in real wages, which should lead to a 
0.2 % of GDP increase in pension expenditure. Such adaptations 
occur every two years.
Sources: Commission services and 2005 budget.281
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rather fast increase in output and employment, while
expenditure should rise by about 7 % as in 2005. The
deterioration in the government balance should thus
occur despite a significant acceleration in revenues and
a non-negligible slowdown in spending: for compari-
son, total government revenues rose by 4 to 5 % a year
from 2002 to 2004, while total government spending
increased by more than 8 % in 2003 and 2004. As a
result of these widening deficits, the public debt is
expected to rise to about 8 % of GDP in 2006.
Government spending in a medium-term perspective
In recent years, government finances have experienced
major changes in Luxembourg: the general government
surplus, which had been fluctuating around 2 or 3 % of
GDP since the early 1990s, rose sharply at the end of the
decade, reaching 6.2 % of GDP both in 2000 and 2001.
As indicated above, it then declined abruptly and turned
into a 1.1 % of GDP deficit in 2004, a 7.3 percentage
points of GDP deterioration in only three years. These
sharp fluctuations were related to the extremely high
volatility in GDP growth, which reached 9.0 % in 2000
and then abruptly slowed down to 1.5 % in 2001. How-
ever, as shown by Graph V.7, fluctuations in the govern-
ment balance in recent years were caused more by devel-
opments in expenditure than by changes in revenues, as
the buoyancy in revenues induced by the record growth
of the late 1990s was for a large part compensated by
important tax cuts The biggest decline in the revenues
ratio observed over the period occurred between 1996
and 2000, when the surplus was surging.
On the contrary, the expenditure ratio exhibited important
fluctuations throughout the period, partly — but not
exclusively — due to the volatility in real and nominal
GDP growth: as shown by Graph V.7, government
expenditure in Luxembourg has gone through three differ-
ent phases since the beginning of the 1990s: from 1990 to
1996, the expenditure ratio fluctuated in a narrow margin
around 45 % of GDP, from 1996 to 2000 it fell by almost
7 percentage points of GDP and since 2000 it has been
increasing again, coming back to similar levels as in the
period 1990–96. During the first phase, only social trans-
fers, especially transfers in cash, rose significantly in rela-
tive terms, increasing by 2.4 percentage points of GDP
from 1990 to 1996. During the same period, all the other
main categories of public expenditure hardly rose by more
than 0.2 or 0.3 percentage points of GDP and even often
declined in relative terms.
Graph V.7:  General government expenditure and revenues, 1990–2004 (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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declined sharply in relative terms, with the exception of
the residual item ‘other current expenditure’. Overall,
general government expenditure fell by 6.9 percentage
points of GDP in four years, of which 5.7 percentage
points of GDP were accounted for by current expendi-
ture. This sharp fall did not result from spending cuts,
since the rise in government spending was only slightly
slower than during the previous years, but from a
‘denominator effect’: the main factor behind this strong
fall in the expenditure ratio was the record real and nom-
inal GDP growth of the late 1990s (1).
The reverse happened from 2000 to 2004: in four years,
general government total expenditure rose by 7.5 per-
centage points and current expenditure by 5.5 percent-
age points of GDP. The sudden slowdown in real and
nominal GDP growth played a major role in this evolu-
tion. However, there was an additional factor: as shown
in Table V.34, the rise in all categories of government
expenditure, with the sole exceptions of the interest pay-
ments and the item ‘other current expenditure’, acceler-
ated with respect to the period 1996–2000. This acceler-
ation was especially marked for social transfers (9.5 % a
year on average as against 6.6 % for social transfers in
kind and 8.6 % instead of 6.4 % for transfers other than
in kind) and for capital expenditure (12.0 % as against
5.5 % for government investment and 21.2 % instead of
4.9 % for other capital expenditure).
It is often argued that the fast rise in public spending in
Luxembourg in recent years is due to the very high and
rapidly increasing investment by the government. This is
only part of the explanation: capital expenditure explains
2.0 and current expenditure 5.5 of the 7.5 percentage
points of GDP increase in total government spending
from 2000 to 2004. Over the same period, social trans-
fers (both in kind and in cash) rose by 3.9 percentage
points of GDP, which means that they contributed nearly
twice as much as capital expenditure to the global
increase in government spending. They also accounted
for about three quarters of the rise in current government
expenditure. The rise in unemployment (the Eurostat
harmonised unemployment rate rose from 2.0 % in the
spring of 2001 to 4.4 % in the latest months) resulting
from the economic slowdown played a role in this
increase in social transfers but this role was limited as
total government expenditure related to unemployment
only rose from 1.0 % of GDP in 2000 to 1.2 % in 2004.
A much more important factor was some discretionary
measures taken in the early years of the century, such as
the creation of the dependency insurance (2) or the major
rise in pensions decided in 2002 and known as the Rent-
endësch (altogether with a large increase in family
allowances), which, according to some estimates,
increased pension expenditure by about 10 %.
The situation of Luxembourg’s public finances is cer-
tainly not bad: public debt remains extremely low
despite its recent upward revision and assets held by the
general government amount to about 50 % of GDP,
according to most estimates. However, the experience of
recent years shows that a sharp deterioration in the gov-
ernment balance can occur quite rapidly in periods of
slower growth (and despite the fact that, during the
recent slowdown, growth has remained significantly
more robust in Luxembourg than in neighbouring coun-
tries). This requires some restraint in spending in the
years to come, in order to ensure that government
expenditure remains in line with revenues and that suffi-
cient security margins may be kept to cope with a possi-
ble slowdown in growth in the medium term and with the
burden that the ageing population will inevitably impose
on public finances.
¥1∂ The annual growth rates in real GDP recorded from 1997 to 2000 ranged
from 6.9 % in 1998 to 9.0 % in 2000 and the rate of increase in nominal
GDP varied from 9.8 % in 1998 to 13.6 % in 2000. ¥2∂ It was created in 1998 but only progressively resulted in large outlays.283
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 5Table V.34
Main categories of government expenditure 1990–2004, Luxembourg
 Levels 
(% of GDP)
 Differences 
(% of GDP)
 Average annual growth 
rates (%)
  1996  2000  2004  1996–2000  2000–04  1996–2000  2000–04
1. Total government consumption
(1)  = (2) + (3) 18.9 15.7 18.2
 
– 3.2 + 2.5 6.2 8.6
1a. Of which: compensation of employees  9.7  7.8  8.6  – 1.9  + 0.8  5.4  7.4
2. Collective consumption  8.0  6.5  7.2  – 1.5  + 0.7  5.7  7.4
3. Social transfers in kind  10.9  9.2  11.0  – 1.7  + 1.8  6.6  9.5
4. Social transfers other than in kind  16.2  13.6  15.7  – 2.6  + 2.1  6.4  8.6
5. Total social transfers 
(5) = (3) + (4) 27.1
 
22.8 26.7 – 4.3 + 3.9 6.5 9.0
6. Interest payments  0.5  0.3  0.2  – 0.2  – 0.1  0.8  – 3.3
7. Subsidies  2.0  1.6  1.7  – 0.5  + 0.1  4.1  6.7
8. Other current  expenditure  1.8  2.4  3.3  + 0.7  + 0.8  20.6  12.7
9. Current expenditure
(9)  = (1) + (4) + (6) + (7) + (8) 39.4 33.7 39.1 – 5.7 + 5.5 6.9 8.8
10. Gross fixed capital formation  4.7  3.8  5.0  – 0.9  + 1.2  5.5  12.0
11. Other capital expenditure (including 
capital transfers)
 1.3  1.0  1.9  – 0.3  + 0.8  4.9  21.2
12. Capital expenditure
(12)  = (10) + (11) 6.0 4.9 6.9 – 1.2 + 2.0 5.4 14.2
13. Total expenditure
(13)  = (9) + (12) 45.4 38.5 46.0
 
– 6.9 + 7.5 6.7 9.5
Pm Real GDP  —  —  —  —  —  8.0  2.8
Pm Nominal GDP  —  —  —  —  —  11.2  4.8
Source: Commission services.284
15. Hungary
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the March 2005 EDP notification, the gen-
eral government deficit was reduced by 1.7 percentage
points of GDP in 2004, reaching 4.5 % of GDP. This is
worse than the 3.6 % of GDP deficit target of the May
2004 convergence programme. It should be noted that
the 2004 deficit is significantly affected by an adjust-
ment in the recording of VAT revenue, increasing the
2003 deficit by 0.7 percentage points of GDP while
reducing the 2004 deficit accordingly, which may be
subject to further revision. The debt-to-GDP ratio
increased from 56.9 % of GDP in 2003 to 57.6 % of
GDP in 2004.
The 2005 budget was adopted by Parliament on
20 December 2004, targeting a deficit of 3.6 % of GDP.
The expenditure reduction would be mainly based on a
0.5 percentage point decline in the interest burden and a
1.7 percentage point reduction in public investment
expenditure (which would be largely compensated by an
increased recourse to PPP projects).
In light of the existing risks, notably a repeated short-
fall in VAT revenues as in 2004 and the uncertain
budgetary impact of the intended PPP projects, the
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects an
outcome of 3.9 % of GDP. This already takes into
account the 0.3 percentage points of GDP increase in
the ‘emergency’ reserve against a possible missing of
the 2005 target contained in the budget, and some lim-
ited additional revenues, which are expected to result
from the measures announced by the Hungarian gov-
ernment in March 2005.
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
the deficit to rise to 4.1 % of GDP in 2006, compared
with a target of 2.9 % in the December 2004 update of
the convergence programme (1). The difference is due to
the usual no-policy-change assumption underlying the
Commission services’ forecast. In particular, the
increase in public investment projected in the update is
not assumed to be compensated as the expenditure-sav-
ing effects of the measures contained in the 2005 budget
were not backed by sufficient reforms. The convergence
programme update plans a further deficit reduction in
2007 and 2008, to 2.2 % and 1.6 % of GDP respectively
(figures including the pension reform burden would be
3.4 and 2.8 % of GDP respectively).
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
the debt ratio to broadly stabilise in 2005–06, at around
58 % of GDP, rather than decline slightly, as targeted in
the updated convergence programme, which is explained
by the higher deficit forecasts in the spring forecast. 
¥1∂ Taking into account the revised pension reform burden as explained in the
second footnote to Table V.34.285
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Budgetary developments 2003–08, Hungary
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
General government balance (2)  – 6.2  – 4.5  – 3.9  – 4.1   
— Total revenues (2)  44.5  47.5  44.0  43.2   
Of which: — current taxes  25.5  26.0  25.2  25.5   
— social contributions (2)  135  13.6  13.6  13.4   
— Total expenditure  50.7  52.0  47.9  47.3   
Of which: — collective consumption  10.8  10.6  10.2  10.0   
— social transfers (3)  27.5  27.3  26.7  26.5   
— interest expenditure  4.2  4.3  3.8  3.4   
— gross fixed capital formation  3.4  3.5  2.3  3.1   
Primary balance (2)  – 2.2  – 0.2  0.0  – 0.7   
Government debt (2)  56.9  57.6  57.8  57.9   
Pm Real GDP (4)  3.0  4.0  3.9  3.8   
Convergence  programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
General government balance (2)  – 5.5  – 4.4  – 3.6  – 2.9  – 2.2  – 1.6
Primary balance (2)  – 1.6  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.6  1.0
Government debt (2)  57.0  56.7  55.5  53.0  50.6  48.3
Pm Real GDP (4)  3.0  3.9  4.0  4.2  4.3  4.6
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In line with the transition period granted by Eurostat for the implementation of its March 2004 decision on the classification of second-pillar pension funds, these
funds can be classified inside the general government sector until the March 2007 EDP notification. The figures indicated in this table take into account the decision
by the Hungarian authorities to avail themselves of this possibility. The official general government deficit figures and targets have therefore been reduced by the
estimated impact of the pension reform (as notified in March 2005) compared with the figures provided in the May convergence programme. According to the
March 2005 EDP notification, the budgetary effect for Hungary was of 0.9 % of GDP in 2003 and 2004 and on the debt of 2.2 % of GDP in 2003 and 3.1 % of GDP
in 2004. According to the Hungarian national sources, the effect in 2005 and 2006 is expected to be of 1.1 % of GDP in 2005 and 1.2 % of GDP p.a. for the period
until 2008.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in December 2004; the figures indicated as coming from the convergence programme have been adjusted by the change in the pension reform burden as
notified in March 2005.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Hungary.
Table V.36
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Hungary
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Changes in the tax and contribution system, mainly in the 
personal income tax system and in some smaller tax categories 
(impact on tax revenues: – 0.35 % of GDP); two thirds of the 
impact due to one-off effects (such as the disappearance of 
customs revenues after EU accession and the non-adjustment of 
some excise taxes)
• Revenues from the extension of expiring GSM licences
• Decrease in public investment expenditures (1.7 % of GDP)
• Expected decline in interest expenditures (0.5 % of GDP)
• A number of institutional changes to better control operational 
expenditure and the public sector wage bill
• The freeze of the level of unused appropriations at their end-2004 
level
• Increase in ‘emergency’ reserve (from 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points 
of GDP) against a possible departure from the 2005 target
  Source: Commission services.286
16.  Malta
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the March 2005 EDP notification, the gen-
eral government deficit for 2004 reached 5.2 % of GDP.
This is half the 2003 outcome (10.5 % of GDP) and con-
sistent with the deficit target set in both the May 2004
convergence programme and the updated version sub-
mitted on 7 December 2004. Part of the deficit reduction
in 2004 (3.2 percentage points of GDP) reflects a one-off
operation related to the restructuring of the shipyards in
2003. Another part is the result of the fiscal consolida-
tion measures undertaken in the budget (around 1.5 per-
centage points of GDP). The rest is due to higher tax col-
lection brought about by stronger economic growth. The
debt ratio in 2004 increased to 75 % of GDP, which is
above the 73.2 % estimated in the convergence pro-
gramme. The difference is explained by the upward revi-
sion of the 2003 general government deficit.
Parliament approved the 2005 budget in December
2004. The budget seems consistent with the commit-
ments spelled out in the convergence programme to cut
the budget deficit to below 4 % of GDP in 2005. The
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects the
deficit to fall to 3.9 % of GDP in 2005, compared with a
target of 3.7 %. The deficit reduction will be reached
through revenue-enhancing measures and expenditure
restraint. Only some of the revenue-enhancing measures
are permanent (adjustments in taxes and strengthening of
the fight against tax and benefit fraud) whilst others are
one-offs (other minor receipts). On the revenue side, the
measures announced in the budget are projected to lower
the deficit ratio for 2005 by 1.5 percentage points of
GDP. Expenditure cutbacks are expected from the
restructuring of public entities, limiting public sector hir-
ing and reducing administrative costs. The revenue and
expenditure ratios are foreseen to decline by 0.8 and
1.5 percentage points of GDP respectively. As a result,
the primary balance is expected to turn positive to 0.5 %
of GDP, from – 1.1 % of GDP in 2004. The major reve-
nue sources are current taxes, which are projected to
grow by 2.2 percentage points of GDP, and social secu-
rity contributions fuelled by gradually increasing job
creation, which increase by 0.3 percentage points of
GDP. However, the rise in taxes and social security
receipts is more than offset by the fall in other current
resources. On the expenditure side, while both social
transfers and collective consumption marginally decline,
gross fixed capital formation drops by 0.4 % of GDP, as
project implementation linked to the Italian protocol (1)
comes to an end. The bulk of the expenditure reduction
comes from other current and capital expenditures.
For 2006, based on a no-policy-change assumption, the
Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects a
further decrease in the general government deficit to
2.8 % of GDP. This is above the deficit target of 2.3 %
of GDP presented in the update of the convergence pro-
gramme. For 2007, the updated convergence programme
targets a further fall in the deficit to 1.4 % of GDP.
The spring 2005 forecast projects the general govern-
ment debt level for 2005 to increase to 76.4 % of GDP,
with a further increase to 77.1 % by 2006. These projec-
tions do not take into account possible stock-flow adjust-
ments produced by some privatisation operations fore-
seen by the government.
The reform of the pension system
In November 2004, the Maltese government presented
as a White Paper the report prepared by the Pensions
Working Group. The government aims at launching a
process of discussion and consultations among the social
partners leading to the reform of the Maltese pension
system. 
¥1∂ Cooperation agreement between Malta and Italy to finance works in Malta
on a grant basis.287
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currently threaten the future viability of the current sys-
tem: (i) demographic developments; (ii) inefficiencies in
the Maltese labour market; (iii) the financial constraints
caused by the inadequacy and lack of sustainability of the
existing scheme. The White Paper recommends changing
the current PAYG scheme to a three-pillar system. The
main principle is that health funding should be separated
from social security funding. The retirement age is gradu-
ally increased to 65 years of age for both men and women.
Table V.37
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Malta
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance  – 10.5  – 5.2  – 3.9  – 2.8  
 — Total revenues  40.5  49.0  48.8  48.6  
 Of which: — current taxes  25.6  27.2  29.4  29.3  
 — social contributions  8.3  8.3  8.6  8.7  
 — Total expenditure  50.9  54.1  52.6  51.4  
 Of which: — collective consumption  10.1  10.2  10.1  10.0  
 — social transfers (2)  24.4  24.5  24.3  23.5  
 — interest expenditure  3.8  4.1  4.3  4.3  
 — gross fixed capital formation  5.3  4.3  3.9  3.7  
 Primary balance  – 6.7  – 1.1  0.5  1.5  
 Pm Tax burden  32.5  35.7  38.1  37.8  
 Government debt  71.8  75.0  76.4  77.1  
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 1.8  1.5  1.7  1.9  
 Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  – 9.6  – 5.2  – 3.7  – 2.3  – 1.4
 Primary balance  – 6.0  – 1.4  0.3  1.6  2.4
 Government debt  72.0  73.2  72.0  70.5  70.4
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 1.7  0.6  1.5  1.8  2.2
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Malta.
Table V.38
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Malta
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Inherited real estate within a specified period will be able to 
adjust the declared value in order to reflect the change in the 
value of the real estate up to 25 November 2003
• Broadening of items subject to eco-contribution
• Introduction of excise duty and VAT on kerosene
• Doubling of passenger departure tax payable on outgoing air 
fares
• Introduction of excise duty on mobile telephony
• Strengthening the fight against tax and benefit fraud
• Restructuring of public entities
• Sale of government property in 2005
• Limiting public sector hiring and reducing administrative costs
 Sources: Commission services and updated convergence programme Malta.288
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minimum pension as a safety-net against poverty for
those individuals with short careers or very low earnings
during their working lives. Recipients of the first-pillar
pension would have their retirement pension indexed to
the retail price index. The contribution period should be
increased from 30 to 40 years, while the baseline for the
calculation of the pension should be changed from the
best consecutive three years from the last 10 years to the
average of the 40-year contribution accumulation his-
tory. The second pillar should also be mandatory but
introduced in a gradual manner, first on a voluntary basis
as from January 2006, to become mandatory by 2010,
subject to an assessment to determine whether the pre-
vailing conditions at that time require such a step. The
second pillar should be devoted to supplementing pen-
sion benefits received. The third pillar should also pro-
vide for voluntary individual retirement provisions and
should be introduced as from January 2006. The annual
contribution to this pillar up to a capped value should not
be taxed, while income tax on the basis of the individ-
ual’s rate of PAYE (pay as you earn) will be paid upon
maturity of the investment.
The demographic and economic projections modelled by
the World Bank compare a baseline scenario of no
change and a model scenario with the introduction of the
proposed changes. The base case shows a social security
deficit deterioration within a relatively short period of
time, while in the model scenario this deficit increases
steeply in the first 10 years, but less than in the base case,
due to the transfer of first-pillar contributions to the
health fund. However, under the proposed reform, the
social security deficit will decrease from 3 % of GDP to
2 % of GDP by 2025.
The implementation of the reform should also notably
smooth the deterioration in the benefits as a percentage
of the average wage, stabilising at 30 % of the average
wage by 2023 to improve gradually to 40 % of the aver-
age wage.
The White Paper draws a gradual and long-term scenario
for the implementation of the reform of the pension sys-
tem in order to make the transition to the new system
easier and to smooth the impact on individuals, employ-
ers and the economy as a whole. It is noted that the
reform must be managed in a gradual manner with struc-
tured periodic reviews to allow for the adoption of para-
metrical changes as and when appropriate. It is also per-
tinent to mention that the well-developed financial sector
in Malta paves the way for the risk diversification of pen-
sion assets generated for a funded pillar and, at the same
time, contributes to the expansion of the domestic finan-
cial market. The first measures to implement the reform
of the Maltese pension system are expected in the forth-
coming months.  289
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2 0 0 5Graph V.8:  Sustainability
Source: World Bank, October 2004.
Graph V.9:  Adequacy
Source: World Bank, October 2004.
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17. The Netherlands
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
According to the March 2005 EDP notification, the gen-
eral government deficit fell to 2.5 % of GDP in 2004.
This is a slightly higher deficit than the 2.3 % of GDP
foreseen in the October 2003 update of the stability pro-
gramme. The composition of the deficit in 2004 was dif-
ferent from what was anticipated in the 2004 budget. Tax
revenues were weaker, even though they recovered
sharply towards the end of 2004, but receipts from the
sale of natural gas were higher in the wake of rising oil
and gas prices.
Some expenditure overruns were largely offset by non-
recurrent lower public infrastructure investment and
lower payments to the EU. The debt ratio increased by
1.4 percentage points of GDP, to 55.7 % at the end of
2004.
The budget for 2005 was presented to Parliament on
21 September 2004, and adopted shortly afterwards with
some modifications that did not have an appreciable
impact on the main budgetary aggregates. The 2005
budget contains substantial increases in the tax burden
and expenditure cuts, aimed at further reducing the defi-
cit (see Table V.40). The 2005 budget targets a general
government deficit of 2.6 % of GDP in 2005. However,
the March 2005 EDP reporting expects a lower deficit of
2.1 % of GDP (1). The Commission services’ spring
2005 forecast also projects a lower deficit of 2.0 % of
GDP, mainly on account of the more favourable starting
position in 2004, higher receipts from the sale of natural
gas, and tax receipts picking up due to the gradual cycli-
cal upturn.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the fiscal stance as measured by the change in
the cyclically adjusted balance will tighten markedly.
The cyclically adjusted deficit is expected to fall from
1.2 % of GDP in 2004 to 0.4 % of GDP in 2005, in
response to fiscal tightening. The improvement in the
underlying budgetary position between 2004 and 2005 is
stronger than was calculated using the data in the 2004
stability programme update. On the basis of the latter,
the cyclically adjusted deficit would fall from 1.6 % of
GDP in 2004 to 1.2 % of GDP this year, in view of a
higher projected nominal deficit than in the Commission
services’ spring 2005 forecast, and a somewhat different
profile for the determinants of potential growth.
Public finances are expected to improve further in 2006.
This reflects the forecast economic upturn, as the fiscal
stance will be broadly neutral under the no-policy-
change assumption. The Commission services’ spring
forecast projects a deficit of 1.6 % of GDP in 2006,
which is lower than the target of 2.1 % of GDP set in the
November 2004 update of the stability programme. This
is mainly due to the differences in the starting points of
the projections (2). The stability programme update
projects the general government balance to marginally
improve further in 2007, to 1.9 % of GDP.
According to the spring 2005 forecast, the debt ratio will
rise further in 2005 and 2006, to 57.6 and 57.9 % of GDP
respectively. This is due to the still significant nominal
deficit, fairly weak nominal GDP growth, and, in 2005,
to the purchase of gas transport infrastructure equivalent
to 0.6 % of GDP, an operation which is not reflected in
the deficit.  
¥1∂ See http://www.minfin.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MFCWDEF1AE0AD
B8604FACA9E090D8745D48C1X2X59419X91.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.291
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The Dutch tax system allows for the deduction or
exemption of certain items from taxable income. The tax
reform of 2001 considerably reduced the number of
exemptions, which was compensated by lowering the
social security contribution and income tax rates. How-
ever, the two most important tax-deductible or tax-
exempt items which were already in place before the
2001 tax reform still remain in place. They are pension
premiums paid into the private pension system (tax
exemption applies to both employers and employees for
their respective payments, up to a certain limit, but pen-
Table V.39
Budgetary developments 2003–07, the Netherlands
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  – 3.2  – 2.3  – 2.0  – 1.6   
 — Total revenues  45.8  45.5  45.8  47.6   
 Of which: — current taxes  23.9  24.1  24.5  24.5   
— social contributions  15.5  15.1  15.0  16.9   
 — Total expenditure  48.9  48.0  47.9  49.2   
 Of which: — collective consumption  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4   
 — social transfers (2)  26.2  25.8  25.8  27.6   
 — interest expenditure  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.8   
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.4   
 Primary balance  – 0.3  0.4  0.8  1.2   
 Pm Tax burden  39.3  39.6  39.8  41.7   
 Government debt  54.3  55.7  57.6  57.9   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 2.0  – 1.2  – 0.4  – 0.0   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  0.9  1.7  2.5  2.8   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  367.1  372.0  375.6  383.0   
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  – 3.2  – 3.0  – 2.6  – 2.1  – 1.9
 Primary balance  – 0.3  – 0.1  0.3  0.7  0.8
 Government debt  54.1  56.3  58.1  58.6  58.3
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 0.9  1.25  1.5  2.5  2.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in November 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of the Netherlands.
Table V.40
Main measures in the budget for 2005, the Netherlands
Revenue measures (increases of 0.2 % of GDP)  Expenditure measures (savings of 0.3 % of GDP)
• Increase in the tax rate for the two lowest brackets of income tax
• Higher disability insurance premiums
• Increases in public health insurance premiums
• New obligation to pay corporate taxes for two independent public 
sector agencies
• Reduction in unemployment benefits
• Wage freeze for civil servants
• Introduction of own risk in public health insurance
• Phasing-out of subsidies on low-paid labour
• Reductions in expenditure of ministries
 Sources: Commission services and 2005 budget.292
P a r t  V
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t ssions paid are taxed on retirement) and payments of
mortgage interest for the first house owned and occupied
by the taxpayers (without an upper limit). Since the early
1990s, the combined value of tax-deductible and tax-
exempt items in household income has been on an
upward trend. This has led to a considerable narrowing
of the tax base, as summarised in Table V.41 (1). In 2003,
the estimated total loss in revenue on account of these
two items amounted to more than 4 % of GDP, with the
tax exemption of pension premiums accounting for the
largest share. To put the figures in the table in perspec-
tive: in 1991, the estimated revenue loss was equivalent
to slightly over 11 % of total receipts from taxes on
income from employment and social security premiums.
By 1996, this share had increased to 16.5 % and, by
2003, it had reached 19.1 %. Hence, the fiscal treatment
of private pension premiums and mortgage interest in the
Netherlands has led to a significant narrowing of the
income tax base. That said, there is a clear ratio for the
tax exemption of pension premiums: since pension pay-
ments are taxed, this adds to the stability of tax revenue
in an ageing society.
The amount of tax-exempt private pension premiums
paid has been influenced by events in global financial
markets. The fall in financial asset prices depleted the
financial buffers of private pension funds managing
mandatory pension savings in the so-called second pillar
of the pension system (the public pension system is the
first pillar; the third pillar consists of non-obligatory
pension savings made by individuals, which, up to a cer-
tain threshold, may also be tax exempt if the people con-
cerned can prove that they lack a full pension build-up
under the other two pillars). The value of assets managed
by pension funds fell from 114.2 % of GDP in 2001 to
98.7 % of GDP in 2003. This made it necessary for pen-
sion funds to raise their premiums, translating into fur-
ther shortfalls in income tax receipts. In addition, the fall
in financial buffers affected public finances in a more
direct way. Net pension premiums paid by the govern-
ment to the public sector pension fund (ABP) increased
from 0.5 % of GDP in 2001 to 0.7 % of GDP in 2003.
However, the effect of restoring financial buffers should
be temporary and contribution rates might decrease
again as financial markets recover.
Tax-deductible mortgage interest payments have grown
particularly rapidly since the mid-1990s, in line with ris-
ing house prices, falling interest rates and the consequent
ongoing rapid growth of mortgage credit to households.
Another important upward impact has been the spread of
mortgage products where no amortisation is paid during
the period of the loan, only interest. These mortgage
forms have become increasingly popular since the mid-
1990s, and were developed by banks in order to let tax-
payers benefit as much as possible from the tax deduc-
tion. In 2003, the total mortgage debt of Dutch house-
holds reached around 86 % of GDP. As an illustration,
the tax deductions due to net mortgage interest (after
allowing for the taxes levied on imputed income from
¥1∂ Note that the table shows net deductions of mortgage interest. This means
that the (taxed) imputed income from owner-occupied housing, which is
higher than in most EU Member States and which to some extent offsets
the tax deductibility of mortgage interest, has been deducted.
Table V.41
Deductions of mortgage interest and exemption of pension premiums, the Netherlands
(% of GDP)
 1991–96  1997–2001  2002  2003  2004
 Deduction of mortgage interest  2.2  3.2  3.5  3.7  3.8
 Deduction of pension premiums  6.9  6.9  6.8  7.3  n.a.
 Estimated loss in revenue:      
 — due to mortgage interest  0.8  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.3
 — due to deduction of pension premiums  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.9  n.a.
 Total estimated loss in revenue  3.6  3.9  4.0  4.2  n.a.
 Yearly loss in revenue due to narrowing of the base  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  n.a.
 NB: Due to the denominator effect, cumulated yearly losses in revenue do not add up to the change in the total.
 Sources: CPB, CBS, Netherlands Ministry of Finance and own estimates. Figures may not add up due to rounding.293
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GDP, and can be viewed as a kind of implicit interest
paid by the government on behalf of house owners with
a mortgage debt. Especially middle- and higher-income
groups benefit from the deductibility of mortgage inter-
est, as there is no upper limit to the amount that can be
deducted and as marginal rates are highest in the higher
tax brackets.
The upward trend in the deduction of mortgage interest
has been mitigated, but not halted, by several govern-
ment measures taken since the late 1990s to limit deduct-
ibility. Under the new, more stringent, rules a mortgage
on a second house is no longer deductible. Furthermore,
taxpayers now have to prove that the mortgage is indeed
used for the purchase and/or improvement of their own
house, while capital gains on selling a house have to be
deducted from the amount that can be financed with a
tax-favoured mortgage. The high mortgage debt of
Dutch households has raised concerns about their finan-
cial position should interest rates rise in the future. How-
ever, since most Dutch households still finance their
mortgages against fixed long-term interest rates, the
impact of higher interest rates would be spread over time
and relatively limited.
The progressive ageing of the Dutch population in the
next few decades will put increasing pressure on the sus-
tainability of public finances. With ageing, the ratio of
economically active to inactive persons will worsen con-
siderably. Under current arrangements, no pension con-
tributions for the first (public) pillar of the pension sys-
tem (equivalent to an earmarked income tax) are levied
on the income of those who are 65 or more. In other
words, the marginal tax rate that people over 65 have to
pay in the first bracket of income is relatively low, not
only on their pension income, but also on other sources
of income. This will be a substantial financing burden
for the public part of the pension system as ageing
progresses. This risks putting upward pressure on the tax
rates charged to the population of working age (as a pos-
sible shortfall in first-pillar pension premiums has to be
supplemented from general resources), which could be
detrimental to labour supply and economic activity.
Admittedly, though, the situation in the Netherlands in
this respect may be considered more favourable than in
some other Member States where demographic trends
are more adverse. Moreover, the Dutch pension system
does not depend only on the public (first) pillar, the so-
called AOW, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis. Substantial second- and third-pillar-funded pen-
sion schemes exist with sizeable financial assets built up
over the last decades. Furthermore, pension income from
the second and third (private and funded) pillars of the
pension system is taxed just like other sources of
income. Marginal and average rates paid by those over
65 will be lower, since they do not have to pay AOW
contributions. Hence, the sharp rise in the number of
pensioners will also lead to the delayed taxation of the
pension premiums deducted over the working lives of
the people receiving them.
Several policies can be pursued to ensure the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. Among them are measures to
increase labour participation and enhance productivity
growth. As regards fiscal policy, the achievement and
maintenance of a sound fiscal position and lowering the
public debt are very important. Broadening the tax base
(or avoiding a further erosion) helps achieve this aim.
In this respect, stemming the marked increase in tax-
deductible mortgage interest payments — or even
reversing it — may be a promising avenue to explore.
This may mean abolishing entirely the tax deductibility
of mortgage interest payments, or, alternatively, limiting
the maximal deductible amount. This can be defended on
the grounds that the tax exemption for mortgage interest
payments is inefficient and arguably leads to the diver-
sion of capital from more productive uses. In any case, it
may be advisable to opt for a gradual transition, in order
to dampen large negative shocks to disposable income
for many households and to avoid disruption in the hous-
ing market. The latter may have serious macroeconomic
consequences in view of the sharp rises in house prices
in recent years and the associated increase in the ratio of
mortgage debt to disposable income of Dutch house-
holds. This suggests that private consumption and eco-
nomic activity in the Netherlands have become increas-
ingly sensitive to changes in net household wealth.
As regards pensions, one may consider limiting the tax
deductibility of private pension premiums. However,
on closer inspection, this may not be advisable. As said
above, the present system for the treatment of pension
savings has more desirable properties than the tax
deductions of mortgage interest. Since the premiums
paid are not taxed, but future pension income from the
second and third pillars is, albeit at a lower average
rate, the mechanism helps to spread tax revenue over
time, thus mitigating the adverse effect of ageing on
Dutch public finances. Nevertheless, under current
arrangements, there remains a negative impact of the294
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future rise in public expenditure on first-pillar pen-
sions. This may be partly compensated by levying
AOW contributions (used to finance the first, public,
pillar of the pension system) on sources of income of
people over 65 years of age other than their public pen-
sion. The ensuing broadening of the tax base would
allow marginal tax rates to be lowered in the lowest
brackets of income tax. Such a reduction in the mar-
ginal tax wedge could be positive for labour participa-
tion, and will also help limit the impact on the purchas-
ing power of elderly people who have a relatively low
pension income. Again, it seems advisable to phase this
in gradually over an extended transition period, allow-
ing future pensioners to build up additional pension
rights and thus mitigate negative income effects.295
18.  Austria
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The 2003 update of the stability programme targeted a
general government deficit of 0.7 % of GDP for 2004.
It was missed by a considerable margin as the 2004 gen-
eral government deficit turned out to be 1.3 % of
GDP (1) in spite of the fact that the update had already
taken into account the carrying-forward of parts of the
2005 tax reform.
The deviation by 0.6 percentage points cannot be attrib-
uted to negative surprises in GDP growth. Part of it can
be explained by the fact that the profit of the central bank
turned out to be 0.1 % of GDP lower than in the budget-
ary plans. However, the slippage mainly stems from the
expenditure side. A major factor for this was the addi-
tional investment premium (Investitionszuwachs-
prämie). This fiscal benefit was taken up by businesses
to a much larger extent than expected by the authorities,
resulting in additional expenditure of about ä % of
GDP. In addition, expenditure targets were missed
across all levels of government. At 65.2 % of GDP, the
public debt ratio was 0.2 percentage points lower in
2004 than in the previous year (2).
The budget for 2005 was adopted on 17 November 2004.
The main measure consists of the implementation of the
second stage of the 2004/05 tax reform. According to the
2004 update of the stability programme, the general gov-
ernment deficit will amount to 1.9 % of GDP in 2005.
This is in line with the Commission services’ spring
2005 forecast. In the same forecast, the Commission
services upheld their last autumn’s prediction that the
cyclically adjusted general government deficit would
amount to 1.9 % of GDP in 2005 (up from an estimated
1.1 % of GDP in 2004).
Assuming no change in policy, the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2005 forecast sees the general government
deficit falling by a ä percentage point to 1.7 % of GDP
in 2006. This is in line with the target presented in the
update of the stability programme submitted by the Aus-
trian authorities on 30 November 2004 (3). The update
also foresees the deficit at 0.8 % of GDP in 2007 and a
balanced budget in 2008. However, it does not specify
how this consolidation is to be achieved.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall to 64.4 and
64.1 % of GDP in 2005 and 2006 respectively.
The national stability pact
The three layers of government in Austria coordinate
their medium-term budgetary plans in the Revenue Shar-
ing Act (Finanzausgleich), usually for a period of four
years, which allocates the revenues to territorial authori-
ties. The 1999 national stability pact (NSP) set up an
enforcement mechanism on how the general government
deficit was to be allocated to the different levels of gov-
ernment. A more detailed NSP was passed for the period
2001–04, temporarily suspending the 1999 NSP.
This 2001 NSP foresaw a consolidation path leading to a
balanced budget of general government in 2002–04, for
which deficit targets (so-called ‘stability contributions’)
are allocated to the federal, state and local levels of gov-
ernment, flanked by a sanctioning mechanism. 
¥1∂ According to the data received from the Austrian statistical office after the
publication of the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, the 2004
deficit was slightly lower due to unexpectedly high VAT receipts in Febru-
ary 2005 attributed still to the year 2004. 
¥2∂ Note that this does not include the recalculation of ‘financial intermedia-
tion services indirectly measured’ (FISIM) in the GDP.
¥3∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.296
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NSP. The column ‘NSP target’ lists the budget balance
targets in per cent of GDP given in the 2001 NSP. ‘Out-
come (unadj.)’ shows the ex post budgetary outcome
according to the updates of the stability programme.
However, this is subject to two adjustments before com-
pliance with the NSP target is assessed. First, the NSP is
fixed in terms of ESA 95 as of October 2000, which does
Table V.42
Budgetary developments 2003–08, Austria
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  – 1.1  – 1.3  – 2.0  – 1.7   
 — Total revenues  50.0  49.4  48.1  47.4   
Of which: — current taxes  28.3  28.0  26.9  26.4   
 — social contributions  16.5  16.4  16.4  16.3   
 — Total expenditure  51.2  50.7  50.1  49.2   
 Of which: — collective consumption  7.2  7.0  6.9  6.8   
 — social transfers (2)  29.9  29.9  29.7  29.4   
 — interest expenditure  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.8   
 — gross fixed capital formation  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1   
 Primary balance  2.0  1.7  0.9  1.1   
 Pm Tax burden  43.5  43.2  42.1  41.6   
 Government debt  65.4  65.2  64.4  64.1   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 0.8  – 1.1  – 1.9  – 1.6   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  2.3  1.9  1.1  1.2   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  0.8  2.0  2.1  2.1   
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
 General government balance  – 1.1  – 1.3  – 1.9  – 1.7  – 0.8  0.0
 Primary balance  – 2.1  1.9  1.2  1.3  2.2  2.9
 Government debt  64.5  64.2  63.6  63.1  61.6  59.1
 Pm Real GDP (3)  0..8  1.9  2.5  2.5  2.2  2.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in November 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Austria.
Table V.43
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Austria
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
 • The 2004/05 tax reform (– 0.8 % of GDP). The reform’s second 
stage in force since 1 January 2005 foresees: the personal income 
tax schedule reduced to four brackets, including a zero tax bracket 
up to an income of EUR 10 000; the corporate tax rate reduced 
from 34 % to 25 %; and, in addition, tax rules for holdings 
(domestic and foreign) simplified.
• Healthcare reform (0.1 % of GDP); increase in the contribution 
rate and increase in the tobacco tax
• Savings in expenditure due to administrative reforms in the 
healthcare system (0.1 % of GDP)
 Sources: Commission services and Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance.297
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that property sales are not considered as deficit reducing.
Second, revised deficit targets can be negotiated
between the governments in the case of an exceptional
burden, in particular revenue shortfalls and expenditure
increases due to a severe economic slowdown. These
exceptional circumstances are not specified more pre-
cisely in the NSP. The column ‘Outcome adj.’ shows the
budgetary outcome adjusted in such a way, according to
the Austrian authorities.
The federal budget for 2003 may be illustrative. The
NSP targeted the deficit at 0.75 % of GDP. The deficit
according to the 2004 update of the stability programme
amounted to 1.7 % of GDP. Thus, the difference
between the federal deficit reported in the stability pro-
gramme update and the NSP target equalled 0.95 per-
centage points. The actual deficit was adjusted down to
1.4 % of GDP by property sales, which are not consid-
ered as deficit reducing by a Eurostat decision taken only
after October 2000, and by exceptional expenditure
related to the floods of 2002.
The difference between the target of 0.75 % and the
adjusted outcome now implies a shortfall from the NSP
target of 0.65 percentage points.
However, the NSP foresees a further margin of toler-
ance. For the federal level, an (approximately) 0.25 per-
centage point deviation from a given year’s target is
acceptable and may be offset in future years. Thus, after
the acceptable tolerance for 2003 the shortfall from the
target is reduced to 0.4 percentage points. The notes
accompanying the NSP law seem to rule out that a budg-
etary performance better than the target can be carried
over to future years (1).
Thus, it may be the case that for 2003 the federal level
might have exceeded the tolerable deficit by the 0.4 per-
centage points calculated above. A coordination com-
mittee between the different levels of government mon-
itors compliance and would, if necessary, ask the Court
of Auditors to establish a violation. Following a (non-
public) report by the latter, a mediation committee would
need to decide unanimously by February in the second
year after the violation whether sanctions are due. The
committee consists of two representatives of the federal
government and two representatives of Länder/local
governments. The latter cannot come from the state or
commune that failed to comply with the pact. The NSP
fixes the amount of the sanction, which takes the form of
an interest-bearing deposit. If in the following year the
respective target is not reached, the deposit is transferred
to those governments in compliance, and reimbursed
otherwise. However, the NSP does not foresee publicity
of procedures and the 2004 report of the Court of Audi-
tors is silent on the compliance.
¥1∂ ‘829 der Beilagen XXI. GP, Materialien — Regierungsvorlage Stabilität-
spakt 2001–2004’, available at www.parlament.gov.at. Matzinger, A.,
‘Finanzausgleich’, in Steger, G. (ed.), Öffentliche Haushalte in Österreich,
Vienna, 2002, pp. 51–94. Diebalek, L., W. Köhler-Töglhofer and D. Pram-
mer, ‘The Austrian internal stability pact — its effectiveness revisited’,
preliminary paper presented at the Workshop on Fiscal Rules, Madeira, 9
and 10 December 2004.
Table V.44
National stability pact 2001–04, budgetary targets and results, Austria
(% of GDP)
 2001  2002 2003 2004
 NSP       outcome NSP       outcome  NSP       outcome NSP       outcome
 Level  target  adj.  (unadj.)  target  adj.  (unadj.)  target  adj.  (unadj.)  target  (unadj.)
 General government  – 1.3  0.7  (0.3)  0.0  0.4  (– 0.2)  0.0  – 0.6  (– 1.1)  0.0  (– 1.3)
 Federal  – 2.05  – 0.2  (– 0.5)  – 0.75  – 0.5  (– 0.9)  – 0.75  – 1.4  (– 1.7)  – 0.75  (– 1.7)
 Lower  0.78  0.9  (0.8)  0.76  0.9  (– 0.7)  0.75  0.8  (– 0.6)  0.75  (– 0.4)
 Social security  n.a.  n.a.  (0.0)  n.a.  n.a.  (0.0)  n.a.  n.a.  (0.0)  n.a.  (0.0)
  NB: Explanation in the text. Figures may not add up due to rounding.
 Source: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on data by Statistics Austria.298
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stood by the federal and state levels as that the required
stability contribution should be respected only on aver-
age over the pact’s duration. The average of the federal
targets (columns ‘NSP target’) for the four years
amounts to 1.1 % of GDP. The average of the adjusted
outcomes from 2001 to 2004 (columns ‘Outcome adj.’
2001–03 and ‘Outcome (unadj.)’ for 2004) equals
0.95 % of GDP, which would imply that, on average,
the targets would have been met. In effect, this calcula-
tion implies that the better-than-required adjusted out-
come in 2001 would ensure compliance, even though
the federal deficit in all subsequent years exceeded the
NSP target.
The 2005 NSP concluded for the years 2005–08, which
is the baseline for the 2004 update of the stability pro-
gramme, very much resembles the 2001 NSP. For 2005
and 2006, only the ESA accounting rules as of October
2000 continue to be applicable. However, the 2005 NSP
does not foresee a tolerance margin for exceeding the
deficit target by 0.25 % of GDP for the years 2005 and
2006, but only for 2007 and 2008. The recent update of
the stability programme takes the targets of the 2005
NSP at face value. In particular, the 2005 NSP targets the
general government budgetary position to be balanced
by 2008. However, given the room for manoeuvre that
the NSP seems to offer, substantial deviations may be
possible before the NSP becomes binding.
In conclusion, the NSP is a useful tool aimed at involv-
ing all levels of government in the consolidation of pub-
lic finances. In providing for legally enshrined budgetary
commitments across various government levels, Austria
may serve as a benchmark in the EU. However, there is
still room for improvement in terms of clarity of the NSP
rules and transparency of the procedures accompanying
it. Moreover, it still remains to be seen how enforceable
the pact is, once there is a case where the sanction mech-
anism needs to be activated.299
19. Poland
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
At 4.8 % of GDP, the general government deficit in 2004
was considerably lower than targeted in the 2004 budget
(5.7 % of GDP). The downward revision of the deficit
resulted mainly from a better-than-expected perform-
ance by the social security subsector. A better-than-
expected position of the central government due to
higher revenue from corporate income tax also contrib-
uted to the positive outcome. The level of the debt ratio
in 2004 at 43.6 % of GDP was considerably lower than
expected in the May 2004 convergence programme
(49 % of GDP). The better outcome was due to stronger-
than-expected nominal GDP growth, favourable valua-
tion effects following the appreciation of the zloty and
higher-than-expected privatisation proceeds.
The most recent update of the convergence programme,
submitted on 1 December 2004, foresees a general gov-
ernment deficit of 3.9 % of GDP in 2005 compared with
4.2 % in the May 2004 convergence programme. The
budget law for 2005, approved by Parliament on
22 December 2004, confirms the target.
The budget does not contain significant tax changes,
apart from an increase in excise taxes. It incorporates not
only the savings measures from the public finance
reform package (the so-called Hausner plan) which have
been endorsed by Parliament, but also those that are still
being discussed. All these measures taken together have
an estimated total impact of 1.2 % of GDP in 2005. The
2005 budget does not specify or quantify the other
sources of revenue that should result from the implemen-
tation of the ‘widening of the taxation base’ announced
in the convergence programme with an expected yield of
0.35 % of GDP.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecasts, the general government deficit is projected to
decrease from 4.8 % of GDP in 2004 to 4.4 % in 2005
and 3.8 % in 2006 compared with respectively 3.9 and
3.2 % of GDP in the updated convergence programme.
The forecast takes into account the information on the
implementation of the public finance reform package
provided in the updated programme. Based on the no-
policy-change assumption, it includes, however, only the
measures that have been approved by Parliament (esti-
mated budgetary impact of approximately 0.75 % of
GDP in 2005 and 0.6 % in 2006). The updated pro-
gramme foresees a reduction in the deficit to 2.2 % of
GDP in 2007. The deficit figures in both the Commis-
sion services’ forecast and the updated convergence pro-
gramme still include the surplus of the second-pillar
funded pension funds, which is estimated at around 2 %
of GDP annually in the period 2004–06, within the gen-
eral government sector.
From 43.6 % of GDP in 2004, the debt-to-GDP ratio
would increase to 46.8 % in 2005 and reach 47.6 % in
2006. The Polish debt figures will have to be adjusted
upwards by between 3 and 6 percentage points in the
period 2003–06 to reflect the March 2004 Eurostat deci-
sion on the classification of the second-pillar pension
funds, which needs to be implemented by March 2007.
High share of non-flexible expenditure in the budget 
and the response of the authorities
One of the challenges for Poland’s public finances is the
relatively high share of fixed expenditure, of which
legally determined expenditure constitutes a major part.
This rigidity hampers the increase of investment outlays
and earmarking money for co-financing structural funds.
It also prevents the authorities from decreasing more
quickly the tax burden on labour. The high deficit of the
Social Insurance Fund (FUS) is a barrier for the decrease
of the tax wedge. Eventually, the high share of fixed
expenditure makes it more difficult to ensure a sustain-
able reduction in the general government deficit under
the constraint of continuous pressure from ongoing and
foreseen structural reforms and EU-related spending. 300
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Budgetary developments 2003–07, Poland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance (2)  – 4.5  – 4.8  – 4.4  – 3.8  
 — Total revenues  44.3  43.8  44.2  44.2  
   Of which: — current taxes  22.3  22.1  22.3  22.5  
 — social contributions  14.1  13.1  12.9  12.7  
— Total expenditure  48.8  48.7  48.6  48.0  
 Of which: — collective consumption  9.1  8.8  8.5  8.3  
 — social transfers (3)  26.1  25.9  25.3  24.6  
 — interest expenditure  2.9  2.6  2.6  2.5  
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.4  3.4  4.2  4.7  
 Primary balance  – 1.6  – 2.2  – 1.9  – 1.3  
 Pm Tax burden  36.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
 Government debt  45.4  43.6  46.8  47.6  
 Pm Real GDP (4)  3.8  5.3  4.4  4.5  
 Convergence programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance (2)  – 3.9  – 5.4  – 3.9  – 3.2  – 2.2
 Primary balance  – 0.8  – 2.6  – 1.3  – 0.5  0.4
 Government debt (2)  45.4  45.9  47.6  48.0  47.3
 Pm Real GDP (4)  3.8  5.7  5.0  4.8  5.6
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In line with the transition period granted by Eurostat for the implementation of its March 2004 decision on the classification of second-pillar pension funds, these
funds can continue to be classified inside the general government sector until the March 2007 EDP notification. The budgetary effect on the deficit for Poland was,
according to the March 2005 EDP notification, of 1.7 % of GDP in 2003 and 2.0 % of GDP in 2004 and on the debt of 3.3 % of GDP in 2003 and 4.1 % of GDP in
2004. According to the Polish national sources, the effect on the deficit in 2005 and 2006 is expected to be of 1.9 % of GDP p.a. and on debt of 6 % of GDP p.a.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Poland.
Table V.46
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Poland
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
Approved by Parliament or not requiring legislative changes:
• Restructuring of State-owned enterprises (railways sector, coal 
mining) (0.1 % of GDP)
In the legislative process or rejected by Parliament:
• Change in the social security contributions of the self-employed 
(0.17 % of GDP)
• Reform of the farmers’ pension scheme (KRUS) (0.10 % of GDP)
Not specified in the budget law for 2005:
• Widening of the taxation base (0.35 % of GDP) (Hausner plan 
measure, mentioned in the May and December 2004 convergence 
programmes)
Approved by Parliament or not requiring legislative changes:
• Changes in pension indexation (0.42 % of GDP)
• Changes in defence financing (0.14 % of GDP)
• Changes in pre-retirement benefits (0.05 % of GDP)
• Reductions in administrative costs (0.05 % of GDP)
In the legislative process or rejected by Parliament:
• Some changes in the social security system (e.g. employment of 
the disabled) (0.13 % of GDP)
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Poland.301
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cusses the evolution of the structure of general govern-
ment expenditure: non-flexible expenditure is defined as
that resulting from legal provision or international agree-
ments, inter alia retirement and disability pensions,
unemployment benefits, housing allowances, contribu-
tion to the EU budget and debt servicing costs. Flexible
expenditure includes mainly salaries, expenditures on
purchases of goods and services and subsidies to compa-
nies outside the general government.
Still, before EU accession, the Polish authorities adopted
the ‘programme of rationalisation and reduction of pub-
lic spending’ (the so-called Hausner plan) designed to
tackle the need for public finance restructuring and to
ensure a fiscal consolidation in a sustainable manner. It
was also meant to contribute to broader discussions on
future economic policy and structural reforms in Poland
touching upon a rationalisation of public expenditure in
the fields of: (i) functioning of the State and its adminis-
tration; (ii) functioning of inefficient sectors in the econ-
omy — resulting from the consequences of the ongoing
restructuring in the mining, railways and health sectors;
and (iii) social policy — among which are entitlement
programmes including deindexation, raising the pension
age, and reforming the disability pension schemes and
the highly inefficient and costly farmers’ social security
system (KRUS).
If the Hausner plan were fully implemented, the share of
non-flexible expenditure in the general government
budget would decrease from 42.5 % in 2003 to 39.3 % in
2007. The modification of the indexation rule makes an
important contribution to this. Indexation is not likely to
take place every year, as was the case when retirement
benefits were linked to the average wage increase in the
economy, but only when the compounded inflation rate
exceeds 5 %. Still, an important number of measures
were rejected or blocked in Parliament.
The Ministry of Finance unveiled on 11 March 2005
the main ideas of a public finance management strategy
for 2005–08, which introduces complementary meas-
ures to the Hausner plan and includes measures affect-
ing the public finance management and reforming the
tax system.
The strategy aims at:
• an introduction of a tax system (flat rate of 18 % for
VAT and corporate and income tax) that would
stimulate growth and competitiveness of the Polish
economy and lead to a reduction in labour costs;
• a reform of the public finance management that
would improve its efficiency, increase the share of
non-legally determined (or flexible) expenditure and
allow a better absorption of the EU Structural Funds;
• meeting the 3 % deficit reference value in 2007. An
additional fiscal tightening comparable to that
described in the December 2004 convergence pro-
gramme would lead to a deficit of 2.8 % of GDP in
2007 with the second-pillar pension funds being
excluded from the general government sector.
The strategy implies a strengthening of the fiscal adjust-
ment beyond 2005 and constitutes a direct answer to the
Council opinion of 17 February 2005 on Poland’s 2004
December convergence programme (the updated pro-
gramme contained a 2007 deficit target of 2.2 % of GDP,
but with the second-pillar pension funds classified
within the general government sector) (1).
Table V.47
Share of non-flexible (legally determined) 
expenditure in the general government budget, 
Poland
 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 Non-flexible  42.5  40.7  40.7  39.1  39.3
 Flexible  57.5  59.3  59.3  60.9  60.7
 Source: Updated convergence programme, December 2004.
¥1∂ Not approved by the government, the strategy has not been taken into
account in the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecasts. 302
20.  Portugal
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government deficit for 2004 is estimated at
2.9 % of GDP (1). This figure is comparable to a target of
2.8 % of GDP set in the December 2003 update of the
stability programme. In 2004, a deficit below 3 % of
GDP was achieved through the one-off transfer to the
government of pension liabilities for the employees of
four State-owned enterprises in exchange for lump-sum
payments worth almost 2.3 % of GDP.
Therefore, the underlying deficit was 5.2 % of GDP in
2004, which compares with a target of 4 % in the budget
for 2004, with the divergence being caused by a slippage
on expenditure. In 2004, the public debt stood at 61.9 %
of GDP, which is above the 60 % target set in the
December 2003 update of the stability programme. The
deviation from the target is accounted for by an upward
revision of the 2003 debt outturn by 0.6 percentage
points of GDP and debt-increasing stock-flow adjust-
ments amounting to 0.9 percentage points of GDP,
against – 0.4 percentage points of GDP assumed in the
2003 update.
The budget for 2005 was presented to Parliament on
15 October and approved on 6 December 2004. The tar-
get for the 2005 general government deficit set therein is
2.8 % of GDP, which was confirmed in the December
2004 stability programme update. However, it remains
to be seen whether the new government, which took
office on 12 March, will: (i) stick to the targets and meas-
ures set by the former Cabinet, in particular on the envis-
aged implementation of revenue-raising one-off opera-
tions worth 1.4 % of GDP (2); and (ii) adopt new
measures with a significant budgetary impact. The Com-
mission services’ spring 2005 economic forecast
projects a deficit of 4.9 % of GDP. The difference with
the 2005 budget is due to three factors: first, the consid-
eration of lower revenues from one-off measures (just
0.3 % of GDP from a transfer of a pension fund to the
government sector); second, lower tax proceeds in the
context of significantly lower economic growth; third, a
less optimistic evaluation of expenditure developments,
in particular on social transfers. The cyclically adjusted
balance according to the Commission services’ spring
2005 economic forecast will widen to – 3.9 % of GDP.
This weakening is wholly attributed to the significantly
lower revenues from one-off operations, since the under-
lying cyclically adjusted position, i.e. excluding any of
those revenues in both years, is expected to remain
broadly constant (– 4.3 % of GDP in 2004 and – 4.2 %
in 2005). The new government is committed to submit-
ting a new update of its stability programme by the end
of May. This will very likely provide new information
on the Portuguese authorities’ intentions for 2005 (and
beyond) as regards budgetary targets and new policy
measures. The government is also considering the sub-
mission to Parliament of a corrective budget for 2005 by
early summer.
In 2006, the Commission services’ spring 2005 eco-
nomic forecast projects a deficit of 4.7 % of GDP on the
customary no-policy-change assumption and abstracting
from any one-off revenue-raising measures. This figure
compares with a target deficit of 2.5 % of GDP set in the
December 2004 update of the stability programme (3).
The stability programme update foresees a further reduc-
tion in the deficit in 2007 to 1.8 % of GDP. 
¥1∂ In releasing the data following the March 2004 EDP notification, Eurostat
added that there are ongoing discussions which may lead to a subsequent
revision of the data.
¥2∂ Three one-off measures were envisaged to raise those proceeds. The Com-
mission services were able to take on board one of them, worth 0.3 % of
GDP, in the Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecast; another
measure, with an expected revenue of 0.5 % of GDP, was considered by
Eurostat as a financial operation with no impact on the deficit, and, finally,
the third measure (0.6 % of GDP) was not announced with a sufficient
degree of detail to allow a proper assessment by the Commission services.
¥3∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.303
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Budgetary developments 2003–07, Portugal
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance  – 2.9  – 2.9  – 4.9  – 4.7  
 — Total revenues  44.8  45.5  43.2  43.2  
 Of which: — current taxes  24.9  24.4  24.1  24.2  
 — social contributions  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  
— Total expenditure  47.6  48.4  48.2  47.9  
 Of which: — collective consumption  8.6  8.4  8.4  8.3  
 — social transfers (2)  26.8  27.8  28.3  28.5  
 — interest expenditure  2.9  2.8  2.9  3.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.0  
 Primary balance  0.0  – 0.1  – 2.0  – 1.6  
 Pm Tax burden  37.1  36.7  36.4  36.5  
 Government debt  60.1  61.9  66.2  68.5  
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 2.2  – 2.1  – 3.9  – 3.7  
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  0.7  0.8  – 1.0  – 0.7  
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 1.1  1.0  1.1  1.7  
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  – 2.8  – 2.9  – 2.8  – 2.5  – 1.8
 Primary balance  – 0.1  – 0.1  – 0.1  – 0.6  – 1.3
 Government debt  —  62.0  63.1  62.7  61.4
 Pm Real GDP (3)  – 1.2  1.0  2.4  2.7  2.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Portugal.
Table V.49
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Portugal
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Cuts in personal tax rates for most income brackets by 0.5 to 
1.5 percentage points
• Elimination of tax subsidies on individual saving plans, which is 
expected to fully compensate for the abovementioned cuts in 
personal income tax rates
• Limit to the use of fiscal benefits by corporations with the setting 
of a minimum effective corporate tax rate at 60 % of the nominal 
tax rate of 25 %
• Transfer of a pension fund to the government sector (0.3 % 
of GDP)
• Reduction of public investment in real terms
 Sources: Commission services, 2005 budget and Portuguese Ministry of Finance.304
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nomic forecast, the debt ratio will continue to increase as
a consequence of the high government deficits, low
nominal GDP growth, and one-off debt-increasing
stock-flow adjustments as foreseen in the Portuguese
stability programme of last December and as confirmed
in the debt and deficit figures in the March 2005 EDP
notification. It is expected to reach 66.2 and 68.5 % of
GDP at the end of 2005 and 2006 respectively. Such a
trajectory for public debt is well above that projected in
the stability programme of Portugal of December 2004
on account of lower growth and higher deficit figures.305
21. Slovenia
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2004, the general government deficit fell slightly, to
1.9 % of GDP. Established within the new methodolog-
ical framework, including the two extra-budgetary funds
reclassified in the general government sector, the outturn
was higher than the initial target (1.6 % of GDP accord-
ing to the 2003 pre-accession programme). The national
authorities raised the deficit forecast to 2.1 % of GDP in
the middle of 2004, when the budget incurred a substan-
tial revenue shortfall linked to the loss in VAT resources,
following the dismantling of border controls after EU
accession. Moreover, taxes on labour came in lower than
budgeted due to the increase in the minimum threshold
for payment of payroll tax, adopted in July and effective
as of September.
Furthermore, in September, excise duties on fuel were
set at the lowest level permitted by the EU to buffer the
negative consequences of the oil price hike on infla-
tion (1). However, the revenue shortfall was contained by
the good economic performance — with the highest real
GDP growth rate in five years — coupled with a firm
determination to safeguard the deficit target. In October,
when the shortfall approached the limit set in the imple-
mentation bill to the 2004 budget, the government
refused claims for any further expenditure (2). At the end
of 2004, the gross general government debt accounted
for roughly 29.5 % of GDP.
The 2005 budget, adopted by Parliament in December
2003 (in accordance with Slovenia’s budgetary proce-
dure with a two-year planning horizon), is largely based
on revenue measures, improving tax administration and
reforming the direct tax regime. In 2004, new personal
and corporate income tax legislation was adopted, com-
ing into effect on 1 January 2005. The new personal
income tax regime was estimated to reduce government
revenues by 0.2 % of GDP in 2005. This was expected to
be compensated by an increase in corporate income tax.
On the expenditure side, the main measures concern
cost-effectiveness and flexibility while additional spend-
ing commitments related to EU membership were envis-
aged. The change in government following the October
2004 parliamentary elections prompted the decision to
amend the budget in line with the priorities of the centre-
right coalition, such as the intention to reduce further the
tax burden on wages while aiming to keep the fiscal tar-
gets unchanged. The March 2005 EDP notification
projects the deficit to remain at 1.9 % of GDP in 2005.
However, in the absence of corrective measures in a
pending supplementary budget, the Commission serv-
ices foresee that, taking into account the plans
announced by the new government, the deficit would
increase to 2.2 % of GDP.
In the medium term, the deficit is expected to decline
gradually as the positive net inflow from the EU budget
outweighs the negative fiscal effect of the direct tax
regime reform. Under a no-policy-change assumption,
the Commission services are, however, more cautious
than the national authorities as regards the budgetary
consolidation. At 2.1 % of GDP in 2006, the spring 2005
forecast sets the deficit slightly above 1.8 % of GDP as
projected in the first update of the convergence pro-
gramme, covering the period 2004–07, which was sub-
mitted in January 2005 (3). The programme anticipates a
considerable fiscal adjustment from 2006 onwards, nar-¥1∂ Adjustments in fuel excise duties are carried out every fortnight as a stand-
ard procedure to avoid inflation being excessively affected by world mar-
ket price fluctuations.
¥2∂ As stipulated in the implementation bill to the 2004 supplementary budget,
it was within the government’s discretion to reduce expenditure propor-
tionally — up to SIT 15 billion (0.25 % of GDP) — to a revenue shortfall
in the course of the year, without having to propose that the budget be
amended.
¥3∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.306
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by 2007.
The gross general government debt is expected to
increase further but will remain contained over the fore-
casting horizon. The Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast projects the debt ratio to rise gradually to 30.4 %
of GDP in 2006.
Budgetary procedure: the two-year planning horizon
In December 2001, Slovenia started adopting budgets for
two consecutive years simultaneously in an effort to drive
greater certainty into the planning of public finances, aim-
ing to enhance fiscal prudence. In the first stage, the gov-
ernment sets out the overall expenditure framework for
the next two years. Subsequently, it confirms the budget
appropriations within the agreed expenditure limits. The
Table V.50
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Slovenia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance  – 2.0  – 1.9  – 2.2  – 2.1  
 — Total revenues  46.2  45.8  45.4  45.1  
   Of which: — current taxes  25.2  25.2  24.8  24.5  
 — social contributions  15.2  14.8  14.5  14.2  
— Total expenditure  48.2  47.7  47.6  47.2  
 Of which: — collective consumption  8.4  8.2  8.1  8.1  
 — social transfers (2)  29.1  28.8  28.5  28.2  
 — interest expenditure  2.1  1.9  1.7  1.6  
 — gross fixed capital formation  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9  
 Primary balance  0.1  0.0  – 0.5  – 0.5  
 Pm Tax burden  40.1  39.8  39.0  38.5  
 Government debt  29.4  29.4  30.2  30.4  
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2.5  4.6  3.7  4.0  
 Convergence programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  – 2.0  – 2.1  – 2.1  – 1.8  – 1.1
 Primary balance  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.3  – 0.3
 Government debt  29.4  30.2  30.7  30.9  29.7
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2.5  4.0  3.8  3.9  4.0
 (1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
 (2) In kind and other than in kind.
 (3) Annual % change.
 (4) Submitted in January 2005.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Slovenia.
Table V.51
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Slovenia
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Further harmonisation of excise duties on tobacco with the acquis
• New personal income tax regime, introducing five tax brackets 
with rates ranging from 16 to 50 %, designed to disburden the 
lowest income classes
• New corporate income tax regime, broadening the tax base and 
eliminating loopholes in the legislation
• Containing the rise in public wages and social benefits
• Increasing the cost-effectiveness of the public administration 
(rationalisation of material costs)
 Source: Commission services.307
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rately and stipulated in the accompanying budget imple-
mentation bill. Included in the bill are the specific condi-
tions allowing the amendment of the budget as the
existing budgetary procedure does not maintain expendi-
ture ceilings fixed over the two-year horizon regardless of
the changing economic circumstances.
On the whole, budgetary targets have been relatively
well met. However, disappointing growth in 2002–03
led to budgets being revised in the middle of the year.
For 2003, the general government deficit was much
higher than initially planned. In order to limit the budg-
etary impact of adverse cyclical developments, the
implementation bill attached to the 2004 budget intro-
duced a novel measure. The government was given dis-
cretion to suspend new spending commitments in case of
a revenue shortfall within the limits set in the bill. A rev-
enue undershooting of up to SIT 15 billion (0.25 % of
GDP) due to unfavourable economic conditions was to
be compensated by a proportional reduction in expendi-
ture in the course of the year, without introducing a sup-
plementary budget. In case unfavourable macroeco-
nomic conditions persisted, an up to SIT 10 billion
(0.17 % of GDP) higher budget deficit was nevertheless
to be accepted at the end of the year. By invoking the
right to refuse claims for further expenditure as of Octo-
ber 2004, the government was successful in safeguard-
ing the deficit target for 2004.
In evaluating the performance of such a budgetary set-
ting, methodological adjustments also need to be
taken into account. In the framework of the March
2004 EDP reporting, Eurostat noted an inadequate
delimitation of general government and urged the
Ministry of Finance to correct it in time for the Sep-
tember 2004 notification. On that occasion, two enti-
ties hitherto classified outside the government, the so-
called extra-budgetary funds, have been included in
the government accounts.
The Capital Fund helps to finance the pay-as-you-go
system by managing assets to cover for the liabilities of
the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund. The Restitu-
tion Fund was established for restoration of nationalised
and confiscated properties to the original owners and for
compensation of damages to war and post-war victims.
While the inclusion of the former has not had any budg-
etary effect, the general government balance deteriorated
due to the latter running persistent deficits since its crea-
tion in 1993. In 2002 and 2003, the Restitution Fund
incurred a deficit of 0.2 % of GDP.
The methodological adjustment of the government
accounting system has also involved the exclusion of
certain institutions, such as pharmacies, homes for the
elderly and student residences, from the general govern-
ment sector. The impact on the budget, though, was neg-
ligible. This comprehensive ex post revision of budget-
ary data has increased the general government deficit for
the period 2000–03 by 0.2 to 0.5 % of GDP, the most
significant correction being in 2000, when the deficit
was raised from 3.0 % of GDP to 3.5 % of GDP.
Table V.52
The general government deficit initial targets, revisions and outcome, Slovenia
 Initial targets 
(budget prepared in t – 2)
ESA 95
 Revised targets 
(supplementary budget in t – 1)
ESA 95
 Outcome 
(March 2005 notification)
ESA 95
 Budget for the year
 2002 (1)  2.4°  2.6°  2.4
 2003  1.0°  1.9°  2.0
 2004  n.a.  1.6  1.9
 2005  1.6   
 (1) The launch of the new budgetary procedure at the end of 2001 with a two-year planning horizon, setting initial targets for  the 2002 and 2003 budgets.
 Sources: 2002–05 budgets, 2002–04 supplementary budgets, pre-accession and convergence programmes, March 2005 EDP notification. ° Report to the July 2003
Association Committee meeting.308
22. Slovakia
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government deficit for 2004 was 3.3 % of
GDP. This is significantly lower than the 4 % of GDP
included in the budget for 2004 (and even the 3.8 % of
GDP estimated in the November 2004 convergence pro-
gramme). The better outturn is mostly due to spending
postponements, including those related to co-payments
for EU funds. The debt ratio in 2004 amounted to 43.6 %
of GDP. The budget for 2005 was adopted by Parliament
in December 2004 and targets a deficit of 3.8 % of GDP.
This includes the revenue-decreasing and hence, ceteris
paribus, deficit-increasing effect of the introduction of a
funded pension pillar in 2005, estimated at 0.4 % of
GDP at the time when the budget was passed. Both the
revenue-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios are
foreseen to rise in 2005, mainly due to an assumed
increased inflow of transfers from the EU on the revenue
side and the associated spending (including co-financ-
ing) and the contributions to the EU budget on the
expenditure side.
On the revenue side, after the major tax reforms in 2004
(unified rate of 19 % for income and value added tax)
and the associated shift from direct to indirect taxation,
changes to the tax legislation in 2005 are marginal. How-
ever, social contributions are significantly affected by
the introduction of a funded pension pillar at the begin-
ning of 2005. On the expenditure side, the major reform
measure included in the 2005 budget is a second tranche
of healthcare reforms. The budgetary target of 3.8 % of
GDP is in line with the Commission services’ spring
2005 forecast.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the general government deficit for 2006 is pro-
jected at 4.0 % of GDP on a no-policy-change basis.
This is broadly in line with the target of 3.9 % of GDP
set in the most recent update of the convergence pro-
gramme submitted on 30 November 2004 (1). The pro-
gramme does not foresee major reform measures in the
election year 2006. It projects a major fiscal adjustment
in 2007 when the deficit is planned to be reduced to the
3 % of GDP Treaty reference value.
In the Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast, the
debt-to-GDP ratio is predicted to increase from 43.6 %
in 2004 to 44.2 % in 2005 and to 44.9 % of GDP in
2006.
Pension reform in Slovakia
Slovakia has reformed its pension system in two steps: in
a first step, it introduced several changes to the parame-
ters of the pay-as-you-go pillar (first pillar) that became
effective in 2004. These parametric changes reduced the
scope of entitlements and, hence, the (implicit) debt of
the first pillar. They prepared the ground for the second
(systemic) reform step, i.e. the introduction of a funded
pension pillar (second pillar) at the beginning of 2005.
Furthermore and in parallel with these reforms, the pos-
sibilities for voluntary old-age provisions (third pillar)
have been expanded.
The main parametric changes to the pay-as-you-go pillar
were the following: (i) an annual stepwise increase in the
retirement age by nine months to 62 for both men (to be
completed by 2006) and women (to be completed by
2012) from 60 for men and 53 to 57 for women (depend-
ing on the number of children); (ii) the introduction of a
close link between contribution history and pension ben-
efits; (iii) the institution of an automatic indexation
mechanism for benefits, with the adjustment based half
on inflation and half on the average nominal wage
increase in the previous year.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.309
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Budgetary developments 2003–07, Slovakia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance (2)  – 3.7  – 3.3  – 3.8  – 4.0  
 — Total revenues (2)  35.4  35.1  36.1  34.8  
   Of which: — current taxes  18.7  17.5  17.4  16.9  
 — social contributions (2)  12.4  12.4  12.5  12.0  
 — Total expenditure  39.2  38.5  39.9  38.8  
 Of which: — collective consumption  11.0  10.8  10.8  10.7  
 — social transfers (3)  20.3  18.4  18.0  17.7  
 — interest expenditure  2.5  2.2  2.4  2.2  
 — gross fixed capital formation  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.4  
 Primary balance (2)  – 1.2  – 1.1  – 1.4  – 1.7  
 Pm Tax burden  31.1  30.0  29.9  28.9  
 Government debt  42.6  43.6  44.2  44.9  
 Pm Real GDP (4)  4.5  5.5  4.9  5.2  
 Convergence programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance (2)  – 3.7  – 3.8  – 3.8  – 3.9  – 3.0
 Primary balance (2)  – 1.1  – 1.5  – 1.4  – 1.6  – 0.7
 Government debt  42.8  43.0  44.2  45.3  45.5
 Pm Real GDP (4)  4.2  5.0  4.5  5.1  5.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Includes the revenue-decreasing and hence, ceteris paribus, deficit-increasing effect of the introduction of a funded pension pillar in 2005 (estimated at around â %
of GDP in 2005; 1 % of GDP in 2006; and 1.1 % of GDP in 2007).
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in November 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Slovakia.
Table V.54
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Slovakia
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Introduction of a funded pension pillar (second pillar) at the 
beginning of 2005, leading to a redirection of 9 % of gross wages 
away from the pay-as-you-go pillar (â % of GDP)
 • Second tranche of reforms in the healthcare system leading to an 
upfront increase in the GDP share of expenditures by health 
insurance companies of around a â percentage point in 2005 but 
a stable share thereafter. The GDP share of health insurance 
contributions is also expected to increase in 2005 (by 0.4 
percentage points), including due to improved contribution 
compliance.
Major reform elements are:
• introduction of individual private health insurance
• adjustments in the assessment base for health insurance 
contributions
• better conditions for streamlining of the healthcare benefit 
package
• more competition, better incentives, and harder budget 
constraints
 Sources: Commission services and November 2004 convergence programme of Slovakia.310
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2005 is sizeable and receives contributions by partici-
pants of 9 % of their gross wages, which are otherwise
paid into the public PAYG pillar. Participation in the
funded pillar is compulsory for new labour market
entrants. Further pension-related social contributions,
which are paid into the public pension system consist of:
(i) another 9 % of gross wages for old-age pensions;
(ii) 6 % for disability pensions; and (iii) 4.75 % for a
reserve fund which is envisaged to cover potential short-
falls in the public pension system. Roughly three quar-
ters of the contribution total are paid by employers.
The November 2004 convergence programme update
estimates the revenue flow to the new funded pillar at
0.4 % of GDP in the first year, at 0.9 % of GDP in
2006 and at 1.1 % in 2007 (see Graph V.10). The risks
attached to these estimates seem to be largely bal-
anced. Specific uncertainties relate to the share of
incumbent workers who will actually opt to switch to
the new system and the exact timing of the switching
(as the decision can be taken during a period spanning
from the beginning of 2005 to mid-2006).
The pension reforms implemented to date considera-
bly improve the long-term sustainability of the pen-
sion system. In addition, the reforms diversify the risk
for beneficiaries and are likely to foster contribution
compliance and to enhance work incentives. The
introduction of a funded pillar may also have a favour-
able effect on financial market development. Never-
theless, sustainability considerations suggest that fur-
ther reforms should be considered in the medium
term. These include additional increases in the retire-
ment age and further changes in the indexation mech-
anism.
Graph V.10:  Budgetary effects of the pension reform
(1) That is, the introduction of a funded pension pillar in 2005.
Source: Commission services.
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23. Finland
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
In 2004, the general government balance continued to be
in surplus, at 2.1 % of GDP. This was almost a âper-
centage point higher than the target of 1.7 % set in the
original 2004 budget and November 2003 update of the
stability programme. The overall budgetary outturn was
better than expected as central government finances
posted a surplus of 0.4 % of GDP compared with a pro-
jected deficit of 0.7 %. This positive outcome derived
from higher overall tax receipts and increased dividend
revenues and lower interest expenditure. However, the
deficit in local government finances at 0.7 % of GDP
was higher than the envisaged 0.4 %, while the social
security surplus at 2.4 % of GDP turned out lower than
the target of 2.8 %.
Despite the positive outcome in the general government
surplus, the debt ratio in 2004 was 45.1 % of GDP, while
the target in the updated 2003 stability programme was
44.7 %. This higher-than-expected debt ratio follows
mainly from the fact that local governments increased
their borrowing, whereas central government accumu-
lated less debt than originally planned. 
The State budget for 2005 was approved by Parliament
on 22 December 2004. The main measures of the
budget are the income tax cuts which supplement the
new centralised two-and-half-year wage agreement set-
tled in late 2004 and the capital and corporate taxation
reform. Expenditures excluding interest expenditure
will go up by 1.3 % in real terms from 2004. Most of
the increases derive from higher healthcare costs and
increased transfers to local governments. Revenues are
set to grow by 0.6 % in real terms, as the government
has cut both the capital and corporate taxation, and
income taxation.
The target for the general government surplus in 2005 in
the biannual economic survey of the Ministry of
Finance (1) is 1.6 % of GDP (1.8 % in the December
2004 update of the stability programme) (2). The Com-
mission services’ spring 2005 forecast of the general
government surplus is 1.7 % of GDP (3) for 2005. On
17 May 2004, the government adopted the first supple-
mentary budget for 2005. Based on current information,
the budgetary projections for 2005 in the Commission
services’ spring forecast are still valid, but might be on
the cautious side. In the first supplementary budget pro-
posal, the government revised upwards the revenue pro-
jections by EUR 610 million (i.e. 0.4 % of GDP) for
2005 as tax receipts, dividend income and revenues from
financial asset sales are foreseen to be higher than origi-
nally expected. As expenditure will be increased by EUR
160 million (i.e. 0.1 % of GDP), the central government
finances should end the year better than the 0.5 % of
GDP deficit presented in the original budget. In 2005,
the cyclically adjusted surplus will decrease by approxi-
mately a â percentage point from 2004 to 1.9 % of GDP,
indicating an expansionary stance in fiscal policy.
Given the no-policy-change assumption in the forecast
for 2006, the general government finances are foreseen
to record a surplus of 1.6 % of GDP, which is a â per-
centage point lower than the surplus target presented in
the December 2004 update of the stability pro-
gramme (4). This derives from the fact that the update of
the stability programme took only partially into account
the centralised two-and-half-year wage agreement set-
tled in late 2004, which was supplemented by the gov-
ernment with income tax cuts worth of EUR 1.2 billion
¥1∂ The biannual economic survey is published in February and September.
¥2∂ Starting from 2003, the national accounts definition and the EDP defini-
tion of the general government balance have differed due to swap interest
payments. The difference in 2004 was 0.2 percentage points, the EDP def-
inition of general government surplus being 2.1 % of GDP and the national
accounts definition 1.9 %.
¥3∂ EDP definition; the Ministry of Finance will continue to use the national
accounts definition.
¥4∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.312
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Budgetary developments 2003–08, Finland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  2.5  2.1  1.7  1.6   
 — Total revenues  53.3  52.5  51.9  51.3   
   Of which: — current taxes  32.2  31.7  31.2  30.5   
 — social contributions  12.1  12.0  12.3  12.6   
 — Total expenditure  50.9  50.7  50.5  50.0   
 Of which: — collective consumption  7.8  7.8  7.9  7.9   
 — social transfers (2)  31.4  31.4  31.4  31.3   
 — interest expenditure  2.1  2.1  1.9  1.7   
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.7   
 Primary balance  4.5  4.0  3.3  3.1   
 Pm Tax burden  44.9  44.3  44.0  43.7   
 Government debt  45.3  45.1  44.3  43.7   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  3.2  2.4  1.9  1.8   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  5.2  4.3  3.5  3.4   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2.4  3.7  3.3  2.9   
 Stability programme (4)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
 General government balance  2.1  2.0  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.0
 Primary balance (5)  4.1  3.7  3.4  3.8  3.9  3.7
 Government debt  45.6  44.6  43.4  42.5  41.7  41.1
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2.0  3.2  2.8  2.4  2.2  2.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
(5) The Finnish authorities provide primary balances on the basis of net interest payments rather than gross interest payments. 
The Commission services have recalculated the figures based on the data given in the stability programme.
 Sources: Commission services and stability programme of Finland.
Table V.56
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Finland
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Inflation adjustment of 2 % in the central government income tax 
scale and an increase in earned income deductions in municipal 
taxation and lowering the State income tax scale (0.3 % of GDP)
• Reducing corporate income tax rate from 29 % to 26 % and 
capital income tax rate by 1 percentage point to 28 % (0.4 % of 
GDP)
• Extending the domestic help credit in order to improve 
employment possibilities in domestic services (0.01 % of GDP) 
• Increasing development cooperation spending (0.04 % of GDP)
• Providing grants and subsidies for municipality mergers
• Increasing funding for research and technology and financing of 
universities (0.04 % of GDP)
• Increasing active labour market policy measures
 Sources: Commission services and Finnish Ministry of Finance (budget for 2005).313
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2 0 0 5(i.e. 0.8 % of GDP) for 2005–06. This has now been
fully incorporated into the Commission services’ spring
forecast, which explains part of the discrepancy. Also,
higher central government spending plans for 2006
explain the difference. Moreover, the financial position
of local governments turned out to be weaker than
expected in 2004 and this has had its effect on the current
fiscal outlook for 2005–06. Beyond 2006, the update of
the stability programme foresees the general government
balance to remain in a comfortable surplus, at 2.2 % of
GDP and 2.0 % for 2007 and 2008 respectively.
According to the spring 2005 forecast, the debt ratio is
seen to decrease moderately from 44.3 % of GDP to
43.7 % during 2005–06. This is broadly in line with the
projections in the update of the stability programme.
However, based on the better-than-anticipated revenue
flow, the debt ratio may be lower than projected in the
Commission services’ spring forecast for 2005.
Spending ceilings
Multiannual spending ceilings were first introduced into
the Finnish budgetary process in 1991, but, after identi-
fied malfunction and recurrent overruns during the
period 1999–2003 (1), the current government, which
took office in June 2003, redesigned the spending ceil-
ings and made them politically more binding. Under the
new arrangement, the government at the beginning of its
term agrees on the budget expenditure ceilings covering
the entire four-year electoral period. The government’s
overall guiding premiss is that the deficit in central gov-
ernment finances, as measured in national accounting
terms, must not exceed 2ã % of GDP even during weak
economic growth. About three quarters of the budget
appropriations (i.e. 19.0 % in relation to GDP), includ-
ing the supplementary budgets, are under the binding
spending limits. Excluded from the ceilings are mainly
cyclically fluctuating expenditure (e.g. unemployment
subsidies), interest expenses on central government debt
and certain items which are not deemed appropriate to tie
to spending limits.
The spending limits are broken down for the ministries
when preparing their annual appropriation proposals for
the following year’s budget. All additional spending
items have to be accommodated within the ceilings.
Each year, the government carries out a technical review
so that ceilings are in line with the budget proposal’s cost
and price level and also to include changes that have
been made to the structure of the budget. In 2005, these
adjustments revised upwards the spending ceilings by
about EUR 940 million (i.e. 0.6 % of GDP) per year
between 2006 and 2007 compared with the level decided
in 2003.
Experience so far
The spending ceilings worked well in 2004, their first
year in operation, when final expenditure remained
below the spending limits by EUR 84 million or 0.1 % of
GDP. Also, the 2005 budget is within the ceilings, with
expenditures of EUR 212 million or 0.1 % of GDP
below the ceilings. This leeway will be used to cover any
supplementary budgets.
According to the spending limits, total expenditure by
the central government is allowed to increase by nearly
1 % a year in real terms on average in 2004–07. For the
coming years, there will be testing times for the ceilings
as they leave only limited scope for further expenditure
increases, after spending in administrative branches in
2004 increased by 3.8 % in real terms from 2003. Also,
the fact that there will be parliamentary elections in
spring 2007 may exert additional pressure on the
expenditure ceilings. Currently, the average leeway
under the ceilings for 2006 and 2007 is EUR 280 million
(i.e. 0.2 % of GDP) and beyond the current electoral
period for 2008–09 the average is EUR 300 million.
¥1∂ See analysis of the previous expenditure frameworks in European Commis-
sion (2003a), which can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_
finance/publications/european_economy/public_finances2003_en.htm.314
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M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t sGraph V.11:  Budget and spending limits for the electoral period 2003–07, 
at the 2006 price level (billion EUR and % of GDP)
NB: Value for 2003 is the final budget, 2004 includes original and supplementary budgets and 2005 comprises original budget. Ceilings for 2008–09
are indicatives ones, as the electoral period ends in 2007.
Source: Finnish Ministry of Finance.
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24. Sweden
Recent developments 
and medium-term prospects
The general government recorded a surplus of 1.4 % of
GDP in 2004 (1.2 % of GDP in the national accounts
where the impact of swaps in the calculation of interest
is excluded). This was an unexpectedly high surplus
against a target of 0.4 % surplus given in the November
2003 updated convergence programme and against even
the 0.7 % of GDP surplus estimated in the convergence
programme submitted in November 2004. The better
outcome is not surprising given the target was set using
a cautious 2 % growth assumption while the growth real-
ised, mainly due to a better export performance, was
3.5 %. However, revenues developed close to expecta-
tions in nominal terms. Instead, expenditures were lower
than foreseen in the 2003 update, both in nominal terms
and more prominently in shares of GDP. Lower-than-
expected interest expenditure and consumption are key
explanatory components. The general government debt-
to-GDP ratio continued to fall and was 51.2 % of GDP in
2004.
The budget for 2005 was presented on 22 September
2004 and received parliamentary approval on 16 Decem-
ber 2004. The updated convergence programme for the
period 2004–07, drawing fully on the draft budget, was
submitted to the Commission on 18 November 2004
with a surplus target of 0.6 % of GDP for 2005. The
lower surplus in 2005 as compared with the 2004 out-
come mainly reflects the expansionary measures intro-
duced in the 2005 budget, most importantly reductions in
income taxes. The Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, taking into account the better-than-expected
2004 outcome, projects a slightly higher surplus of 0.8 %
of GDP in 2005. On 14 April 2005, the government pre-
sented its spring budget bill with an updated surplus
forecast of 0.7 % of GDP.
The Commission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects
the cyclically adjusted surplus to narrow by around
1 percentage point of GDP in 2005. This suggests a
slightly more expansionary fiscal stance than indicated
by the calculations made in the Commission’s assess-
ment of the updated programme, mainly reflecting the
stronger-than-expected 2004 surplus.
Based on a no-policy-change assumption, the Commis-
sion services’ spring 2005 forecast projects an
unchanged surplus of 0.8 % of GDP in 2006. This is
higher than the projection in the updated convergence
programme of a surplus of 0.4 % of GDP, and reflects
the upward revisions in the 2004 budget outcome and
more favourable growth assumptions. In the spring
budget bill, the government forecast a 0.6 % surplus in
2006 and 1.1 % in 2007 (compared with a 0.9 % surplus
target for 2007 in the 2004 updated convergence pro-
gramme).
The general government debt ratio is projected to con-
tinue to decline in 2005–06, to slightly below 50 % of
GDP, though the nominal level of debt is projected to
rise. The moderate pace of decline in the debt ratio
reflects the 2 % of GDP surplus in the pension system
being mainly invested in non-government financial
assets.
Local government: the setting
Local government in Sweden consists of 290 munici-
palities and 20 county councils. By long tradition,
they enjoy strong political and financial independ-
ence. Independent, local governments are neverthe-
less required by law to provide a large part of general
public services. For example, municipalities are
responsible for the provision of social services includ-
ing childcare, and environmental and health protec-
tion, as well as primary and secondary education. The
county councils mainly deal with healthcare. Munici-
palities and county councils share responsibility for
public transport. The municipalities account for 70 %
of local government expenditure while the county
councils cover the remaining 30 %. Overall, local316
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eral government primary expenditures and 70 % of
general government investment and consumption.
More than half of the costs are for personnel and local
governments employ about 25 % of employees in the
economy.
For its financing, local governments have the right to
levy direct tax. Tax revenues cover roughly two thirds of
total revenues. They are raised through a flat-rate tax on
income, i.e. salaries, unemployment and illness benefits
and pensions. The average municipality tax is about
21 % and the average county council tax 10.5 % making
Table V.57
Budgetary developments 2003–07, Sweden
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006  
 General government balance (2)  0.2  1.4  0.8  0.8  
 — Total revenues  58.6  58.4  57.8  57.4  
   Of which: — current taxes  36.0  36.3  35.8  35.5  
 — social contributions  15.0  14.7  14.7  14.7  
 — Total expenditure  58.4  57.0  57.0  56.6  
 Of which: — collective consumption  8.2  8.0  8.0  7.9  
 — social transfers (3)  38.3  37.8  37.6  37.2  
 — interest expenditure  2.1  1.8  2.0  2.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0  
 Primary balance  2.3  3.2  2.9  2.9  
 Pm Tax burden  50.8  50.7  50.1  49.8  
 Government debt  52.0  51.2  50.3  49.2  
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  1.3  1.7  0.8  0.7  
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  3.4  3.5  2.9  2.8  
 Pm Real GDP (4)  1.5  3.5  3.0  2.8  
 Convergence programme (5)  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
 General government balance  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.9
 Primary balance  2.7  2.8  2.8  2.7  3.3
 Government debt  52.0  51.7  50.5  50.0  49.0
 Pm Real GDP (4)  1.6  3.5  3.0  2.5  2.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In line with the transition period granted by Eurostat for the implementation of its March 2004 decision on the classification of second-pillar pension funds, these
funds can continue to be classified inside the general government sector until the March 2007 EDP notification. This is the case in Sweden and has an estimated
positive effect on the budget balance of about 1 % of GDP per year.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Annual % change.
(5) Submitted in November 2004.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Sweden.
Table V.58
Main measures in the budget for 2005, Sweden
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Half of the fourth and last step of the income tax reform (0.3 % of 
GDP)
• Abolishment of inheritance and gift taxes  (0.1 % of GDP)
• Further steps in ‘green tax swap’
• Increase in grants to local government to support employment 
(volume 0.6 % of GDP)
 Sources: Commission services and Swedish Ministry of Finance.317
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2 0 0 5the average local tax about 31.5 % (this varies across
local governments; in 2003, the highest local tax rate
was 33.3 % while the lowest was 28.9 %).
Local governments may also raise income through fees
for some services provided. However, most of the
remaining revenues consist of general grants and grants
directed towards a specific use (special-purpose grants).
The level of the grants does not follow any indexation
rule but is decided each year on a discretionary basis. As
from 2005, general grants have been provided within an
‘equalisation’ system administered by the central gov-
ernment. This consists of an ‘income equalisation’ sys-
tem and a ‘cost equalisation’ system. On the income
side, local governments with low per capita income are
compensated by central government general grants
(there is also small co-financing by local governments
with very high per capita income).
On the cost side, there is compensation for structural dif-
ferences in the cost structure (e.g. due to differences in
demography). The cost equalisation system only redis-
tributes across local governments and there is no finan-
cial contribution from central government. The special
purpose grants are mainly directed towards education
and employment where those for the latter have been
increased substantially in the 2005 budget.
Since 2000, budgetary developments at local level have
been guided by a ‘budget balance requirement’. This
stipulates that budgets must be planned with revenues
(taxes, fees and grants) higher than or equal to expendi-
tures. Borrowing is allowed to finance investments but
the costs to finance the loans are covered through the
budget. As from 2005, a number of changes have been
introduced to make the rules slightly more flexible. It is
now possible to present a budget in deficit if there are
‘special reasons’ such as a healthy balance sheet or a par-
ticular need for large structural measures. Should a defi-
cit materialise despite a planned surplus or balance, a
consolidation rule specifies that the deficit must be com-
pensated by surpluses in the following three years (as
from 2005 — the period was two years up to 2004).
There is, however, no explicit sanction mechanism in the
case of non-compliance.
Budgetary problems: a procyclical bias?
Table V.59 shows the budgetary situation in local gov-
ernments over the 1997–2004 period. In the 1998–2000
period, tax bases grew relatively strongly in line with
overall growth and employment. At the same time, cen-
tral government grants were higher than before. Backed
by the healthy growth in revenues, local government
activity expanded relatively strongly in volume terms.
The impact on costs from the increasing activity gradu-
ally started to show on the budget balance and in 2002
the sector recorded a 0.5 % of GDP net lending deficit.
Hence, in 2003, a year of weak GDP growth and falling
employment in the economy as a whole, measures were
taken to curb the growth in consumption while at the
same time the average local tax rate was increased by
0.65 percentage points.
In 2004, the measures to curb the growth in consumption
had an increased effect as mirrored by a negative local
government employment growth. Even so, the average
Table V.59
Local government finances 1997–2004, Sweden
(% of GDP)
Outturn  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
 Revenue  22.3  23.6  23.2  22.4  22.8  23.2  23.6  23.3
 Taxes  15.5  15.5  15.5  15.3  15.8  16.1  16.5  16.5
 Central government grants  4.3  5.5  5.3  5.0  5.0  5.1  5.0  4.8
 Other  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.0  1.9  2.1  2.0  2.0
 Expenditure  22.8  23.4  23.1  22.2  23.0  23.7  23.8  23.3
 Consumption  18.5  19.4  19.3  18.7  19.3  20.0  20.3  20.0
 Other  4.3  4.0  3.9  3.5  3.7  3.7  3.5  3.2
 Net lending  – 0.5  0.2  0.1  0.2  – 0.2  – 0.5  – 0.3  0.1
 Source: Swedish Ministry of Finance.318
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tional 0.34 %. During this period, the yearly increase in
central government grants merely followed nominal
GDP growth. In 2004, the sector showed a surplus again,
partially explained by an increased sale of real estate. In
the 2005 budget bill, the government introduced sizeable
increases in transfers targeted towards supporting
employment. This should limit the need for further tax
increases while allowing for a positive employment
growth in a context of controlled consumption growth
(but lower the surplus of general government). The key
financial problems of the sector as a whole therefore
seem to be largely under control even though the situa-
tion remains quite disparate across local governments.
About 40 % of municipalities and 60 % of county coun-
cils did not meet the balance requirement in 2004. Effec-
tively, to recuperate the deficits realised, there is still a
need for consolidation in the coming years and margins
remain small.
Concluding remarks
The recent experience with the problems in the local
government budgetary situation has led to some debate
on the budgetary framework and the role of local govern-
ment. First, the balance requirement has not been able to
prevent procyclical budgetary policies. When income
growth was cyclically healthy, expenditures were
increased and, when the economic conditions later dete-
riorated, it was necessary to reduce employment and
increase taxes. It is noteworthy that the local tax
increases to a large extent have neutralised the govern-
ment efforts to lower income taxes in order to promote
incentives to work. The efforts to introduce some more
flexibility in the rules can be seen as an attempt to alle-
viate this problem: that is, the longer time allowed for
compensating for deficits and the increased possibilities
to have exceptions from the balanced budget require-
ment. Second, the financial problems at local level
quickly feed through to central level. There is arguably
an implicit commitment by the central government to
ensure that the provision of general public services is
secured. If local governments can count on being ‘bailed
out’, it may create a moral hazard problem (1). By decid-
ing the level of grants only by discretion, the government
puts pressure on local authorities to plan cautiously. The
discretion also allows the government a higher degree of
control and freedom to adjust measures and priorities
across expenditure areas. In particular, central govern-
ment expenditures must meet the nominal expenditure
ceilings set by Parliament. However, the discretionary
allocation of grants creates uncertainty at local level
which may make effective planning more difficult. This
is so even if general grants have in practice been raised
to cover increases in prices and wage costs in a seem-
ingly semi-automatic way (2). Third, the recent budget-
ary pressure has increased awareness of the medium- to
longer-term budgetary challenges from the ageing of the
population. Given the demographic outlook, the cost
pressures from the provision of public services will to a
large extent show at local level. The government’s long-
term survey 2003/04 (3) pointed to the budgetary pres-
sures stemming from the ageing of the population. To be
able to finance the higher demand for welfare services, it
will be necessary to increase productivity and employ-
ment participation since the scope to increase tax rates is
limited. Furthermore, a government committee on public
sector responsibilities is currently studying the structure
and division of responsibilities across different layers of
government with a view to securing the public welfare
commitment. Thus, even if the outlook for local govern-
ment finances looks beneficial in the short term, the
major budgetary challenges remain.
¥1∂ See Fischer, J., ‘Swedish budget rules: praise from Brussels, pressure at
home’, European Commission, Country Focus, Volume II, issue 4.
¥2∂ See NIER (National Institute of Economic Research) (2004), The Swedish
economy, December 2004.
¥3∂ SOU (2004), The long-term survey of the Swedish economy , Swedish gov-
ernment official report, 2004, p. 19.319
25.  United Kingdom
Recent developments and medium–term 
prospects
The outturn for the general government balance in the
2004/05 financial year (1) is estimated in the March 2005
budget to be a deficit of 3.0 % of GDP, a worse outturn
than the 2.7 % deficit projected in the March 2004
budget (and also the 2.9 % projected in the December
2004 update of the UK convergence programme) (all
figures reported here are after adjustment by the Com-
mission services: see footnote 5 to Table V.60).
This deterioration appears to reflect both revenue growth
slightly weaker than expected, in spite of robust GDP
growth, and strength in current spending. On the revenue
side, general government current receipts are estimated
to have been GBP 3.8 billion (0.3 % of GDP) lower than
expected in the 2004 budget, even though the rising price
of oil led to stronger revenues from North Sea oil pro-
duction. Disappointing growth of corporation tax
receipts during the first half of the financial year was a
significant factor in the shortfall, which the authorities
suggest may have reflected a previous underestimate of
the backlog in unused losses accumulated by financial
companies that have depressed taxable profits in the
short term, a legacy of the earlier collapse in equity mar-
kets. More recently, however, receipts of corporation tax
have picked up sharply, reflecting a combination of con-
tinued strength in corporate profitability and the intro-
duction of a number of measures designed to reduce tax
avoidance. On the expenditure side, general government
current expenditure is estimated to have been GBP 1.4
billion (around 0.1 % of GDP) higher than expected in
the 2004 budget: central government departments appear
to have made use of accumulated underspends from pre-
vious years, available to them under the UK’s system of
‘end year flexibility’. The authorities argue that this
reflects a smoothing of expenditure given that the rate of
growth in spending planned for 2004/05 had been slower
than for either the preceding or following financial years.
The authorities also note higher-than-expected expendi-
ture on the UK’s international commitments, including
Iraq. However, this is offset by lower net investment
than projected in the 2004 budget: investment is now
estimated to have been some GBP 2 billion (0.2 % of
GDP) less than planned in 2004/05. The debt ratio,
meanwhile, is estimated to have reached 41.0 % of GDP
by the end of 2004/05.
The latest budget, presented on 16 March 2005, sets out
a number of discretionary policy changes which have a
broadly neutral impact on the UK’s fiscal position in
both 2005/06 and 2006/07. The largest expenditure
measure was a one-off GBP 200 contribution to all
households containing someone over 65 with an obliga-
tion to pay the local government tax levied on property
values (‘council tax’). The biggest revenue measure was
a one-off change to the payment profile of North Sea cor-
poration tax (expected to bring in over GBP 1 billion or
0.1 % of GDP) over the coming financial year. The 2005
budget also set new estimates and projections for the
public finances, updating those set in the December 2004
convergence programme update. The general govern-
ment balance is now expected to improve modestly to a
deficit of 2.7 % for 2005/06. In the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2005 forecast, the projected outcome for cal-
endar year 2005 is also for a modest improvement, but to
a slightly less optimistic 3.0 % of GDP. This largely
reflects a more conservative estimate of revenue recov-
ery, despite forecasts for GDP growth broadly similar to
the macroeconomic forecasts used by the government to
forecast the public finances. Nonetheless, as measured
by the change in the cyclically adjusted balance, the fis-
cal stance in 2005 is broadly unchanged or very slightly
tighter than in 2004.   
In 2006, under a no-policy-change assumption, the Com-
mission services’ spring 2005 forecast projects a further
modest improvement in the general government balance,¥1∂ The financial year runs from April to March.320
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Budgetary developments 2003–08/09, United Kingdom
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1)  2003  2004  2005  2006   
 General government balance  – 3.4  – 3.2  – 3.0  – 2.7   
 — Total revenues  40.0  40.4  40.9  41.4   
   Of which: — current taxes  28.4  29.0  29.6  30.0   
 — social contributions  8.0  8.1  8.1  8.1   
— Total expenditure  43.4  43.6  44.0  44.1   
 Of which: — collective consumption  8.0  8.1  8.2  8.3   
 — social transfers (2)  26.4  26.5  26.5  26.5   
 — interest expenditure  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1   
 — gross fixed capital formation  1.7  1.8  2.0  2.1   
 Primary balance  – 1.3  – 1.1  – 1.0  – 0.7   
 Pm Tax burden  36.5  37.2  37.8  38.2   
 Government debt  39.7  41.6  41.9  42.5   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted balance  – 3.0  – 3.0  – 2.9  – 3.0   
 Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance  – 0.9  – 1.0  – 0.8  – 0.5   
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2.2  3.1  2.8  2.8   
 Convergence programme (4)  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09
 General government balance (5)  – 3.2  – 2.9  – 2.8  – 2.3  – 2.1  – 1.7
 Primary balance (6)  – 1.2  – 0.8  – 0.7  – 0.2  – 0.1  n.a.
 Government debt  39.5  40.9  41.8  42.4  42.8  42.8
 Pm Real GDP (3)  2ã  3ä  3  2â  2ä  2ä
(1) Commission services’ spring 2005 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2004.
(5) The UK authorities include, in their projections for the general government balance, annual receipts of around GBP 1.0 billion from the sale of UMTS licences
in 2000. All figures in the table are, after adjusting for this, to bring the projections onto an EDP basis (in line with the Eurostat decision set out in News
Release 81/200, 14.7.2000); this has the effect of subtracting around 0.1 percentage point from the balance (i.e. increasing the deficit) in each year.
(6) The UK authorities provide primary balances excluding net interest rather than only interest payments as done by the Commission.  Figures shown above are as
recalculated by the Commission services.
 Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of the United Kingdom.
Table V.61
Main measures in the budget for 2005, United Kingdom
Revenue measures  Expenditure measures
• Changes to advance the payment profile of North Sea corporation 
tax (0.1 % of GDP in 2005/06)
• Changes in property transaction tax regime (‘stamp duties’): ending 
relief for commercial transactions in disadvantaged areas (0.03 % of 
GDP); doubling of the zero-rate threshold from GBP 60 000 to GBP 
120 000 for residential transactions (– 0.03 % of GDP)
• Specific countermeasures preventing tax avoidance through: the 
use of financial-product-based schemes (0.03 % of GDP); the 
exploitation by companies of differences within and between tax 
codes (0.01 % of GDP)
• Deferral of the previously planned inflation-based increase in 
main road fuel duties to 1 September 2005 (– 0.02 % of GDP)
• Payments of GBP 200 to over-65 households to defray local 
government property (‘council’) tax charges (0.08 % of GDP)
• Overseas obligations including in Iraq (0.04 % of GDP)
Sources: Commission services and 2005 budget.321
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2 0 0 5to a deficit of 2.7 % of GDP, though remaining higher
than the authorities’ projection of 2.3 % in the 2006/07
financial year.
Thereafter, the authorities assume that the balance will
continue to improve steadily, to 1.6 % of GDP by 2009/
10. This is broadly in line with the profile envisaged in
the December 2004 update of the UK’s convergence
programme (1).
According to the Commission services’ spring 2005
forecast, the general government gross debt-to-GDP
ratio is expected to rise over the forecast period, from
41.6 % of GDP in 2004 to 42.5 % in 2006.
Improving the efficiency of public services
Recent policy priorities in the UK aim to overturn a leg-
acy of underinvestment and underprovision in public
services by increasing government current and capital
spending. Consequently, though remaining within the
overall constraints of the UK’s domestic fiscal policy
rules, total general government spending rose from
around 39â % of GDP in 1999 to around 43â % in
2004, while a reduction in debt interest costs also
allowed spending to be redirected from servicing debt to
public services — interest payments fell from 3.6 % of
GDP to 2.1 % between 1996 and 2002, reflecting consol-
idation of the public finances from 1997 to 1999 and
improvements to the macroeconomic framework. The
rise in general government spending (plus slower growth
in 2002) contributed to the general government balance
deteriorating from surplus as recently as 2001 to a 3.2 %
of GDP deficit in 2004.
The authorities have introduced a series of reforms to
ensure public services are provided efficiently. These
include the introduction of public service agreements
(PSAs) which set out the outcomes each government
department is committed to achieving (detailed in Euro-
pean Commission, 2002a), and service delivery agree-
ments (SDAs) which outline the steps that will be taken
to achieve these objectives. Building on this, and reflect-
ing the increased pressure on the public finances, the
2003–05 BEPGs included a recommendation for the UK
authorities to ensure that the public services accompany-
ing the planned increase in spending ‘… are delivered
efficiently and with a view to ensuring cost-effective-
ness’.
The 2003 budget made achieving efficiency savings in
public service delivery a key objective, savings which
the government intended to redirect to increase the direct
provision of public services. Potential savings were
identified in a report commissioned by the government
and published in July 2004, Releasing resources to the
front line: independent review of public sector efficiency
(the Gershon report (2). Its results and recommendations
¥1∂ The programme, and its assessment by the Commission and the Council, can
be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm./economy_finance/about/activities/
sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ Prepared by Sir Peter Gershon, a former chief executive of the Office of
Government Commerce (the government’s centralised procurement
agency set up in 2000).
Table V.62
Annual public service efficiency savings expected or achieved in the UK since July 2004
Department How Amount (% of GDP)
Health Negotiating a  new procurement deal for generic medicines 0.07 expected
Negotiation of a new procurement deal for branded 
medicines
0.03
Home Office Better use of police time, smarter procurement, 
improvements to the National Offender Management 
Service, substantial reductions in the cost of asylum
0.06
Defence Improving defence logistics < 0.03
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Reforms to the delivery of new supply, capital works, and 
commodity procurement and management and maintenance
> 0.02
Work and Pensions Paying the benefits and pensions of 90 % of its customers 
directly into their bank accounts
< 0.02
Sources: Commission services, 2004 pre-budget report and 2005 budget.322
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both the 2004 budget and the 2004 spending review
which, in July 2004, set out detailed spending plans for
the 2005/06 to 2007/08 financial years.
Taking its figures directly from the Gershon report, the
2004 spending review identified potential annual public
sector efficiency gains of over GBP 21.5 billion (roughly
2 % of GDP) by 2007/08. This was based on depart-
ments achieving annual efficiency savings relative to
their baseline expenditure (1) of at least 2.5 % per year
over the period from 2005/06. Contributing to that end,
the spending review set each government department’s
administration budget for 2006/07 and 2007/08 at, or
below, its 2005/06 nominal level, implying a real term
reduction in administration costs alone of at least 5 %
over the two-year period (2)..
The Gershon savings include a net reduction in civil
service employment of 70 600 posts (roughly 13.5 % of
the April 2004 total of 523 580) by 2008; 84 000 posts
are to be cut, of which just under 14 000 postholders are
intended to be moved to direct service provision. A fur-
ther 20 000 jobs were expected to be cut by the devolved
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire-
land, while just over 20 000 posts were identified for
relocation away from the south-east of England to lower-
cost locations.
Six areas were identified as providing scope for the effi-
ciency savings and job reductions. The first is improving
the efficiency of ‘back-office’ facilities by such means
as pooling administrative functions to eliminate job
duplication amongst departments. The second is to get
better value out of public procurement. The third is by
improving processes associated with government trans-
actions, including the operation of benefit payments. The
fourth and fifth are by lightening the monitoring and reg-
ulation of the public and private sectors. The sixth is by
increasing the time spent by staff on service delivery,
including by improving sickness absence management.
The government has set out a formal process for assess-
ing departmental progress against the targets set in the
2004 spending review. Departmental reports setting out
how performance will be measured have been scruti-
nised by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Audit
Commission, and have been made public. Departments
will be required to report formally on their progress
against efficiency targets in their departmental reports,
published each spring. In addition, all departments will
be required to have, by December 2006, a professional
finance director reporting to the head of department (the
Permanent Secretary), with a seat on the departmental
board.
Measures to reap the efficiency savings identified in the
Gershon report were only initially understood to start
from the 2005/06 financial year — i.e. April 2005
onwards. However, the December 2004 pre-budget
report and the March 2005 budget claim that substantial
progress has already been made, with GBP 2 billion
already saved. Details of some of the biggest savings are
provided in Table V.62.
Of the 84 000 civil service posts the government intends
to try to eliminate by 2008, it expects 12 500 to have
gone by the end of 2005. The bulk of these are being
eliminated from the Department of Work and Pensions.
On the relocation of posts away from south-east Eng-
land, the government claims that by the end of 2004/05
it will have achieved 4 300 of the 20 000 due by the end
of 2008 and that another 3 500 posts are already firmly
planned for relocation.
This ‘input-oriented’ approach should complement the
existing focus by public service agreements on outputs/
results — indeed, the Treasury has a specific PSA objec-
tive of ‘working with departments to help them meet
their … efficiency targets amounting to [GBP] 20 billion
a year by 2007/08’. Fully assessing the ultimate success
of the initiative will, however, only become evident over
the medium term, not least because some identified
potential savings are difficult to assess ex ante. In addi-
tion, a successful outcome, one that is easily demonstra-
ble to the wider public, requires clear, rigorous and
accessible assessments.
¥1∂ Baseline expenditure is defined as the departmental expenditure limit
(DEL) plus additional spending by local governments in particular policy
areas for which they are responsible (e.g. education) in the 2004/05 finan-
cial year. Departments are expected to achieve a 2.5 % saving relative to
that baseline in each of the three years covered by the 2004 spending
review, i.e. 2005/06 through to 2007/08, implying a cumulative efficiency
gain equivalent to 7.5 % of expenditure in 2004/05. 
¥2∂ It is important to note that the spending plans set out in the 2004 spending
review — and the government’s fiscal rules — do not rely on the effi-
ciency targets being met. The overall spending plans have been set consist-
ent with the authorities’ view that the spending is affordable even without
the efficiency savings. Instead, if the savings are achieved, the government
intends to use all the resources released for further provision of public
services, leaving the overall level of expenditure unchanged.323
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1. Glossary
Accession countries Countries in the process of acces-
sion to the European Union. They include Bulgaria and
Romania.
Automatic stabilisers Various features of the tax and
spending regime which react automatically to the eco-
nomic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the
budget balance tends to improve in years of high growth,
and deteriorate during economic slowdowns.
Broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) Annual
guidelines for the economic and budgetary policies of
the Member States. They are prepared by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council of Ministers responsible
for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin).
Budget balance The balance between total public
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a posi-
tive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance
indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State
budgetary positions, the EU uses general government
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, primary
budget balance and primary structural balance.
Budgetary rules Rules and procedures through which
policy-makers decide on the size and the allocation of
public expenditure as well as on its financing through
taxation and borrowing.
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget bal-
ance in percentage of GDP brought about by a change in
the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on
average.
Candidate countries Countries that wish to accede to
the EU. Besides the accession countries, they include
Croatia and Turkey.
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement con-
tained in the Stability and Growth Pact, according to
which Member States should, over the medium term,
achieve an overall budget balance close to balance or in
surplus.
Code of conduct on the format and content of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes Policy document
endorsed by the Ecofin Council in July 2001 setting
down the information requirements and key definitions
to be followed by Member States in preparing their sta-
bility or convergence programmes.
Convergence programmes Medium-term budgetary
and monetary strategies presented by each of those
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. They
are updated annually, according to the provisions of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Prior to the third stage of
EMU, convergence programmes were issued on a volun-
tary basis and used by the Commission in its assessment
of the progress made in preparing for the euro. See also
stability programmes.
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due
to changes in interest rates and exchange rates triggered
by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy.
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the
change in the budget balance that follows automatically
from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the
reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in
the output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing
and structural budget balance.
Cyclically adjusted budget balance See structural
budget balance.
Demand and supply shocks Disturbances that affect the
economy on the demand side (e.g. changes in private
consumption or exports) or on the supply side (e.g.
changes in commodity prices or technological innova-
tions). They can impact on the economy either on a tem-
porary or permanent basis.327
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2 0 0 5Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of people who
receive government transfers, especially pensions, rela-
tive to those who are available to provide the revenue to
pay for those transfers.
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on personal or
corporate incomes and property.
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget bal-
ance and in its components under the control of govern-
ment aiming at stabilising the economy. It is usually
measured as the residual of the change in the balance
after the exclusion of the budgetary impact of automatic
stabilisers. See also fiscal stance.
Early-warning mechanism Part of the preventive ele-
ments of the SGP, and activated when there is significant
divergence from the budgetary targets set down in a sta-
bility or convergence programme.
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly
the Monetary Committee, renamed the Economic and
Financial Committee as of January 1999. Its main task is
to prepare and discuss (Ecofin) Council decisions with
regard to economic and financial matters.
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior
officials whose main task is to prepare discussions of the
(Ecofin) Council on structural policies. It plays a large
role in the preparation of the BEPGs, and it is active on
policies related to labour markets, methods to calculate
cyclically adjusted budget balances and ageing popula-
tions.
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of tax
revenue (labour income, capital income, consumption)
to their respective tax bases.
ESA 95/ESA 79 European accounting standards for the
reporting of economic data by the Member States to the
EU. As of 2000, ESA 95 has replaced the earlier ESA 79
standard with regard to the comparison and analysis of
national public finance data.
Excessive deficit procedure (EDP) A procedure
according to which the Commission and the Council
monitor the development of national budget balances
and public debt in order to assess the risk of an excessive
deficit in each Member State. Its application has been
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also stability programmes and Stability and Growth
Pact.
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a
subset of) public expenditure.
Fiscal consolidation A continuous improvement in the
budget balance, either specified by the amount of the
improvement or the period over which the improvement
continues.
Fiscal decentralisation The transfer of authority and
responsibility for public functions from the central gov-
ernment to intermediate and local governments or to the
market.
Fiscal federalism A subfield of public finance that
investigates the fiscal relations across levels of govern-
ment.
Fiscal impulse The estimated effect of fiscal policy on
GDP. It is not a model-free measure and it is usually cal-
culated by simulating an econometric model. The esti-
mates presented in the present report are obtained by
using the Commission services’ model QUEST.
Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy,
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal per-
formance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, debt, or a major component thereof. See also
budgetary rules and expenditure rules.
Fiscal stance A measure of the discretionary fiscal pol-
icy component. In this report, it is defined as the change
in the primary structural budget balance relative to the
preceding period. When the change is positive (negative)
the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive).
General government As used by the EU in its process
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general
government sector covers national government, and
regional and local government, as well as social security
funds. Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to
and from the EU budget.
Government budget constraint A basic condition
applying to the public finances, according to which total
public expenditure in any one year must be financed by
taxation, government borrowing, or changes in the mon-
etary base. In the context of EMU, the ability of govern-328
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prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment and sustaina-
bility.
Government contingent liabilities Obligations for the
government that are subject to the realisation of specific
uncertain and discrete future events. For instance, the
guarantees granted by governments to the debt of private
corporations bonds issued by enterprises are contingent
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay
depends on the non-ability of the original debtor to hon-
our its own obligations.
Government implicit liabilities Government obliga-
tions that are very likely to arise in the future in spite of
the absence of backing contracts or law. The government
may have a potential future obligation as a result of legit-
imate expectations generated by past practice or as a
result of the pressure by interest groups. Most implicit
liabilities are contingent, i.e. depend upon the occur-
rence of uncertain future events.
Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter A statistical technique
used to calculate trend GDP and output gaps by filtering
actual GDP.
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the pro-
duction stage, and not on the income and property aris-
ing from economic production processes. Prominent
examples of indirect taxation are value added tax (VAT),
excise duties, import levies, and energy and other envi-
ronmental taxes.
Interest burden General government interest payments
on public debt as a share of GDP.
Maastricht reference values for public debt and defi-
cits Respectively, a 60 % general government debt/GDP
ratio and a 3 % general government deficit/GDP ratio.
These thresholds are defined in a protocol to the Maas-
tricht Treaty on European Union. See also excessive def-
icit procedure.
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of total
debt in terms of when it is due to be paid back. Interest
rate changes affect the budget balance directly to the
extent that the general government sector has debt with
a relatively short maturity structure. Long maturities
reduce the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes
in the prevailing interest rate. See also public debt.
Minimal benchmarks Values indicating a budgetary
position that would provide a cyclical safety margin for
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely during eco-
nomic slowdowns without leading to excessive deficits.
The minimal benchmarks are estimated by the European
Commission. They do not cater for other risks such as
unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate
shocks and should not be confused with the ‘close-to-
balance or in-surplus’ medium-term requirement of the
Pact.
Monetary conditions index (MCI) An indicator com-
bining the change in real short-term interest rate and in
the real effective exchange rate to gauge the degree of
easing or tightening of monetary policy.
Mundell–Fleming model Macroeconomic model of an
open economy which embodies the main Keynesian
hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity preference). In spite
of its shortcomings, it remains useful in short-term eco-
nomic policy analysis.
NAIRU Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemploy-
ment.
Non-Keynesian effects Supply-side and expectation
effects which reverse the sign of traditional Keynesian
multipliers. Hence, if non-Keynesian effects dominate,
fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.
Old-age dependency ratio Population aged over 65 as
a percentage of working-age population (usually defined
as persons aged between 15 and 64).
Output gap The difference between actual output and
estimated potential output at any particular point in time.
See also cyclical component of budget balance.
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system Pension sys-
tem in which current pension expenditures are financed
by the contributions of current employees.
Pre-accession economic programmes (PEPs) Annual
programmes submitted by candidate countries which set
the framework for economic policies. The PEPs consist
of a review of recent economic developments, a detailed
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public
finance issues and an outline of the structural reform
agenda.329
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Provides the framework for budgetary surveillance of
candidate countries in the run-up to accession. It closely
approximates the policy coordination and surveillance
mechanisms at EU level.
Policy-mix The overall stance of fiscal and monetary
policy. The policy-mix may consist of various combina-
tions of expansionary and restrictive policies, with a
given fiscal stance being either supported or offset by
monetary policy.
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of
interest payments on general government debt.
Primary structural budget balance The structural (or
cyclically adjusted) budget balance net of interest pay-
ments.
Procyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which amplifies
the economic cycle by increasing the structural primary
deficit during an economic upturn, or by decreasing it in
a downturn. It can be contrasted with (discretionary)
countercyclical policy that has the opposite effects. A
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically adjusted budget
balance unchanged over the economic cycle but lets the
automatic stabilisers work. See also tax smoothing.
Production function approach A means to estimate the
potential level of output of an economy on taking inputs
on labour and capital as well as trend factor productivity
into account. This is used to estimate the output gap that
is a key input in the estimation of cyclical budget com-
ponent.
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general
government sector. It includes the total nominal value of
all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State,
except that part of the debt which is owed to other public
institutions in the same Member State.
Public goods Those goods and services that are con-
sumed jointly by several economic agents and for which
there is no effective pricing mechanism that would allow
private provision through the market.
Public investment The component of total public
expenditure through which governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide.
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) Agreements that
transfer to the private sector investment projects that tra-
ditionally have been executed or financed by the public
sector. To qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a
public function, involve the general government as the
principal purchaser, be financed from non-public
sources and engage a corporation outside the general
government as the principal operator that provides sig-
nificant inputs in the design and conception of the
project and bears a relevant amount of the risk.
Quality of public finances The part of the EU fiscal
framework that relates to the identification of strategic
priorities and the effective and efficient use of resources
in reaching them.
Quasi-fiscal activities Activities promoting public pol-
icy goals carried out by non-government units.
QUEST The Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s
macroeconomic model of the EU Member States plus
the United States and Japan.
Recently acceded Member States Countries that
became members of the EU in May 2004, i.e. the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive theoret-
ical assumptions on the consumer’s behaviour (inter alia
infinite horizon for decision-making), the impact of fis-
cal policy does not depend on whether it is financed by
tax increases or by a widening deficit. The basic reason-
ing behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and was
revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s.
Securitisation Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with the
intention of paying interest and capital out of the pro-
ceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or from future
revenue flows.
Sensitivity analysis An econometric or statistical simu-
lation designed to test the robustness of an estimated
economic relationship or projection, given various
changes in the underlying assumptions.
Significant divergence A sizeable excess of budget bal-
ance over the targets in the stability or convergence pro-
grammes, that triggers the early-warning mechanism of
the SGP.330
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debt accumulation or decumulation arising from a posi-
tive or negative differential between the interest rate paid
on public debt and the growth rate of the national econ-
omy. See also government budget constraint.
Social security contributions (SSCs) Mandatory con-
tributions paid by employers and employees to a social
insurance scheme to cover pension, healthcare and other
welfare provisions.
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997,
the SGP clarifies the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
regarding the surveillance of Member State budgetary
policies and the monitoring of budget deficits during the
third stage of EMU. The SGP consists of two Council
regulations setting out legally binding provisions to be
followed by the European institutions and the Member
States and two resolutions of the European Council in
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also excessive deficit pro-
cedure.
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary strate-
gies presented by those Member States that have already
adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according
to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also convergence programmes.
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment
(also known as the debt–deficit adjustment) ensures con-
sistency between the net borrowing (flow) and the vari-
ation in the stock of gross debt. It includes the accumu-
lation of financial assets, changes in the value of debt
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining statisti-
cal adjustments.
Structural budget balance The actual budget balance
adjusted for its cyclical component. The structural bal-
ance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the
budget balance, when taking into account the automatic
effect on the budget of the economic cycle. It is also
referred to as the cyclically adjusted budget balance. See
also primary structural budget balance.
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and
debt that ensures that the latter does not grow without
bound. While conceptually intuitive, an agreed opera-
tional definition of sustainability has proven difficult to
achieve.
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances. They measure the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over a given projection period to achieve a predeter-
mined level of debt at the end of that projection period.
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be kept
stable in order to minimise the distortionary effects of
taxation, while leaving it for the automatic stabilisers to
smooth the economic cycle. It is also referred to as neu-
tral discretionary fiscal policy. See also cyclical compo-
nent of fiscal policy.
UMTS Third generation of technical support for mobile
phone communications. Sale of UMTS licences gave
rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 2001.
Wagner’s law Theory according to which public spend-
ing — since it comprises ‘luxury goods’ with high elas-
ticity to income — would tend to rise as a share of GDP
as per capita income increases.
Welfare state Range of policies designed to provide
insurance against unemployment, sickness and risks
associated with old age.331
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3. Useful Internet links
European Union
Economics and Finance Ministries
European Commission europa.eu.int/comm
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm
European Parliament www.europarl.eu.int/
Council of the European Union ue.eu.int/
Belgium treasury.fgov.be/interthes Ministère des Finances/Ministerie van Financen
Czech Republic www.mfcr.cz Ministry of Finance
Denmark www.fm.dk Ministry of Finance
Germany www.bundesfinanzministerium.de Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Estonia www.fin.ee Ministry of Finance
Spain www.mineco.es/ Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
France www.finances.gouv.fr Ministère Économie, Finances et l’Industrie
Ireland www.irlgov.ie/finance Department of Finance
Italy www.tesoro.it Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Ministry of Finance
Latvia www.fm.gov.lv Ministry of Finance
Lithuania www.finmin.lt Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg www.etat.lu/FI Ministère des Finances
Hungary www.p-m.hu Ministry of Finance
Malta mfea.gov.mt Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
Netherlands www.minfin.nl Ministerie van Financien
Austria www.bmf.gv.at Bundesministerium für Finanzen
Poland www.mofnet.gov.pl Ministry of Finance
Portugal www.min-financas.pt Ministério das Finanças
Slovenia sigov1.sigov.si/mf Ministry of Finance338
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Slovakia www.finance.gov.sk Ministry of Finance
Finland www.vn.fi/vm Ministry of Finance
Sweden finans.regeringen.se Finansdepartementet
United Kingdom www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Her Majesty’s Treasury
Bulgaria www.minfin.bg Ministry of Finance
Romania www.mfinante.ro Ministry of Finance
Turkey www.maliye.gov.tr Ministry of Finance
Japan www.mof.go.jp Ministry of Finance
United States of America www.ustreas.gov Department of the Treasury
European Union www.ecb.int European Central Bank
Belgium www.nbb.be Banque Nationale de Belgique/Nationale Bank van 
België
Czech Republic www. cnb.cz Czech National Bank
Denmark www.nationalbanken.dk Danmarks Nationalbank
Germany www.bundesbank.de Deutsche Bundesbank
Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank
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EXTable A.1.1
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Belgium 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.2 13.1 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.2 13.4 13.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 16.7 17.3 17.6 17.6 17.0 17.1 17.3 16.8
3. Social contributions 16.8 16.1 16.4 16.7 16.5 16.0 15.8 15.5
4. Of which actual social contributions 14.8 14.1 14.4 14.6 14.4 14.0 13.8 13.6
5. Other current resources 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
6. Total current resources 48.8 49.4 49.7 50.0 49.1 49.0 49.0 48.1
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.4 21.1 21.7 22.3 22.8 22.9 22.9 22.8
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.9 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.1 11.9 11.8 11.6
9. Collective consumption 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.1
10. Social benefits in kind 13.5 13.2 13.7 13.9 14.4 14.5 14.7 14.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.6 15.2 15.4 16.0 16.2 15.9 15.7 15.5
12. Interest payments 9.3 6.7 6.5 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2
13. Subsidies 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
15. Total current expenditure 50.7 46.5 47.2 47.9 48.3 47.3 46.8 46.2
16. Gross savings – 2.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 0.8 1.6 2.1 1.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 2.5 0.9 0.5 0.5
18. Total resources 48.5 49.4 49.9 50.3 51.3 49.6 49.1 48.5
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0
20. Other capital expenditure 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9
21. Total expenditure 52.9 49.2 49.3 50.2 50.9 49.5 49.3 49.0
22. Tax burden 46.8 47.5 47.7 48.0 47.2 47.2 47.4 46.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.346
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.2
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (2)
 Germany (1) 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.4 12.0 11.9 11.9 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.1 12.5 11.1 10.8 10.6 10.2 10.1 10.2
3. Social contributions 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.5 18.6 18.2 18.0 17.8
4. Of which actual social contributions 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.5 17.2 17.0 16.8
5. Other current resources 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.5
6. Total current resources 44.8 46.1 44.5 44.2 44.1 42.9 42.7 42.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.8 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.2 18.7 18.5 18.2
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.0 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.4
9. Collective consumption 8.4 7.9 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3
10. Social benefits in kind 11.4 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.3 11.0 11.0 10.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 18.1 18.7 18.8 19.4 19.7 19.4 19.3 18.8
12. Interest payments 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
13. Subsidies 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure 44.9 44.5 44.3 45.0 45.2 44.2 43.5 42.8
16. Gross savings – 0.1 1.6 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
18. Total resources 46.1 47.1 45.5 45.1 45.0 43.8 43.6 43.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 – 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
21. Total expenditure 49.4 45.7 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 47.0 46.2
22. Tax burden 42.2 43.8 42.0 41.5 41.6 40.7 40.4 40.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.3 1.3 – 2.8 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.8
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.347
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EXTable A.1.3
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Greece 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.5 15.2 14.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 14.3 14.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 7.4 10.8 9.5 9.5 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.7
3. Social contributions 12.6 14.0 14.1 15.0 15.5 16.3 16.8 17.2
4. Of which actual social contributions 10.5 11.7 11.9 12.8 13.2 13.9 14.3 14.6
5. Other current resources 4.5 3.6 4.3 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0
6. Total current resources 38.1 43.5 42.6 42.7 41.5 41.8 42.1 42.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 15.3 17.7 16.8 17.6 16.4 17.1 16.9 16.4
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.3 11.7 11.6 12.2 11.9 12.5 12.5 12.2
9. Collective consumption 9.4 11.7 10.7 11.4 10.2 10.9 10.8 10.5
10. Social benefits in kind 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.1 5.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.1 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.8 18.7 19.6 20.5
12. Interest payments 12.7 8.2 7.3 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.5
13. Subsidies 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
14. Other current expenditure 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure 44.9 43.7 42.4 42.3 41.8 43.4 43.7 44.1
16. Gross savings – 6.8 – 0.2 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.8
17. Capital transfers received 1.6 3.2 2.7 1.8 1.9 2.6 2.7 2.5
18. Total resources 40.9 47.9 46.5 45.2 43.5 43.9 44.3 44.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 4.1 4.0 3.6 4.0 4.1 3.3 3.1
20. Other capital expenditure 1.7 3.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.4 2.1
21. Total expenditure 51.0 52.0 50.2 49.0 48.0 50.0 48.8 48.7
22. Tax burden 34.4 40.6 38.9 39.5 38.7 39.2 39.7 40.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 10.2 – 4.1 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 5.2 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 4.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.348
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EXTable A.1.4
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Spain 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 10.2 11.7 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.4 12.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 10.1 10.5 10.4 10.9 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.7
3. Social contributions 13.0 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.7
4. Of which actual social contributions 12.0 12.4 12.7 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.8 12.9
5. Other current resources 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0
6. Total current resources 37.4 38.8 38.9 39.4 39.6 39.8 39.9 40.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.1 17.7 17.6 17.7 17.9 18.3 18.5 18.7
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.3 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.3
9. Collective consumption 8.0 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.1
10. Social benefits in kind 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.5 10.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind 13.9 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.1
12. Interest payments 5.2 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0
13. Subsidies 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0
14. Other current expenditure 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
15. Total current expenditure 39.2 35.7 35.1 35.3 35.2 35.2 35.3 35.4
16. Gross savings – 1.8 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6
17. Capital transfers received 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
18. Total resources 38.4 39.1 39.2 39.8 40.0 40.2 40.4 40.5
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
20. Other capital expenditure 2.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.7
21. Total expenditure 45.0 39.9 39.7 40.1 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
22. Tax burden 34.0 36.1 35.9 36.5 36.7 37.0 37.2 37.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 6.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.349
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EXTable A.1.5
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 France 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.4 15.5 15.0 15.1 15.1 15.5 15.5 15.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.5 12.2 12.5 11.5 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.4
3. Social contributions 20.5 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.5 18.2 18.4 18.4
4. Of which actual social contributions 18.7 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.4 16.5 16.5
5. Other current resources 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6
6. Total current resources 48.1 49.3 49.3 48.3 48.2 48.5 48.9 48.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 23.9 23.2 23.2 23.9 24.3 24.1 24.0 23.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.7 13.5 13.4
9. Collective consumption 9.8 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3
10. Social benefits in kind 14.1 14.0 14.0 14.5 14.8 14.7 14.7 14.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind 18.5 17.8 17.7 18.0 18.4 18.4 18.5 18.4
12. Interest payments 3.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0
13. Subsidies 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1
15. Total current expenditure 49.2 47.0 47.0 48.0 48.9 48.8 48.8 48.8
16. Gross savings – 1.1 2.3 2.2 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.8
18. Total resources 49.7 51.2 50.9 50.2 50.4 50.8 51.5 51.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7
21. Total expenditure 55.2 52.5 52.5 53.4 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
22. Tax burden 45.2 46.5 46.2 45.3 45.2 45.4 45.7 45.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.2 – 4.2 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.350
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EXTable A.1.6
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Ireland 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.5 13.2 12.0 12.2 12.7 13.2 13.1 13.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 13.6 13.5 12.9 11.7 12.2 12.5 11.7 11.5
3. Social contributions 6.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.1
4. Of which actual social contributions 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.6
5. Other current resources 2.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7
6. Total current resources 36.8 34.5 32.9 31.8 32.8 34.0 32.8 32.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 16.5 14.0 14.8 15.4 15.9 16.1 16.0 15.8
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.2 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.4
9. Collective consumption 6.5 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
10. Social benefits in kind 10.0 8.7 9.5 9.9 10.3 10.5 10.4 10.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.8 8.1 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.2 9.6 9.3
12. Interest payments 5.4 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
13. Subsidies 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
14. Other current expenditure 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5
15. Total current expenditure 36.8 26.8 27.7 28.4 29.1 29.5 29.8 29.3
16. Gross savings 0.0 7.8 5.2 3.4 3.8 4.5 3.0 3.0
17. Capital transfers received 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
18. Total resources 39.5 36.4 34.5 33.6 34.6 35.7 34.5 34.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 3.6 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.9
20. Other capital expenditure 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8
21. Total expenditure 41.6 32.0 33.6 33.9 34.4 34.3 35.1 34.6
22. Tax burden 35.1 33.1 31.3 30.1 31.2 32.3 31.4 31.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.1 4.4 0.9 – 0.4 0.2 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.351
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EXTable A.1.7
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Italy 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.1 15.0 14.5 14.7 14.4 14.4 14.6 14.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 14.8 14.7 15.1 14.3 13.8 13.7 13.4 13.2
3. Social contributions 14.8 12.7 12.6 12.8 13.0 12.9 12.9 12.9
4. Of which actual social contributions 13.0 12.4 12.3 12.5 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.6
5. Other current resources 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.1
6. Total current resources 44.8 45.5 45.5 45.0 44.3 44.3 44.1 43.6
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.9 18.3 18.8 19.0 19.5 19.2 19.2 18.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.2 10.6 10.8 10.8 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.8
9. Collective consumption 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.2
10. Social benefits in kind 10.6 11.2 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.7 16.8 16.6 17.0 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.4
12. Interest payments 11.5 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.0
13. Subsidies 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
15. Total current expenditure 48.6 44.0 44.5 44.3 44.8 44.3 44.3 44.0
16. Gross savings – 3.8 1.4 1.0 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.3
18. Total resources 45.8 46.2 46.0 45.6 46.3 45.4 44.6 44.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.1 2.4 2.5 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.9
20. Other capital expenditure 2.5 0.2 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6
21. Total expenditure 53.4 46.9 49.0 48.2 49.2 48.4 48.2 48.5
22. Tax burden 42.3 43.0 42.8 42.2 41.5 41.4 41.2 40.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 7.6 – 0.6 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 4.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.352
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EXTable A.1.8
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Luxembourg 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.5 14.1 13.6 13.4 13.5 15.0 15.2 15.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 17.5 15.4 15.5 16.0 15.7 13.9 13.5 13.3
3. Social contributions 12.5 11.2 12.0 12.2 12.4 12.2 12.0 11.9
4. Of which actual social contributions 11.2 10.3 11.1 11.4 11.5 11.3 11.2 11.1
5. Other current resources 5.6 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8
6. Total current resources 48.2 45.2 45.8 46.4 45.9 45.1 44.6 44.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.4 15.7 16.9 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.0 18.0
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.7 7.8 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.3
9. Collective consumption 8.0 6.5 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1
10. Social benefits in kind 10.4 9.2 10.0 10.3 10.6 11.0 10.9 10.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.4 13.6 14.3 15.4 16.1 15.7 15.9 16.1
12. Interest payments 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
13. Subsidies 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
14. Other current expenditure 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.5
15. Total current expenditure 39.9 34.2 36.0 37.9 39.6 39.5 39.4 39.5
16. Gross savings 8.3 11.0 9.9 8.5 6.5 5.6 5.2 4.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total resources 47.6 44.7 45.3 46.0 45.5 44.9 44.4 44.2
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.6 3.8 4.4 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 1.0 – 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.8
21. Total expenditure 45.0 38.5 39.1 43.7 45.1 46.0 46.0 46.0
22. Tax burden 43.5 41.3 41.5 42.0 42.1 41.6 41.3 41.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 2.5 6.2 6.2 2.3 0.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.353
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.9
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 The Netherlands 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 10.7 12.1 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 12.4 12.1 11.9 12.0 11.2 11.0 11.1 11.2
3. Social contributions 17.2 17.1 15.3 14.9 15.5 15.1 15.0 16.9
4. Of which actual social contributions 16.0 16.0 14.3 13.9 14.5 14.5 14.4 16.3
5. Other current resources 6.0 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.0
6. Total current resources 46.3 46.1 45.2 44.5 44.3 44.3 44.6 46.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 24.0 22.7 23.5 24.6 25.4 25.4 25.5 26.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.8 10.0 10.1 10.5 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.5
9. Collective consumption 11.6 10.6 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
10. Social benefits in kind 12.5 12.0 12.4 13.3 14.0 14.0 14.1 15.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.3 11.8 11.7 11.8 12.3 11.8 11.8 11.9
12. Interest payments 5.9 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
13. Subsidies 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0
14. Other current expenditure 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
15. Total current expenditure 47.4 41.5 41.7 42.7 43.8 43.1 43.1 44.5
16. Gross savings – 1.1 4.6 3.5 1.7 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
18. Total resources 47.3 47.5 46.6 45.9 45.8 45.5 45.8 47.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure 0.4 – 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
21. Total expenditure 51.4 45.3 46.6 47.8 49.0 48.0 47.9 49.2
22. Tax burden 41.5 42.2 40.7 40.1 40.0 39.9 40.2 42.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.2 2.2 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.354
A
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EXTable A.1.10
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Austria 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 14.0 14.6 14.6 15.0 14.8 15.0 14.6 14.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.8 13.2 15.0 14.0 13.5 13.1 12.3 12.0
3. Social contributions 17.3 16.8 16.7 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.3
4. Of which actual social contributions 15.1 14.9 14.9 14.8 14.8 14.7 14.7 14.6
5. Other current resources 4.9 3.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.6
6. Total current resources 48.1 47.9 50.6 49.5 48.8 48.2 47.0 46.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 20.3 18.6 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.1 17.8 17.5
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.6 11.0 9.8 9.7 9.7 9.4 9.3 9.1
9. Collective consumption 8.2 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 6.8
10. Social benefits in kind 12.2 11.2 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.1 10.9 10.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 19.5 18.6 18.7 18.6 18.9 18.8 18.8 18.7
12. Interest payments 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
13. Subsidies 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.7
14. Other current expenditure 2.4 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6
15. Total current expenditure 49.0 46.1 46.8 46.5 46.9 46.3 45.8 45.3
16. Gross savings – 1.0 1.6 3.6 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total resources 50.9 50.5 51.7 50.8 50.0 49.4 48.1 47.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.0 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
20. Other capital expenditure 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.8
21. Total expenditure 56.7 52.0 51.4 51.0 51.2 50.7 50.1 49.2
22. Tax burden 44.1 45.3 47.1 45.9 45.2 44.9 43.8 43.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.7 – 1.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.355
A
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EXTable A.1.11
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Portugal 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.6 14.4 14.2 15.0 15.6 15.3 15.4 15.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.9 10.4 9.9 9.8 9.3 9.1 8.7 8.9
3. Social contributions 11.0 11.8 12.0 12.3 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
4. Of which actual social contributions 10.1 10.9 11.1 11.4 11.7 11.9 11.9 11.9
5. Other current resources 4.1 3.6 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.4
6. Total current resources 37.6 40.3 39.8 41.1 41.5 41.4 41.0 41.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.6 20.5 20.9 21.2 21.2 21.4 21.4 21.0
8. Of which compensation of employees 13.6 15.0 15.1 15.4 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.4
9. Collective consumption 7.6 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.3
10. Social benefits in kind 11.0 12.1 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.9 12.9 12.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.8 12.4 12.7 13.2 14.2 14.9 15.4 15.7
12. Interest payments 6.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1
13. Subsidies 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 1.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6
15. Total current expenditure 39.6 39.5 40.5 41.4 42.6 43.6 43.8 43.8
16. Gross savings – 2.1 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 2.3 – 2.8 – 2.5
17. Capital transfers received 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.9 4.2 2.3 2.0
18. Total resources 39.6 42.3 41.9 43.3 44.8 43.8 42.5 43.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.1
21. Total expenditure 45.0 45.1 46.3 45.9 47.7 46.7 47.4 47.8
22. Tax burden 34.4 37.2 36.6 37.4 38.0 37.4 37.1 37.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.5 – 2.8 – 4.4 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.9 – 4.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.356
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EXTable A.1.12
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Finland 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.6 13.7 13.4 13.7 14.2 13.9 13.8 13.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 17.4 21.4 19.5 19.3 18.1 17.8 17.4 16.9
3. Social contributions 14.8 12.3 12.6 12.3 12.1 12.0 12.3 12.6
4. Of which actual social contributions 14.6 12.3 12.6 12.3 12.1 12.0 12.3 12.6
5. Other current resources 7.3 6.2 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.7
6. Total current resources 53.1 53.6 51.9 51.5 50.3 49.7 49.2 48.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 22.8 20.6 21.0 21.6 22.1 22.4 22.6 22.8
8. Of which compensation of employees 15.2 13.2 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.9
9. Collective consumption 8.5 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9
10. Social benefits in kind 14.3 13.2 13.6 14.0 14.3 14.6 14.7 14.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 22.1 16.5 16.4 16.8 17.0 16.8 16.7 16.5
12. Interest payments 4.0 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.5
13. Subsidies 2.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
15. Total current expenditure 53.7 43.9 43.9 44.5 45.2 44.8 44.9 44.7
16. Gross savings – 0.7 9.7 8.0 7.0 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
18. Total resources 55.7 56.1 54.4 54.2 53.3 52.5 51.9 51.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
21. Total expenditure 59.6 49.1 49.2 50.0 50.8 50.4 50.3 49.8
22. Tax burden 46.5 47.9 45.9 45.6 44.6 43.9 43.7 43.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.9 7.1 5.2 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.357
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EXTable A.1.13
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Czech Republic 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.3 11.5 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.9 11.7 11.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.6 8.4 8.9 9.3 9.8 9.4 8.4 8.3
3. Social contributions 14.4 14.5 14.5 15.0 15.1 14.8 14.8 14.6
4. Of which actual social contributions 14.4 14.5 14.5 10.7 15.1 14.8 14.8 14.6
5. Other current resources 6.9 6.7 7.0 6.8 7.6 7.8 8.1 7.7
6. Total current resources 43.1 41.2 41.5 42.3 43.8 43.9 42.9 42.1
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.7 22.1 22.2 23.0 24.0 22.8 22.6 22.5
8. Of which compensation of employees 7.3 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.1
9. Collective consumption 10.6 11.5 11.2 11.5 12.3 11.6 11.7 12.1
10. Social benefits in kind 11.2 10.6 10.9 11.5 11.7 11.3 10.8 10.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind 10.7 12.3 12.1 12.5 12.3 11.9 11.9 11.4
12. Interest payments 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
13. Subsidies 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.7 3.5 2.9 3.0
14. Other current expenditure 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5
15. Total current expenditure 37.4 39.0 39.0 40.3 41.6 40.9 40.1 39.9
16. Gross savings 5.7 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.8 2.3
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2
18. Total resources 41.0 38.5 39.1 40.2 41.6 42.7 41.8 41.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 5.1 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9
20. Other capital expenditure 14.6 3.1 5.5 5.0 9.8 2.2 3.6 2.6
21. Total expenditure 54.4 42.1 45.0 46.9 53.3 45.7 46.3 45.1
22. Tax burden 36.2 34.5 34.5 35.5 36.2 36.1 34.8 34.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 13.4 – 3.7 – 5.9 – 6.8 – 11.7 – 3.0 – 4.5 – 4.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.358
A
N
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EXTable A.1.14
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Denmark 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 16.9 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 30.4 29.7 30.0 29.4 29.5 30.5 29.6 29.3
3. Social contributions 2.6 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
4. Of which actual social contributions 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
5. Other current resources 6.4 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.6
6. Total current resources 56.3 55.2 55.8 54.6 54.7 55.8 54.5 53.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 25.8 25.3 25.9 26.3 26.6 26.5 26.2 26.0
8. Of which compensation of employees 17.3 16.9 17.3 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.7
9. Collective consumption 8.4 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4
10. Social benefits in kind 17.4 17.6 18.3 18.8 19.0 18.9 18.7 18.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind 20.4 17.3 17.3 17.5 18.1 18.0 17.8 17.5
12. Interest payments 6.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0
13. Subsidies 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
14. Other current expenditure 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
15. Total current expenditure 56.9 50.9 51.2 51.5 51.9 51.5 50.8 50.1
16. Gross savings – 0.5 4.2 4.5 2.9 2.6 4.1 3.6 3.5
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
18. Total resources 57.6 56.7 57.4 56.6 56.6 57.7 56.5 55.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7
20. Other capital expenditure 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
21. Total expenditure 59.9 54.1 54.3 54.9 55.3 55.0 54.3 53.5
22. Tax burden 50.2 50.4 50.7 49.7 49.7 50.9 49.9 49.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.3 2.6 3.2 1.7 1.2 2.8 2.1 2.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.359
A
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EXTable A.1.15
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Estonia 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.9 12.9 12.8 13.1 13.1 12.7 13.5 13.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 10.9 8.1 7.6 7.9 8.7 8.7 7.6 6.9
3. Social contributions 13.1 11.4 11.1 11.4 11.5 11.2 11.2 10.9
4. Of which actual social contributions 13.1 11.4 11.1 11.4 11.5 11.2 11.2 10.9
5. Other current resources 8.8 4.1 5.0 4.7 4.2 5.6 6.2 5.8
6. Total current resources 46.6 36.5 36.5 37.1 37.5 38.2 38.5 37.2
7. Government consumption expenditure 27.2 19.9 19.0 18.8 18.7 18.7 19.4 19.0
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.7 10.8 10.2 9.9 10.2 9.9 9.8 9.7
9. Collective consumption 11.9 9.5 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 9.0 8.8
10. Social benefits in kind 15.3 10.3 9.9 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.3 10.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.2 9.6 10.2 10.6 10.5
12. Interest payments 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
13. Subsidies 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.6
14. Other current expenditure 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 2.6 1.6 1.3
15. Total current expenditure 39.5 31.9 30.7 29.9 30.3 33.1 33.4 32.6
16. Gross savings 7.1 4.6 5.8 7.2 7.2 5.1 5.1 4.6
17. Capital transfers received 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.6 1.7 1.6
18. Total resources 43.9 37.7 37.2 38.0 38.9 40.9 40.8 39.2
19. Gross fixed capital formation 5.0 3.9 4.1 4.7 3.4 3.6 4.3 4.2
20. Other capital expenditure 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5
21. Total expenditure 43.4 38.2 36.9 36.6 35.8 39.1 40.0 38.7
22. Tax burden 37.9 32.4 31.6 32.4 33.4 32.6 32.3 31.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 0.4 – 0.6 0.3 1.4 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.360
A
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EXTable A.1.16
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Cyprus 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports      : 12.7 13.2 13.4 16.5 16.1 16.1 16.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth      : 11.1 11.3 11.2 9.7 9.2 9.8 9.3
3. Social contributions      : 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.1 8.4 8.2 8.0
4. Of which actual social contributions      : 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.1 8.4 8.2 8.0
5. Other current resources      : 3.2 3.7 2.9 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
6. Total current resources      : 33.7 35.1 34.4 37.3 37.4 37.7 37.2
7. Government consumption expenditure      : 16.4 17.5 18.4 19.9 18.3 18.0 17.6
8. Of which compensation of employees      : 13.8 13.5 13.9 15.7 14.8 13.8 13.0
9. Collective consumption      : 8.4 9.6 10.1 11.0 10.1 9.9 9.7
10. Social benefits in kind      : 8.0 7.9 8.3 9.0 8.2 8.1 7.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind      : 9.1 9.4 10.3 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.3
12. Interest payments      : 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2
13. Subsidies      : 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.6
14. Other current expenditure      : 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4
15. Total current expenditure      : 32.6 34.0 35.3 39.6 37.5 36.6 35.2
16. Gross savings      : 1.1 1.1 – 0.9 – 2.3 – 0.2 1.2 2.0
17. Capital transfers received      : 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1
18. Total resources      : 35.3 36.6 36.1 39.1 39.4 39.4 38.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation      : 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.5
20. Other capital expenditure      : 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
21. Total expenditure      : 37.7 38.9 40.6 45.4 43.6 42.3 40.7
22. Tax burden      : 30.5 31.5 31.4 33.3 33.6 34.1 33.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)      : – 2.4 – 2.3 – 4.5 – 6.3 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 1.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.361
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EXTable A.1.17
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Latvia 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.7 11.7 11.2 10.7 11.5 11.3 11.2 11.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 7.8 8.3 8.5 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.1
3. Social contributions 12.2 10.2 9.4 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.2 7.8
4. Of which actual social contributions 12.1 10.0 9.3 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.2 7.8
5. Other current resources 6.4 7.2 7.4 5.9 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.2
6. Total current resources 40.0 37.5 36.5 34.8 35.4 34.5 33.1 32.2
7. Government consumption expenditure 24.4 21.0 20.6 21.1 21.8 21.5 21.1 20.7
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.3 10.9 10.3 10.6 11.1 10.9 11.2 11.6
9. Collective consumption 12.0 10.3 10.5 10.7 11.0 10.9 10.7 10.5
10. Social benefits in kind 12.5 10.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 10.6 10.5 10.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.8 12.6 11.3 10.3 9.6 8.3 8.0 7.8
12. Interest payments 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
13. Subsidies 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.6
14. Other current expenditure 0.1 1.7 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2
15. Total current expenditure 39.8 37.3 35.4 34.0 33.7 32.4 32.7 32.1
16. Gross savings 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.1 0.5 0.2
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 2.6 3.4
18. Total resources 37.3 35.1 34.4 33.1 34.2 35.2 35.4 35.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.6 3.1
20. Other capital expenditure 0.8 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.9
21. Total expenditure 39.3 37.9 36.5 35.8 35.7 35.9 37.0 36.8
22. Tax burden 33.7 30.3 29.1 28.9 29.1 28.5 27.7 27.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 1.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.362
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.18
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Lithuania 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.3 12.5 12.2 12.5 11.9 11.1 10.8 10.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.8 8.5 7.9 7.5 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.6
3. Social contributions 7.6 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.5
4. Of which actual social contributions 7.6 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.5
5. Other current resources 6.3 5.7 4.7 3.7 3.3 3.4 4.0 3.8
6. Total current resources 34.9 36.1 33.8 32.5 31.9 30.8 31.1 30.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.9 21.6 19.8 19.3 18.5 17.5 17.4 16.9
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.1 12.8 11.7 11.4 11.0 11.1 11.0 10.7
9. Collective consumption 9.9 9.5 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.0
10. Social benefits in kind 12.0 12.1 11.8 11.6 10.8 10.2 10.1 9.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 8.6 10.7 10.6 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.3 8.9
12. Interest payments 0.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
13. Subsidies 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.5
14. Other current expenditure 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.8
15. Total current expenditure 32.0 35.2 33.1 31.0 29.9 29.7 30.0 29.0
16. Gross savings 2.9 1.0 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.1 1.1 1.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.2
18. Total resources 34.2 35.8 33.0 32.8 32.3 31.8 32.3 31.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure      : 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2
21. Total expenditure 36.1 38.4 35.0 34.3 34.2 34.3 34.8 33.6
22. Tax burden 28.6 30.5 29.1 28.7 28.6 27.4 27.1 26.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.363
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.19
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Hungary 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 17.9 16.4 15.7 15.2 15.8 16.3 15.7 16.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.4 9.7 9.7 9.4 9.4
3. Social contributions 15.6 13.9 14.0 13.9 13.5 13.6 13.5 13.4
4. Of which actual social contributions      : 13.8 13.9 13.9 13.4 13.7 13.5 13.5
5. Other current resources      : 6.0 5.7 5.7 6.6 5.5 5.3 5.2
6. Total current resources      : 46.2 45.7 45.2 45.6 45.2 43.9 44.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 23.6 21.3 21.8 23.4 24.2 23.7 22.7 22.3
8. Of which compensation of employees 12.2 10.7 11.4 12.5 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.6
9. Collective consumption 11.0 10.0 10.2 10.8 10.8 10.6 10.1 9.9
10. Social benefits in kind 12.6 11.3 11.6 12.6 13.4 13.1 12.5 12.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.8 12.8 12.9 13.7 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.1
12. Interest payments      : 5.6 4.7 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.8 3.4
13. Subsidies 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure      : 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.8 2.3
15. Total current expenditure      : 43.0 42.9 44.8 45.8 44.8 43.6 43.2
16. Gross savings      : 3.1 2.7 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8
17. Capital transfers received      : 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
18. Total resources      : 45.3 45.0 44.1 44.5 47.5 43.9 43.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation      : 3.2 3.8 4.9 3.4 3.5 2.3 3.1
20. Other capital expenditure      : 2.8 3.1 4.4 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.4
21. Total expenditure      : 47.6 48.7 52.6 50.8 52.0 47.8 47.1
22. Tax burden      : 40.2 40.0 39.5 39.8      :      :   :           
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)      : – 2.4 – 3.7 – 8.5 – 6.2 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.364
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.20
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Malta 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports      : 12.9 13.4 14.2 13.4 15.3 17.2 17.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth      : 9.3 10.2 11.8 12.2 11.9 12.1 12.2
3. Social contributions      : 7.7 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.7
4. Of which actual social contributions      : 6.5 7.0 6.8 6.7 8.3 8.5 8.3
5. Other current resources      : 6.3 6.6 6.5 7.4 5.4 4.4 3.9
6. Total current resources      : 36.2 38.6 40.9 41.2 40.9 42.3 41.9
7. Government consumption expenditure      : 19.4 20.6 21.2 21.4 21.7 21.5 20.9
8. Of which compensation of employees      : 13.3 15.0 15.1 15.3 15.0 15.2 14.9
9. Collective consumption      : 9.2 9.8 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.1 10.0
10. Social benefits in kind      : 10.2 10.8 11.2 11.4 11.5 11.4 10.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind      : 12.1 12.6 12.8 13.0 13.1 12.9 12.6
12. Interest payments      : 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.3
13. Subsidies      : 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.4
14. Other current expenditure      : 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.8
15. Total current expenditure      : 38.6 40.7 42.2 42.7 43.0 42.7 42.1
16. Gross savings      : – 2.4 – 2.1 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 0.3 – 0.2
17. Capital transfers received      : 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 2.0 2.2 2.2
18. Total resources      : 36.0 37.6 40.0 40.5 49.0 48.8 48.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation      : 4.1 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.3 3.9 3.7
20. Other capital expenditure      : 0.9 1.0 0.4 3.5 0.7 1.9 1.1
21. Total expenditure      : 42.3 44.1 45.8 50.9 54.1 52.6 51.4
22. Tax burden      : 29.9 32.0 34.4 33.9 35.5 37.9 38.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)      : – 6.3 – 6.4 – 5.9 – 10.5 – 5.2 – 3.9 – 2.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.365
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.21
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Poland 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.8 14.8 14.4 14.7 15.1 15.1 15.4 15.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 12.8 7.4 6.9 6.6 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.9
3. Social contributions 11.7 14.0 15.3 14.7 14.1 13.1 12.9 12.7
4. Of which actual social contributions 11.7 14.0 15.3 14.7 14.1 13.1 12.9 12.7
5. Other current resources 4.9 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.3 3.6 3.9 4.1
6. Total current resources 45.1 40.3 40.7 40.1 40.7 38.9 39.2 39.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.0 18.0 18.0 18.1 17.6 16.9 16.5 16.1
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.3 11.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.5 11.4 11.2
9. Collective consumption 9.3 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.3
10. Social benefits in kind 9.7 8.9 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.9 16.6 17.1 17.7 17.6 17.7 17.3 16.9
12. Interest payments 5.8 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.5
13. Subsidies 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9
14. Other current expenditure 1.4 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.5 2.5 2.3 2.2
15. Total current expenditure 44.6 39.3 39.9 40.1 40.1 40.6 39.7 38.6
16. Gross savings 0.5 1.4 0.9 – 0.7 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.4 0.9
17. Capital transfers received – 0.7 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1
18. Total resources 47.4 42.5 43.8 43.9 44.3 43.8 44.2 44.2
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 2.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.7
20. Other capital expenditure 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9
21. Total expenditure 51.3 45.2 47.7 47.5 48.8 48.7 48.6 48.0
22. Tax burden 40.2 36.2 36.6 36.1 36.6 35.5 35.5 35.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.3 – 1.6 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 4.5 – 4.8 – 4.4 – 3.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.366
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.22
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Slovenia 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports      : 16.5 16.2 16.5 16.8 16.7 16.4 16.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth      : 7.6 7.7 8.0 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
3. Social contributions      : 15.1 15.4 15.2 15.2 14.8 14.5 14.2
4. Of which actual social contributions      : 14.9 15.1 14.9 14.9 14.6 14.2 14.0
5. Other current resources      : 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.6
6. Total current resources      : 42.9 43.2 43.6 44.3 43.9 43.5 43.3
7. Government consumption expenditure      : 19.9 20.5 20.2 20.3 19.9 19.7 19.6
8. Of which compensation of employees      : 11.8 12.3 12.1 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.1
9. Collective consumption      : 7.6 7.8 8.3 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.1
10. Social benefits in kind      : 12.3 12.7 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind      : 17.2 17.1 17.2 17.2 17.1 16.9 16.7
12. Interest payments      : 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
13. Subsidies      : 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9
14. Other current expenditure      : 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8
15. Total current expenditure      : 42.2 42.5 42.3 42.4 42.0 41.8 41.5
16. Gross savings      : 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8
17. Capital transfers received      : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total resources      : 44.7 45.1 45.7 46.2 45.8 45.4 45.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation      : 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9
20. Other capital expenditure      : 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
21. Total expenditure      : 48.2 47.9 48.1 48.2 47.7 47.6 47.2
22. Tax burden      : 39.2 39.3 39.7 40.4 39.9 39.2 38.7
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)      : – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.367
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.23
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Slovakia 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.6 13.0 11.8 12.0 11.5 11.8 11.8 11.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.6 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 5.7 5.6 5.4
3. Social contributions 14.4 13.8 13.7 13.6 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.0
4. Of which actual social contributions 14.3 13.7 13.7 13.5 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.0
5. Other current resources 13.8 15.1 14.3 13.8 6.0 4.8 5.7 5.5
6. Total current resources 55.4 49.5 47.2 46.9 37.2 34.7 35.6 34.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 20.5 19.8 20.1 20.1 19.9 19.4 19.4 19.2
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.5 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.5 8.2
9. Collective consumption 16.2 10.9 11.3 11.3 11.0 10.8 10.8 10.7
10. Social benefits in kind 4.4 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.2 12.3 12.0 11.8 11.4 9.7 9.4 9.1
12. Interest payments 2.3 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.2
13. Subsidies 4.8 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
14. Other current expenditure 8.0 10.1 9.0 10.6 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.7
15. Total current expenditure 47.9 48.9 47.3 47.6 37.8 35.2 35.9 34.9
16. Gross savings 7.5 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5
17. Capital transfers received 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.4
18. Total resources 53.3 47.6 45.5 45.2 35.4 35.1 36.1 34.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4
20. Other capital expenditure 6.9 10.5 3.1 2.2 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.5
21. Total expenditure 54.1 59.9 51.5 50.9 39.2 38.5 39.9 38.8
22. Tax burden 41.6 34.3 32.9 33.1 31.2      :      :   :           
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 0.9 – 12.3 – 6.0 – 5.7 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 4.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.368
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.24
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 Sweden 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.6 16.4 16.5 17.0 17.1 17.0 16.8 16.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 20.1 22.4 19.9 18.0 18.9 19.3 19.0 18.9
3. Social contributions 13.7 15.0 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.7 14.7 14.7
4. Of which actual social contributions 13.1 14.4 14.8 14.6 14.3 14.0 14.0 13.9
5. Other current resources 8.2 6.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7
6. Total current resources 57.5 59.8 56.9 55.3 56.0 55.9 55.3 54.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 27.2 26.6 27.0 27.9 28.3 27.8 27.6 27.5
8. Of which compensation of employees 16.7 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.3
9. Collective consumption 8.3 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9
10. Social benefits in kind 18.9 18.2 18.8 19.6 20.1 19.8 19.7 19.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind 20.6 17.5 17.4 17.5 18.2 18.1 17.9 17.7
12. Interest payments 6.7 4.1 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.1
13. Subsidies 3.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
15. Total current expenditure 60.2 52.0 51.4 52.3 52.7 51.6 51.6 51.2
16. Gross savings – 2.6 7.7 5.5 2.7 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.6
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total resources 60.8 62.3 59.5 57.8 58.6 58.4 57.8 57.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
20. Other capital expenditure 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
21. Total expenditure 67.8 57.4 57.0 58.1 58.4 57.0 57.0 56.6
22. Tax burden 50.1 54.3 52.3 50.6 51.4 51.3 50.8 50.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 7.0 5.0 2.5 – 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.369
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.25
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 United Kingdom 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.1 13.6 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.4 13.3 13.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 14.9 16.7 16.8 15.7 15.2 15.6 16.3 16.7
3. Social contributions 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.4 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1
4. Of which actual social contributions 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.6
5. Other current resources 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
6. Total current resources 38.3 40.3 40.4 38.7 38.6 39.2 39.8 40.2
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.5 18.6 19.1 20.0 20.9 21.2 21.4 21.6
8. Of which compensation of employees 10.8 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.9
9. Collective consumption 8.3 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3
10. Social benefits in kind 11.2 11.2 11.5 12.2 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.4 13.3 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.4 13.2
12. Interest payments 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
13. Subsidies 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
14. Other current expenditure 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9
15. Total current expenditure 41.0 37.4 38.0 38.6 39.8 40.3 40.5 40.5
16. Gross savings – 2.7 2.9 2.4 0.0 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.3
17. Capital transfers received 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
18. Total resources 39.1 41.2 41.5 40.0 40.0 40.4 40.9 41.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1
20. Other capital expenditure 1.2 – 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8
21. Total expenditure 44.9 37.4 40.9 41.7 43.4 43.6 44.0 44.1
22. Tax burden 36.5 38.5 38.3 36.8 36.8 37.5 38.0 38.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.8 3.8 0.7 – 1.7 – 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.370
A
N
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EXTable A.1.26
Resources and expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions (2)
 Euro area (1) 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.5 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.4 13.0 12.6 12.1 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5
3. Social contributions 17.4 16.2 16.0 16.0 16.2 15.9 15.9 15.9
4. Of which actual social contributions 16.0 15.1 14.9 14.9 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.8
5. Other current resources 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1
6. Total current resources (1 + 2 + 3 + 5) 45.1 46.0 45.4 45.0 44.7 44.4 44.3 44.2
7. Government consumption expenditure (9 + 10) 20.5 19.9 20.1 20.4 20.7 20.5 20.4 20.4
8. Of which compensation of employees 11.1 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.4
9. Collective consumption 8.6 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1
10. Social benefits in kind 11.9 11.7 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.2 12.2 12.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.3 16.6 16.6 16.9 17.2 17.1 17.1 16.9
12. Interest payments 5.6 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3
13. Subsidies 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
15. Total current expenditure (9 to 14) 46.5 43.7 43.7 44.1 44.5 44.1 43.9 43.6
16. Gross savings (6 – 15) – 1.4 2.3 1.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6
17. Capital transfers received 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6
18. Total resources (6 + 17) 46.5 47.2 46.5 46.1 46.3 45.7 45.6 45.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6
20. Other capital expenditure 1.7 0.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
21. Total expenditure (15 + 19 + 20) 51.5 47.1 48.3 48.6 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.0
22. Tax burden 42.2 43.3 42.5 42.0 41.8 41.6 41.5 41.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (18 – 21) – 5.1 0.1 – 1.8 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.7
(1) Due to problem with availability of data, Luxembourg data are not included; from 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.371
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EXTable A.2.1
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Belgium
1. Net borrowing (1) 4.4 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.6
2. Interest payments 9.3 6.7 6.5 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.1 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.6 5.2 2.5 2.7 3.2 5.1 4.1 4.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.4 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.8 – 5.7 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 4.9 – 3.6 – 4.1
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 1.5 0.1 2.2 0.4 – 1.8 0.6 2.7 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 4.9 – 6.9 – 7.2 – 6.1 – 5.7 – 4.8 – 4.3 – 3.6
9. Snowball effect 4.5 1.1 3.9 3.1 2.1 – 0.2 0.8 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 1.5 0.1 2.2 0.4 – 1.8 0.6 2.7 0.4
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 1.9 – 5.8 – 1.1 – 2.6 – 5.4 – 4.4 – 0.7 – 3.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 134.0 109.1 108.0 105.4 100.0 95.6 94.9 91.7
 Germany (*)
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.3 – 1.3 2.8 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 2.8
2. Interest payments 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.7 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.0 2.3 1.4 2.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.3 – 1.3 2.8 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 2.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 1.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.2 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.3 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.3 – 4.7 – 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
9. Snowball effect 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.6 2.1 1.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.2 1.9 – 2.3 – 1.3 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (5) 7.7 – 1.0 – 0.8 1.5 3.3 1.8 2.0 0.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 57.0 60.2 59.4 60.9 64.2 66.0 68.0 68.9
(*) From 1991, including former East Germany.
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.372
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EXTable A.2.2
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Greece
1. Net borrowing (1) 10.2 4.1 3.6 4.1 5.2 6.1 4.5 4.4
2. Interest payments 12.7 8.2 7.3 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 13.2 7.9 6.9 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 12.1 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.3 7.7 6.3 6.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 10.2 4.1 3.6 4.1 5.2 6.1 4.5 4.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 11.6 – 8.3 – 8.3 – 8.4 – 8.6 – 7.8 – 6.5 – 6.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 5.9 5.5 1.7 0.6 2.9 1.9 0.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 2.6 – 4.0 – 3.7 – 2.2 – 0.6 0.4 – 1.0 – 1.0
9. Snowball effect 1.1 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 2.1 – 2.9 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 1.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 5.9 5.5 1.7 0.6 2.9 1.9 0.7
11. Change in gross debt (5) 0.8 1.7 0.7 – 2.6 – 2.9 1.3 – 0.1 – 1.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 108.7 114.0 114.8 112.2 109.3 110.5 110.5 108.9
 Spain 
1. Net borrowing (1) 6.6
2. Interest payments 5.2 0.9 0.5 0.3 – 0.3 0.3 0.0 – 0.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.2 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.8 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 6.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 – 0.3 0.3 0.0 – 0.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.4 – 4.7 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 3.1 – 2.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.6
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.4 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.8 – 1.9 – 2.1 – 2.1
9. Snowball effect 0.8 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.8
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.6
11. Change in gross debt (5) 2.8 – 2.0 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 3.6 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 2.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 63.9 61.1 57.8 55.0 51.4 48.9 46.5 44.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.373
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EXTable A.2.3
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
France
1. Net borrowing (1) 5.5 1.4 1.5 3.2 4.2 3.7 3.0 3.4
2. Interest payments 3.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.0 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.4 4.8 3.9 3.5 2.0 4.4 3.7 4.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.5 1.4 1.5 3.2 4.2 3.7 3.0 3.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.6 – 2.7 – 2.1 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.3 – 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.8 0.6 0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.8 – 1.7 – 1.6 0.2 1.3 0.8 0.1 0.4
9. Snowball effect 2.2 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.8 0.2 0.6 0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.3 – 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.8 0.6 0.0 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5) 6.2 – 1.6 0.2 2.1 4.9 1.6 0.7 0.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 54.6 56.8 57.0 59.0 63.9 65.6 66.2 67.1
 Ireland 
1. Net borrowing (1) 2.1 – 4.4 – 0.9 0.4 – 0.2 – 1.3 0.6 0.6
2. Interest payments 5.4 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 6.8 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 13.0 15.2 12.0 10.9 5.3 8.5 7.7 7.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.1 – 4.4 – 0.9 0.4 – 0.2 – 1.3 0.6 0.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 10.3 – 6.4 – 4.1 – 3.5 – 1.6 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 0.4 2.5 – 0.1 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.3 – 6.4 – 2.4 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.5 – 0.5 – 0.5
9. Snowball effect – 4.9 – 4.4 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 0.3 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 1.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 0.4 2.5 – 0.1 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.4
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 7.6 – 10.4 – 2.5 – 3.2 – 0.6 – 2.1 – 0.1 – 0.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 82.0 38.3 35.8 32.6 32.0 29.9 29.8 29.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.374
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EXTable A.2.4
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Italy
1. Net borrowing (1) 7.6 0.6 3.0 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.6 4.6
2. Interest payments 11.5 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.0 5.9 6.1 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.9
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.1 5.3 4.5 3.5 3.2 3.9 3.5 3.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 7.6 0.6 3.0 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.6 4.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 9.3 – 5.8 – 4.7 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 4.0 – 3.5 – 4.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 0.9 1.3 – 1.5 – 1.3 0.4 – 0.3 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.9 – 5.8 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 2.4 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 0.4
9. Snowball effect 2.2 0.7 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.0 1.4 1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 0.9 1.3 – 1.5 – 1.3 0.4 – 0.3 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 0.6 – 4.3 – 0.5 – 2.6 – 1.7 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 124.3 111.2 110.7 108.0 106.3 105.8 105.6 106.3
 Luxembourg
1. Net borrowing (1) – 2.5 – 6.2 – 6.2 – 2.3 – 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.9
2. Interest payments 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.2 6.3 7.0 5.0 4.4 3.6 3.0 2.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 13.6 3.5 3.6 5.0 7.0 7.1 6.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) – 2.5 – 6.2 – 6.2 – 2.3 – 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 3.2 6.4 8.1 2.8 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.0 – 6.5 – 6.5 – 2.6 – 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.7
9. Snowball effect 0.3 – 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 3.2 6.4 8.1 2.8 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.2
11. Change in gross debt (5) 0.4 – 0.5 1.7 0.3 – 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 6.7 5.5 7.2 7.5 7.1 7.5 7.8 7.9
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.375
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EXTable A.2.5
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 The Netherlands
1. Net borrowing (1) 4.2 – 2.2 0.1 1.9 3.2 2.5 2.0 1.6
2. Interest payments 5.9 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.1 6.5 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 5.1 7.5 6.7 3.7 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.2 – 2.2 0.1 1.9 3.2 2.5 2.0 1.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.7 – 4.4 – 3.5 – 1.9 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.4 – 0.6 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.7 – 6.0 – 3.3 – 1.1 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.8 – 1.2
9. Snowball effect 2.2 – 0.6 – 0.2 1.2 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.4 – 0.6 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (5) 0.8 – 7.2 – 3.0 – 0.3 1.7 1.4 1.9 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 77.2 55.9 52.9 52.6 54.3 55.7 57.6 57.9
 Austria
1. Net borrowing (1) 5.8 1.5 – 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.3 2.0 1.7
2. Interest payments 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 6.3 5.5 5.4 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.9 5.2 2.5 2.5 2.3 3.9 3.8 3.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.8 1.5 – 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.3 2.0 1.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.4 – 3.2 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 1.1 2.3 1.0 – 0.7 0.7 – 0.4 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.9 – 2.1 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 0.9 – 1.1
9. Snowball effect 1.4 0.3 1.9 1.6 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 1.1 2.3 1.0 – 0.7 0.7 – 0.4 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (5) 4.6 – 0.7 0.4 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 68.8 66.7 67.1 66.7 65.4 65.2 64.4 64.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.376
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EXTable A.2.6
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Portugal
1. Net borrowing (1) 5.5 2.8 4.4 2.7 2.9 2.9 4.9 4.7
2. Interest payments 6.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.9 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.9 7.0 6.1 4.8 1.6 3.5 3.4 4.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.5 2.8 4.4 2.7 2.9 2.9 4.9 4.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.5 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 0.9 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 2.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 – 0.3 1.3 2.5 – 0.4 0.9 1.4 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.8 – 0.4 1.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.0 1.6
9. Snowball effect 1.7 – 0.3 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 – 0.3 1.3 2.5 – 0.4 0.9 1.4 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (5) 2.2 – 1.0 2.6 2.6 1.6 1.9 4.3 2.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 64.3 53.3 55.9 58.5 60.1 61.9 66.2 68.5
 Finland
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.9 – 7.1 – 5.2 – 4.3 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.6
2. Interest payments 4.0 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.5 6.6 6.4 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.8 3.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.4 8.5 4.1 3.6 2.2 4.5 4.0 4.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.9 – 7.1 – 5.2 – 4.3 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.5 – 3.7 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.3 8.3 6.2 4.4 6.2 3.8 2.5 2.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.1 – 10.0 – 7.9 – 6.5 – 4.5 – 4.0 – 3.3 – 3.1
9. Snowball effect – 0.5 – 0.8 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.3 8.3 6.2 4.4 6.2 3.8 2.5 2.7
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 0.9 – 2.5 – 0.7 – 1.4 2.8 – 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 57.1 44.6 43.8 42.5 45.3 45.1 44.3 43.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.377
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EXTable A.2.7
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Czech Republic
1. Net borrowing (1) 13.4 3.7 5.9 6.8 11.7 3.0 4.5 4.0
2. Interest payments 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 5.7 6.3 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.7 4.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 16.8 5.3 7.7 4.3 5.6 7.9 7.9 7.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 13.4 3.7 5.9 6.8 11.7 3.0 4.5 4.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 0.8 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 1.6 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.6 4.4 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 1.2 – 2.7 – 0.9
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 12.3 2.8 4.8 5.2 10.3 1.8 3.2 2.6
9. Snowball effect    : 0.1 – 0.2 0.4 – 0.3 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.6 4.4 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 1.2 – 2.7 – 0.9
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 2.3 9.0 3.4 7.7 – 0.9 – 1.0 0.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)    : 18.2 27.2 30.7 38.3 37.4 36.4 37.0
 Denmark
1. Net borrowing (1) 2.3 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 2.2
2. Interest payments 6.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.1 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 4.6 5.9 3.6 2.7 2.6 3.7 4.0 3.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.3 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 2.2
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.4 – 3.2 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 1.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.1 0.5 0.4 2.4 – 0.1 2.3 1.6 1.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.7 – 6.2 – 6.3 – 4.5 – 3.8 – 5.1 – 4.3 – 4.2
9. Snowball effect 2.6 0.3 1.3 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.1 0.5 0.4 2.4 – 0.1 2.3 1.6 1.4
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 4.2 – 5.4 – 4.5 – 0.5 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 73.2 52.3 47.8 47.2 44.7 42.7 40.5 38.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.378
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EXTable A.2.8
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estonia
1. Net borrowing (1) – 0.4 0.6 – 0.3 – 1.4 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 0.5
2. Interest payments 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 6.0 5.9 6.7 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.9
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 37.3 13.6 12.5 12.0 7.7 9.6 9.7 9.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) – 0.4 0.6 – 0.3 – 1.4 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 0.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 1.2 0.5 2.8 3.5 1.9 0.6 0.5
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.6 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.7 – 3.3 – 2.0 – 1.1 – 0.7
9. Snowball effect    : – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 1.2 0.5 2.8 3.5 1.9 0.6 0.5
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : – 1.4 – 0.3 0.9 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.0
 Cyprus
1. Net borrowing (1)    : 2.4 2.3 4.5 6.3 4.2 2.9 1.9
2. Interest payments    : 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 6.2 6.1 5.3 5.7 5.1 4.9 5.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 9.4 8.9 7.5 4.4 6.8 6.0 6.9 6.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)    : 2.4 2.3 4.5 6.3 4.2 2.9 1.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 4.9 – 4.2 – 2.6 – 4.2 – 4.1 – 4.5 – 4.3
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 2.5 3.9 1.5 2.5 2.0 – 1.2 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)    : – 1.1 – 1.1 1.3 2.8 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.4
9. Snowball effect    : – 1.5 – 0.7 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 1.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 2.5 3.9 1.5 2.5 2.0 – 1.2 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 0.0 2.0 3.3 4.6 2.1 – 2.8 – 2.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)    : 59.9 61.9 65.2 69.8 71.9 69.1 66.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.379
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EXTable A.2.9
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Latvia
1. Net borrowing (1) 2.0 2.8 2.1 2.7 1.5 0.8 1.6 1.5
2. Interest payments 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 8.7 8.2 6.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 14.0 10.9 10.3 10.1 11.1 16.4 11.6 11.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.0 2.8 2.1 2.7 1.5 0.8 1.6 1.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 1.3 1.1 – 2.2 0.2 1.2 – 0.5 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 0.8 1.8 1.1 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.7
9. Snowball effect    : – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 0.6
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 1.3 1.1 – 2.2 0.2 1.2 – 0.5 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 0.3 2.0 – 0.8 0.3 0.1 – 0.4 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 12.9 14.9 14.1 14.4 14.4 14.0 14.3
 Lithuania
1. Net borrowing (1) 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.4 1.9
2. Interest payments 0.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 8.0 7.2 6.5 6.2 5.3 5.3 4.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 51.3 5.0 6.3 6.7 8.8 10.2 9.6 9.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.4 1.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.6 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 2.3 0.9 – 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.1
9. Snowball effect    : 0.7 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.6 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 2.3 0.9 – 0.4
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 0.8 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 1.8 1.5 – 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)    : 23.8 22.9 22.4 21.4 19.7 21.2 20.9
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.380
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EXTable A.2.10
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hungary
1. Net borrowing (1)    : 2.4 3.7 8.5 6.2 4.5 3.9 4.1
2. Interest payments    : 5.6 4.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.8 3.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 10.6 9.6 8.7 8.0 8.2 7.3 6.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 28.6 15.6 12.7 12.7 10.9 8.9 8.9 8.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)    : 2.4 3.7 8.5 6.2 4.5 3.9 4.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 8.2 – 6.3 – 5.9 – 5.5 – 4.6 – 4.9 – 4.3
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 0.4 – 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)    : – 3.2 – 1.0 4.4 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
9. Snowball effect    : – 2.6 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 0.4 – 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : – 5.5 – 3.3 3.4 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 55.4 52.2 55.5 56.9 57.6 57.8 57.9
 Malta
1. Net borrowing (1)    : 6.3 6.4 5.9 10.5 5.2 3.9 2.8
2. Interest payments    : 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 7.2 6.6 6.4 6.3 5.8 6.0 5.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 11.4 7.0 1.6 2.8 3.1 3.2 4.3 3.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)    : 6.3 6.4 5.9 10.5 5.2 3.9 2.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 3.7 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 2.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 2.4 0.7 – 4.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)    : 2.5 2.8 1.9 6.7 1.1 – 0.5 – 1.5
9. Snowball effect    : 0.1 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 2.4 0.7 – 4.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 0.2 5.5 0.2 9.2 3.1 1.5 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 57.0 62.4 62.7 71.8 75.0 76.4 77.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.381
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EXTable A.2.11
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Poland
1. Net borrowing (1) 3.9 2.4 3.6 4.3 4.7 4.9 4.4 3.6
2. Interest payments 5.8 2.8 2.9 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 8.7 9.0 8.1 7.3 6.3 6.2 5.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 36.9 10.9 5.1 2.7 4.3 8.4 6.2 6.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.9 2.4 3.6 4.3 4.7 4.9 4.4 3.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 4.0 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 1.7 – 3.5 – 2.6 – 2.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.9 – 2.2 1.8 1.4 – 3.0 1.3 – 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 2.0 – 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.6 2.2 1.9 1.3
9. Snowball effect    : – 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.2 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 0.9 – 2.2 1.8 1.4 – 3.0 1.3 – 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : – 3.2 – 0.1 4.4 4.2 – 1.7 3.2 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)    : 36.8 36.7 41.2 45.4 43.6 46.8 47.6
 Slovenia
1. Net borrowing (1)    : 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1
2. Interest payments    : 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 10.7 9.9 9.3 7.8 6.8 6.2 5.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 15.0 9.7 12.0 11.6 8.1 7.7 6.8 6.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)    : 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 2.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 1.9 – 1.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 1.3 0.8 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)    : 1.0 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5
9. Snowball effect    : 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : 1.3 0.8 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 2.6 0.7 1.4 – 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)    : 27.4 28.1 29.5 29.4 29.4 30.2 30.4
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.382
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EXTable A.2.12
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Slovakia
1. Net borrowing (1) 0.9 12.3 6.0 5.7 3.7 3.3 3.8 4.0
2. Interest payments 2.3 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2)    : 9.5 8.7 8.0 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 16.3 10.7 8.1 8.8 9.3 10.3 8.0 8.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 0.9 12.3 6.0 5.7 3.7 3.3 3.8 4.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth    : – 4.5 – 3.7 – 3.9 – 3.7 – 4.0 – 3.2 – 3.3
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 5.1 – 3.4 – 7.2 – 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.5 8.2 2.0 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.7
9. Snowball effect    : – 0.5 0.3 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)    : – 5.1 – 3.4 – 7.2 – 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)    : 2.7 – 1.1 – 5.5 – 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 49.9 48.7 43.3 42.6 43.6 44.2 44.9
Sweden (*)
1. Net borrowing (1) 6.9 – 5.0 – 2.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 0.8
2. Interest payments 6.6 4.1 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.8 6.9 6.2 5.8 4.2 3.6 4.2 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.6 5.7 3.4 3.7 3.6 4.3 4.4 4.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 6.9 – 5.0 – 2.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 0.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 5.2 – 3.4 – 1.7 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 2.3
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.0 – 1.6 5.7 – 0.2 1.6 2.8 2.1 2.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 0.3 – 9.1 – 5.7 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.9
9. Snowball effect 1.5 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.0 – 1.6 5.7 – 0.2 1.6 2.8 2.1 2.1
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 0.2 – 9.9 1.5 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 73.7 52.8 54.3 52.4 52.0 51.2 50.3 49.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.383
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EXTable A.2.13
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
United Kingdom
1. Net borrowing (1) 5.8 – 3.8 – 0.7 1.7 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.7
2. Interest payments 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.8 6.4 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 5.6 5.2 4.6 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.0 5.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.8 – 3.8 – 0.7 1.7 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.6 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 2.1
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.1 3.1 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 2.2 – 6.6 – 3.1 – 0.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.7
9. Snowball effect 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.1 3.1 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (5) 3.2 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 0.4 1.4 1.9 0.4 0.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 51.8 42.0 38.8 38.3 39.7 41.6 41.9 42.5
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10.
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.384
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EXTable A.2.14
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EUR-12 (1)
1. Net borrowing (2) 5.1 – 0.1 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7
2. Interest payments 5.6 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
3. Implicit interest rate (3) 8.5 5.8 5.9 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 4.7 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.6 4.0 3.4 3.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2) 5.1 – 0.1 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.1 – 3.4 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 2.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 2.7 1.0 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5) –0.5 – 4.2 – 2.2 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.6
9. Snowball effect 2.5 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.6 1.0 0.6
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4) 2.7 1.0 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
11. Change in gross debt (6) 4.7 – 2.5 – 0.8 – 0.1 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 73.8 70.6 69.8 69.7 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.1
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus.
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(4) Line 7 = line 10.
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 – line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.385
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EXTable A.3.1
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Belgium
Total resources
1. Actual data 48.5 49.4 49.9 50.3 51.3 49.6 49.1 48.5
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 48.7 48.3 49.5 50.4 51.8 49.8 49.3 48.5
Total uses
4. Actual data 52.9 49.3 49.4 50.2 51.0 49.6 49.4 49.1
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 52.9 49.5 49.6 50.2 50.8 49.4 49.3 49.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 4.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.6
8. Cyclical component – 0.6 1.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.8 – 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
— as % of potential GDP – 3.8 – 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.4 3.9 0.7 0.9 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.3
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.2 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.9 1.9 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.6
Germany
Total resources
1. Actual data 46.1 47.1 45.5 45.1 45.0 43.8 43.6 43.4
2. Cyclical component 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.9 46.3 44.9 45.1 45.6 44.2 44.2 43.8
Total uses
4. Actual data 49.4 45.7 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 47.0 46.2
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 49.5 48.3 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 46.9 46.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 3.3 1.3 – 2.8 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.8
8. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.5 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.5
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.2 – 1.7 – 3.2 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 2.3
— as % of potential GDP – 3.2 – 1.7 – 3.2 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 2.7 – 2.3
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.7 2.9 0.8 0.1 – 0.1 1.6 0.8 1.6
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.1 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.3 1.0 0.7 – 0.2 – 1.2 –0.8 – 1.2 – 1.0
Source: Commission services.386
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EXTable A.3.2
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Greece
Total resources
1. Actual data 40.9 47.9 46.5 45.2 43.5 43.9 44.3 44.3
2. Cyclical component – 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data 41.6 47.9 46.3 45.0 42.9 43.1 43.8 44.0
Total uses
4. Actual data 51.0 52.1 50.2 49.0 48.1 49.9 48.8 48.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.0 52.0 50.7 49.0 48.0 50.0 48.8 48.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 10.2 – 4.1 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 5.2 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 4.4
8. Cyclical component – 1.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.9
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 9.0 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 5.7 – 7.1 – 5.4 – 5.3
— as % of potential GDP – 8.7 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 5.8 – 7.3 – 5.6 – 5.5
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.1 4.5 4.3 3.8 4.7 4.2 2.9 3.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.1 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.1 – 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 2.4 2.2 2.2
Spain
Total resources
1. Actual data 38.4 39.1 39.2 39.8 40.0 40.2 40.4 40.5
2. Cyclical component – 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 39.1 38.4 38.6 39.5 39.9 40.2 40.4 40.6
Total uses
4. Actual data 45.0 40.0 39.7 40.1 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 44.9 40.1 39.7 40.1 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 6.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
8. Cyclical component – 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.8 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 0.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.2
— as % of potential GDP – 5.2 – 1.4 – 0.7 0.0 1.1 0.6 1.0 1.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.8 4.4 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.1 1.9 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.2
Source: Commission services.387
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EXTable A.3.3
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
France
Total resources
1. Actual data 49.7 51.2 50.9 50.2 50.4 50.8 51.5 51.1
2. Cyclical component – 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.0 50.6 50.9 51.6 51.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 55.2 52.6 52.5 53.4 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 55.1 52.7 52.7 53.5 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 5.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.2 – 4.2 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4
8. Cyclical component – 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.9 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 3.6 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.1
— as % of potential GDP – 4.8 – 2.3 – 2.4 – 3.6 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.7 3.8 2.1 1.2 0.5 2.5 2.0 2.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.7
Ireland
Total resources
1. Actual data 39.5 36.4 34.5 33.6 34.6 35.7 34.5 34.0
2. Cyclical component – 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.5 34.9 33.3 32.6 34.3 35.4 34.5 34.0
Total uses
4. Actual data 41.6 31.9 33.5 33.9 34.4 34.3 35.1 34.6
5. Cyclical component 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 41.3 32.4 34.0 34.4 34.6 34.4 35.1 34.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 2.1 4.4 0.9 – 0.4 0.2 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
8. Cyclical component – 0.9 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.7
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.2 2.7 – 0.2 – 1.4 0.2 1.6 – 0.1 0.1
— as % of potential GDP – 1.2 2.9 – 0.2 – 1.4 0.2 1.5 – 0.1 0.1
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 9.8 9.9 6.0 6.1 3.7 5.4 4.9 5.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
7.0 8.1 7.7 7.0 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.4 5.2 3.6 2.7 0.0 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 2.0
Source: Commission services.388
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.4
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Italy
Total resources
1. Actual data 45.8 46.2 46.0 45.6 46.3 45.4 44.6 44.0
2. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.9 45.7 45.4 45.4 46.5 45.6 44.8 44.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 53.4 46.9 49.0 48.4 49.3 48.5 48.2 48.5
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 53.4 48.1 49.0 48.2 49.2 48.4 48.2 48.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 7.6 – 0.6 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 4.6
8. Cyclical component 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 7.7 – 2.7 – 3.9 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 4.0
— as % of potential GDP – 7.7 – 2.8 – 3.9 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 3.9
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.9 3.0 1.8 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.7
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
1.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
0.2 2.0 2.1 0.8 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.4
Luxembourg
Total resources
1. Actual data 47.6 44.7 45.3 46.0 45.5 44.9 44.4 44.2
2. Cyclical component – 1.6 2.2 1.1 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 49.2 42.5 44.2 45.6 45.7 44.9 44.4 44.0
Total uses
4. Actual data 45.0 38.5 39.1 43.7 45.1 46.0 46.0 46.0
5. Cyclical component 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 44.4 39.5 39.6 43.8 45.0 46.0 46.0 46.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance 2.5 6.2 6.2 2.3 0.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9
8. Cyclical component – 2.0 3.1 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance 4.6 3.1 5.2 2.5 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
— as % of potential GDP 4.4 3.3 5.3 2.5 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.4 9.0 1.5 2.5 2.9 4.2 3.8 4.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
4.8 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.2 5.5 1.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 2.0
Source: Commission services.389
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.5
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
The Netherlands
Total resources
1. Actual data 47.3 47.5 46.6 45.9 45.8 45.5 45.8 47.6
2. Cyclical component – 0.6 1.4 1.1 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data 47.9 46.1 45.5 45.3 46.1 45.9 46.5 48.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 51.4 45.3 46.7 47.8 49.0 48.0 47.9 49.3
5. Cyclical component 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.0 47.0 47.4 48.3 48.8 47.7 47.4 48.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 4.2 2.2 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.6
8. Cyclical component – 0.9 2.1 1.4 0.3 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.7 – 1.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.3 – 0.6 – 1.4 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.0
— as % of potential GDP – 3.2 – 0.6 – 1.5 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.0 3.5 1.4 0.6 – 0.9 1.3 1.0 2.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.7 2.7 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.3 3.3 2.1 0.5 – 1.9 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4
Austria
Total resources
1. Actual data 50.9 50.5 51.7 50.8 50.0 49.4 48.1 47.4
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 51.1 49.8 51.4 50.7 50.3 49.6 48.2 47.4
Total uses
4. Actual data 56.8 52.1 51.6 51.2 51.3 50.8 50.3 49.3
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 56.7 52.4 51.4 51.0 51.2 50.7 50.1 49.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 5.8 – 1.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.7
8. Cyclical component – 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.4 – 2.5 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.6
— as % of potential GDP – 5.3 – 2.5 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.9 3.4 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.2 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.0 2.2 0.8 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4
Source: Commission services.390
A
N
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EXTable A.3.6
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Portugal
Total resources
1. Actual data 39.6 42.3 41.9 43.3 44.8 43.8 42.5 43.1
2. Cyclical component – 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.3 41.2 41.0 42.7 45.1 44.3 43.1 43.7
Total uses
4. Actual data 45.0 45.2 46.3 46.0 47.8 46.7 47.4 47.8
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 45.0 45.5 46.4 46.0 47.7 46.6 47.3 47.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 5.5 – 2.8 – 4.4 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 4.9 – 4.7
8. Cyclical component – 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.9
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.5 – 4.0 – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 3.7
— as % of potential GDP – 4.4 – 4.1 – 5.1 – 2.9 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 3.8 – 3.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.3 3.4 1.7 0.4 – 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.7
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.6 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.9 2.5 1.9 0.4 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.8 – 2.7
Finland
Total resources
1. Actual data 55.7 56.1 54.4 54.2 53.3 52.5 51.9 51.3
2. Cyclical component – 2.5 1.9 0.8 0.3 – 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 58.2 54.3 53.6 53.9 53.3 52.3 51.7 51.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 59.6 49.1 49.2 50.0 50.9 50.7 50.5 50.0
5. Cyclical component 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 58.7 49.7 49.4 50.1 50.8 50.5 50.4 49.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 3.9 7.1 5.2 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.6
8. Cyclical component – 2.7 2.3 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.2 4.7 4.7 4.5 3.2 2.4 1.9 1.8
— as % of potential GDP – 1.2 4.9 4.7 4.5 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.4 5.1 1.1 2.2 2.4 3.7 3.3 2.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
1.8 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.8 3.5 0.8 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4
Source: Commission services.391
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.7
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Czech Republic
Total resources
1. Actual data 41.0 38.5 39.1 40.2 41.6 42.7 41.8 41.0
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 54.4 42.1 45.0 46.9 53.2 45.7 46.3 45.0
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 13.4 – 3.7 – 5.9 – 6.8 – 11.6 – 3.0 – 4.5 – 4.0
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 5.9 3.9 2.6 1.5 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
     : – 2.3 – 1.4 – 2.2 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.4 1.4
Denmark
Total resources
1. Actual data 57.6 56.7 57.4 56.6 56.6 57.7 56.5 55.7
2. Cyclical component – 0.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 57.7 55.7 56.6 56.3 57.1 58.2 56.7 55.8
Total uses
4. Actual data 59.9 54.2 54.3 55.1 55.5 55.2 54.5 53.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 59.8 54.5 54.8 55.1 55.1 54.8 54.2 53.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 2.3 2.6 3.2 1.7 1.2 2.8 2.1 2.2
8. Cyclical component – 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.4 2.0 3.4 2.5 2.4
— as % of potential GDP – 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.4 2.0 3.3 2.5 2.4
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.8 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3
Source: Commission services.392
A
N
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EXTable A.3.8
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estonia
Total resources
1. Actual data 43.9 37.7 37.2 38.0 38.9 40.9 40.8 39.2
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 43.4 38.2 36.9 36.6 35.8 39.1 40.0 38.7
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance 0.4 – 0.6 0.3 1.4 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.5
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.5 7.8 6.4 7.2 5.1 6.2 6.0 6.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 4.7 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 7.4 – 1.2 – 0.1 1.0 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5
Cyprus
Total resources
1. Actual data      : 35.3 36.6 36.1 39.1 39.4 39.4 38.9
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data      : 37.7 38.9 40.6 45.4 43.6 42.3 40.7
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance      : – 2.4 – 2.3 – 4.5 – 6.3 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 1.9
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 9.9 5.0 4.1 2.1 2.0 3.7 3.9 4.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.1 3.9 3.3 3.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
1.6 1.5 1.9 0.2 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.6 0.2
Source: Commission services.393
A
N
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EXTable A.3.9
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Latvia
Total resources
1. Actual data 37.3 35.1 34.4 33.1 34.2 35.2 35.4 35.3
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 39.3 37.9 36.5 35.8 35.7 35.9 37.0 36.8
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :  : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 1.5
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) – 0.9 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.5 8.5 7.2 6.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 5.5 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.5 8.1 8.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.2 – 1.5 0.1 – 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.5 – 0.7
Lithuania
Total resources
1. Actual data 34.2 35.8 33.0 32.8 32.3 31.8 32.3 31.6
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 36.1 38.4 35.0 34.3 34.2 34.3 34.8 33.6
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 3.3 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.7 6.7 6.4 5.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 3.6 4.4 5.5 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 5.3 – 4.5 – 2.8 – 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.7 0.8
Source: Commission services.394
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.10
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hungary
Total resources
1. Actual data      : 45.3 45.0 44.1 44.5 47.5 43.9 43.0
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data      : 47.7 48.7 52.7 50.7 52.0 47.8 47.1
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance      : – 2.4 – 3.7 – 8.5 – 6.2 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.1
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 1.5 5.2 3.8 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.9 3.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
2.2 0.4 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5
Malta
Total resources
1. Actual data      : 36.0 37.6 40.0 40.5 49.0 48.8 48.6
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data      : 42.3 44.1 45.8 50.9 54.1 52.6 51.4
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance      : – 6.3 – 6.4 – 5.9 – 10.5 – 5.2 – 3.9 – 2.8
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 6.2 6.4 – 1.7 2.2 – 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 3.7 2.8 0.6 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.3 4.7 0.1 1.7 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.2
Source: Commission services.395
A
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EXTable A.3.11
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Poland
Total resources
1. Actual data 47.4 42.5 43.8 43.9 44.3 43.8 44.2 44.2
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 51.3 44.9 47.4 48.3 49.1 48.8 48.6 47.9
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 3.9 – 2.4 – 3.6 – 4.3 – 4.7 – 4.9 – 4.4 – 3.6
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 7.0 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 5.3 4.4 4.5
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 3.7 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.3 3.6 3.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 4.2 0.0 – 2.0 – 3.1 – 1.9 0.1 0.8 1.5
Slovenia
Total resources
1. Actual data      : 44.7 45.1 45.7 46.2 45.8 45.4 45.1
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data      : 48.2 47.9 48.1 48.2 47.7 47.6 47.2
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance      : – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.1 3.9 2.7 3.3 2.5 4.6 3.7 4.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
     : 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.2
Source: Commission services.396
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.12
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Slovakia
Total resources
1. Actual data 53.3 47.6 45.5 45.2 35.4 35.1 36.1 34.8
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data 54.1 59.9 51.5 50.9 39.2 38.5 39.9 38.8
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 0.9 – 12.3 – 6.0 – 5.7 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 4.0
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 5.8 2.0 3.8 4.6 4.5 5.5 4.9 5.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 2.7 3.7 4.6 4.9 3.9 3.9 4.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
     : – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 2.2 – 0.6 0.3 1.3
Sweden
Total resources
1. Actual data 60.8 62.3 59.5 57.8 58.6 58.4 57.8 57.4
2. Cyclical component – 0.5 1.5 0.6 0.2 – 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data 61.2 60.8 58.9 57.6 59.0 58.4 57.6 57.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 67.7 57.4 57.0 58.4 58.7 57.2 57.0 56.6
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 67.7 57.8 57.2 58.2 58.3 57.0 57.1 56.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 6.9 5.0 2.5 – 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.8
8. Cyclical component – 2.5 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.5 4.2 2.9 0.3 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.7
— as % of potential GDP – 4.4 4.3 2.9 0.3 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 4.1 4.3 1.0 2.0 1.5 3.5 3.0 2.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.6 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 1.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
Source: Commission services.397
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.13
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 United Kingdom
Total resources
1. Actual data 39.1 41.2 41.5 40.0 40.0 40.4 40.9 41.4
2. Cyclical component – 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 39.4 40.6 41.1 39.9 40.2 40.3 40.8 41.1
Total uses
4. Actual data 44.9 37.4 40.9 41.7 43.4 43.6 44.0 44.1
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 44.9 39.8 40.9 41.7 43.3 43.6 44.0 44.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 5.8 3.8 0.7 – 1.7 – 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7
8. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.6 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.6 0.8 0.3 – 1.6 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6
— as % of potential GDP – 5.6 0.8 0.3 – 1.6 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.9 3.9 2.3 1.8 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.4 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.4 1.3 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3
Source: Commission services.398
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.14
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
(% of GDP)
ESA 95 definitions
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EUR-12 (1)
Total resources
1. Actual data 46.5 47.2 46.5 46.1 46.3 45.7 45.6 45.4
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 46.7 46.5 45.9 45.9 46.5 45.9 45.9 45.6
Total uses
4. Actual data 51.5 47.2 48.3 48.6 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.1
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.5 48.3 48.5 48.7 49.0 48.4 48.2 48.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance – 5.1 0.1 – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.7
8. Cyclical component – 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.6 – 1.8 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.2
— as % of potential GDP – 4.6 – 1.8 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 2.1
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.2 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 2.0 1.6 2.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.3 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.2 – 1.2
EU-25
Total resources
1. Actual data      : 46.6 46.0 45.4 45.6 45.3 45.2 45.1
2. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
3. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Total uses
4. Actual data      : 45.8 47.3 47.7 48.5 48.0 47.8 47.6
5. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
6. Cyclically adjusted data      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
7. Actual balance      : 0.8 – 1.2 – 2.3 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.5
8. Cyclical component      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
9. Cyclically adjusted balance      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
— as % of potential GDP      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      : 
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change) 2.5 3.6 1.7 1.1 0.9 2.3 1.9 2.3
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
     : 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
     : 1.6 1.1 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.9
(1) From 1991, including former East Germany. Due to problem with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
Source: Commission services.399
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.1
Current tax burden; total economy 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        46.8 47.5 47.7 48.0 47.2 47.2 47.4 46.6
DE (1) 42.2 43.8 42.0 41.5 41.6 40.7 40.4 40.3
EL        34.4 40.6 38.9 39.5 38.7 39.2 39.7 40.0
ES        34.0 36.1 35.9 36.5 36.7 37.0 37.2 37.3
FR        45.2 46.5 46.2 45.3 45.2 45.4 45.7 45.6
IE        35.1 33.1 31.3 30.1 31.2 32.3 31.4 31.0
IT        42.3 43.0 42.8 42.2 41.5 41.4 41.2 40.8
LU        43.5 41.3 41.5 42.0 42.1 41.6 41.3 41.1
NL        41.5 42.2 40.7 40.1 40.0 39.9 40.2 42.1
AT        44.1 45.3 47.1 45.9 45.2 44.9 43.8 43.2
PT        34.4 37.2 36.6 37.4 38.0 37.4 37.1 37.2
FI        46.5 47.9 45.9 45.6 44.6 43.9 43.7 43.4
Euro area (2)  42.2 43.3 42.5 42.0 41.8 41.6 41.5 41.4
CZ        36.2 34.5 34.5 35.5 36.2 36.1 34.8 34.3
DK        50.2 50.4 50.7 49.7 49.7 50.9 49.9 49.4
EE        37.9 32.4 31.6 32.4 33.4 32.6 32.3 31.4
CY             : 30.5 31.5 31.4 33.3 33.6 34.1 33.6
LV        33.7 30.3 29.1 28.9 29.1 28.5 27.7 27.3
LT        28.6 30.5 29.1 28.7 28.6 27.4 27.1 26.6
HU             : 40.2 40.0 39.5 39.8      :      :      :
MT             : 29.9 32.0 34.4 33.9 35.5 37.9 38.0
PL        40.2 36.2 36.6 36.1 36.6 35.5 35.5 35.5
SI             : 39.2 39.3 39.7 40.4 39.9 39.2 38.7
SK        41.6 34.3 32.9 33.1 31.2      :      :      :
SE        50.1 54.3 52.3 50.6 51.4 51.3 50.8 50.4
UK        36.5 38.5 38.3 36.8 36.8 37.5 38.0 38.4
EU-25           : 42.6 41.9 41.2 41.1      :      :      :
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.400
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.2
Social contributions received; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        16.8 16.1 16.4 16.7 16.5 16.0 15.8 15.5
DE (1) 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.5 18.6 18.2 18.0 17.8
EL        12.6 14.0 14.1 15.0 15.5 16.3 16.8 17.2
ES        13.0 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.7
FR        20.5 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.5 18.2 18.4 18.4
IE        6.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.1
IT        14.8 12.7 12.6 12.8 13.0 12.9 12.9 12.9
LU        12.5 11.2 12.0 12.2 12.4 12.2 12.0 11.9
NL        17.2 17.1 15.3 14.9 15.5 15.1 15.0 16.9
AT        17.3 16.8 16.7 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.3
PT        11.0 11.8 12.0 12.3 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
FI        14.8 12.3 12.6 12.3 12.1 12.0 12.3 12.6
Euro area (2)  17.4 16.2 16.0 16.0 16.2 15.9 15.9 15.9
CZ        14.4 14.5 14.5 15.0 15.1 14.8 14.8 14.6
DK        2.6 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
EE        13.1 11.4 11.1 11.4 11.5 11.2 11.2 10.9
CY             : 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.1 8.4 8.2 8.0
LV        12.2 10.2 9.4 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.2 7.8
LT        7.6 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.5
HU        15.6 13.9 14.0 13.9 13.5 13.6 13.5 13.4
MT             : 7.7 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.7
PL        11.7 14.0 15.3 14.7 14.1 13.1 12.9 12.7
SI             : 15.1 15.4 15.2 15.2 14.8 14.5 14.2
SK        14.4 13.8 13.7 13.6 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.0
SE        13.7 15.0 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.7 14.7 14.7
UK        7.5 7.6 7.6 7.4 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1
EU-25           : 14.3 14.2 14.2 14.4 14.2 14.2 14.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.401
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.3
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        16.7 17.3 17.6 17.6 17 17.1 17.3 – 17.3
DE (1) 11.1 12.5 11.1 10.8 10.6 10.2 10.1 – 10.1
EL        7.4 10.8 9.5 9.5 8.8 8.9 8.9 – 8.9
ES        10.1 10.5 10.4 10.9 10.6 10.7 10.7 – 10.7
FR        8.5 12.2 12.5 11.5 11.2 11.3 11.4 – 11.4
IE        13.6 13.5 12.9 11.7 12.2 12.5 11.7 – 11.7
IT        14.8 14.7 15.1 14.3 13.8 13.7 13.4 – 13.4
LU        17.5 15.4 15.5 16 15.7 13.9 13.5 – 13.5
NL        12.4 12.1 11.9 12 11.2 11 11.1 – 11.1
AT        11.8 13.2 15 14 13.5 13.1 12.3 – 12.3
PT        8.9 10.4 9.9 9.8 9.3 9.1 8.7 – 8.7
FI        17.4 21.4 19.5 19.3 18.1 17.8 17.4 – 17.4
Euro area (2)  11.4 13 12.6 12.1 11.8 11.7 11.6 – 11.6
CZ        9.6 8.4 8.9 9.3 9.8 9.4 8.4 – 8.4
DK        30.4 29.7 30 29.4 29.5 30.5 29.6 – 29.6
EE        10.9 8.1 7.6 7.9 8.7 8.7 7.6 – 7.6
CY             : 11.1 11.3 11.2 9.7 9.2 9.8 – 9.8
LV        7.8 8.3 8.5 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 – 8.2
LT        8.8 8.5 7.9 7.5 8.1 7.9 7.7 – 7.7
HU        9.4 9.9 10.4 10.4 9.7 9.7 9.4 – 9.4
MT             : 9.3 10.2 11.8 12.2 11.9 12.1 – 12.1
PL        12.8 7.4 6.9 6.6 7.2 7 7 – 7
SI             : 7.6 7.7 8 8.4 8.4 8.4 – 8.4
SK        11.6 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 5.7 5.6 – 19
SE        20.1 22.4 19.9 18 18.9 19.3 19 – 5.6
UK        14.9 16.7 16.8 15.7 15.2 15.6 16.3 – 16.3
EU-25           : 14 13.7 13.1 12.7 12.7 12.7 – 12.7
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.402
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.4
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        12.2 13.1 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.2 13.4 13.4
DE (1) 11.4 12 11.9 11.9 12 11.9 11.9 11.9
EL        13.5 15.2 14.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 14.3 14.5
ES        10.2 11.7 11.4 11.6 12 12.4 12.4 12.6
FR        15.4 15.5 15 15.1 15.1 15.5 15.5 15.4
IE        13.5 13.2 12 12.2 12.7 13.2 13.1 13
IT        12.1 15 14.5 14.7 14.4 14.4 14.6 14.5
LU        12.5 14.1 13.6 13.4 13.5 15 15.2 15.4
NL        10.7 12.1 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.3
AT        14 14.6 14.6 15 14.8 15 14.6 14.4
PT        13.6 14.4 14.2 15 15.6 15.3 15.4 15.4
FI        13.6 13.7 13.4 13.7 14.2 13.9 13.8 13.6
Euro area (2)  12.5 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.6
CZ        12.3 11.5 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.9 11.7 11.5
DK        16.9 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.2
EE        13.9 12.9 12.8 13.1 13.1 12.7 13.5 13.5
CY             : 12.7 13.2 13.4 16.5 16.1 16.1 16.2
LV        13.7 11.7 11.2 10.7 11.5 11.3 11.2 11.1
LT        12.3 12.5 12.2 12.5 11.9 11.1 10.8 10.5
HU        17.9 16.4 15.7 15.2 15.8 16.3 15.7 16
MT             : 12.9 13.4 14.2 13.4 15.3 17.2 17.2
PL        15.8 14.8 14.4 14.7 15.1 15.1 15.4 15.6
SI             : 16.5 16.2 16.5 16.8 16.7 16.4 16.1
SK        15.6 13 11.8 12 11.5 11.8 11.8 11.5
SE        15.6 16.4 16.5 17 17.1 17 16.8 16.6
UK        13.1 13.6 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.4 13.3 13.2
EU-25           : 13.7 13.5 13.6 13.6 13.8 13.8 13.7
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.403
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.5
Other current resources; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        3.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
DE (1) 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.5
EL        4.5 3.6 4.3 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0
ES        4.1 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0
FR        3.7 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6
IE        2.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7
IT        3.1 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.1
LU        5.6 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8
NL        6.0 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.0
AT        4.9 3.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.6
PT        4.1 3.6 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.4
FI        7.3 6.2 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.7
Euro area (2)  3.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1
CZ        6.9 6.7 7.0 6.8 7.6 7.8 8.1 7.7
DK        6.4 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.6
EE        8.8 4.1 5.0 4.7 4.2 5.6 6.2 5.8
CY             : 3.2 3.7 2.9 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
LV        6.4 7.2 7.4 5.9 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.2
LT        6.3 5.7 4.7 3.7 3.3 3.4 4.0 3.8
HU             : 6.0 5.7 5.7 6.6 5.5 5.3 5.2
MT             : 6.3 6.6 6.5 7.4 5.4 4.4 3.9
PL        4.9 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.3 3.6 3.9 4.1
SI             : 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.6
SK        13.8 15.1 14.3 13.8 6.0 4.8 5.7 5.5
SE        8.2 6.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7
UK        2.9 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
EU-25           : 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.404
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.6
Total current resources; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        48.8 49.4 49.7 50.0 49.1 49.0 49.0 48.1
DE (1) 44.8 46.1 44.5 44.2 44.1 42.9 42.7 42.4
EL        38.1 43.5 42.6 42.7 41.5 41.8 42.1 42.3
ES        37.4 38.8 38.9 39.4 39.6 39.8 39.9 40.0
FR        48.1 49.3 49.3 48.3 48.2 48.5 48.9 48.8
IE        36.8 34.5 32.9 31.8 32.8 34.0 32.8 32.3
IT        44.8 45.5 45.5 45.0 44.3 44.3 44.1 43.6
LU        48.2 45.2 45.8 46.4 45.9 45.1 44.6 44.4
NL        46.3 46.1 45.2 44.5 44.3 44.3 44.6 46.4
AT        48.1 47.9 50.6 49.5 48.8 48.2 47.0 46.3
PT        37.6 40.3 39.8 41.1 41.5 41.4 41.0 41.3
FI        53.1 53.6 51.9 51.5 50.3 49.7 49.2 48.8
Euro area (2)  45.1 46.0 45.4 45.0 44.7 44.4 44.3 44.2
CZ        43.1 41.2 41.5 42.3 43.8 43.9 42.9 42.1
DK        56.3 55.2 55.8 54.6 54.7 55.8 54.5 53.8
EE        46.6 36.5 36.5 37.1 37.5 38.2 38.5 37.2
CY             : 33.7 35.1 34.4 37.3 37.4 37.7 37.2
LV        40.0 37.5 36.5 34.8 35.4 34.5 33.1 32.2
LT        34.9 36.1 33.8 32.5 31.9 30.8 31.1 30.4
HU             : 46.2 45.7 45.2 45.6 45.2 43.9 44.0
MT             : 36.2 38.6 40.9 41.2 40.9 42.3 41.9
PL        45.1 40.3 40.7 40.1 40.7 38.9 39.2 39.3
SI             : 42.9 43.2 43.6 44.3 43.9 43.5 43.3
SK        55.4 49.5 47.2 46.9 37.2 34.7 35.6 34.4
SE        57.5 59.8 56.9 55.3 56.0 55.9 55.3 54.9
UK        38.3 40.3 40.4 38.7 38.6 39.2 39.8 40.2
EU-25           : 45.4 44.9 44.2 44.1 43.9 43.9 43.8
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.405
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.7
Interest payments; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure)
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        9.3 6.8 6.6 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.5 4.3
DE (1) 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
EL        12.7 8.2 7.2 6.4 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5
ES        5.2 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0
FR        3.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0
IE        5.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
IT        11.5 6.5 6.5 5.9 5.4 5.1 4.9 5.0
LU        0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
NL        5.9 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
AT        4.0 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0
PT        6.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1
FI        4.0 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7
Euro area (2)  5.6 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
CZ        1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
DK        6.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2
EE        0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
CY             : 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2
LV        1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
LT        0.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
HU             : 5.6 4.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.8 3.4
MT             : 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.3
PL        5.8 2.8 2.9 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.4
SI             : 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
SK        6.6 4.1 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1
SE        2.3 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.2
UK        3.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
EU-25           : 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.406
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.8
Final consumption expenditure of general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        21.4 21.1 21.7 22.3 22.8 22.9 22.9 22.8
DE (1) 19.8 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.2 18.7 18.5 18.2
EL        15.3 17.7 16.8 17.6 16.4 17.1 16.9 16.4
ES        18.1 17.7 17.6 17.7 17.9 18.3 18.5 18.7
FR        23.9 23.2 23.2 23.9 24.3 24.1 24.0 23.9
IE        16.5 14.0 14.8 15.4 15.9 16.1 16.0 15.8
IT        17.9 18.3 18.8 19.0 19.5 19.2 19.2 18.9
LU        18.4 15.7 16.9 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.0 18.0
NL        24.0 22.7 23.5 24.6 25.4 25.4 25.5 26.9
AT        20.3 18.6 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.1 17.8 17.5
PT        18.6 20.5 20.9 21.2 21.2 21.4 21.4 21.0
FI        22.8 20.6 21.0 21.6 22.1 22.4 22.6 22.8
Euro area (2)  20.5 19.9 20.1 20.4 20.7 20.5 20.4 20.4
CZ        21.7 22.1 22.2 23.0 24.0 22.8 22.6 22.5
DK        25.8 25.3 25.9 26.3 26.6 26.5 26.2 26.0
EE        27.2 19.9 19.0 18.8 18.7 18.7 19.4 19.0
CY             : 16.4 17.5 18.4 19.9 18.3 18.0 17.6
LV        24.4 21.0 20.6 21.1 21.8 21.5 21.1 20.7
LT        21.9 21.6 19.8 19.3 18.5 17.5 17.4 16.9
HU        23.6 21.3 21.8 23.4 24.2 23.7 22.7 22.3
MT             : 19.4 20.6 21.2 21.4 21.7 21.5 20.9
PL        19.0 18.0 18.0 18.1 17.6 16.9 16.5 16.1
SI             : 19.9 20.5 20.2 20.3 19.9 19.7 19.6
SK        20.5 19.8 20.1 20.1 19.9 19.4 19.4 19.2
SE        27.2 26.6 27.0 27.9 28.3 27.8 27.6 27.5
UK        19.5 18.6 19.1 20.0 20.9 21.2 21.4 21.6
EU-25           : 20.0 20.2 20.7 21.0 20.9 20.8 20.8
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.407
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.9
Compensation of employees; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        11.9 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.1 11.9 11.8 11.6
DE (1) 9.0 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.4
EL        11.3 11.7 11.6 12.2 11.9 12.5 12.5 12.2
ES        11.3 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.3
FR        13.7 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.7 13.5 13.4
IE        10.2 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.4
IT        11.2 10.6 10.8 10.8 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.8
LU        9.7 7.8 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.3
NL        10.8 10.0 10.1 10.5 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.5
AT        12.6 11.0 9.8 9.7 9.7 9.4 9.3 9.1
PT        13.6 15.0 15.1 15.4 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.4
FI        15.2 13.2 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.9
Euro area (2)  11.1 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.4
CZ        7.3 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.1
DK        17.3 16.9 17.3 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.7
EE        11.7 10.8 10.2 9.9 10.2 9.9 9.8 9.7
CY             : 13.8 13.5 13.9 15.7 14.8 13.8 13.0
LV        11.3 10.9 10.3 10.6 11.1 10.9 11.2 11.6
LT        10.1 12.8 11.7 11.4 11.0 11.1 11.0 10.7
HU        12.2 10.7 11.4 12.5 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.6
MT             : 13.3 15.0 15.1 15.3 15.0 15.2 14.9
PL        11.3 11.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.5 11.4 11.2
SI             : 11.8 12.3 12.1 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.1
SK        9.5 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.5 8.2
SE        16.7 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.3
UK        10.8 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.9
EU-25           : 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.0 10.9 10.9 10.8
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.408
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.10
Total current expenditure; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        50.7 46.6 47.3 47.9 48.3 47.3 46.9 46.3
DE (1) 44.9 44.5 44.3 45.0 45.2 44.2 43.5 42.8
EL        44.9 43.7 42.4 42.4 41.9 43.2 43.7 44.1
ES        39.2 35.7 35.2 35.3 35.2 35.2 35.4 35.4
FR        49.2 47.0 47.0 48.0 48.9 48.8 48.8 48.8
IE        36.8 26.8 27.7 28.4 29.0 29.5 29.8 29.3
IT        48.6 44.1 44.5 44.4 44.8 44.4 44.3 44.0
LU        39.9 34.2 36.0 37.9 39.6 39.5 39.4 39.5
NL        47.4 41.5 41.7 42.7 43.8 43.1 43.1 44.5
AT        49.1 46.2 47.0 46.9 47.1 46.4 46.0 45.5
PT        39.6 39.6 40.5 41.4 42.7 43.6 43.8 43.8
FI        53.7 43.9 43.9 44.5 45.3 45.3 45.2 44.9
Euro area (2)  46.5 43.7 43.7 44.2 44.6 44.1 43.9 43.6
CZ        37.4 39.0 39.0 40.3 41.6 40.9 40.1 39.8
DK        56.9 51.0 51.3 51.7 52.1 51.7 51.0 50.3
EE        39.5 31.9 30.7 29.9 30.3 33.1 33.4 32.6
CY             : 32.6 34.0 35.3 39.6 37.5 36.6 35.2
LV        39.8 37.3 35.4 34.0 33.7 32.4 32.7 32.1
LT        32.0 35.2 33.1 31.0 29.9 29.7 30.0 29.0
HU             : 43.1 42.9 44.8 45.7 44.8 43.6 43.2
MT             : 38.6 40.7 42.2 42.7 43.0 42.7 42.1
PL        44.6 38.9 39.8 40.8 40.2 40.7 39.7 38.5
SI             : 42.2 42.5 42.3 42.4 42.0 41.8 41.5
SK        47.9 48.9 47.3 47.6 37.8 35.2 35.9 34.9
SE        60.1 52.0 51.3 52.6 53.0 51.8 51.6 51.2
UK        41.0 37.5 38.1 38.7 39.8 40.3 40.5 40.5
EU-25           : 42.8 42.9 43.4 44.0 43.6 43.4 43.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.409
A
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EXTable A.4.11
Gross saving; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        – 2.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 0.8 1.6 2.1 1.9
DE (1) – 0.1 1.6 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.4
EL        – 6.8 – 0.2 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.8
ES        – 1.8 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6
FR        – 1.1 2.3 2.2 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.0
IE        0.0 7.8 5.2 3.4 3.8 4.5 3.0 3.0
IT        – 3.8 1.4 1.0 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.4
LU        8.3 11.0 9.9 8.5 6.5 5.6 5.2 4.9
NL        – 1.1 4.6 3.5 1.7 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.9
AT        – 1.0 1.6 3.6 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.9
PT        – 2.1 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.2 – 2.3 – 2.8 – 2.5
FI        – 0.7 9.7 8.0 7.0 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.9
Euro area (2)  – 1.4 2.3 1.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6
CZ        5.7 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.8 2.3
DK        – 0.5 4.2 4.5 2.9 2.6 4.1 3.6 3.5
EE        7.1 4.6 5.8 7.2 7.2 5.1 5.1 4.6
CY             : 1.1 1.1 – 0.9 – 2.3 – 0.2 1.2 2.0
LV        0.2 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.1 0.5 0.2
LT        2.9 1.0 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.1 1.1 1.4
HU             : 3.1 2.7 0.4 – 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8
MT             : – 2.4 – 2.1 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 0.3 – 0.2
PL        0.5 1.4 0.9 – 0.7 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.4 0.9
SI             : 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8
SK        7.5 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5
SE        – 2.6 7.7 5.5 2.7 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.6
UK        – 2.7 2.9 2.4 0.0 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.3
EU-25           : 2.6 2.0 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.410
A
N
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EXTable A.4.12
Gross fixed capital formation; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0
DE (1) 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
EL        3.2 4.1 4.0 3.6 4.0 4.1 3.3 3.1
ES        3.7 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
FR        3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
IE        2.3 3.6 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.9
IT        2.1 2.4 2.5 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.9
LU        4.6 3.8 4.4 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1
NL        3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4
AT        3.0 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
PT        3.7 3.8 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0
FI        2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7
Euro area (2)  2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6
CZ        5.1 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9
DK        1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7
EE        5.0 3.9 4.1 4.7 3.4 3.6 4.3 4.2
CY             : 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.5
LV        1.9 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.6 3.1
LT        3.4 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4
HU             : 3.2 3.8 4.9 3.4 3.5 2.3 3.1
MT             : 4.1 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.3 3.9 3.7
PL        3.4 2.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.7
SI             : 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9
SK        2.3 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4
SE        4.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
UK        2.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1
EU-25           : 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.411
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EXTable A.4.13
Total expenditure; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        52.9 49.3 49.4 50.2 51.0 49.6 49.4 49.1
DE (1) 49.4 45.7 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 47.0 46.2
EL        51.0 52.1 50.2 49.0 48.1 49.9 48.8 48.7
ES        45.0 40.0 39.7 40.1 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
FR        55.2 52.6 52.5 53.4 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
IE        41.6 31.9 33.5 33.9 34.4 34.3 35.1 34.6
IT        53.4 46.9 49.0 48.4 49.3 48.5 48.2 48.5
LU        45.0 38.5 39.1 43.7 45.1 46.0 46.0 46.0
NL        51.4 45.3 46.7 47.8 49.0 48.0 47.9 49.3
AT        56.8 52.1 51.6 51.2 51.3 50.8 50.3 49.3
PT        45.0 45.2 46.3 46.0 47.8 46.7 47.4 47.8
FI        59.6 49.1 49.2 50.0 50.9 50.7 50.5 50.0
Euro area (2)  51.5 47.2 48.3 48.6 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.1
CZ        54.4 42.1 45.0 46.9 53.2 45.7 46.3 45.0
DK        59.9 54.2 54.3 55.1 55.5 55.2 54.5 53.7
EE        43.4 38.2 36.9 36.6 35.8 39.1 40.0 38.7
CY             : 37.7 38.9 40.6 45.4 43.6 42.3 40.7
LV        39.3 37.9 36.5 35.8 35.7 35.9 37.0 36.8
LT        36.1 38.4 35.0 34.3 34.2 34.3 34.8 33.6
HU             : 47.7 48.7 52.7 50.7 52.0 47.8 47.1
MT             : 42.3 44.1 45.8 50.9 54.1 52.6 51.4
PL        51.3 44.9 47.4 48.3 49.1 48.8 48.6 47.9
SI             : 48.2 47.9 48.1 48.2 47.7 47.6 47.2
SK        54.1 59.9 51.5 50.9 39.2 38.5 39.9 38.8
SE        67.7 57.4 57.0 58.4 58.7 57.2 57.0 56.6
UK        44.9 37.4 40.9 41.7 43.4 43.6 44.0 44.1
EU-25           : 45.8 47.3 47.7 48.5 48.0 47.8 47.6
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.412
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EXTable A.4.14
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–); general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        – 4.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.6
DE (1) – 3.3 1.3 – 2.8 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.8
EL        – 10.2 – 4.2 – 3.6 – 4.2 – 5.2 – 6.0 – 4.5 – 4.4
ES        – 6.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
FR        – 5.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 3.2 – 4.2 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4
IE        – 2.1 4.4 1.0 – 0.3 0.2 1.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
IT        – 7.6 – 0.7 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 3.0 – 3.1 – 3.6 – 4.6
LU        2.5 6.2 6.2 2.3 0.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9
NL        – 4.2 2.2 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 3.3 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.6
AT        – 5.8 – 1.7 0.1 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 2.2 – 1.9
PT        – 5.5 – 2.9 – 4.4 – 2.7 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 4.9 – 4.7
FI        – 3.9 7.1 5.2 4.3 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.3
Euro area (2)  – 5.1 0.1 – 1.8 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.7
CZ        – 13.4 – 3.7 – 5.9 – 6.8 – 11.6 – 3.0 – 4.5 – 4.0
DK        – 2.3 2.5 3.1 1.5 1.0 2.5 2.0 2.0
EE        0.4 – 0.6 0.3 1.4 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.5
CY             : – 2.4 – 2.3 – 4.5 – 6.3 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 1.9
LV        – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.6 – 1.5
LT        – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
HU             : – 2.4 – 3.7 – 8.5 – 6.2 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.1
MT             : – 6.3 – 6.4 – 5.9 – 10.5 – 5.2 – 3.9 – 2.8
PL        – 3.9 – 2.4 – 3.6 – 4.3 – 4.7 – 4.9 – 4.4 – 3.6
SI             : – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1
SK        – 0.9 – 12.3 – 6.0 – 5.7 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 4.0
SE        – 6.9 5.0 2.6 – 0.5 – 0.1 1.2 0.8 0.8
UK        – 5.8 3.8 0.7 – 1.7 – 3.3 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7
EU-25           : 0.8 – 1.2 – 2.3 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.5
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.413
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EXTable A.4.15
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) excluding interest; general government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        4.9 6.9 7.2 6.1 5.7 4.8 4.3 3.6
DE (1) 0.3 4.7 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.2
EL        2.6 4.0 3.7 2.2 0.6 – 0.4 1.0 1.0
ES        – 1.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
FR        – 1.8 1.7 1.6 – 0.2 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.4
IE        3.3 6.4 2.4 1.0 1.5 2.5 0.5 0.5
IT        3.9 5.8 3.6 3.2 2.4 2.0 1.3 0.4
LU        3.0 6.5 6.5 2.6 0.8 – 0.9 – 1.3 – 1.7
NL        1.7 6.0 3.3 1.1 – 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.2
AT        – 1.9 2.1 3.8 3.1 2.0 1.7 0.9 1.1
PT        0.8 0.4 – 1.2 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 – 2.0 – 1.6
FI        0.1 10.0 7.9 6.5 4.5 4.0 3.3 3.1
Euro area (2)  0.5 4.2 2.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
CZ        – 12.3 – 2.8 – 4.8 – 5.2 – 10.3 – 1.8 – 3.2 – 2.6
DK        3.7 6.2 6.3 4.5 3.8 5.1 4.3 4.2
EE        0.6 – 0.2 0.5 1.7 3.3 2.0 1.1 0.7
CY             : 1.1 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.8 – 0.9 0.4 1.4
LV        – 0.8 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 0.7 0.0 – 0.8 – 0.7
LT        – 1.5 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.1
HU             : 3.2 1.0 – 4.4 – 2.0 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.7
MT             : – 2.5 – 2.8 – 1.9 – 6.7 – 1.1 0.5 1.5
PL        2.0 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.3
SI             : – 1.0 – 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.5
SK        1.5 – 8.2 – 2.0 – 2.1 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.7
SE        – 0.3 9.1 5.7 2.8 2.3 3.2 2.9 2.9
UK        – 2.2 6.6 3.1 0.3 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 0.7
EU-25           : 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.414
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EXTable A.4.16
General government consolidated gross debt 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        134.0 109.1 108.0 105.4 100.0 95.6 94.9 91.7
DE (1) 57.0 60.2 59.4 60.9 64.2 66.0 68.0 68.9
EL        108.7 114.0 114.8 112.2 109.3 110.5 110.5 108.9
ES        63.9 61.1 57.8 55.0 51.4 48.9 46.5 44.2
FR        54.6 56.8 57.0 59.0 63.9 65.6 66.2 67.1
IE        82.0 38.3 35.8 32.6 32.0 29.9 29.8 29.6
IT        124.3 111.2 110.7 108.0 106.3 105.8 105.6 106.3
LU        6.7 5.5 7.2 7.5 7.1 7.5 7.8 7.9
NL        77.2 55.9 52.9 52.6 54.3 55.7 57.6 57.9
AT        68.8 66.7 67.1 66.7 65.4 65.2 64.4 64.1
PT        64.3 53.3 55.9 58.5 60.1 61.9 66.2 68.5
FI        57.1 44.6 43.8 42.5 45.3 45.1 44.3 43.7
Euro area (2)  73.8 70.6 69.8 69.7 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.1
CZ             : 18.2 27.2 30.7 38.3 37.4 36.4 37.0
DK        73.2 52.3 47.8 47.2 44.7 42.7 40.5 38.2
EE             : 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.0
CY             : 59.9 61.9 65.2 69.8 71.9 69.1 66.6
LV             : 12.9 14.9 14.1 14.4 14.4 14.0 14.3
LT             : 23.8 22.9 22.4 21.4 19.7 21.2 20.9
HU             : 55.4 52.2 55.5 56.9 57.6 57.8 57.9
MT             : 57.0 62.4 62.7 71.8 75.0 76.4 77.1
PL             : 36.8 36.7 41.2 45.4 43.6 46.8 47.6
SI             : 27.4 28.1 29.5 29.4 29.4 30.2 30.4
SK             : 49.9 48.7 43.3 42.6 43.6 44.2 44.9
SE        73.7 52.8 54.3 52.4 52.0 51.2 50.3 49.2
UK        51.8 42.0 38.8 38.3 39.7 41.6 41.9 42.5
EU-25           : 62.9 62.2 61.7 63.3 63.8 64.1 64.2
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.415
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EXTable A.4.17
Cyclically adjusted total resources of general government                                                                                            
Adjustment based on potential GDP 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        49.0 48.5 49.7 50.6 52.0 50.0 49.5 48.7
DE (1) 46.2 46.6 45.1 45.2 45.5 44.1 44.1 43.8
EL        42.1 48.2 46.4 45.0 43.0 42.9 43.4 43.4
ES (3) 39.1 38.4 38.6 39.5 39.9 40.2 40.4 40.6
FR        50.2 50.5 50.4 49.9 50.6 50.9 51.7 51.3
IE        40.1 35.1 33.6 33.0 34.6 35.8 34.9 34.5
IT        45.7 45.4 45.2 45.3 46.6 45.9 45.2 44.5
LU        49.0 42.6 44.6 46.1 46.1 45.4 45.1 45.0
NL        47.8 46.2 45.8 45.7 46.5 46.3 46.8 48.6
AT        51.2 49.9 51.4 50.8 50.3 49.6 48.2 47.5
PT        40.4 41.5 41.3 43.1 45.5 44.6 43.4 44.0
FI        57.7 54.4 54.0 54.4 53.8 52.8 52.1 51.5
Euro area (2)  46.8 46.6 46.0 46.0 46.7 46.1 46.1 45.8
CZ             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
DK        57.8 55.7 56.7 56.4 57.1 58.1 56.7 55.8
EE             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
CY             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LV             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
HU             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
MT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
PL             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SI             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SK             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SE        62.7 61.7 59.8 58.3 59.5 58.6 57.8 57.3
UK        39.2 40.7 41.2 40.0 40.3 40.5 41.1 41.5
EU-25           :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Adjustment based on trend GDP.
Source: Commission services.416
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EXTable A.4.18
Cyclically adjusted total expenditure of general government
Adjustment based on potential GDP 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        52.8 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.8 49.4 49.2 49.0
DE (1) 49.4 48.3 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 46.9 46.1
EL        51.0 52.0 50.7 49.0 48.0 50.0 48.8 48.7
ES (3) 44.9 40.1 39.7 40.1 39.7 40.5 40.4 40.4
FR        55.1 52.7 52.7 53.6 54.6 54.5 54.5 54.4
IE        41.4 32.4 33.9 34.3 34.4 34.3 35.0 34.4
IT        53.4 48.1 49.1 48.2 49.2 48.4 48.2 48.5
LU        44.5 39.5 39.4 43.6 44.8 45.8 45.7 45.7
NL        51.1 46.9 47.2 48.0 48.5 47.4 47.2 48.6
AT        56.7 52.4 51.4 51.0 51.2 50.7 50.1 49.2
PT        44.9 45.5 46.3 46.0 47.7 46.6 47.3 47.7
FI        58.9 49.7 49.3 49.9 50.6 50.3 50.2 49.7
Euro area (2)  51.4 48.3 48.4 48.6 49.0 48.4 48.1 47.9
CZ             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
DK        59.8 54.5 54.8 55.0 55.1 54.8 54.2 53.5
EE             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
CY             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LV             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
HU             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
MT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
PL             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SI             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SK             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SE        67.2 57.5 56.9 58.0 58.2 56.9 57.0 56.6
UK        44.9 39.8 40.9 41.7 43.3 43.5 44.0 44.1
EU-25           :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Adjustment based on trend GDP.
Source: Commission services.417
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.19
Cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general government                                                                     
Adjustment based on potential GDP 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 definitions (1)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE        – 3.8 – 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2
DE (1) – 3.2 – 1.7 – 3.2 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 2.8 – 2.3
EL        – 9.0 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 4.3 – 5.7 – 7.1 – 5.4 – 5.3
ES (3) – 5.8 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 0.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.2
FR        – 4.9 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 3.6 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.1
IE        – 1.2 2.7 – 0.2 – 1.4 0.2 1.6 – 0.1 0.1
IT        – 7.7 – 2.7 – 3.9 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 4.0
LU        4.6 3.1 5.2 2.5 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6
NL        – 3.3 – 0.6 – 1.4 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.0
AT        – 5.4 – 2.5 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.6
PT        – 4.5 – 4.0 – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 3.9 – 3.7
FI        – 1.2 4.7 4.7 4.5 3.2 2.4 1.9 1.8
Euro area (2)  – 4.6 – 1.8 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 2.1
CZ             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
DK        – 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.4 2.0 3.4 2.5 2.4
EE             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
CY             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LV             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
LT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
HU             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
MT             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
PL             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SI             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SK             :      :      :      :      :      :      :   :
SE        – 4.5 4.2 2.9 0.3 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.7
UK        – 5.6 0.8 0.3 – 1.6 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6
EU-25           :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
(3) Adjustment based on trend GDP.
Source: Commission services.418
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EXTable A.5.1
Gross domestic product at current market prices
(Billion  EUR)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 BE        211.5 247.9 254.2 261.1 269.5 283.2 294.7 307.9
 DE (1) 1 880.0 2 030.0 2 074.0 2 107.0 2 128.0 2 177.0 2 208.0 2 258.0
 EL        89.9 123.2 131.3 141.7 153.5 165.3 175.7 187.1
 ES        446.9 610.5 653.9 698.6 744.8 798.7 852.0 906.5
 FR        1 188.0 1 420.0 1 476.0 1 527.0 1 557.0 1625.0 1 685.0 1 752.0
 IE        50.7 103.1 115.4 128.0 134.8 146.2 157.4 169.7
 IT        839.0 1 167.0 1 219.0 1 261.0 1 301.0 1 351.0 1 398.0 1 453.0
 LU        13.8 21.3 22.0 22.8 24.0 25.6 27.5 29.2
 NL        317.3 402.3 429.3 445.2 454.3 465.3 474.2 487.8
 AT        183.2 210.4 215.6 221.0 226.1 235.1 243.9 252.7
 PT        82.6 115.5 122.5 128.5 130.5 135.0 139.6 145.4
 FI        99.2 130.1 135.5 140.3 143.3 149.7 155.8 162.1
 Euro area (2)  5 389.0 6 560.0 6 826.0 7 059.0 7 243.0 7 532.0 7 784.0 8 082.0
 CZ        42.3 60.4 68.0 78.4 80.1 86.3 98.4 104.1
 DK        137.8 171.6 177.9 183.1 188.0 194.7 202.1 210.0
 EE        2.9 5.9 6.7 7.5 8.0 8.8 9.7 10.6
 CY        7.0 9.9 10.6 11.1 11.7 12.4 13.2 14.1
 LV        3.7 8.4 9.2 9.8 9.9 11.1 11.9 13.3
 LT        4.9 12.3 13.5 14.9 16.3 17.9 19.7 21.5
 HU        34.1 50.7 57.9 68.9 73.2 80.3 90.2 97.5
 MT        2.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6
 PL        103.9 180.6 207.1 202.5 185.2 195.2 233.7 245.5
 SI        15.3 20.6 21.9 23.5 24.6 25.9 27.6 29.5
 SK        14.8 21.9 23.3 25.7 29.0 33.1 37.4 40.0
 SE        189.7 259.9 245.2 256.8 267.3 278.7 293.1 307.2
 UK        867.0 1 560.0 1 599.0 1 660.0 1 591.0 1 706.0 1 753.0 1 838.0
 EU-25      6 829.0 8 947.0 9 292.0 9 629.0 9 756.0 10 213.0 10 606.0 11 048.0
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.419
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EXTable A.5.2
Gross domestic product at 1995 market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 BE        2.4 3.9 0.7 0.9 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.3
 DE (1) 1.7 2.9 0.8 0.1 – 0.1 1.6 0.8 1.6
 EL        2.1 4.5 4.3 3.8 4.7 4.2 2.9 3.1
 ES        2.8 4.4 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7
 FR        1.7 3.8 2.1 1.2 0.5 2.5 2.0 2.2
 IE        9.8 9.9 6.0 6.1 3.7 5.4 4.9 5.1
 IT        2.9 3.0 1.8 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.7
 LU        1.4 9.0 1.5 2.5 2.9 4.2 3.8 4.0
 NL        3.0 3.5 1.4 0.6 – 0.9 1.3 1.0 2.0
 AT        1.9 3.4 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.1
 PT        4.3 3.4 1.7 0.4 – 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.7
 FI        3.4 5.1 1.1 2.2 2.4 3.7 3.3 2.9
 Euro area (2)  2.3 3.5 1.7 0.9 0.6 2.0 1.6 2.1
 CZ        5.9 3.9 2.6 1.5 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.2
 DK        2.8 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.1
 EE        4.5 7.8 6.4 7.2 5.1 6.2 6.0 6.2
 CY        9.9 5.0 4.1 2.1 2.0 3.7 3.9 4.2
 LV        – 0.9 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.5 8.5 7.2 6.9
 LT        3.3 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.7 6.7 6.4 5.9
 HU        1.5 5.2 3.8 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.9 3.8
 MT        6.2 6.4 – 1.7 2.2 – 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
 PL        7.0 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 5.3 4.4 4.5
 SI        4.1 3.9 2.7 3.3 2.5 4.6 3.7 4.0
 SK        5.8 2.0 3.8 4.6 4.5 5.5 4.9 5.2
 SE        4.1 4.3 1.0 2.0 1.5 3.5 3.0 2.8
 UK        2.9 3.9 2.3 1.8 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.8
 EU-25      2.5 3.6 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.4 2.0 2.3
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.420
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EXTable A.5.3
Potential (1) gross domestic product at 1995 market prices 
(Annual percentage change)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 BE        2.2 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2
 DE (2) 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
 EL        2.1 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
 ES        2.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8
 FR        1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
 IE        7.0 8.1 7.7 7.0 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.7
 IT        1.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.4
 LU        4.8 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4
 NL        2.7 2.7 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.9
 AT        2.2 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
 PT        2.6 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6
 FI        1.8 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0
 Euro area (3)  2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0
 CZ             : 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2
 DK        2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0
 EE             : 4.7 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.2
 CY             : 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.1 3.9 3.3 3.4
 LV             : 5.5 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.5 8.1 8.2
 LT             : 3.6 4.4 5.5 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.9
 HU             : 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7
 MT             : 3.7 2.8 0.6 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.9
 PL             : 3.7 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.3 3.6 3.8
 SI             : 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3
 SK             : 2.7 3.7 4.6 4.9 3.9 3.9 4.1
 SE        2.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.7
 UK        2.4 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.8
 EU-25           : 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2
(1) For Spain, the trend GDP rather than potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.421
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EXTable A.5.4
Gap between actual and potential (1) gross domestic product at 1995 market prices 
(% of potential GDP)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 BE        – 0.9 1.9 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.6
 DE (2) – 0.3 1.0 0.7 – 0.2 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 1.0
 EL        – 3.1 – 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 2.4 2.2 2.2
 ES        – 2.1 1.9 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.2
 FR        – 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.7
 IE        – 2.4 5.2 3.6 2.7 0.0 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 2.0
 IT        0.2 2.0 2.1 0.8 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.4
 LU        – 3.2 5.5 1.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 2.0
 NL        – 1.3 3.3 2.1 0.5 – 1.9 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 2.4
 AT        – 1.0 2.2 0.8 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4
 PT        – 2.9 2.5 1.9 0.4 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.8 – 2.7
 FI        – 3.8 3.5 0.8 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4
 Euro area (3)  – 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.3 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.2 – 1.2
 CZ             : – 2.3 – 1.4 – 2.2 – 1.3 – 0.3 0.4 1.4
 DK        – 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3
 EE        – 7.4 – 1.2 – 0.1 1.0 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5
 CY        1.6 1.5 1.9 0.2 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.6 0.2
 LV        – 3.2 – 1.5 0.1 – 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.5 – 0.7
 LT        – 5.3 – 4.5 – 2.8 – 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.7 0.8
 HU        2.2 0.4 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5
 MT        – 2.3 4.7 0.1 1.7 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.2
 PL        – 4.2 0.0 – 2.0 – 3.1 – 1.9 0.1 0.8 1.5
 SI             : 1.0 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.2
 SK             : – 1.8 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 2.2 – 0.6 0.3 1.3
 SE        – 3.6 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.9 – 1.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.1
 UK        – 0.4 1.3 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3
 EU-25           : 1.6 1.1 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.9
(1) For Spain, the trend GDP rather than potential GDP is taken.
(2) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(3) Excluding Luxembourg; from 1991, including former East Germany.
Source: Commission services.422
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